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Between that which is departing and that which is only now arriv-
ing, sleepwalking spirits are materialising. Fantômas, Eduard Raban, 
von Passenov. Perhaps the key to these ciphers might be that which 






















Every reader remembers the sentence beneath the illustration of 
a particularly dastardly deed in an old penny dreadful: “He rang up 
the Yard about an hour ago and said his chambers had been invaded 
by Chinamen.” Reading on we learn that the burglary had been re-
ported using Bell’s “electrical speech machine” by no less than the 
inventor of the aero-torpedo, plans to which had been seized by the 
Chinese. A century on and the aficionado of lowbrow literature will 
already have realised that the book in question is The Insidious Doc-
tor Fu Manchu by the English author Sax Rohmer. The book was 
published in 1913 and was the first in a series spread over more than 
thirty years, with the last published in 1959 (leaving aside various 
posthumous continuations). The main character is the eponymous 
oriental villain who heads a secret organisation of Asians. Fu Man-
chu’s nemesis, Nayland Smith, a colonial police commissioner with 
extraordinary powers of access and arrest, offers us a description of 
just how fiendish is Fu Manchu right at the start of the series, when 
he tells Dr. Petrie, his loyal companion:
“This man, whether a fanatic or a duly appointed agent, is, unquestionably, 
the most malign and formidable personality existing in the known world 
today. He is a linguist who speaks with almost equal facility in any of the 
civilized languages, and in most of the barbaric. He is an adept in all the 
arts and sciences which a great university could teach him. He also is an 
adept in certain obscure arts and sciences which no university of to-day can 
teach. He has the brains of any three men of genius. Petrie, he is a mental 
giant.”
“But, Smith, this is almost incredible! What perverted genius controls this 
awful secret movement?”
“Imagine a person, tall, lean and feline, high-shouldered, with a brow like 
Shakespeare and a face like Satan, a close-shaven skull, and long, mag-
netic eyes of the cat-green. Invest him with all the cruel cunning of an entire 
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Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the resources of 
science past and present, with all the resources, if you will, of a wealthy 
government – which, however, already has denied all knowledge of his ex-
istence. Imagine that awful being, and you have a mental picture of Dr. Fu 
Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate in one man.”1
 
So why do I feel the need to return to what is a pretty bizarre book? 
In fact I was reminded of the novel, which sketches out the radical 
threat faced by the whole of European (Western) civilisation, while 
reading the last published work by Edmund Husserl entitled The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 
based on the lectures he gave in Prague and Vienna entitled “Philos-
ophy and the Crisis of European Humanity”. In other words, I was 
put in mind of a classic of pulp fiction while reading a work that 
takes the state of emergency as its central theme. Though the crisis 
Husserl speaks of is manifest on the surface in the blind objectivism 
of science, on a deeper level it involves a forgetting of the original 
meaning that Western rationality was born both with and into. In-
terestingly, this period also saw the emergence of a new literary gen-
re generally deemed lowbrow or trivial, and in this literature too we 
find what we might call a description of crisis, albeit a crisis refash-
ioned into criminal and other such storylines. In the two years either 
side of Husserl’s lecture, two more novels were published featuring 
Doctor Fu Manchu: The Trail of Fu Manchu and President Fu Man-
chu. The thriller by Eric Ambler The Dark Frontier (1936) also came 
out, the plot of which revolves around the discovery of atomic energy 
being misused in order to create a weapon. The hero, who loses his 
memory and is only subsequently informed of the events that have 
taken place, is Professor Barstow, an eminent physicist and expert 
in atomic energy, who, under the influence of the chance discovery 
of a volume of pulp fiction, is mentally reincarnated as the superhero 
1 Sax Rohmer, The Insidious Dr. Fu Manchu, Methuen, London 1913, ch. 2. 
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Conway Carruthers and decides to feign collaboration with the ar-
mament manufacturers in order to thwart their dastardly plans. But 
do not be confused by the farfetchedness of the plot – Ambler’s book 
is one of the first examples of the political thriller and masterfully 
evokes the atmosphere of living under the threat of atomic death, 
as well as its cultural and political backdrop. And just as Doctor Fu 
Manchu, though of oriental origin, is a master of Western science, 
so science and its soft underbelly form the theme of Ambler’s book, 
as is clear from the conversation Professor Barstow has with a rep-
resentative of the weapon manufacturers:  
 
“The ideals of science are constructive, not destructive,” answered the Pro-
fessor stiffly. “Science in the past has been shamefully exploited. But it has 
learnt to protect itself.”
Simon Groom shook his head. 
“No, Professor, you are wrong. While scientists are men, science cannot 
protect itself. The desire for supremacy which is in the hearts of all men 
prevents it. Even as I talk to you now, events are proving you wrong. The 
first atomic bomb has been made!”2
 
We might also note that the ominous collocation “atom bomb” first 
appears in literature intended for “the widest readership”, namely 
the novel by H.G. Wells The World Set Free (1914). This book not 
only predicts the discovery of atomic energy almost twenty years be-
fore it happened (1933), but also the industrial applications that saw 
nuclear power definitively replace steam in 1953. However, in the 
book the discovery of cheap, easily available energy (nuclear plants 
are not only safe but smaller than traditional plants and can be situ-
ated everywhere) causes the complete collapse of civilisation, grow-
ing unemployment, unrest, and eventually a  devastating war and 
2 Eric Ambler, The Dark Frontier, Fontana Books, London 21967 (1936), ch. 1.
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the dropping of an atom bomb on Berlin. The soldier in the plane 
carrying this new weapon,  
 
sat with his legs spread wide over the long, coffin-shaped box which con-
tained in its compartments the three atomic bombs, the new bombs that 
would continue to explode indefinitely and which no one so far had ever 
seen in action.3
 
During the mid-1920s, H.G. Wells still imagined that a devastating 
world war would be the first stage in the establishment of a new 
system in a world liberated from work in which man is transformed 
into artist. However, after the end of what was the First (bona fide) 
World War and in the period immediately preceding the Second, 
such a dream was scarcely any longer feasible. 
Eight years after Husserl’s  lectures on crisis, Graham Greene, 
whose early novel A Gun For Sale came out in 1936, published the 
next of what he termed his “entertainments”, the thriller The Min-
istry of Fear. The book depicts the atmosphere of a kind of general 
but now unquestionably genuine crisis, firstly by setting the events 
in a  London exposed night after night to German bombing, and 
secondly by virtue of the fact that what had hitherto been deemed 
fiction is now undeniably real. In the following passage, the hero of 
Greene’s novel has a dream in which he speaks with his deceased 
mother and attempts to describe the world in which he is obliged 
to live:  
 
I’m hiding underground, and up above the Germans are methodically 
smashing London to bits all round me. (…) It sounds like a thriller, doesn’t 
it, but the thrillers are like life – more like life than you are, this lawn, your 
sandwiches, that pine. You used to laugh at the books Miss Savage read – 
about spies, and murders, and wild motor-car chases, but, dear, that’s real 
3 H.G. Wells, The World Set Free. A Story of Mankind, MacMillan, London 1914, ch. 2, sec. 3.
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life: it’s what we’ve all made of the world since you died. I’m your little Ar-
thur who wouldn’t hurt a beetle and I’m a murderer too. The world has been 
remade by William Le Queux. (…) Let me lend you the History of Contem-
porary Society. It’s in hundreds of volumes, but most of them are sold in 
cheap editions: Death in Piccadilly, The Ambassador’s Diamonds, The Theft 
of the Naval Papers, Diplomacy, Seven Days’ Leave, The Four Just Men…4
 
The books he refers to are real and identifiable. William Le Queux 
is the author of exciting (albeit interminable) novels in which he 
gives vent to his concern for British politics with a fictional descrip-
tion of the invasion of Britain by the German army. His Invasion of 
1910 came out in 1906. However, in Spies of the Kaiser (1909), Rev-
elations of the Secret Service (1911), and many other semi-fictional, 
pseudo-documentary books he exposed the danger to Britain of Ger-
man spy rings and other forms of international conspiracy. Death in 
Piccadilly is a whodunit from 1936 written by Elliot Bailey, Seven 
Day’s Leave is a film (a romantic comedy) made in 1942, and The 
Four Just Men is Edgar Wallace’s first novel, written in 1905. This 
last is especially noteworthy for its ambivalence: the four just men of 
the title, while murderers of noble origin and method, only liquidate 
those who represent a menace to society and whom the police do not 
have enough proof to prosecute. And finally there is Gregory Bellairs, 
author of detective stories written in the 1930s and 40s, who is pos-
sibly present in Greene’s novel in the guise of Mrs Bellairs, one of 
the conspirators.  
In order to ease out the links between these sensation novels and 
Europe’s crisis, let us remain a moment with the best known of the 
authors referred to, Edgar Wallace, the harbinger of this style in 
many respects. The blurb to the Czech translation of The Four Just 
Men, though referring to detective fiction, captures very accurately 
the emerging subgenre of pulp fiction, when it says of the author:  
4 Graham Greene, The Ministry of Fear, Penguin, Vintage Classics, pp. 95–96.
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Edgar Wallace is an author with the mind of a genius. This novel, which 
displays masterly ingenuity, is a good example of his detection skills. The 
reader’s imagination is refined and exercised by the inexhaustible combina-
tions that pervade the complex web of intrigue. One is unable to resist the 
excitement of being caught up in this detective story. To turn a page of this 
book is to close the doors of the present and to be swept away from every-
day life, to forget everything and to live with Wallace. And a moment spent 
in Wallace’s company is simply priceless.5
 
The “four just men” are actually three (the fourth is hired). The 
novel is the first of a  series. Six books in total feature the same 
protagonists, the last being Again the Three Just Men published in 
1929. In the first, the quartet of conspirators attempts to dissuade 
a British MP from submitting a draft bill on the extradition of for-
eigners who are in danger of being executed by their political op-
ponents upon returning to their home country. They begin by send-
ing warning letters that mysteriously find their way directly to the 
table of their addressee. However, the MP is determined and so the 
subsequent warnings (always announced in advance) are more spec-
tacular: a bomb planted in parliament, a  secret visit to a newspa-
per editor, etc. All of this foments panic in the population at large. 
The perpetrators are invisible and elude capture: there is no saying 
where or when they will turn up next. State officials keeping their 
own private vigil over justice are apoplectic and sense a threat to the 
very foundations of civilisation itself:  
 
“It is monstrous,” said the Colonial Secretary hotly; “it is inconceivable that 
such a state of affairs can last. Why, it strikes at the root of everything, it 
unbalances every adjustment of civilisation.”6
 
5 Edgar Wallace, Čtyři spravedliví (The Four Just Men), transl. Běla Vrbová-Pavlousková, Julius 
Albert, Prague 1940.
6 Edgar Wallace, The Four Just Men, House of Stratus, Cornwall 2001, p. 72 (ch. VIII).
20
The inhabitants of London are horrified by the seeming ubiquity 
and omnipotence of these just men (not even the police can save the 
life of the MP, who is electrocuted by his telephone), and the atmo-
sphere of the city on the day of reckoning is reminiscent of a state 
of war or emergency.  
 
And within an hour there was witnessed in London a scene that has no par-
allel in the history of the Metropolis. From every district there came a small 
army of policemen. They arrived by train, by tramway car, by motorbus, by 
every vehicle and method of traction that could be requisitioned or seized. 
They streamed from the stations, they poured through the thoroughfares, till 
London stood aghast at the realisation of the strength of her civic defences.7
 
Edgar Wallace undoubtedly created the prototype, though his was 
a very free model allowing for considerable variability within a gen-
re it is difficult to put a name to. Perhaps this is why we speak of 
a  “sensation” novel (even though the term was originally applied 
to Victorian authors), since the category of detective story would 
be too narrow. The sensation novel sometimes contains the seeds 
of a political thriller, and in this respect Eric Ambler’s precursor 
was H.C. McNeile (Sapper) in books featuring Bulldog Drummond 
(the first of which, Bulldog Drummond: The Adventures of a Demo-
bilised Officer Who Found Peace Dull, was published in 1920), in 
which a faint echo could be heard of J. Conrad’s The Secret Agent, 
published in 1907. All of these books are about more than merely un-
tangling a criminal plot. The sensationalism of their narratives was 
not driven simply by an attempt to attract the most readers, nor did 
it reflect the gradual commodification of literature, a phenomenon 
very visible in the serialised novels and booklets sold in railway sta-
tion kiosks referred to by Walter Benjamin8. These books also act as 
7 Ibid., p. 98 (ch. X).
8 Walter Benjamin, “Kriminalromane, auf Reisen”, Gesammelte Werke 4.1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann – 
Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1972–1989.
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a mirror, however distorted, held up to that which is already here in 
that it is in the process of arriving. In their own way, sensation nov-
els model an uncertain and indefinable, yet still real fear – the heart 
of darkness at the very core of civilisation, something akin to crisis. 
This disquiet, this testing of the boundaries of the classical who-
dunit (it was during this time that authors such as Agatha Christie, 
S.S. Van Dine, Freeman W. Crofts, Dorothy Sayers, et al. published 
their first books), is perhaps best illustrated in the books of H.C. 
McNeile, who wrote under the pseudonym Sapper, since as a serv-
ing officer in the British Army he was not permitted to publish un-
der his own name. His hero, Hugh Drummond, is a man of action, 
though it is not only his superb physical condition that distinguishes 
him from his companions, but also his natural intelligence. His ad-
versary in the first books is Carl Petersen, a criminal mastermind 
who operates under various different guises but whose modus ope-
randi involves contract work for plutocrats with the aid of puppet 
conspirators. The sole aim of these plutocrats is to subvert the exist-
ing order and benefit from the ensuing chaos. In the very first novel 
we encounter a Bolshevik revolutionary who has moved to England, 
where he is bent upon applying his skills:  
 
I know not what this young man has done: I care less. In Russia such trifles 
matter not. He has the appearance of a bourgeois, therefore he must die. 
Did we not kill thousands – aye, tens of thousands of his kin, before we 
obtained the great freedom? Are we not going to do the same in this ac-
cursed country?9
 
In his bruising struggle with the conspirators and their puppet mas-
ters, Hugh Drummond is reluctantly reminded of his wartime ex-
periences:  
 
9 H.C. McNeile (Sapper), Bulldog Drummond, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1920, VII, ch. I.
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He felt singularly wide-awake, and, after a while, he gave up attempting to 
go to sleep. The new development which had come to light that evening 
was uppermost in his thoughts; and, as he lay there, covered only with 
a sheet, for the night was hot, the whole vile scheme unfolded itself before 
his imagination. The American was right in his main idea – of that he had 
no doubt; and in his mind’s eye he saw the great crowds of idle foolish men 
led by a few hot-headed visionaries and paid blackguards to their so-called 
Utopia. Starvation, misery, ruin, utter and complete, lurked in his mental 
picture; spectres disguised as great ideals, but griming sardonically under 
their masks. And once again he seemed to hear the toc-toc of machine 
guns, as he had heard them night after night during the years gone by. But 
this time they were mounted on the pavement of the towns of England and 
the swish of the bullets, which had swept like swarms of cockchafers over 
No Man’s Land, now whistled down the streets between rows of squalid 
houses...10
 
Anarchists continue to undermine civilisation in Sapper’s next nov-
el, The Black Gang (1922), in which, with the aid of corrupt politi-
cians, they try to hammer “another nail in the coffin of Capital. And, 
by heaven! A big one”11 and infect England with Bolshevism. In the 
third in the series (The Third Round, 1923), Carl Petersen muses 
on the workings of the world and says to his partner in crime and 
mistress:  
 
Take Drakshoff: that man controls three of the principal Governments of Eu-
rope. The general public don’t know it; the Governments themselves won’t 
admit it: but it’s true for all that.12
10 Ibid., IX, ch. II.
11 Sapper (H.C. McNeile), The Black Gang, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1922, ch. 5.
12 Sapper (H.C. McNeile), The Third Round, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1923, ch. 1.
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“Only from its extremes can reality be revealed,” wrote Siegfried 
Kracauer in 1929 at the start of his study The Salaried Masses.13 
However, the same could be said of the relationship between the 
high and the low, the dominant and the marginalised, and, as the 
philosophical treatise The Detective Novel14 by the same author 
shows, the relationship between the sensation novel and serious 
reflections upon the phenomenon of crisis. Philosophers have dis-
played but a sporadic interest in lowbrow literature. However, along 
with Walter Benjamin, who alludes to the novels of Gaston Leroux, 
Frank Heller and Sven Elvestad (highly popular in his day, though 
whose detective Asbjörn Krag is rather too similar to the master 
of disguise Nick Carter15) and others, Siegfried Kracauer is one of 
the exceptions. He wrote a study of the detective novel in 1922–25, 
though only the chapter “Hotel Hall” was published during his life-
time as part of the collection The Mass Ornament (1963).
In its own way Kracauer’s  treatise also aims to diagnose and 
describe the concept of crisis, and his reading of detective stories 
provided him with the appropriate language, since the detective 
traditionally embodies the modern form of rationality. However, 
Kracauer’s diagnosis is also facilitated by his Kierkegaard-inspired 
ontological differentiation of a  higher and lower realm that cor-
responds approximately to nature and transcendence. Man is the 
13 Siegfried Kracauer, Die Angestellten, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1971 (first published in 1929 
in Frankfurter Zeitung).
14 Siegfried Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman. Ein philosophischer Traktat. Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt  a. M. 1979. There is useful material to be found on Siegfried Kracauer in Gertrud Koch, Kra-
cauer. Zur Einführung. Junius Verlag, Hamburg 1996; Frank Grunert, Dorothee Kimmlich (eds.), 
Denken durch die Dinge. Siegfried Kracauer im Kontext. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, Paderborn 2009; 
Nia Perivolaropoulou, Philippe Despoix (eds.), Culture de masse et modernité. Siegfried Kracauer 
sociologue, critique, écrivain. Ed. de la Maison des Sciences de l’homme, Paris 2001. 
15 I am also acquainted with Elvestad’s work from Czech translations, e.g. Ples dobrodruhů, Na-
kladatelství Vendelina Steinhausera in Pilsen 1921, or Stíny dvou mužů, Obelisk, Prague 1925. 
Motrose was translated into Czech by Milena Jesenská (Borový, Prague 1928).
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interbeing (Zwischenwesen), because humanity is determined both 
naturally and by its relationship to annunciation and redemption. 
The locus of the detective novel is (human) reality, a  reality that 
is in crisis because it has lost its relationship to the higher realm, 
even though it is only this relationship that grants the real any 
meaning: without this relationship, reality is de-realised. We are 
afforded a  glimpse of this situation by lowbrow literature, which 
acts as a surface upon which phenomena are recorded (like a photo-
graphic negative) without being interpreted and without that which 
is recorded being deprived of its specificity. In this way, lowbrow 
literature makes phenomena accessible to diagnostic tools, which 
are capable, as Benjamin says, of returning the world of the dream 
to the world of wakefulness, transforming the detective story into 
Denkbild or thought image. This is a crucial concept for Kracauer, 
by which he defines himself in opposition to the Neue Sachlichkeit 
(New Objectivity) movement and the popularity of reportage that 
describes reality instead of searching for traces of its design flaws. 
An illustrative example of this is Kracauer’s harsh criticism of the 
famous “film symphony” Berlin by Ruttmann. Kracauer observes 
that the film aims to encapsulate the metropolis by presenting a se-
ries of microscopic individual traits. However, instead of interrogat-
ing these traits 
in a way that would betray a true understanding of its social, economic and 
political structure (...) it leaves the thousands of details unconnected, one 
next to the other. There is nothing to see in this symphony, because it has 
not exposed a single meaningful relationship.16
The film fails to reveal the connections offered to our gaze by the 
Denkbild, the image of a thought (a thought in the form of an im-
age, a thought-image). 
16 Siegfried Kracauer,“Film 1928“, in: Ornament der Masse, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1977. The 
Mass Ornament, transl. T. Y. Levin, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2005.
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The Denkbild is illustrative reflection and reflected illustration in one. It 
combines (...) both methods of cognition. Shaping (Gestaltung) is perme-
ated by theory, theory is absorbed by shaping. Cognition and experience, 
reflection and opinion, content and form, or however else this antinomy is 
referred to, permeate each other. And as they reach their limits, material 
reality is suddently transformed into significant image.17
 
The origin of this new instrument of thinking is to be found in the 
“Erkenntniskritische Vorrede” (Epistemo-Critical Prologue) pre-
ceding Benjamin’s essay on tragic drama and in his theory of ideas 
as constellations (ideas are to phenomena as constellations are to 
stars). The constellation is the tissue of an idea, which is objective 
in the sense that its parts are determined by concrete phenomena 
and its organisation expresses the internal logic implied in and dis-
tilled from reality. The concept was adopted in the 1930s by Theodor 
W. Adorno, who formulated more generally the meaning and objec-
tive of thinking, which now aims to grasp reality by means of the 
construction of thought-images instead of concepts. Adorno’s inter-
pretation is perhaps the more comprehensible, albeit at the ex-
pense of simplifying somewhat the original version propounded by 
Benjamin. For instance, in “The Actuality of Philosophy” he writes: 
 
Philosophy distinguishes itself from science not by a higher level of general-
ity, as the banal view still today assumes, nor through the abstraction of its 
categories nor through the nature of its materials. The central difference lies 
far more in that the separate sciences (Einzelwissenschaften) accept their 
findings (Befunde), at least their final and deepest findings, as indestruc-
tible and static, whereas philosophy perceives the first findings which it 
17 Helmut Stalder, “Das anschmiegende Denken”, in: Grunert –Kimmlich (eds.), Denken durch 
die Dinge, p. 70; trans. here by Phil Jones. Regarding the term “Denkbild” see Gerhard Richter, 
Thought-Images: Frankfurt School Writers‘ Reflections from Damaged Life, Stanford UP, Stanford 
2007.
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alights upon as a sign that needs unriddling. Plainly put: the idea of science 
is research; that of philosophy is interpretation (Deutung).
In this remains the great, perhaps the everlasting paradox: philosophy per-
sistently and with the claim of truth, must proceed interpretively without 
ever possessing a  sure key to interpretation; nothing more is given to it 
than fleeting, disappearing traces within the riddle figures of that which ex-
ists and their astonishing entwinings. The history of philosophy is nothing 
other than the history of such entwinings. Thus it reaches so few “results”. 
It must always begin anew and therefore cannot do without the least thread 
which earlier times have spun, and through which the lineature is perhaps 
completed which could transform the ciphers into a text.
(...)
…the function of riddle-solving is to light up the riddle-Gestalt like lightning 
and to negate it, not to persist behind the riddle and imitate it. Authentic 
philosophic interpretation does not meet up with a fixed meaning which 
already lies behind the question, but lights it up suddenly and momentarily, 
and consumes it at the same time. Just as riddle-solving is constituted, in 
that the singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought into 
various groupings long enough for them to close together in a figure out of 
which the solution springs forth, while the question disappears – so phi-
losophy has to bring its elements, which it receives from the sciences, into 
changing constellations, or, to say it with less astrological and scientifically 
more current expression, into changing trial combinations, until they fall 
into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the same time the 
question disappears. The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed 
and manifest intentions of reality, but to interpret unintentional reality, in 
that, by the power of constructing figures, or images, out of the isolated 
elements of reality, it negates questions, the exact articulation of which is 
the task of science.18
 
18 Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 
1986, here GS I, pp. 334–345. English translation from“The Actuality of Philosophy”, Telos, vol. 
31, 1977, pp. 126–127. 
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To simplify somewhat: what appears at first sight to be a continuous 
and straightforward social reality (“existing relations” in Adorno’s 
words) must be deconstructed by means of the isolation of its ele-
ments (including those seemingly not worthy of attention) and the 
rearrangement thereof in order to discover in them something like 
an “image” rendering visible the contingency of a  seemingly un-
shakeable reality – to expose its crisis. In adopting this cognitive 
tool, Adorno especially was motivated by Marx (the relationship 
between the forces and relations of production must be decoded in 
the form of goods), as explicitly evinced by aphorism 124 of Minima 
Moralia. The same aphorism also makes it clear that he was inspired 
by the “picture-puzzle” (Vexierbild), which was the privileged form 
of Benjamin’s One-Way Street (1928). Analysing Antonín Dvořák’s 
Humoresque in the essay Quasi una fantasia, Adorno writes: 
At one time there used to be a craze for a certain type of puzzle in the en-
tertainment and theatre section of the daily newspapers. They were called 
picture-puzzles. A caption might read: Can you find the burglar? The pic-
ture showed an empty street without any people. A long ladder is leaning 
against a house, but it too has no one on it. Dark spots of rain are shown 
falling on the white houses. There is no sign of a burglar. The trick was to 
turn the page this way and that, sideways or upside down, until you discov-
ered that the lines signifying rain, when taken with a bulky chimney, formed 
a grimacing gaze which could be arrested.19
However, Siegfried Kracauer had already carried out similar opera-
tions involving these thought images (Denkbilder) in The Detective 
Novel. The detective brings to light deracinated reason, the police-
man the ineffectually functioning machine of legality, blindly obey-
ing the law and detached from any relationship with justice. Nev-
ertheless, the figure of the detective is remarkable. It is a cipher of 
19 Adorno, GS 16, p. 28.
28
modern society inasmuch as it elucidates that liminal state that is 
human destiny and which now takes on a very special form. Like the 
priest before him, the detective is an intermediary. Like the priest, 
he too relates to the mysterious and secret, he mediates between the 
covert and the communal. However, while the priest invoked faith 
(i.e. mediated the relationship to that “higher” realm), the detective 
relies solely on the ratio appropriate to this world and in this way 
represents modern rationality, reason, which is no longer aware of 
its limitations and therefore also lacks a  sense of morality. In the 
picture puzzle of the detective novel we can see that rationally fabri-
cated reality, though at first sight cohesive and compact, is in actu-
ally fact incomplete and truncated. 
Around the same time, Walter Benjamin in his early texts (e.g. 
“On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy” of 1918 et al.) pon-
ders the possibility of expanding Kant’s concept of experience and 
arrives at the concept of speculative experience. For Kant there is no 
room in experience for the idea of reason. Benjamin wants to show 
that in the final experience (subordinate to space-time, hence final) 
the absolute may also be manifest, but – since this is the experience 
of a finite being – only indirectly, distortedly, in a kind of broken way. 
Accordingly, this experience must be deciphered. 
It is likely that Siegfried Kracauer had this in mind when he writes 
in The Detective Novel: “clouded sense becomes lost in the labyrinth 
of distorted events whose distortion it no longer perceives.”20 The 
labyrinth in which modern man loses himself is reality de-realised 
by rationality, which means that this is not only the realm of finality 
(because finality in itself is related to a higher realm, for instance 
to a transcendental idea of justice), but the realm of finality shat-
tered by mechanical rationality. The policeman mechanically obeys 
the law without relating to the meaning to which it refers. The ratio 
is unmasked as a mere substitute: it is not capable of guaranteeing 
20 Kracauer, The Mass Ornament, p. 173.
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the meaning of that which it investigates, the events that it reveals, 
the reality that it explains.  
It would be no exaggeration to claim that Kracauer, too, in his 
own way diagnoses crisis: a crisis of meaning, but also the meaning 
of crisis and meaning as crisis. However, this can only be corroborat-
ed more convincingly if we examine in more detail his Denkbilder. 
That “hotel lobby”, for instance. And possibly it will become clearer 
why Kracauer focused on so-called “trivial” literature, something he 
hints at near the start of the chapter on the detective novel, when 
he writes: 
Just as the detective discovers the secret that people have concealed, the 
detective novel discloses in the aesthetic medium the secret of a society 
bereft of reality, as well as the secret of its insubstantial marionettes. The 
composition of the detective novel transforms an ungraspable life into 
a translatable analogue of actual reality.21
The hotel lobby, which is a venue that puts in frequent appearances 
in the classical detective novel, can be read as the “mirror image 
of God’s house”. Man visits here as a guest, but unlike the house 
of God, which is dedicated to the service of the one whom people 
wish to encounter, the “hotel lobby accommodates all who go there 
to meet no one”. People are scattered around the lobby and receive 
their hosts incognito and without question; this is why the hotel 
lobby does not unite but simply emphasises their dispersal: the com-
munity in the hotel lobby is without meaning. Though it is not a quo-
tidian space (man is not at home, he is a guest), in the hotel lobby 
man finds himself – albeit outside the everyday – vis à vis rien: the 
hotel lobby creates a gratuitous distance from the everyday.  
21 Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman, p. 51.
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In tasteful lounge chairs a civilisation intent on rationalisation comes to an 
end, whereas the decorations of the church pews are born from the tension 
that accords them a revelatory meaning.22
 
If, in the pure realm of Man as understood to include that which 
transcends it, equality is given by the relationship of the last things 
before the last (I am paraphrasing the title of Kracauer’s last, un-
finished book Geschichte – Vor den letzten Dingen, which was first 
published in English in 1969 as History – The Last Things Before the 
Last and in German translation as late as in 1971), in the hotel lobby 
equality is based on the “relation to nothingness”, i.e. an equality 
that means emptying out within the framework of rational socialisa-
tion.  
Here, the visitors suspend the undetermined special being, which, in the 
house of God, gives way to that invisible equality of beings standing before 
God (out of which it both renews and determines itself) by devolving into 
tuxedos.23
Tranquillity reigns in the hotel lobby, a solemn stillness holds court 
“that is the pride of all large hotels”, as Thomas Mann wrote in his 
Death in Venice. However, the “contentless solemnity” of this quiet 
in the hotel lobby is a 
silence that abstracts from the differentiating word and compels one down-
ward into the equality of the encounter with the nothing, an equality that 
a voice resounding through space would disturb. (...) Remnants of individu-
als slip into the nirvana of relaxation, faces disappear behind newspapers, 
and the artificial continuous light illuminates nothing but mannequins.24




The hotel lobby is a cipher, the key to which is the house of God, 
but a hotel lobby of the kind that appears in detective novels. The 
ciphers are not to be found in the depth of (high) art, but take shape 
on the surface, in trivial, i.e. superficial literature. Kracauer discov-
ered Oberfläche (the surface) as text, and it is for this reason that 
his best known essay “The Mass Ornament” explains wherein re-
sides the importance of the surface in a modern age permeated by 
rationalism. At the start of the essay there are dancers produced 
by the entertainment industry, then dance revues, and finally mass 
gymnastics in stadiums reported on by weekly film magazines: on 
the screen we can see “ornaments (...) composed of thousands of 
bodies, sexless bodies in bathing suits. The regularity of their pat-
terns is cheered by the masses, themselves arranged by the stands in 
tier upon ordered tier.”25 
It is these patterns, these ornaments and monograms, that could 
be termed a “cipher” or Denkbild, carried by the very “mass” that 
participated in the creation of these ornaments as material, because 
people are merely the building blocks of ornament, fragments of 
some image. The ornament does not grow from within them or 
within the community, but “appears despite them”. In this sense 
it creates something that can be made legible. “Creates” – in many 
senses of the word. The cipher can be read: the ornament is rational, 
it consists of the geometrical degrees and circles of Euclidian geom-
etry, of the waves and spirals of physics, it is laid out in accordance 
with the rational principles of the organisation of labour, it is the 
aesthetic reflex of the rationality of production. But it is a cipher, 
which is why Kracauer writes:  
No matter how low one gauges the value of the mass ornament, its degree 
of reality is still higher than that of artistic productions which cultivate out-
25 Ibid., p. 76.
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dated noble sentiments in obsolete forms – even if it means nothing more 
than that.26
The ornament qua cipher is ambiguous: by virtue of its abstractness 
it makes reference to rationality (whose abstractness sets it apart 
from empiricism). However, that which is beyond the reach of the 
empirical, which is lost in abstraction, is nothing concrete in the vul-
gar sense of the word, for we can say that abstraction is simply a dis-
torted form of universality that belongs to transcendence – without 
abstraction it would be impossible to relate not to the law, but to 
the idea of justice. However, just to be clear, I would add that Kra-
cauer’s topology in The Detective Novel is somewhat more complex: 
 
If an existential tension is to be manifested, the law cannot be the last 
frontier. Instead, joint being within the sphere of sanctioned forms must 
retain its connection with the mystery over fixed forms. Since most people 
remain in a space surrounded by the law, from a sociological point of view 
attempting this connection is a matter for the individual. This connection 
takes place in a zone in which the power of the law does not apply without 
breakage, in the zone of that which contradicts the law and is above it, 
a zone that conceals mystery and danger within itself. Inasmuch as the law 
determines the true centre, it must turn away that which contradicts the 
law in the same way as it itself is impeded by what is above the law. Upper 
and lower powers outside the law are connected in such a way that the 
thread runs through the law. The human intermediate therefore demands 
that the whole life of existential community is played out in two spaces: in 
the space in which the law exerts control, and in the space in which the law 
is recognised as conditional.27
26 Ibid. p. 79.
27 Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman, p. 15 (trans. here by Phil Jones).
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According to Kracauer, meaning resides precisely in the traces of 
the non-contingent present in the contingent. As soon as one is torn 
from the other, reality is meaningless. 
Returning to the diagnostics of crisis, we observe certain similari-
ties with Husserl. Here and there its source is rationality that has 
either forgotten its relationship with the founding idea (Husserl) or 
with the realm of the non-contingent (Kracauer). However, Kracauer, 
more expressively than Husserl, considers “objectivism” an impor-
tant symptom of crisis, especially if it is manifest in a mechanisation 
pervading not only science but the level of the lived world. Several 
chapters are devoted to this idea of Kracauer’s extensive study on 
the hitherto unexplored “tribe” of employees,28 in which he exam-
ines the Taylorization of administration in large corporations. 
More important (and this applies to both Kracauer and Husserl) is 
the relationship of “meaning” and history, even if in Kracauer’s case 
this relationship is gradually developed, especially in his last, incom-
plete work on history from his exile in America.29 While for Husserl 
the crisis is situated on the boundary between forgetting and recol-
lecting (it is this irresolution that is the impulse for Besinnung in 
the sense of the clarification of meaning that is somehow here but 
obscured by scientific achievements), Kracauer, especially in his es-
say on photography devoted to the mechanism of memory and recol-
lection, speaks of crisis as a “go-for-broke game of history”.30 How-
ever, unlike Husserl he does not look for a clear therapy (which for 
Husserl is phenomenology), but rather for an approach appropriate 
to the situation that appears as crisis. He formulates this approach 
(present in the title itself) in the essay Die Wartenden of 1922.31 
28 Kracauer, Die Angestellten. 
29 Siegfried Kracauer, Geschichte – Vor den letzten Dingen. In: Siegfried Kracauer Werke 4, ed. 
Ingrid Belke, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2009. Original ed.: Siegfried Kracauer, The Last Things 
Before the Last. Completed after the death of the Author by Paul Oskar Kristeller. Marcus Wiener 
Publishers, Princeton 1995 (1. ed. Oxford University Press 1966).
30 Kracauer, The Mass Ornament, p. 61.
31 Kracauer, “Those Who Wait”, in: The Mass Ornament.
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Crisis is defined here as “metaphysical suffering from a lack of some 
higher meaning in the world” and as residing in an empty space, 
which is perceived as exile and isolation. This can then lead to ex-
treme relativism (there exists no binding horizon of values or ideas), 
or even to horror vacui. However, this unfortunate state of affairs has 
a positive aspect: waiting. Waiting is “hesitant openness”, zögerndes 
Geöffnetsein. This does not entail focusing on the last things, but 
a  receptiveness to what cannot be predicted and what is unen-
forceable. In this respect the last sentences of the essay are crucial: 
Must it be added that getting oneself ready is only a preparation for that 
which cannot be obtained by force, a preparation for transformation and for 
giving oneself over to it? Exactly when this transformation will come to pass 
and whether or not it will happen at all is not at issue here, and at any rate 
should not worry those who are exerting themselves.32
Kracauer returns from the opposite pole, in a polemic with the spec-
tre of universal history, to the restrained openness displayed by those 
who wait from the other side in his last book devoted to “the last 
things before the last”. He rejects the idea of the chronological, ho-
mogenous, linear time accepted without question by historiography, 
and on the contrary seeks to understand it as a  tissue of various 
shapes or forms in a synchronous cross-section, i.e. he foregrounds 
the discovery (inspired by Kubler, the theoretician of ancient art) 
that contemporary events are in fact mostly asynchronous if they 
belong to different time series or sequences whose character is al-
ways specific (a  claim he again corroborates with the example of 
human memory). From this perspective space-time is the meeting 
place where unexpected encounters take place between different se-
ries of events – he uses the image of a railway station waiting room 
(not a million miles from a hotel lobby). But for this very reason 
32 Ibid., p. 120. Cited in Gertrued Koch, Siegried Kracauer: An Introduction, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey 2000, p. 117. 
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historical reality is like that which has no end, something like Vor-
raum, a  lobby or waiting room. And this calls for a different way 
of thinking (Vorraum-Denken und -Verhalten) – to remain on this 
earth and think through concrete things. If the subject of philosophy 
is to be the “ultimate truths” formulated in complete generality and 
with a claim to objectivity, and if it is so incontestable that, as such, 
philosophy has nothing to say of relevance about things pertaining 
to the lifeworld (Kracauer deliberately uses Husserl’s term Lebens-
welt), then the solution to this dispute can only be the “complemen-
tarity principle”, i.e. not restricting ourselves to top down thinking, 
but thinking simultaneously in the opposite direction. Only this cor-
responds to that human “position in the middle” referred to in the 
book on the detective novel and which Kracauer now brings into 
convergence with the lifeworld of phenomenology in which, as he 
says, man does not deal with the last things but instead with the 
penultimate things as though they were the last (an idea captured 
more faithfully in the English rather than the German title of the 
book on history and historiography). If history is without end, it 
is deprived even of the aesthetic rescue of the past, the project at-
tempted by Marcel Proust. And so history, like the present, must 
be viewed through the eyes of the exile, the extreme form of which 
in Kracauer’s  last book is Ahasver, the Wandering Jew. But then 
one thing is related to the other: he who waits is he who accepts his 
extra-territoriality as the basic human condition. 
The immense importance of this shift in accent is not always ob-
vious. In The Detective Novel the last reference point is atonement 
in the theological sense as mediated by the Judaic tradition of Mes-
sianism, something Kracauer studied in depth when in 1920–22 he, 
along with Leo Löwenthal and Erich Fromm, visited the Frankfurt 
Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus33, while in the essay on those who wait 
and in his last book the relationship to the last thing is character-
33 In this respect see Enzo Traverso, “Sous le signe de l’exteritorialité. Kracauer et la modernité 
juive”. In: Perivolaropoulou – Despoix (eds.), Culture de masse et modernité.
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ised as “hesitant openness”. However, as Kracauer himself writes in 
a letter, we must turn our back on theology in the interests of theol-
ogy itself. The emphasis is now on the insuperability of the boundary 
separating man from the absolute (which excludes any teleological 
speculation). Those who maintain permanent vigil awaiting the ar-
rival of the Messiah or even want to expedite matters (such as Buber 
and Rosenzweig through the example of their Bible) are, according 
to Kracauer, Kurzschluss-Menschen or short-circuit people. In brief, 
history has no end, and yet it has (can have) meaning now as long as 
the unattainable, since absolute, “idea” is measured at every instant. 
This is a concept the final seal of which is surely the last sentence 
of the final aphorism of Adorno’s Minima Moralia written immedi-
ately after the end of World War II:  
 
The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the 
unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered 
up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehened for 
the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, 
the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.34
 
Kracauer’s  exposure of monograms, that is to say significant pat-
terns, and his reading of the ciphers on the surface of the quotidian 
in his book Ornament der Masse and elsewhere, clearly follows in 
the tradition of Simmelesque sociology. However, for this very rea-
son it is easier to place his microanalyses within the wider context 
of “crisis”, to a more precise understanding of which Georg Simmel 
contributed a  range of important parameters aiding orientation. 
For example, it is impossible that Kracauer’s  theme and position 
of exile or extra-territoriality, which is closely connected with his 
Vorraum-Denken, was not influenced by Simmel’s Essay About the 
34 Minima Moralia. Reflections from the Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, Verso, London and 
New York 2005, p. 247. I shall leave to one side the complex question of who inspired whom in the 
case of W. Benjamin, S. Kracauer and T. W. Adorno.
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Stranger of 1908, and possibly by one of the first descriptions of 
the characteristic features of modernity contained in Simmel’s essay 
The Metropolis and Mental Life of 1903. 
Simmel’s  stranger is neither pilgrim nor traveller, neither out-
sider nor wanderer. He does not arrive today and leave tomorrow. 
On the contrary, the stranger is he who arrives today and remains 
tomorrow. He is still potentially a  pilgrim or traveller (der Wan-
dernde), since although he did not leave, he retains his freedom to 
come and go. He does not completely belong where he is, but lives 
within distance, with the consequence that for him that which is 
close is distant and that which is alien is close. However, this dis-
tance provides a specific objectivity to his perspective made possible 
both by his detachment and his participation, a  perspective that 
“alienates” the given, tradition, and “habituality”.35 
Simmel, however, reveals the other side of this position in respect 
of the relationship the stranger has with the community in which he 
remains and of which he is a part, as is the indigent or, as Simmel states 
explicitly, the “enemy within”.36 If the community suffers internal di-
vision, unrest or revolt, whatever the cause, the party at threat will des-
ignate the stranger as an agitator or fifth columnist in order that it be 
possible to present the crisis as something originating from without. 
His whole life Kracauer was fascinated by photography because it 
offered a picture of an epoch extracted from linear time. This is an 
eloquent example of that exterritoriality that he sought as a criti-
cal observer of his time. Like Benjamin’s  flâneur or Hannah Ar-
endt’s pariah,37 he wanted to move “in the near-vacuum of exter-
ritoriality”, as he wrote in his book on history. 
35 Georg Simmel, "Versuch über den Fremden", in: Individualismus der modernen Zeit. Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M. 2008, p. 269.
36 Ibid., p. 267.
37 During the 1930s, Hannah Arendt studied the tradition of the Jews as pariahs. She wrote 
a book on Rahel Levin-Varnhagen and came across the work of Bernard Lazar. See Enzo Traverso, 
L‘histoire déchirée, Ed. du Cerf, Paris 1997.
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However, exile was soon to become his very real fate. In 1933, the 
year the Weimar Republic came to an end, he was forced to leave 
Germany. While staying in Paris in 1934–37 he wrote a book on 
Jacques Offenbach, an Austrian emigrant in France and his kindred 





This encounter between books that, on the face of it, have noth-
ing in common  – early examples of the thriller genre, Graham 
Greene’s  entertainments, and Husserl’s  The Crisis of European 
Sciences  – raises some questions. Is the word “crisis” in the title 
of Husserl’s work from the mid-1930s simply a somewhat exagger-
ated way of expressing certain misgivings harboured at that time 
regarding the exactness of the exact sciences? Or is it a  reaction 
to the relatively profound transformation science was undergoing, 
a transformation that was driving a revaluation of traditional ideas 
of accuracy and scientism, and even of rationality, i.e. the deduc-
tive construction of an axiomatic system from irrefutably first and 
simplest principles? After all, this idea of rational knowledge is dif-
ficult to sustain in an era of relativity theory, quantum physics and 
intuitionism in mathematics. 
All of these questions play a role in Husserl’s book and Husserl 
himself refers tangentially to them. However, they are not the cen-
tral issue, not the “crisis” he has in mind. In any case, Husserl was 
no doubt aware that revolutions in theoretical spheres rarely create 
panic in the population at large. Firstly, their scope is limited, and 
secondly, if they spread at all it is only after having been transformed 
and mediated by culture. 
All the more remarkable, therefore, is the dramatic tone that 
Husserl adopts in the introductory paragraphs, in which he intro-
duces us to the phenomenon of crisis. The very language of these 
preliminary considerations is striking. Husserl speaks of the crisis of 
the sciences as “an expression of the radical life crisis of European 
humanity” (the title of the first section of the book). What caused 
the crisis is the fact that the “genuine scientific character [of sci-
ence] (...) has become questionable” and that this has given rise to 
a “general lament about the crisis of our culture” etc. In short, the 
“crisis of sciences” is a crisis of rationality. Though Husserl, unlike 
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many of his contemporaries, does not speak of a crisis of culture or 
of “discontent” with culture as symptom of a loss of confidence in 
Enlightenment reason, his criticism of the instrumentalisation of 
science points in this direction, and it would perhaps not be going 
too far to claim that Husserl – albeit unwittingly, since he could not 
have suspected the extent of the future catastrophe (even though 
Benjamin’s  essay on mechanical reproduction was published in 
1936, followed a year later by the opening in Munich of the exhibi-
tion Entartete Kunst) – anticipates the despairing question posed by 
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of the Enlightenment, namely 
“why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is 
sinking into a new kind of barbarism”.38 
It might appear as though Husserl is simply retracing a  line of 
argument that has already been addressed either head-on or implic-
itly by earlier authors in texts ranging from what is often dubbed 
trivial literature (the precursor of the political thriller) to the dis-
tinguished essay by Max Weber entitled “Science as a Vocation” of 
1919, in which Weber notes that “science has become a problem in 
calculation, fabricated in laboratories or statistical filing systems 
just as ‘in a factory’, a calculation involving only the cool intellect 
and not one’s ‘heart and soul’.”39 All this is hinted at, at least with 
hindsight, in The Crisis of European Sciences, where for instance the 
author observes “the appearance of puzzling, insoluble obscurities 
in modern, even mathematical sciences, and in connection with that 
(...) the emergence of a set of world enigmas which were unknown 
to earlier times.”40 It is clear that Husserl is by no means speaking 
38 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in: GS 3, p. 11 (“die Erkenntnis, 
warum die Menschheit, anstatt in einen wahrhaft menschlichen Zustand einzutreten, in eine neue 
Art von Barbarei versinkt.”).
39 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation”. Originally delivered as a speech at Munich University, 
1918. Published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich, p. 5. English translation see http://www.
wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/X/WeberScienceVocation.pdf Accessed January 2019.
40 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, transl. 
with an Introduction by David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, pp. 3 and 5.
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of the special problems of the exact sciences, because that on which 
his “phenomenological philosophy” is now focused is the founding 
of science in subjectivity and therefore the relationship between rea-
son and life. Hence the well known statement that summarises his 
perspective on the phenomenon of crisis: “In our vital need  – so 
we are told – this science has nothing to say to us.”41 In fact all of 
Husserl’s  references to “crisis” have a  particular, very ambiguous 
character. For instance:  
We make our beginning with a change which set in at the turn of the past 
century in the general evaluation of the sciences. It concerns not the sci-
entific character of the sciences but rather what they, or what science in 
general, had meant and could mean for human existence.42
It is clear that the key phrase here is “scientific character”, i.e. 
something along the lines of rationality (characteristic of European 
culture), from which, however, existing rationality in the form of 
the objectivism of the exact sciences has somehow split and whose 
meaning it has forgotten. Yet what is striking is the extent to which 
an uncharacteristically personal tone creeps into these considera-
tions on rationality and science, even though both are in crisis. This 
tone tells us that something of genuine import is at stake. 
Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the 
world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the 
world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences 
recognise as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if 
history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual 
world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form 
and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will 




into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, 
where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of 
illusory progress and bitter disappointment?43
 
The world is in disarray. However, as Husserl tries to demonstrate 
and corroborate throughout the entire book, it is not the world itself, 
the world in which we live like foreign bodies in a foreign body – it is 
not the world’s fault. The problem lies on the side of science, which 
is still science but has lost the meaning that is inseparable from sci-
ence. In its self-forgetfulness it has become engrossed in its objectiv-
ism, and the result is that our world, the world founded by science, 
is in disarray. In crisis. “True science” is for Husserl something that 
relates to European Man, to Western culture, to Europe as a cer-
tain spiritual “achievement”. Here too it is clear that he has in mind 
a philosophical meaning of crisis and that, in the final analysis, crisis 
in its capacity as a crisis of meaning is something that belongs to 
meaning. 
Paradoxically, however, the path to this philosophical concept of 






So how should we formulate the theme of crisis more accurately?
Husserl speaks of “crisis” in a dramatic tone, though this tone 
does not determine the very factual character of his reflections on 
the crisis of European sciences. The book is actually another of his 
introductions to phenomenology. At the same time it represents 
a new approach to the subject, since it includes the dimension of 
a certain historicity (Husserl speaks explicitly of “phenomenological 
history”), which it deems fundamental. Nevertheless, the dramatic 
tone of the introduction alerts us to the wider, let us say “cultural”, 
context, namely the awareness of crisis in the 1920s and 30s that is 
evident in both “high culture”, including philosophy, and in low-
brow literature, specifically in thrillers. A  portend of the decades 
that would follow the first world war is contained, for instance, in 
The Decline of the West by Oswald Spengler, published in 1918, of 
which Ernst Cassirer declared: 
At this time many, if not most of us, had realised that something was rot-
ten in the state of our highly prized Western civilisation. Spengler’s book 
expressed in a sharp and trenchant way this general uneasiness.
It is worth noting that Husserl himself did not share this feeling, 
and in a series of articles for the Japanese magazine Kazio in 1923, 
in an obvious allusion to Spengler, warned against believing in the 
decline of the West. Another work clearly reflecting the trauma of 
the First World War is Freud’s Civilisation and its Discontents. But 
in fact the same is true of Husserl, when he introduces the series of 
articles referred to with the following words:  
Renewal (Erneuerung) is the general call in our miserable presence and 
within the entire sphere of European culture. The war of 1914 that laid 
waste to Europe and since 1918 has simply replaced military enforcement 
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techniques with “subtler” instruments of mental torture and morally de-
praved economic crises, has revealed this culture to be inwardly fake and 
empty.44
In other words, the connection between differently formulated feel-
ings of crisis and Husserl’s book is not as loose as it might appear at 
first glance. Husserl’s crisis of European sciences is a reflection on 
the crisis of scientism, the ideal of science, i.e. it is a reflection on the 
crisis inside the history of European rationality itself. When reading 
the book we must not forget his claim that Europe is a “spiritual 
shape”, that it is identical to this type of rationality, the Western 
ideal of science. From this perspective, pulp fiction differs from 
Husserl’s  concept of crisis inasmuch as it perceives the threat to 
Europe as originating from outside (the “yellow peril”), but agrees 
with Husserl that the external enemy has infiltrated Europe and 
now poses a threat from within (London, the heart of civilisation, 
a corrupt Member of Parliament). And when Graham Greene re-
suscitates the thrillers of the 1920s and 30s, he is saying clearly: 
that which I used to read as fiction has in the meantime become 
our reality. In other words, if we feel so inclined, we can situate 
Husserl’s work on crisis on a loose trajectory that includes on the one 
hand The Dialectic of Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer, 
Benjamin’s work and its predecessors, namely Georg Simmel, Max 
Weber and Carl Schmitt, and on the other hand that which comes 
later, e.g. Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. 
And so we have at least a rough coordinate for our deliberations: 
we are justified in speaking of crisis when a threat moves from out-
side of that which is at threat and reappears inside. The exterior 
enters the interior. This is a strange situation, since the “outside” 
is now “inside”. However, I  think that intuitively this coordinate 
can suffice for the purposes of orientation. At the same time, this 
44 Edmund Husserl, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Husserliana XXVII, ed. T. Nenon and H.R. Sepp, Klu-
wer, Dordrecht 1989, p. 3; trans. here by Phil Jones.
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“definition” is the shortest distance between two points, the points 
in question being Husserl’s work on the crisis of European sciences 
and lowbrow (sensation) literature, since the theme is common to 
both: Europe is threatened with crisis; nay, possessed by crisis. 
×××
As an example of this less serious literature I  have cited what 
might be termed early “political thrillers”: William Le Queux’s In-
vasion, Spies of the Kaiser and Eric Ambler’s  The Dark Frontier, 
Uncommon Danger and others. However, we should not overlook 
John Buchan and his novel The Thirty-Nine Steps (1915), in which 
a group of German spies named Der schwarze Stein sabotages Brit-
ain from within and prepares the ground for invasion. And let us not 
omit the diabolical Doctor Fu Manchu from this company. Here the 
“exterior” has seeped everywhere in the form of a fifth column, the 
Orient in London, the exact sciences powerless against poisonous 
fungi, giant centipedes, thugs, etc. When Doctor Fu Manchu ap-
pears in the very heart of Old London Town, our protagonists feel as 
though they have been transported to “a dungeon in old Baghdad”. 
In the centre of a metropolis they have the sensation of languishing 
“in the middle of a desert”. The situation is similar when gangsters 
from Chicago relocate their activities to London.  
However, no literary figure of the period is more characteristic of 
these themes than Fantômas. This is the exterior par excellence, as 
the very name suggests: a phantasmagoric existence within a Eu-
ropean capital, in this case Paris. As such Fantômas embodies the 
most fundamental quality of the “exterior”. He is unidentifiable in 
several respects. He is elusive to the point of invisible, because it is 
impossible to lay hands upon him – he resides outside the frame-
work of “intelligibility”, not least because he is immeasurable by ob-
jective methods. And his indecipherability is in direct relation to the 
terror that his very existence provokes. Fantômas could be anyone! 
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So let us remain briefly with this famous literary figure created by 
Pierre Souvestre and Marcel Allain (both journalists).45 
In 1905, the Fayard publishing house began publishing a  series 
entitled Le Livre populaire (with a colour dust jacket by Gino Sta-
race). Since the print run of each book was a respectable 100,000 
copies, price-wise Le Livre populaire could compete with a similar 
range recounting the adventures of Jean Laffitte. Between 1905 and 
1914, Fayard published 112 novels, most of which first appeared as 
feuilletons in newspapers: Eugène Sue’s The Mysteries of Paris, Paul 
Féval’s The Mysteries of London, and others. The “mysteries” in par-
ticular continued in the vein of late Romanticism (Dumas, Salvator, 
The Mohicans of Paris), and so we find an aristocrat slumming it 
amongst ordinary folk, or the noble savage in the form of the native 
American. These books are a  kind of social criticism tinged with 
sentimentality. The fact they were released in instalments impacted 
on their form, which included protracted dialogue (often in literary 
argot), convoluted subplots, etc. The genre was responding to the 
public’s  insatiable desire for crime (Arsène Lupin in newspapers 
starting 1905, Laffitte in book form starting 1907), something that 
was true of early cinema too. This demand was also met by a flood 
of American detective novels (e.g. Nick Carter  – a  bargain at 25 
centimes for 32 pages a week). 
In 1910, Fayard negotiated a contract with Souvestre and Allain, 
under the terms of which the writers would supply a complete novel 
of some 400 pages every month for 32 months. This was the gen-
esis of the 32 works totalling some 12,000 pages featuring Fantômas 
(the authors dictated material onto a phonograph). In all around 
five million copies were published. 
45 Regarding Fantômas see, for example, Thomas Brandlmeier, Fantômas. Beiträge zur Panik des 
20.Jahrhunderts, Verbrecher Verlag, Berlin 2007; Robin Walz, Pop Surrealism: Insolent Popular 
Culture in Early Twentieth-Century Paris. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles 
2000; special issue Europe: Revue littéraire Mensuelle (1978).
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Fantômas is a ghostly figure who surfaces in the centre of Paris. 
He is a kind of cipher for the perpetrators of all mysteriously unre-
solved crimes, as indeed he is described by Bonnet in the first book: 
 
we have been distressed by a steady access of criminality, and among the 
assets we shall henceforth have to count a mysterious and most danger-
ous creature, to whom the baffled authorities and public rumour generally 
have for some time now given the name of Fantômas! It is impossible to say 
exactly or to know precisely who Fantômas is. He often assumes the form 
and personality of some definite and even well known individual; sometimes 
he assumes the forms of two human beings at once and the same time – 
Fantômas! His shadow hovers above the strangest mysteries, and his traces 
are found near the most inexplicable crimes, and yet...46
 
A  burglar who cannot be apprehended, a  homicidal maniac, but 
above all the bringer of destruction and chaos, who eludes even the 
indefatigable attempts of detective Juve and the journalist Fandor 
(Charles Rambert, the son of Etienne Rambert, whom Fantômas 
first disguises himself as, only later to murder by sinking the ferry 
on which Rambert is travelling by means of a fiendish machine). 
And there is no better description of the way the exterior materialises 
within the interior than that which begins the series: 
“Fantômas.”
“What did you say?”
“I said: Fantômas.”
“And what does that mean?”
“Nothing... And everything!”
“But what is it?”
“Nobody... And yet, it is somebody!”
46 Pierre Souvestre, Marcel Allain, Fantômas, transl. Cranstoun Metcalfe, Dover Publications, Inc. 
Mineola, New York, pp. 3–4.
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“And what does that somebody do?”
“Spreads terror!”47
This terror is induced by the “elusiveness” of Fantômas: the outside 
that is now inside the inside escapes detection because within the 
“grid” of the interior it is unidentifiable. In the case of the Paris 
of Fantômas this grid comprises science in the form of anthropom-
etry and the most highly advanced methods of police identification 
created by Alphonse Bertillon, one of the fathers of forensic sci-
ence. And lest it escape our attention: this is another example of the 
“mathematisation” of the natural world, the numerical transcrip-
tion of life (population statistics, taxes, birth and death rate curves, 
etc.): bertillonage is the numerical transcription of a person that is 
intended to allow for reliable identification but which in Fantômas’ 
case fails repeatedly with catastrophic consequences. For 
(w)hile Bertillon’s archive posited order for “the growing masses” of crimi-
nals, in which one criminal matched one series of numerical notations on 
one fiche d’identité, Fantômas disrupts the supposed numerical singular-
ity of anthropometric identification by effecting multiple matches. Through 
the representation of a criminal whose identity corresponds to a constantly 
increasing number of fiches d’identité, the series systematically defies the 
singularity of numerical criminal identity, while simultaneously reproducing 
the generalised numbers of probably criminality that comprise the archive 
of la police scientifique.48
 
Fantômas is unidentifiable in all senses of the word. So, for instance, 
in the first book the actor Valgrand, who played Fantômas on stage, 
is executed in his place. Furthermore, Fantômas is capable of ap-
pearing as several persons simultaneously. He possesses a physical 
47 Ibid, p. 1. 
48 Nanette L. Fornabai, “Criminal Factors: Fantômas, Anthropometrics, and the Numerical Fic-
tions of Modern Criminal Identity”, Yale French Studies, No. 108 (Crime Fictions), 2005, pp. 60–73.
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existence only at the moment he becomes someone else. Before 
this he is merely a shadow (in the later works dressed in black with 
a  black cowl en cagoule, as he is portrayed in the films by Feuil-
lade). In Fantômas the Elusive he is both man and woman in a sin-
gle house. In The Red Wasp Juve expresses his doubts: 
“Fandor, the unfathomable murder of Lady Beltham gives rise to a most dis-
quieting thought. You hit the nail on the head when you were thinking out 
loud about the strange events that have taken place recently; there are pos-
sibly two Fantômases and we have only one of them under lock and key.”49
In order to apprehend him, Commissioner Juve himself adopts a dis-
guise in a move guaranteed to cause chaos. In A Royal Prisoner, Juve 
is arrested by his boss in the guise of Fantômas, while The Corpse 
Who Kills includes the following monologue by Juve: 
“For, who is Fantômas – the real Fantômas, among so many probable Fantô-
mas?
“Can you tell me that, Fandor?” continued Juve, who was getting excited at 
last. (...) “I grant you that we have seen, in the course of our chequered ex-
istence, an old gentleman, like Etienne Rambert, a thickset Englishman like 
Gurn, a robust fellow like Loupart, a weak and sickly individual like Chaleck. 
We have identified each one of them, in turn, as Fantômas – and that is all.
“As for seeing Fantômas himself, just as he is, without artificial aid, without 
paint and powder, without a false beard, without a wig, Fantômas as his 
face really is under his hooded mask of black – that we have not yet done. 
It is that fact which makes our hunt for the villain ceaselessly difficult, of-
ten dangerous! (...) Fantômas is always someone, sometimes two persons, 
never himself!”
Juve, once started on this subject, could go on for ever, and Fandor did not 
try to stop him: when the course of conversation led them to talk of Fantô-
49 Ibid., p. 450 (trans. here by Phil Jones).
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mas the two men were as though hypnotised by this mysterious creature, so 
well named, for he was really “Fantômatic,” a spectral entity: the two friends 
could not turn their minds to any other subject.50
By the end of the book the reader is inclined to ask: might not Juve 
actually be Fantômas? Not even Juve seems completely sure. And 
this is the horror of the outside inside: Fantômas can be anyone. 
So have we learned something new about crisis?  
Crisis is a state of indistinguishability. In the examples above the 
existing identification grid fails and there is no other to hand. This is 
a particular state of transition in which the world becomes increas-
ingly unintelligible. Nothing makes clear sense, generally acceptable 
institutions prove less than dependable, routine modes of conduct 
are suspended, in short ambivalence reigns. In Husserlian terms, 
the meaning of science for life has been lost, and life has shown it-
self to be immensurable. Rationality appears to be at odds with itself. 
This is because, as Husserl himself says in his original lecture,51 the 
scientist ceased being the subject of investigation. What he means is 
that the objectivism of modern science, i.e. its clear focus “outward” 
(on an “objective” reality that is supposedly completely independent 
of “subjectivity”), has stopped taking into consideration the fact that 
“no objective science can do justice to the very subjectivity which ac-
complishes sciences,”52 which is why such a science has nothing to 
say regarding those questions that relate most closely to man. Ratio-
nality is at odds with itself inasmuch as the cause of the failure of ra-
tional culture, as Husserl states explicitly, “lies not in the essence of 
rationalism itself”.53 This is because reason has become embroiled in 
50 Pierre Souvestre, Marcel Allain, Fantomas se venge [Le Mort qui tue], Livre de poche, Paris 
1961, pp. 313–14.
51 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological philosophy, trans. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston 1970.
52 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 295.
53 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 299.
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“naturalism and objectivism”. In other words, reason (in the guise 
of science) has forgotten its origin in the primordial element of sub-
jectivity that is the life-world, Lebenswelt, or “natural world”. It has 






At the instant that the relationship between inside and outside 
ceases to involve clearly differentiated moments separated by a clear 
boundary, the situation becomes far more complex. This applies to 
the phenomenon of the crisis and the strange forms of mutual inter-
penetration of inside and outside consequent thereupon (the enemy/
stranger within in the case of sensation novels, and a hesitant open-
ness and unintelligibility in scientific theory in the case of serious 
reflection). This might involve, for instance, becoming entangled in 
the exterior as a consequence of the inexorable infiltration of the 
outside into the inside, which is indeed the situation being played 
out in the sensation novels referred to.
Here, however, we must broaden our field of investigation some-
what. Certain subgenres of the sensation novel (though not the clas-
sical whodunit) continue in a long, somewhat vague tradition of ad-
venture literature. However, at the end of the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth they begin to remould this tradition. The event, in 
the sense of that which arrives suddenly, that which is unforeseeable, 
now finds itself foregrounded. However, if the event thus defined is 
unexpectable, then upon its arrival it is outside the current horizon 
of expectations. This raises a question regarding identification of the 
event qua event and identification of its meaning, a meaning indeci-
pherable from the current horizon of understanding. And all of this 
presupposes the event is even recognisable as an event. There are 
ambiguous clues or hints: something happened – but what actually 
happened? We might summarise our preliminary findings thus: the 
event is the outside inside the inside (the outside-in) (this would be 
crisis as event), though takes the form of something incomprehen-
sible and foreign. This is why the event carries the horizon of its un-
derstanding within it (and is only distinguishable after it happens), 
and this horizon is incommensurate with the horizons of that world 
in which the event takes place. 
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This subgenre of the sensation novel dating back to the turn of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which stages this situation 
most effectively by appropriating certain features of adventure lit-
erature, is a depiction of the “war-to-come” that is closely associated 
with the spy novel.54 It finds its predecessor in Chesney’s The Battle 
of Dorking (1871), and then spreads rapidly, not only in England, 
but in Germany and France. The genre is prodigious and includes 
Wells’ War of the Worlds (1898) and the technical science fiction 
by the same author (The War in the Air, 1908), as well as Le Queux 
referred to above (The Great War in England in 1897, 1888), and 
many others.55 
The very term “adventure” would be hopelessly vague if not (again) 
for Simmel’s essay “Philosophie des Abenteuers” from roughly the 
same time (1910), in which adventure is primarily defined as sever-
ance from the context of life. Its time (or “temporality”), if we may 
express it thus, stands outside the continuity of linear and (seem-
ingly) homogenous time. However, this is an outside that “if only 
by a long and unfamiliar detour, is formally an aspect of the inside” 
and thus often takes the form of a dream). The fact that adventure 
exceeds the given horizon of expectation is shown by the fact of its 
being torn from the context of memory and of being centred on 
meaning “that exists as such”. And this is a very accurate descrip-
54 Regarding the genesis of this type of novel, see I. F. Clarke, “Future-War Fiction: The First Main 
Phase, 1871–1900”. Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 24. No. 3 (1997), pp. 387–412; I. F. CLARKE, 
“Forecast of Warfare in Fiction 1803–1914”, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 
10, No. 1 (1967), pp. 1–25; I. F. CLARKE, Voices Prophecying War: Future Wars 1763–3749. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 21993; LeRoy L. Panek, The Special Branch. The British Spy Novel, 
1890–1980, Bowling Green University Popular Press, Ohio 1981; David A.T. Stafford, “Spies and 
Gentlemen: The Birth of the British Spy Novel. 1893–1914.” Victorian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 
(1981), pp. 489–509; Robert Lance Snyder, The Art of Indirection in British Espionage Fiction. 
A Critical Study of Six Novelists, McFarland, Jefferson, NC 2011.
55 It suffices to cite but a few titles at random: The Seizure of the Channel Tunnel (the reaction 
to the plan to build a tunnel under the English Channel in 1882), The Taking of Dover, The Siege 
of Portsmouth; La guerre franco-allemande de 1878 from 1877, the trilogy La guerre de demain de 
capitaine danrit (Emile Auguste Driant), La fin de la Prusse et le démembrement de l’Allemagne from 
1913; Die Abrechnung mit England by Dr. Karel Eisenhart from 1900, and many others.
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tion of the fact that the event (in respect of its meaning) carries the 
horizon of its understanding within itself. 
 
The adventure is freed of the entanglements and concatenations which are 
characteristic of (other forms of our existence) (it) is according to its in-
trinsic meaning (…) independent of the “before” and “after”; its boundar-
ies are defined regardless of them. We speak of adventure precisely when 
continuity with life is thus disregarded in principle – or rather when there 
is not even any need to disregard it, because we know from the begin-
ning that we have to do with something alien, untouchable, out of the 
ordinary.56
 
Temporality, which is actually the event in the strong sense of the 
word, could be called “adventurous time”: this is the form of time 
staged by sensation novels. Its irruption into linear time – the irrup-
tion of the “exterior” – is a symptom of crisis in that form in which 
it becomes the theme of the sensation novel. 
In this respect, novels about the war to come represent a curious 
paradox: they embody an expectation of the unexpectable. And this 
is precisely why spy thrillers develop in parallel, since the unexpect-
able can be expected only to the extent to which we are able to 
distinguish its traces in the current world. Spies must be unmasked 
as the ominous prelude to what is arriving. Spies are strangers set 
to become the “fifth column” and the “enemy within”. This is how 
the unexpectable introduces itself on the threshold of an impending 
crisis: from within on the threshold of the outside. 
The more complex time structure that characterises texts prophe-
sying war is already powerfully present in the prototype of this liter-
ature, The Battle of Dorking by George T. Chesney from 1871, which 
reflects upon the transformation of power structures in Europe in 
56 Georg Simmel, “Philosophie des Abenteuers”, in: Georg Simmel, Gesamtausgabe, 12, Suhr-
kamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2001.
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the wake of the Franco-Prussian war.57 An old man tells his grand-
sons of the unhappy event that took place half a  century before, 
when Britain, weakened by the need to protect its colonies, pacify 
Ireland and defend Canada, and by an unwarranted confidence in its 
own powers, succumbed within a matter of days to a better prepared 
enemy that routed its maritime fleet, penetrated the weak line of the 
army, and eventually reached London. The grandsons to whom all 
this is being recounted are preparing to emigrate from an England 
brought to its knees. 
Here the war to come is projected into the past and the cause of 
the defeat is adjudged to be a failure to recognise the signs of what 
was to come.  
For us in England it came too late. And yet we had plenty of warnings, if 
we had only made use of them. The danger did not come on us unawares. 
It burst on us suddenly, ‘tis true; but its coming was foreshadowed plainly 
enough to open our eyes, if we had not been wilfully blind.
(...)
After all the bitterest part of our reflection is, that all this misery and de-
cay might have been so easily prevented, and that we brought it about 
ourselves by our own short-sighted recklessness. There, across the narrow 
Straits, was the writing on the wall, but we would not choose to read it. The 
warnings of the few were drowned in the voice of the multitude.58
 
Chesney’s book is in reality characterised by a certain extratempo-
rality. In 1914, it was republished and updated (“as though it were 
written yesterday” as it said in the new preface) and became one of 
many “admonitory essays in preparedness”59 gravely warning of the 
57 See for instance I. F. Clarke, “The Battle of Dorking, 1871–1914”, Victorian Studies, Vol. 8, 
No. 4 (1965), pp. 309–328.
58 George Tomkyns Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, Grant Richards, London 1914, pp. 17 and 94.
59 I. F. Clarke, “Future-War Fiction: The First Main Phase, 1871–1900”, p. 392.
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short-sightedness of domestic policy and the decline of patriotism, 
and laying bare what the authors deemed a crisis of governance. 
Though these projections of future war were based on thorough 
research, consultation with the military authorities, and a  care-
ful consideration of potential strategies, and, in the case of novels 
veering in the direction of science fiction (H.G. Wells and others), 
the invention of new weapons, they failed to break the barrier of 
the unexpectable. For instance, Le Queux in his Invasion (which 
combines fictive newspaper despatches from the battlefield with 
equally fictive official documents, posters, etc.) “quotes” the or-
ders issued by the German General Kronhelm to the civilian popu-
lations in conquered territory. In fact, these are exact replicas of 
proclamations made in 1870. Not even forecasts of the damage 
wreaked are remotely hyperbolic  – communiqués from occupied 
Essex announce the “destruction of one of our best golf courses” 
(chapter 5), and one searches in vain for any omen of Verdun or 
Ypres. When war finally broke out for real, the incommensurabil-
ity of expectations with the unexpectable was shockingly apparent. 
In their own way then, novels about an impending war offer a les-
son in expectations of the unexpectable. They teach us that for our 
own sakes we have to learn how to read the signs, the writing on the 
wall, the auguries and portents, as they arrive. At the same time, 
however, it is clear that these pointers are unrecognisable through 
the identification matrix of the current world and hence ignored. 
The existing horizon of understanding is dis-interpreted. The “later” 
inscribed like a memento in these stories adumbrates the fundamen-
tal attribute of an event, the meaning of which is indecipherable 
within the context it threatens to infiltrate, is exterior to it, and as 
such only makes sense afterwards (after the event). The war-to-come 
genre unwittingly anticipates what Sigmund Freud, when speaking 
of wartime trauma, terms Nachträglichkeit or deferred action, which 
after the Second World War became subject to serious philosophical 
57
reflection intent on unearthing the paradoxes of temporality. The 
starting point of these reflections would often be Husserl’s Lectures 
on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, along 
with his concept of history as outlined in The Crisis of European 
Sciences. 
The paradox resides in the fact that the “later” “then” appears 
avoidable by virtue of being visible. The sensation novel (drawing 
in part on the tradition of the detective story running in parallel) is 
also a lesson in the identification of clues, clues betraying the pres-
ence of the outside inside the inside, and is therefore inextricably 
linked to the espionage novel, since it is the spy, i.e. every foreigner 
getting through to “us”, who is the visible materialisation of the 
warning signs of impending danger. This interpermeation of both 
genres is best documented by two classics: Childers’ The Riddle of 
the Sands (1903) and The Thirty Nine Steps by John Buchan (1915). 
In the first novel, Carruthers, a minor official in the Foreign Of-
fice, sets off with his friend Arthur Davies on a holiday in a yacht 
named Dulcibella in the Baltic Sea. However, Carruthers senses 
something fishy. Before he hooked up with Davies, a strange group 
of Germans had tried to kill his friend by luring him onto a sandbank 
during a previous trip. The two follow the Germans’ tracks (three 
quarters of the novel, which is taken up with a detailed description 
of the difficulties of navigating narrow channels between shoals and 
negotiating the ebbs and flows of tides, might well test the patience 
of readers who are not as enthusiastic about sailing as Childers) and 
end up in an area in which the German navy is secretly preparing 
to invade England from its vulnerable north. They are being aided 
and abetted by a certain Dollmann, a  former officer in the Royal 
Navy, who has stolen secret defence plans in England, travelled to 
Germany, and is involved in plotting war against his own country.
Even from this potted summary it is clear that the novel address-
es (very effectively) one of the stumbling blocks of spy fiction: 
Carruthers and Davies are themselves forced into the position of 
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spies. However, unlike the treacherous Dollmann, they are private 
individuals beholden to no-one, both amateurs, and both sportsmen, 
driven solely by patriotism. This distinction is crucial and explains 
the statement made by a character in William Le Queux’s Secrets of 
the Foreign Office: “I am an Englishman, despite the fact that I am 
a spy.” The employees of the British Secret Service are not spies, but 
secret agents, diplomats delegated with particularly delicate tasks 
and very often amateurs who reluctantly adopt this role for the sake 
of the common weal. This completely negates the equivalence spy = 
foreigner/outside(r). In The Man from Downing Street, Le Queux 
conveys this distinction faultlessly:  
 
“There is, I know, something repugnant to the British mind where the secret 
agent is concerned, but it must be remembered that England’s  enemies 
nowadays keep up a whole army of unscrupulous spies. She is compelled, 
therefore, both in her own interests and in those of European peace, to 
supplement her attachés at the various Embassies by a  corps of secret 
agents.”60
 
The second novel, The Thirty-Nine Steps by John Buchan from 1915, 
is quite explicit in this and other respects. The hero is Richard Han-
nay, who is returning from Rhodesia to England. One night he is 
buttonholed by a  stranger, the American Franklin Scudder, who 
grimly sets out the situation in Europe and the balance of forces 
in the world in a way guaranteed to cause alarm. He makes spe-
cial reference to plots against the Greek prime minister Karolides, 
who is the “only barrier between Europe and Armageddon” and 
is therefore to be assassinated (an event which duly takes place). 
Scudder is found murdered, but manages to leave behind a message 
in code. Richard Hannay, now being pursued by both the police and 
the conspirators, unravels the mystery, deciphers the code, and 
60 William Le Queux, Secrets of the Foreign office, ch. 1.
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uncovers a vast network of German spies called Der Schwarze Stein, 
The Black Stone, fifth columnists preparing for a German invasion. 
These examples too, in their own way, bear clear testimony to the 
crisis, to the cracks in the matrix allowing the meaning of events to 
be discerned, because they are unable to grasp and understand the 
signs of that which is arriving to such an extent that it seems that 
the present has lost its connection with the past. Something has 
happened. But what? In spy fiction these clues are largely material 
and visible, and it is therefore no surprise that back then this litera-
ture provoked an almost hysterical fear of a vague threat posed by 
revolutionaries, anarchists, Fenians, or German waiters and cooks 
in English hotels who might be soldiers in disguise. The world is 
a minefield: “A single stroke of the pen, a hasty or ill-advised action, 
and a war might result which would cost our Empire millions in 
money and millions of valuable lives.”61 
 
61 William Le Queux, Of Royal Blood, 1900. Cf. David A.T. Stafford, “Spies and Gentlemen: The 
Birth of the British Spy Novel. 1893–1914.” Victorian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1981), pp. 489–509.
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Luc Boltanski is a  contemporary French sociologist who has ex-
amined detective novels and political thrillers. His Enigmes et 
complots,62 published almost one century after Kracauer’s Der De-
tektiv-Roman, has a  similar starting point. Boltanski too is inter-
ested in the mysteriousness of mystery and introduces an important 
distinction between the world and reality that serves as a framework 
for an examination of that which we call a fact. This then permits 
us to define precisely the enigmatic character of “mystery”. Accord-
ing to Boltanski (and according to detective stories), every event 
that conspicuously stands out against the background of the com-
monplace or leaves a kind of scratch on the otherwise seamless fab-
ric of reality, no matter how negligible (e.g. sugar in a salt cellar, 
or the label “apples” on a basket containing nuts63), is mysterious. 
In brief, the mystery is an anomalous singularity in sharp contrast 
with how a thing is normally presented or how it behaves. If reality 
is that which is socially constructed and stabilised (by means of all 
kinds of institutions and various modes of schematisation), i.e. that 
to which we refer back as soon as we understand what the things 
we encounter every day are and what they are for, then according to 
Boltanski everything that happens unpredictably should be deemed 
the “world”. The event is nothing more than the “emergence of the 
world in the middle of reality”64 – an enigma within the regime of 
the exception. Reality is always “official” reality and the “world” 
makes itself known across reality. Faith in reality presupposes an 
implicit conviction that it is identical with the world.65 However, 
the intervention of a detective is elicited by events whose occurrence 
62 Luc Boltanski, Enigmes et complots. Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes, Gallimard, Paris 2012.
63 The example given by Boltanski is one of Chesterton’s Father Brown stories.
64 Ibid, p. 22.
65 Ideology is the attempt to dissolve the non-identity of world and reality. Cf. Boltanski, Enigmes, 
p. 86.
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disrupts the fixed tissue of reality, which up till now has appeared 
unblemished.66 The detective’s investigation seeks the origin of this 
flaw and culminates (directly or indirectly) in the discovery that 
something is concealed beneath reality, namely the immensurability 
of the world. Or to put it another way: the adventurous temporality 
of the world arises like a mysterious event from linear time.
The detective novel (and this applies to all types of sensational-
ist literature) is the manifestation of a  situation in which the en-
deavours made by official (state) institutions to assign recognisable 
contours to reality and thus to stabilise it have come to naught. The 
official interpretation of reality as enforced by the police apparat or 
(in spy novels) the secret services is put to the test that mystery rep-
resents. The investigation resolves a particular problem, but with-
out eliminating the implicit enigmaticity of reality itself, since the 
policeman “has a tendency to see evil only where the conduct of the 
accused transgresses an explicitly legal rule. This is why he so often 
makes errors in judgement that are apt to turn into legal errors. The 
detective, for his part, sees evil everywhere.”67 
Boltanski’s book, which “conducts an investigation into investiga-
tions”, aims to show how the work of a sociologist and her position 
vis-à-vis the social is close to the investigation of a detective. The 
same rationale lies behind the choice of basic terminology: reality 
(the stabilised order) versus the world (the dimension of events). 
“Everything that happens emanates from the world, but in a spo-
radic and ontologically uncontrollable fashion, while reality, which 
is based on a selection and an organisation of certain possibilities 
offered by the world at a given moment in time, can constitute an 
arrangement apt to be grasped synthetically by sociologists, histo-
rians and local actors.”68 However, if we come to Boltanski from 
Husserl’s phenomenology and do not wish to forfeit the connections 




and contiguities, we must transform what are primarily sociological 
categories into philosophical concepts. This means inverting their 
positions, since (this is something we shall shortly deal with in more 
detail) for Husserl the world is “the horizon of all horizons”,69 i.e. 
the horizon is that which serves as a basic reference point allowing 
for the identification of the meaning of everything we might pos-
sibly encounter. It is a  (passively self-constituting) product of the 
sedimentation and habituation of experience. In its own way (and 
as Boltanski would have it) it is a  stabilising element.70 However, 
apart from the substitution of one word for another, everything 
that Boltanski says applies unchanged and perfectly describes what 
I have in mind when I speak of the matrix of intelligibility or the 
horizon of understanding into which reality irrupts (as I have used 
the word up till now) in the form of an event. 
At the same time (though again not explicitly), the sensation nov-
el, which recounts the emergence of the outside (of reality) within 
the inside (the world), also thematises their non-identity inasmuch 
as it records a deferral and the consequent incommensurability of 
the horizon of expectations (and understanding) in respect of what 
is arriving. To put it another way: not only the protagonists of a de-
tective novel, but the various heroes of sensationalist plots (agents, 
private detectives, investigators and inventors), are in a  unique 
position vis-à-vis the world that is symmetrical to the position of 
criminals: both parties are aware that the tissue of the world is not 
inviolable. Hence the tradition of the criminal mind of the detec-
tive initiated by Sherlock Holmes and followed immediately (with 
a certain swaggering nonchalance) by J. G. Reeder, the creation of 
Edgar Wallace: 
69 Cf. for example Die Krisis, p. 282 (Husserliana VI). In Husserl’s terminology every “something” 
is always “from the world”.
70 Similarly, in Lacan’s differentiation between the imaginary, symbolic and real something un-
identifiable would suddenly emerge more on the side of the “real”, while the world would be more on 
the side of the symbolic. 
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“A brilliant criminal – it is a terrible thing to confess, but I have a reluctant 
admiration for him. You see, as I have so often explained to you, I am cursed 
with a criminal mind. But he was mad.”71
Mr Reeder shook his head. “A romantic surmise.” He sighed heavily. “You 
have to realize, my dear Gaylor, that I have a criminal mind. I see the worst 
in people and the worst in every human action. It is very tragic.”72
 
Taking this eccentric position as our starting point we may also note 
the rigidity characteristic of schematisations of current horizons of 
expectation when confronting an event that is irreducible to the pre-
sent state of the world, in the form either of unreadiness (for the 
war to come) or an inability to keep step with the unforeseen inter-
ventions of events. When in Wells’s The World Set Free a legal bat-
tle breaks out over the patent to the atomic bomb, the inventor, im-
passively observing what takes place in court, looks with amusement 
at the archaically robed judge with his mad wig, and while taking in 
this absurd theatre in the gloomy building, observes to himself:  
The law is the most dangerous thing in this country. It is hundreds of years 
old. It hasn’t an idea. The oldest of old bottles and this new wine, the 
most explosive wine. Something will overtake them. (...) While almost all 
the material and methods of life had been changing rapidly and were now 
changing still more rapidly, the law-courts and the legislatures of the world 
were struggling desperately to meet modern demands with devices and 
procedures, conceptions of rights and property and authority and obligation 
that dated from the rude compromises of relatively barbaric times.73
Leaving aside certain differences, the robes of this panoptical judge 
are not that different from the uniforms donned by Joachim von 
Pasenow in Broch’s The Sleepwalkers, a novel written at approxi-
71 Edgar Wallace, “The Treasure Hunt”
72 Edgar Wallace, “Red Aces”.
73 Herbert George Wells, The World Set Free, ch. I/3.
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mately the same time as Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences. 
The job of the uniform is to 
manifest and obtain order in the world, to arrest the confusion and flux of 
life, just as it conceals whatever in the human body is soft and flowing, 
covering up the soldier’s underclothes and skin, and decreeing that sentries 
on guard should wear white gloves. So when in the morning a man has 
fastened up his uniform to the last button, he acquires a second and thicker 
hide and feels that he has returned to his more essential and steadfast be-
ing. Closed up in his hard casing, braced in with straps and belts, he begins 
to forget his own undergarments, and the uncertainty of life, yes, life itself, 
recedes to a distance.74
Literature deemed trivial, no matter how closely bound by conven-
tions, is in a certain sense free because it is situated in the interstices 
between worlds: between the world passing by and the world that is 
yet to arrive. At this point conventions become spectres, since the 
past, sedimented convention becomes entangled with that which is 
arriving and so is suspended. Convention still binds, but becomes 
a game. The sensation novel does not wish to decipher a mysterious 
code, but transforms it into the protagonists of its stories. Literature 
deemed highbrow, on the other hand, attempts to construct a hori-
zon of understanding in this interspace intrinsic to that event that 
is only beginning to announce its arrival using the method of abduc-
tion. This interstice and this interspace is crisis. 
 
74 Hermann Broch, The Sleepwalkers, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, New York 1947, pp. 20–21. 
65
8
By taking the non-serious seriously, by introducing into the high 
the low that is excluded from it by deep-seated cultural antithesis, 
we arrive at a way of demonstrating the outside inside the inside 
(the outside-in). In this respect Fantômas is the perfect example: 
one only has to reference French surrealism and the circle of au-
thors associated with it. The Fantômas series became part of the 
iconology of high modernist art by virtue of its implicit anarchy and 
a treatment of time and space verging on the deranged. Moments 
of fantasy are released from the Victorian corset of the classic de-
tective novel (and Fantômas stands completely outside the domain 
of deductive rationality and identification), and as for finding some 
kind of moral instruction... au contraire. The surrealists were fasci-
nated by the wild, phantasmagorical poetics of this literature, and 
as Roger Caillois says, the energy concealed in the anarchy of these 
novels is so strong that it is capable not only of confronting but un-
dermining the power of the system.
So far, so indisputable. However, if necessary these findings can 
be bolstered by various cross-sectional comparisons. The traditional 
detective story has a clear structure: the mystery emerges against the 
backdrop of a clearly organised world that the crime has destabilised. 
According to Luc Boltanski, the detective and spy novels represent 
an innovation in the sphere of 20th century literary fiction. The crime 
is a kind of anomalous singularity in stark contrast with the way that 
things normally present themselves: it is the “emergence of reality 
in the middle of the world”. The crime (the enigma) sows confusion 
in the world in its capacity as that which does not belong to the ho-
rizon of expectable events and therefore causes something we might 
term a crisis of the world. The traditional whodunit (Poe, Doyle, 
Agatha Christie et al.) chronicles the derailment of the system and 
its return (a return realised by purely rational means). It depicts the 
restoration of order, the restitution of the world conceived as de iure 
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stable order. Inasmuch as the crime operates as a kind of temporary 
aberration there is an analogy with Husserl: with the resolution of 
the crisis things return to normal. However, the restoration of order 
obliges Husserl to introduce another factor, namely responsibility. 
As in the thriller, in the traditional detective novel the restoration of 
order would not be possible without a private investigator (no mat-
ter what his motivation is), who then in the American hardboiled 
school of detective novels shoulders this “responsibility” explicitly. 
Philip Marlowe does not relate to the world but corresponds to the 
reality that has emerged in the middle of the world. This emergence 
of reality is dealt with in even more detail in the “Flitcraft parable”, 
unobtrusively inserted into The Maltese Falcon by Dashiell Hammett 
(published in 1930) and recounted by Sam Spade.
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During the 1930s, Husserl explored the phenomenon of crisis in de-
tail in what is commonly termed his late work. In 1936, he published 
in the Belgrade journal Philosophia the first of a planned series of 
essays that were to examine the intellectual crisis of that time, es-
pecially the crisis afflicting the sciences. The aim was to advance 
his transcendental phenomenology as the only means of overcoming 
this crisis. This essay is all that was published of his last work; the 
text published in the collected works includes Husserl’s continua-
tion, unfortunately incomplete.75 His late period also includes For-
male und transzendentale Logik of 1929 and Erfahrung und Urteil, 
published after Husserl’s death by Ludwig Landgrebe in 1939 in the 
Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung publishing house in Prague. How-
ever, the firm was closed down that year following the German occu-
pation and dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and though the book had 
already been printed it did not enter the distribution network. The 
entire print run was pulped, apart from 200 copies that the publish-
ing house had managed to send to their London partners. In 1948, 
a photomechanical reprint of the first edition was published using 
one of these copies. At this point in the proceedings Prague enters 
the scene, since the Cercle philosophique de Prague, whose members 
had attempted to rescue Husserl’s manuscripts from his estate prior 
to the German occupation, were keen that the book be published. 
However, when it became clear that Prague was unsafe, Pater van 
Breda created the Husserl Archives in Leuven. 
The starting point of both the Vienna lecture and the book is the 
concept of crisis. Inasmuch as it appears that the Western world is 
75 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phän-
omenologie, ed. Walter Biemel, (Husserliana VI), Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1976. Edmund Husserl, 
Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungs-
band.Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1837, ed. Reinhold N. Smid (Husserliana XXIX), Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, Dodrecht 1993.
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caught up in crisis, then according to Husserl this is because it has 
betrayed the very idea that defines it, i.e. the idea of philosophy, the 
idea of universal knowledge (including the special sciences), and 
the idea ensuing therefrom of an existence striving toward the ideal 
and norms of autonomous reason. European man has lost his re-
lationship with this idea mainly due to the influence of a positivist 
conception of science and the concomitant process of specialisation 
(fragmentation) and technologisation (mechanical application). 
Science has eliminated questions relating to values and meaning 
(both of science itself and of human existence) from its sphere of 
interest and has capitulated to “naturalisation” (i.e. the investiga-
tion of man as object and the dominant status of the “fact”). How-
ever, in so doing the sciences have become incomprehensible (if not 
in respect of their content, then most decidedly in respect of their 
cultural or “existential” function). Science is the product of a cer-
tain intellectual, spiritual activity, and yet spirit has gradually been 
excluded from science as a legitimate field of enquiry. As a conse-
quence, science has lost its relevance to man because it has nothing 
to say about what matters to him most. And yet if Western man 
loses his faith in reason, he loses his faith in himself. The solution 
to this crisis could only reside in a return to the original ideal, i.e. 
the primal establishment of scientificity (rationality as the cultural 
value of the West par excellence). This is the task of this new “intro-
duction to phenomenology” and at the same time an explanation of 
why phenomenology must engage with history. (For that matter the 
concept of “crisis” implies “history”.) Phenomenology now attempts 
to unravel the complex history of the very idea of philosophy, this 
idea being something like the verborgene Einheit intentionaler In-
nerlichkeit (concealed unity of intentional interiority), which makes 
it possible to speak of Europe as of a  certain “formation”. For if 
words such as “Europe”, “science” and “philosophy”, notwithstand-
ing all empirical transformations (scientific discoveries, different 
philosophical theories, historically empirical events, etc.), delineate 
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something identifiable as a unity (an object), this is thanks to this 
primal establishment, from which everything is endowed with a cer-
tain (completely specific) meaning and which is both constitutive of 
and constituted by Europe. 
As we have seen, Husserl believes that Europe is a spiritual shape, 
something that originated, and so he turns his attention to history 
as a philosophical problem. Origin is the same as establishment: Eu-
rope is a project identical to the establishment of philosophy in an-
cient Greece, and this philosophy is established with the creation of 
the ideal of universal knowledge, i.e. a knowledge aimed at an idea 
that transcends man and that therefore man can only set for himself 
as ideal, as telos, a mission by which he will henceforth gauge his 
knowledge (and, of course, his entire life). Telos – ultimate object, 
i.e. entelecheia – the endless pursuit of an objective set at the outset. 
An orientation on this internal teleology is at the same time a norm 
in the sense of constant self-normalisation. A focus on the idea or 
ideal implies responsibility: by his every action man takes upon him-
self responsibility for abiding by this norm. A  completely specific 
type of rationality or reason operates and appears within history, 
“the epoch of mankind that now seeks to live, and only can live, in 
the free shaping of its existence, its historical life, through ideas 
of reason, through infinite tasks.”76 This rationality characterises 
Europe as a certain whole, forever unified by its internal, immanent 
teleology. And so, for instance, Husserl can write: 
In the spiritual sense the English Dominions, the United States, etc., clearly 
belong to Europe, whereas the Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities 
at fairs, or the Gypsies, who constantly wander about Europe, do not.77
The latter represent Europe’s exterior. 
76 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 274.
77 Ibid, p. 273.
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Husserl explains this concept of a specific European rationality 
in detail in The Crisis of European Sciences, and it is enlarged upon 
both by the original lectures and the annexes to the treatise (manu-
scripts from his estate), especially The Origin of Geometry78. These 
additional texts contain, for instance, references to the “critical at-
titude” associated with this teleology, with Western rationality. The 
theoretical attitude (a synonym for European reason) is character-
ised by the universality 
of his (the “philosophical man’s”) critical stance, his resolve not to accept 
unquestioning any pregiven opinion or tradition, so that he can inquire (…) 
after what is true in itself, an ideality (…) The ideal truth becomes an ab-
solute value.79
However, Husserl does not only diagnose the crisis, but devotes his 
essay to a detailed description of a cure. And given that the text 
also serves as an introduction to phenomenology, it is clear that it 
is in fact phenomenology that represents the sought-after therapy. 
This is a phenomenology enriched by what the phenomenon of the 
crisis has brought to it, namely the dimension of history, a phenom-
enological interpretation of historicity. However, in many respects 
this is very specific and it is therefore not surprising that a thinker 
who from the outset was concerned with the method of describing 
essences and essential structures should finally turn his attention 
to history. For such a thinker, history is like the essence of Europe 
itself. It is a specifically European phenomenon in the same way as 
science qua philosophy and philosophy qua science. Both one and 
the other are established at the outset, from which point onward 
they have meaning, and this meaning not only evolves but emerges 
from history. For history (not necessarily in the traditional sense 
of the word) is teleological. If meaning is put in jeopardy by cri-
78 The Crisis, pp. 353–378 and Supplementary Texts, Appendix VI.
79 Husserl, The Crisis, pp. 286–287.
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sis because science has abandoned it, then this meaning must be 
rediscovered. The quest for the primal meaning is what Husserl 
terms Rückfrage: “regressive enquiry” or “backwards reflection” 
as a recollection of the original ideal, which (as this recollection 
reveals) is also a  “task”, which means that this origin or origi-
nal establishment of science (identical with Western rationality) 
somehow contains within it the dimension of directionality. There 
is a close connection here between the ideal of “knowledge from 
the original insight” (the imperative of “evidence”), rationality 
(science, philosophy), and Europe. Husserl’s  book is an attempt 
to reanimate this origin and this connection. Fascinating though 
this connection is, I will leave to one side the relationship between 
Husserl’s “regressive enquiry” and Heidegger’s “destruction of the 
history of ontology”, the purpose of which is to release Being from 
its forgetfulness. 
To conceive of Rückfrage as the simple retracing of its own 
tracks would be to simplify matters. The purpose of “regressive en-
quiry”, i.e. the “return to origin”, is to reveal the innermost cause 
of the crisis (which cause, as becomes clear, is the “forgetting” of 
the origin). It is therefore within tradition (tradere: to deliver, be-
tray – tradition passes down and hands over the origin, the primal 
establishment) that the origin of “crisis” must also be revealed; 
tradition must evince some kind of discontinuity. In simple terms: 
this regressive procedure should be hampered somewhere along 
the way. This of course is not completely accurate. Husserl does 
not allow for anything like this. However, using this observation 
I would like for the moment simply to hint at a certain internal 
difficulty associated with the project of “the way back”. If I wanted 
to explore the problem in greater depth by means of a comparison, 
then for Bergson, for instance, every way back would of necessity 
be a way forward, and in this respect Bergson is at odds with Hus-
serl, despite the fact that both proceed on the basis of an “internal 
sense of time”. 
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Husserl is convinced that it is necessary somehow to correct tra-
dition, which is clearly somehow unreliable in and of itself. It is 
for this reason that a pure relationship to the origin as established 
by this very origin is a relationship of responsibility to the original 
establishment. It is a task. Tradition guarantees nothing; it is only 
tradition if man accepts responsibility for “traditionalising”. How-
ever, in general terms this means that traditionalising is inherently 
a risky relationship to that which is to be traditionalised. 
A discomfiting question arises: is this “instability”, this “disconti-
nuity” of tradition, i.e. the disconnectedness that threatens it (this 
is what Husserl diagnoses as the “forgetting” that, as it were, pe-
riodically jeopardises tradition) – is this something contingent or 
necessary? If it is necessary, then it threatens the very possibility 
of regressive enquiry, and in a  certain sense the traditional con-
cept of tradition would thus be annulled. If it is contingent, then 
it would threaten the “transcendental” dimension of the whole of 
Husserl’s meditation on crisis, because “forgetting” would not have 
a  philosophical but simply a  historical resolution. Forgetting and 
remembering: is this a symmetrical or asymmetrical relationship? 
This is basically the first circle of problems that need to be looked 
at. 
However, there is a second circle too. 
In principle it is clear that this Rückfrage has been necessitated by 
the present era, i.e. the “crisis” itself, the present era as “critical” – 
the era finds itself in crisis. However, this means that the place from 
which to pose the question of origin is not contingent. For instance: 
previously it was impossible to sense, observe and diagnose this de-
viation on the part of tradition from tradition itself. It is only at the 
peak of a crisis that a crisis is apparent as such, and therefore neces-
sitates critical reflection or Besinnung. 
However, if the present is (historically) privileged in this way, if 
it is a questioning of the “situated”, and if its situatedness is the es-
sential perspective of our view of the past, does this mean that we 
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can genuinely look back to the “origin” as it was? Is not every pres-
ence the relationship between forgetting and remembering? And 
if we cannot look back in this fashion on the “origin”, then how 
does it appear now? And this would entail a  large difference; this 
would mean that the recommencement born of remembrance is less 
a  return or a  new acceptance than it is a  new establishment, and 
not merely the repetition of what has already been established at 
some point, a continuation of the way the whole of this constellation 
(European rationalism, Europe) was established. The new accep-
tance of tradition would then be something like a new, equally pri-
mal establishment, and would by no means have to be at odds with 
this tradition’s  concept of telos, with its teleologicality. We could, 
for instance, be inspired by Wittgenstein’s conception of the rule, 
which only emerges through its use, and is “re-established” anew at 
every step. This would be a strange situation: it would be possible to 
speak of a base, and yet there would at the same time be a moment 
of a certain fundamental baselessness or Grundlosigkeit. 
I will try to demonstrate that Husserl must always stand on one 
side in respect of these various alternatives, and yet is immediately 
obliged to take the other side into consideration; that he operates 
within a  strange force field that is determined simultaneously by 
both sides. The side on which he stands has a boundary and Husserl 
ends by operating on this boundary as though to extend beyond it 
and into the other side. 
These first two points give rise to several themes and a generalis-
ing problem. 
Firstly, there is historicity and the concept of the “origin” or the 
“original (primal) establishment”, i.e. the relationship between the 
empirical and the ideal, between that which is de facto and that 
which should be de jure. However, if it is impossible to separate and 
distinguish between the two – if the empirical is within the ideal, 
the historical within the ahistorical or essential – then we are faced 
with an exemplary case of crisis, i.e. of the outside-in.  
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It is for this reason that one of the “appendices” to the Crisis, 
“The Origin of Geometry”, is so important (and the subject of so 
many interpretations). This is a text that on the one hand concretises 
the primary establishment, not as a single act but rather as a certain 
process that necessarily includes several successive stages, and on 
the other demonstrates the “internal teleology” that, just as internal 
teleology allows us to speak of Europe, allows us to speak of one 
geometry, a single geometry, which 
continued to be valid with this very same meaning (…) continued and at 
the same time was developed further, remaining simply “geometry” in all its 
new forms.80
At the same time, this text clearly suggests that we are not operating 
here on the level of historical investigation but on the “transcenden-
tal” level, i.e. on the level of the conditions of possibility: we do not 
enquire how geometry genuinely arose, but we enquire  
into the submerged original beginnings of geometry as they necessarily 
must have been in their “primally establishing” function (…) we inquire 
into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time – in which 
it had to appear, even though we know nothing of the first creators and are 
not even asking after them.81
It had to be thus in order that we have the geometry that we know. 
Our geometry involves a certain (historically manifest) apriorism. 
And this must necessarily have been linked to itself: the discovery 
of geometry in the mind of the first geometrist, the intersubjective 
fixation of this discovery by means of communication, and later on 
its exchange through speech and writing, which is the necessary 
source of each ideal objectivity shared by a certain community. Said 
80 The Crisis, p. 353.
81 Ibid., p. 354.
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community is constituted by this sharing and thus lives permanently 
on the horizon of what is thus shared (the idea of geometry, the idea 
of Europe), and because it is the horizon, i.e. potentiality, openness, 
the origin within this horizon is further (historically) developed 
without losing its timeless existence. It is therefore the establish-
ment of a certain teleology, or to express it in basic phenomenologi-
cal terms: it is the fulfilment of a certain primary intention.  
But why, for instance, must we also speak of “responsibility” and 
a “task”? 
This question is answered by the phenomenological principle of 
all principles, which Husserl again cites in The Origin of Geometry: 
evidence means nothing more than grasping an entity with the conscious-
ness of its original being-itself-there.82 
Applied to the origin of geometry this means that every act of the 
geometrist must be subject to this principle: though she works with 
traditionalised ideally objective objectivities (the word Gegenständli-
chkeit is used very broadly by Husserl), if she is to operate on a ho-
rizon established by the original observation, she must always revive 
this objectivity anew, i.e. have it in front of her as evidence. This 
is a task and in this sense the geometrist is also responsible for the 
traditionalising and continued development of the origin. She is 
summoned to a re-awakening, which is the only guarantee that the 
continued development of the primarily established coincides (and 
in this sense is somehow identifiable) with the initial intention, that 
it is the fulfilment of the initial intention. Husserl formulates this 
completely generally (because it refers to any linguistic expression 
of ideal objectivities), and though his formulation is somewhat com-




In the contact of reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production 
and the product of one subject can be actively understood by the others. 
In this full understanding of what is produced by the other, as in the case 
of recollection, a present coaccomplishment on one’s own part of the pre-
sentified activity necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also 
the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the 
productions of both the receiver of the communication and the communica-
tor; and this occurs reciprocally.83
For the sake of later considerations I would briefly refer to the re-
quirement of “coverage”, i.e. identification, the primacy of identity 
(which does not conflict with creativity precisely because it is played 
out within a specific horizon established once and for all). However, 
it is in this “condition of the possibility” of the traditionalisation 
(submission, sharing, communication) of ideal objectivities that 
there is also the possibility of crisis, loss, petrification. 
It is easy to see that even in (ordinary) human life, and first of all in ev-
ery individual life from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life 
which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the 
basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls vic-
tim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of this life 
lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by associa-
tion; and often enough, in respect to the validities arrived at in this way, it 
is disappointed by subsequent experience.84
 
This bare acceptance without verification by means of a return to 
evidence is something that deforms even such a strict science like 
geometry, inasmuch as each science proceeds deductively (from the 





The process of deduction follows formal-logical self-evidence; but without 
the actually developed capacity for reactivating the original activities con-
tained within its fundamental concepts, i.e., without the “what” and the 
“how” of its prescientific materials, geometry would be a tradition empty 
of meaning; and if we ourselves did not have this capacity, we could never 
even know whether geometry had or ever did have a genuine meaning, one 
that could really be “cashed in”.
This is our situation, and that of the whole modern age.85
 
Among other things it is clear here that what Husserl says about 
geometry applies both to science (i.e. rationality), and, given the 
way that Western culture is bound up with science, to Europe and 
its tradition. Europe is in crisis because it forgot the meaning tradi-
tionalised by this tradition. 
In his Against Epistemology: A  Metacritique,86 Adorno charac-
terises phenomenology as the attempt at a pure realisation of the 
principle of identity by means of a continuous reduction to subjec-
tive immanence (all acts constituting ideality, objectivity, are acts of 
consciousness, i.e. of subjectivity), and says that in Husserl knowl-
edge takes the form of the absolute form of identitarian/identify-
ing thinking. In light of the above this is indisputable. However, 
both Adorno and later Derrida especially elaborate on this theme 
in a way that is fundamental with regard to our own theme, saying 
that Husserl’s texts are an example of how thinking, by virtue of its 
intentions, transcends itself under the pressure of its own contradic-
tions, and so surpasses its own boundaries by applying its own strat-
egies. In his essay “Genesis and Structure” Derrida says the same 
thing, albeit from the opposite end:  
 
85 Ibid., p. 366.
86 Theodor W. Adorno, Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. In: T.W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schrif-
ten 5, pp. 31, 34 and 37.
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Husserl has always indicated his aversion for debate, dilemma and aporia, 
that is for reflection in the alternative mode whereby the philosopher, at the 
end of his deliberations, seeks to reach a conclusion, that is to close the 
question, to enclose his expectations or his concern in an option, a deci-
sion, a solution (...) by his rejection of system and speculative closure and 
by virtue of the style of his thought, Husserl is attuned to the historicity of 
meaning and to the possibility of its becoming, (…) and is also respectful 
of that which remains open within structure.87
 
I mention all of this now because I am trying gradually to reveal the 
“structure” of the phenomenon of crisis. As well as the most gen-
eral relationship of outside-in, now would be a suitable moment to 
articulate the ambiguity already referred to several times, which is 
this: exceeding a thing’s own boundaries from within. This is some-
thing that also characterises the strange “temporality” of the crisis 
in the present: past frameworks of comprehension (this was Hus-
serl’s  original phenomenological project) cannot be applied, and 
yet those frameworks of comprehension that would allow for the 
decipherment of suddenly unreadable meaning are only just arriv-
ing. However, it is in their direction that Husserl’s later philosophy 
appears to point under the pressure of internal contradictions and 
“mysteries”. 
What contradictions and mysteries? We come across some of 
them in The Origin of Geometry: genesis versus observation, or the 
proceduralism of the constitution of ideality that is somehow estab-
lished “in time” notwithstanding that fact that, in its capacity as 
“essence”, ideality is timeless. Secondly: forgetting as a possibility 
linked with traditionalisation. However, if traditionalisation is tied 
to the medium of speech, it is something like a “necessary” possibil-
ity, and this is why forgetting can only be confronted by “responsibil-
ity”, a responsibility that we can but do not have to subscribe to. This 
87 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge, London and New York, 
pp. 154–155. 
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means that such subscription is contingent, a completely empirical 
act, in which case it is difficult to understand traditionalisation oth-
erwise than purely empirical history – the concept of teleological 












The most detailed analysis of this movement within Husserl’s phe-
nomenology was conducted by Jacques Derrida in his introduction 
to “The Origin of Geometry”.88 A return to acts establishing sub-
jectivity presupposes a phenomenological history. Husserl will never 
investigate empirical history. He is interested in ideal history, i.e. the 
movement from the establishment of meaning via its ongoing devel-
opment in recurrent reactivation until the moment of crisis, when 
evidence was lost from science. He is interested, then, in “inten-
tional history” as a tradition that nevertheless reproduces the very 
structure of intentionality, the basis of which is the temporality of 
consciousness (intention gravitating towards its fulfilment). A pres-
ent that, in the movement of protention, holds onto and surpasses 
itself as past present, makes possible a retention of the past in the 
mode of sedimentation, and therefore allows for a “return” to the 
past, since the past remains held by the order of retention: it is a “de-
posit”. However, this deposition is possible only through the aban-
donment of the immanence of consciousness, the externalisation of 
the deposited in language, which is simply this deposit established 
as an intersubjectively shared objectivism. It thus becomes a “docu-
ment” separated from purely intentional history (which makes pos-
sible various “lapses”), a poor reading of the deposited, an associa-
tive interpretation instead of evidence, etc. This is the first point.
The second point is that ideal objectivity is always constituted 
within the lifeworld, within natural experience, for instance in the 
case of geometry through the gradual idealisation of natural, and 
not ideal, forms wholly similar to each other, i.e. through the process 
of “infinitisation”, through advancement to a limit. This is science, 
rationality: the transcending of all sensory or factual limits. 
88 Jacques Derrida, “Introduction”, in: E. Husserl, L’Origine de la géométrie. P. U. F., Paris 1962). 
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey Jr., 
Nebraska UP, Lincoln and London 1989.
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Thus the institution of geometry could only be a philosophical act (...) The 
philosopher is a man who inaugurates the theoretical attitude: the latter is 
only the spirit’s radical freedom, which authorises a move beyond finitude 
and opens the horizon of knowledge as that of a prehaving, i.e. of an infinite 
project or task (Vorhaben).89
 
In “The Origin of Geometry” Husserl wants to grasp at its source 
the origin of apriority itself, i.e. that which establishes infinitisation. 
 
But if each infinitisation is a new birth of geometry in its authentic primor-
dial intention (which we notice still remained hidden to a certain extent by 
the closure of the previous system), we may wonder if it is still legitimate to 
speak of an origin of geometry. Does not geometry have an infinite number 
of births (or birth certificates) in which, each time, another birth is an-
nounced, while still being concealed? Must we not say that geometry is on 
the way toward its origin, instead of proceeding from it?90
 
In his essay on the origin of geometry, Derrida, already prepared for 
a reading of phenomenological texts by his doctoral thesis entitled 
The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology,91 written in the 
first half of the 1950s, tracks step by step how the highly paradoxi-
cal idea of non-linear teleology is outlined. “A primordial conscious-
ness of delay can only have the pure form of anticipation”,92 we 
read in conclusion. In other words, the objective that history has 
(teleologically) in its sights, as described by Husserl and established 
by its commencement, only ever becomes clear later (nachträglich), 
always in aspects determined by situation. The objective is inside his-
tory (teleology), though not in the sense of some arché (principium) 
89 Ibid., p. 125.
90 Ibid., p. 129.
91 Jacques Derrida, Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl. P.U.F., Paris 1990. 
Jacques Derrida, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, trans. Marian Hobson, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003.
92 Derrida, Origin of Geometry. An Introduction, p. 153.
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that right from the start controls the movement flowing from it. It 
is for this reason that the continuity of this movement (tradition) is 
clear only in retrospect. Rückfrage or the retrospective questioning 
of the beginning is therefore productive. Rückfrage is a moment of 
this teleology, it reconstitutes this beginning, it repeats anew the 
establishment and discovers or revives meaning anew. However, 
“anew” means both “again” and “for the first time”. 
This summary, however, does not do justice to all the implica-
tions and consequences contained in the Crisis. Especially unclear 
is the analogy between the establishment of European science, 
i.e. specifically European rationality, the personification of which 
is the task of philosophy, and the establishment of geometry as 
a concrete science with which Husserl works as with an example 
intended to illuminate his teleological conception of the history of 
meaning. Above all, this summary does not make clear how Husserl 
works with his concepts, by means of which his conception of crisis 
takes shape. 
If, when interpreting these concepts, we proceed “chronologi-
cally”, we quickly discover in The Crisis of European Sciences that 
there is a curvature of the time of factual history: we find ourselves 
in “phenomenological” history. The starting point must be the 
Urstiftung or primal establishment. In the case of science (rational-
ity, philosophy, Europe) this is the discovery of the idea of knowl-
edge as a resolution by which man, adopting a theoretical approach 
to the world, transcends the finitude of his existing awareness. The 
closed horizons of understanding in which practical actions take 
place are thus traversed by an infinitely open horizon, by the ho-
rizon of the ultimate purposeful idea of knowledge from evident 
observation. 
 
(W)hat is most essential to the theoretical attitude of philosophical man 
is the peculiar universality of his critical stance, his resolve not to accept 
unquestioningly any pregiven opinion or tradition so that he can enquire, 
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in respect of the whole traditionally pregiven universe, after what is true in 
itself, an ideality (...) Thus ideal truth becomes an absolute value.93
 
This overcoming of the finitude of knowledge is described in detail 
in The Origin of Geometry as it reconstructs the path to ideal objec-
tivities as timeless and intersubjectively communicable, extricated 
from the situational conditionality of cognition. This new, complete-
ly unique horizon of human life is the horizon of infinite orientation 
upon the objective that man opts for, and because it is targeted upon 
infinity its fulfilment cannot be viewed as anything but a task. Sci-
ence is primarily a project that becomes a new purpose to life, and 
this affords it a specific (European, rational) meaning. 
It is this meaning that is in the state of crisis that Husserl diag-
noses when he discovers a  significant deviation from this project, 
the cause of which is forgetting, specifically forgetting the meaning 
within which the project was originally founded. However, if such 
a deviation is de facto possible, this would mean that teleology is not 
some application of the norm, but the acceptance and continued 
renewed acceptance of responsibility for said norm. Perhaps this 
is a very fine distinction. However, it is of crucial significance and 
must therefore be somehow concretised. 
Husserl often refers disparagingly to the “objectivism” of modern 
science. And yet a  significant aspect of true science is its orien-
tation on ideal objectivities. This is not a contradiction. Objectiv-
ism entails forgetting the subsoil of the lifeworld from which it 
emerged (this is analysed by Husserl in §§ 34–36 of The Crisis). 
Furthermore, the construction of ideal objectivities is not an end in 
itself. It has a meaning, namely to overcome finiteness by virtue of 
the infinite alignment of the original resolution (cognition as finite 
can only take possession of the infinite in the form of a task). The 
problem therefore resides in the “traditionalisation” of the original 
93 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 286.
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plan. Husserl addresses this problem not only in the published text 
of The Crisis, but also in manuscripts dating back to the period after 
the publication of its first version, e.g. in an essay entitled “Teleol-
ogy in the History of Philosophy”, where we read:  
 
The only people who have objectives and tasks are those that set them-
selves tasks. To an extent this is so even when we accept a task on the 
basis of tradition. It is not simply subsequent comprehension or empathy 
(Nachverstehen). The same applies to every communication. Understand-
ing it does not mean that it is accepted, but that by our own action we 
co-enact the validity in which the party communicating intends them (selb-
sttätig mitvollziehen). The judgement accepted will become our own, the 
assumed wishes and will our own.94
 
This is a subtle distinction that in the later work is a clear echo of 
the early Logical Investigations and its phenomenological semiol-
ogy, the study of the sign and signification – Bedeutung.95 The sign 
is presented as something binary: on the one hand it is expression 
(Ausdruck), on the other indication (Anzeichen). Expression is de-
termined as the immediate presence of the intended significance in 
a  sign and is thus primary, while indication is a derived mode of 
the sign because it only secondarily refers to the immediately seen. 
Husserl, as Derrida will formulate it,96 privileges full, unmediated 
presence, whose very possibility is the condition for the possibil-
ity of phenomenology, since its necessity is already implied by the 
“principle of all principles” articulated in the first volume of Hus-
serl’s Ideas:  
 
94 Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenolo-
gie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937, p. 373  (trans. here by Phil Jones).
95 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1 (International Library of Philosophy), trans. 
J. N. Findlay, Routledge 2001, pp. 183–233.
96 Once in the “Introduction” to “The Origin of Geometry”, and once in Voice and phenomenon, 
Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomène. P.U.F., Paris 1967.
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No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all 
principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of 
cognition, that everything originary (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) 
offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented 
as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.97 
 
The originary or original cannot be contaminated by anything uno-
riginal and must be present to the opinion that grasps it. This is the 
basis of phenomenological “evidence”. This is why both here and 
in the Crisis the primacy of “idealities” (ideal objectivities and thus 
pure meanings), which as idealities are repeatable within different 
contexts on the basis of the identity of their presence, were of funda-
mental significance for Husserl. 
However, is the implicit primacy of “presence” sustainable within 
the context of this differentiation (i.e. the possibility of a clear dif-
ferentiation between expression and indication)?  
Let’s sum up what we have so far. Inasmuch as Husserl takes cri-
sis to entail a  forgetting of the original meaning, this can mean 
several things in respect of the distinction between expression and 
indication, or, as the case may be, subsequent understanding and 
co-execution: a factual omission during the fulfilment of the found-
ing resolution, the cause of which (completely external) is factual 
or empirical history randomly diverting the direction of teleological 
historicity. This situation creates a need for critical thinking (Besin-
nung) about the relationship to tradition, i.e. it makes it necessary to 
conduct retrospective questioning (Rückfrage) of the primary estab-
lishment (Urstiftung), its ideal meaning, and should therefore take 
97 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Phi-
losophy, transl. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1982, § 24, p. 44. For Husserl, Anwesenheit is: 
"die volle und vollständige Anschauung, die Unmittelbarkeit des Augenblicks, die Selbstgegenwart 
in der reinen Innerlichkeit", cf. Rudolf Bernet, "Differenz und Anwesenheit. Derridas und Husserls 
Phänomenologie der Sprache, der Zeit, der Geschichte, der wissenschaftlichen Rationalität", in: 
Ernst Wolfgang Orth (ed.), Studien zur neueren französischen Phänomenologie, Karl Alber, Freiburg 
and München 1986, p. 57.
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the form of an explicit awareness. It is only necessary to penetrate 
the sedimented, passively stored and hitherto unconscious layers 
of historical acceptance of the project and thus rediscover its true 
meaning – for instance, an infinite movement in the direction of 
ideal objectivities can always be seen behind objectivities. However, 
if Husserl is speaking of a  revival motivated by crisis, if crisis is 
exclusively the work of empirical history, and if reactivation is the 
answer to a concrete situation in the light of an idea, i.e. a decision 
taken on its meaning in the present and from the present, then every 
such reactivation of meaning is also productive insofar as it reveals 
aspects that could not have been evident at the outset. The Rück-
frage conducted is Nachstiftung, i.e. something like a second founda-
tion or re-establishing. This is a term that appears in The Crisis of 
European Sciences, for instance when Husserl writes: 
 
This we seek to discern not from the outside, from facts, as if the tempo-
ral becoming in which we ourselves have evolved were merely an external 
causal series. Rather, we seek to discern it from the inside. (…) For it 
(our history) has spiritual unity through the unity and driving force of the 
task which stands before us not merely as factually required but as a task 
assigned to us, the present-day philosophers. For we are what we are as 
functionaries of modern philosophical humanity; we are heirs and cobearers 
of the direction of the will which pervades this humanity; we have become 
this through a  primal establishment which is at once a  reestablishment 
(Nachstiftung) and a modification of the Greek primal establishment. In the 
latter lies the teleological beginning, the true birth of the European spirit 
as such.98
 
James Dodd explains this point very adeptly while at the same time 
respecting Derrida’s  reading:99 to have a  tradition means dealing 
98 Husserl, The Crisis, pp. 70–71.
99 James Dodd, Crisis and Reflection. An Essay on Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Phaenomenologica 174, 2004, pp. 72 et seq.
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with problems that relate to that which tradition means for us; the 
beginning, though already begun, must nevertheless continue to 
be clarified and stipulated, or the full extent of the assigned task 
will remain concealed in the apparent manifestness of traditional-
ised knowledge. The term Nachstiftung is therefore saying the same, 
again and anew, because it is saying it in a (historically) different 
world. The second time is the first time. (When Husserl speaks of 
Endstiftung,100 it is this movement he has in mind.) 
While “The Origin of Geometry” can still operate within a teleo-
logical horizon (something that must have happened for geometry 
to come into being, i.e. those deeds and actions that established it), 
then the “crisis” that motivates the retrospective questioning of the 
origin thus focused arrives from within, since the wider context of 
the entire volume on the crisis of the European sciences indicates, 
however Husserl wished to avoid this, that at least potentially the 
outside (indication, Nachverstehen) is always already inside, because 
without an active return to the passively accepted, teleology is im-
possible. However, this implies an essential moment of responsibil-
ity: meaning appears only through responsibility because it appears 
in a  response to crisis. Teleological movement is the movement of 
Nachträglichkeit (“afterness” or deferred action), which only now, 
for the first time, reveals the meaning of the original establishment. 
The crisis is therefore itself already Urstiftung.101 The crisis is the 
irreducible dimension of phenomenological history. It is therefore 
inside. It does not arrive from outside, though the exterior (empir-
ical history) is essential in order that this fact shows itself. Hus-
serl’s texts from the period of the Crisis are always characterised by 
a certain ambiguity, inasmuch as they allow for the conclusion that 
“the very meaning of science, its function not only as the project of 
discovering the world but of opening the world to and for a ‘genu-
ine’ life in truth, is itself perpetually in a state of crisis. From the 
100 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 72.
101 For more on this point see Dodd, Crisis and Reflection, pp. 44 et seq.
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latter perspective, the opening of the world to understanding in the 
form of the true is never simply positive, but is always at the same 
time the opening of an experience of the questionableness of the 
world.”102 
102 Dodd, Crisis and Reflection, p. 52.
89
11
It appears, therefore, that the meaning of the word “crisis” is 
weightier than we might have thought. It does not involve simply 
a recognition of the productivity of crisis in the Popperian concept 
of falsification or Kuhn’s  conception of the structure of scientific 
revolutions. Not only does Husserl not regard these examples as cri-
ses, he explicitly states that the radical transformation of concepts 
in theoretical disciplines has nothing in common with his concept 
of crisis. The key to what he diagnoses as crisis is the “crisis of scien-
tificity”, i.e. a threat to the very framework within which paradigm 
shifts and the falsification of theories take place.
For this reason, the problem with Husserl’s  phenomenology as 
philosophical thinking resides in the question of whether this frame-
work, i.e. “scientificity” as a  specific type of rationality that char-
acterises Europe as a  cultural formation, is as unproblematic 
as Husserl appears to think it is. This impression is given by the 
fact that the concept is the precondition of all his other reflections, 
which are framed by the feeling of the uninhabitability of the world 
inasmuch as man feels exiled in his own world.103 This is an issue 
that needs to be addressed if we are to reflect on the phenomenon 
of crisis on a more general level, albeit inspired by phenomenology. 
At first glance it is clear where doubts might arise in connection 
with Husserl’s conception of crisis and history. It suffices to mention 
the name of Michel Foucault, an author whose conception of discon-
tinuity makes him in this respect the antithesis of Husserl. However, 
the concept of such a framework (idea, telos, founding ground) is diffi-
cult to sustain even from within and is problematic in Husserl’s work 
itself (the founding ground inasmuch as it presupposes the possi-
bility of reactivation, identifying its repetition with its beginning). 
For in opposition to this imperative of a return to the founding 
or originary ground, on the obverse of considerations justifying 
103 This is how the feeling of crisis in Husserl is formulated by James Dodd, ibid., p. 39.
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this imperative, stands the possibility that a  return is impossible, 
that repetition is somehow productive other than in the interstices 
or boundaries of the original “intention”, that there is no first be-
ginning, and that therefore the very concept of the first “founding 
ground” is highly problematic. This, as we have seen, is an indication 
that non-linear teleology implies another “adventurous” temporality 
of an event, occasionally breaking through the linear, chronological 
or continual flow of time, the coherence of which is given by the mu-
tual interpenetration of the retention, impression and protention of 
Husserl’s Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time. And it is 
this other temporality that is indirectly thematised in Husserl’s ques-
tion as to how the existence of ideal objectivities is even possible. We 
can only answer this question after conducting the Rückfrage, the 
regressive enquiry. Since ideal objects unquestionably exist (num-
bers, geometric forms, general meanings, etc.), we have to ask about 
the conditions of their possibility (transcendental phenomenology: 
what must have come before?). However, here our deliberations up 
till now are somewhat complicated by the fact that this search for 
the conditions of possibility comes up against not “structure”, but 
genesis, and we therefore have to perform a reconstruction of this 
genesis. Phenomenology thus turns our attention towards the history 
of meaning. Every ideality arises in the realm of the natural world, 
and, as we have said, this is by means of a process of idealisation 
and “infinitisation”, i.e. advancement toward a limit. However, this 
also means that every ideality is established by the transition from 
the sensibly perceivable (something round, circular or non-angular) 
to the non-sensibly perceivable (a circle, ring or spiral). Ideality is 
established on the “bedrock” of the world accessible to the senses. 
However, this bedrock cannot be regarded as a “founding ground”, 
because it is surpassed by idealisation. And because this involves ad-
vancement toward a limit, at the same time a horizon opens up of 
endless continuation, openness, i.e. something like the idea in the 
Kantian sense of the word, hence “infinitisation”. Here, as we know, 
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we find ourselves at the source of the equivalence of science/ratio-
nality and Europe, since aiming for an endless limit is eo ipso a task. 
However, this is ideal history and not empirical history, because 
what Husserl is attempting to reveal is the very “eidos” of histo-
ricity, the meaning of history, i.e. something like the condition of 
the possibility of empirical history. He is attempting to reveal that 
which he designates as phenomenological history, which he has no 
intention of abandoning during his analyses of idealities. 
Nevertheless, infinitisation in itself is not the entire establish-
ment of ideality, because there is no ideality without its universal 
communicability, and this assumes the possibility of its preserva-
tion by means of the fixation of idealities. The establishment of ide-
ality, meaning, only culminates with this essential fixation, which 
mediates ideality for tele-communication. As soon as ideality is estab-
lished as tele-communicable between contemporaries and in time by 
means of tradition, it is communicated not by means of pure expres-
sion (this is only in the mind of the first founder), but via the sign as 
indication: it is not bedeutet, it is not meant, but rather “implied” by 
means of its material manifestation in the signs by means of which it 
is exteriorised. This is at the core of Derrida’s argument in his Intro-
duction to The Origin of Geometry. However, indicativity necessarily 
implies the interpretability of the idealities thus mediated (mean-
ings, sense), i.e. the possibility that the original intention will be 
distorted or deformed. Husserl confronts this with a demand: there 
must be responsibility, i.e. the task of re-animating the original mean-
ing, reactivating it (the re-execution of the original act of observa-
tion, the acquisition of primary evidence). It is therefore necessary 
to accept that, beyond responsibility to the infinite task, there exists 
no ideal communication that would guarantee the continuity of the 
traditionalisation of the original establishment (the meaning thus 
established). However, if this ideal communication is supposed to 
belong to “duration” within the framework of an intentionally teleo-
logical horizon, an ideal historicity and orientation on the ideal limit 
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(from the order of in-finity), it is extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to separate it from the sphere of empirical historicity to which it 
is necessarily related by virtue of its dependence on the indicativity 
of traditionalisation, to the sphere of indexes and interpretations, 
which for Husserl is a field in which “omission”, “forgetting” and 
“defeat” take place, i.e. a field in which meaning is lost, in which 
rationality misses itself, without its being possible to push this field 
beyond the boundary of phenomenological history: it is the outside 
that is inside history. Or to put it another way: responsibility is not 
a necessary but a free act (or after Schelling: freedom resides in the 
capability of responsibility and irresponsibility), and this means it 
is impossible to eliminate the possibility of a complete forgetting of 
the original evidence. What for Husserl is the ground changes dur-
ing the course of his deliberations into the postulate. 
Derrida again: 
 
But since, in order to escape worldliness, sense must first be able to be set 
down in the world and be deposited in sensible spatiotemporality, it must 
put its pure international ideality, i.e., its truth-sense, in danger. Thus a pos-
sibility, which even here accords only with empiricism and nonphilosophy, 
appears in a philosophy which is (at least because of certain motifs) the 
contrary of empiricism: the possibility of truth’s disappearance.
 
And when in this respect he mentions Husserl’s distinction between 
expression and indication, he writes in a note: 
 
Using this distinction we could interpret the phenomenon of crisis (which 
for Husserl always refers to a disorder or illness of language) as a degrada-
tion of the sign expression into a sign indication, of a “clear” intention into 
an empty signal.104
 
104 Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, footnote 96, p. 92.
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The irruption of another temporality. The movement of searching 
and finding should be under the control of a  teleological horizon 
guaranteeing the continuity of tradition as tele-communication  – 
this would be pure “transcendental historicity”. However, a condi-
tion of the possibility of finding (in the sense of reactivation) is for-
getting. This is a figure that is already present in Husserl’s Lectures 
on Internal Time-Consciousness: the Ur-impression is conscious only 
as grasped retention. Here though in concrete form: the first is sec-
ondary in relation to the second, loss is the condition of the possibil-
ity of further development, the original meaning is traditionalised 
only if empirical history and finiteness are in play contaminating 
each ideality as tele-communicated. In other words, risk is linked 
with contamination, with irreducible entanglement. Meaning is al-
ways in crisis. 
But then we can say: the phenomenological method will grow 
into a reflection upon what phenomenology does not possess, what 
it lacks, how it deviates from its original establishment. This means, 
however, that legible traces of this absence are present in it. 
However, this is the same as the question: how will phenomenol-
ogy fulfil its telos (the idea of phenomenology)? 
If it identifies a “crisis” as a) a severance of the relationship to the 
origin, and b) the exterior (forgetting, succumbing to the tempta-
tions of language), then phenomenology itself is in a special rela-
tionship with this crisis inasmuch as it itself is the crisis (albeit unre-
flectedly). This special position of phenomenology itself as deviating 
from its origin, its constant iteration that is always a new foundation, 
is the crisis (factoid: all of Husserl’s published texts are conceived 
of as an “introduction to phenomenology” intended to demonstrate 
the teleological necessity of phenomenology against the backdrop of 
“recent philosophy” after Descartes). 
In order to complete our sketch of all contiguities perhaps we 
simply have to answer a  single question. Husserl wants to under-
stand crisis as something extraordinary or exceptional in light of 
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the intentional teleology of the phenomenological history of mean-
ing. But what does the exceptionalism of the exception mean? For 
history under the administration of teleology it should – de jure – be 
a factual deviation within, albeit also without the horizon of the orig-
inal foundation of rationality. Restitution should therefore always 
be possible, even though the restoration of the teleological move-
ment has up till now revealed (necessarily) concealed aspects of the 
original idea albeit somehow already implied at the start. The excep-
tion would then be something against which history can always be 
immunised by critical reflection and acceptance of the appropriate 
responsibility. On the other hand, we might say: the exception is – 
de jure – the necessary medium of the manifestation of meaning, 
which is why Urstiftung needs Nachstiftung (from the perspective of 
Endstiftung); it is the medium of an act in which a decision is always 
reached anew (i.e. always for the first time) regarding in what sense 
we are now, at this very moment, to understand the original idea. 
Exception as a moment of crisis would then be a far riskier caesura. 
This is also intimated by Husserl when he says that the condition 
of Besinnung or critical thinking is epoché in respect of the entire 
preceding tradition: 
 
We can (...) subsequently (nachträglich) adopt a position of critical reflec-
tion and enquire of the original motives of the traditionalised that con-
ferred meaning upon it..., in order to legitimise the task as a task for us, 
or to eliminate it as illegitimate. For in this resides the cornerstone of our 
freedom, namely that epoché is also always possible in respect of the past 
(nachträglich).105
 
Crisis is a moment in which tradition is suspended as a whole. We 
become aware (Husserl’s example) of the failure of our attempt to 
accomplish what we promised ourselves. 
105 Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenolo-
gie. Ergänzungsband.Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937, p. 374 (trans. here by Phil Jones).
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This is why – if failures proliferate – one says: “This is no way to live”, and, 
on the contrary, a  successful person asked “How are you?”, replies with 
a simple “Fine thanks”.106
 
It is for this reason that the exception could qualify as a  state of 
emergency. In the case of Husserl this would lead to a new confirma-
tion of the norm if by means of the epoché it were to be possible to 
reinstate the status quo ante, inasmuch as this involves the meaning 
of heading for the original objective. However, it also seems, if we 
read his texts from the 1930s with greater detachment, that rules 
are possible only thanks to the exceptions in which they are first 
established as rules. To express this in the language of political and 
legal philosophy: this would be more a case of the exceptionalism of 
an exceptional state as the condition of the reactivation of meaning. 
However, there is then no return to what is departing and a general 
epoché in respect of tradition would be the condition of an openness 
to what is arriving. 
None of this is without risk. Husserl wrote his text on the crisis 
facing Europe in the period immediately following the collapse of 
the Weimar Republic. Its dissolution and takeover by the National 
Socialists was made possible, inter alia, by Article 48 of its Con-
stitution, which authorised the president to suspend completely or 
partially certain fundamental rights temporarily, i.e. to declare de 
facto an exceptional state (a state of emergency)107. Only a few years 
later, Walter Benjamin had the following to say in his Theses on the 
Philosophy of History:  
 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule.108
106 Ibid., p. 384.
107 Regarding this point see Dan Diner, Beyond the Conceivable. Studies on Germany, Nazism, and 
the Holocaust. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2000, pp. 11–25.
108 Walter Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte. Kritische Gesamtausgabe 9. Ed. Gérard 
Raulet, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2010, pp. 74, 87 and 97.
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All of this had already been predicted by sensationalist literature 
in which, in its way, this exceptional structure of meaning is also 
revealed: the meaning of meaning itself, meaning as crisis, mean-
ing as the event of a crisis: the outside is inside, the crisis is a state 
and an event, action that is manifest as a state because it paralyses 
and suspends the existing order (suspense novel). But this paralysis 
has its own strange dynamic, an almost hectic movement: the city 
is teeming with police, the chaotic excitement of crowds, an atmos-
phere of general uncertainty and a tense expectation of what is to 
follow. Think of the literature already quoted: Paris terrorised by 
Fantômas, London in the power of the Chinese, or London being 
fought over by gangsters. This last novel cited, by Edgar Wallace 
(When the Gangs Came to London), at one point even describes the 
“suspensive” aspect of the phenomenon of the “crisis” with almost 
clinical precision in a conversation between the American detective 
Jiggs Allerman and cabinet members at a  meeting of what these 
days would be called a “crisis management team”: 
The prime minister asks: 
 
“What are we going to do, Captain Allerman? You know these people, you’re 
acquainted with the methods employed to deal with them – what’s your 
suggestion?”
Jiggs did not speak for a moment. He sat by the table, drumming his fingers 
on the polished surface. Presently he lifted his head.
“Any suggestion I make, gentlemen, will sound immodest. The first is that 
I be given absolute control of the Metropolitan police force for a month.The 
second is that you suspend all your laws which protect criminals – these 
fair play methods of yours are going to get you in worse than you’re in 
already. I suggest you scrap every rule you’ve laid down for Scotland Yard; 
that you suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, and give us an indemnity in ad-
vance for any illegal act – that is to say, for any act which is against your 
law – that may be committed in the course of that month. If you’ll do this, 
I’ll put these two gangs just where they belong.”
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“In prison?”
Jiggs shook his head.
“In hell,” he said.
It was perhaps unfortunate that he used this extravagant illustration. The 
Home Secretary was a very earnest Nonconformist, who took his religion 
seriously.
“That, of course, is...” He paused.
“Fantastical,” suggested Jiggs. “I’m getting quite used to the word. It’s the 
one you pull when any hard-sense suggestion is made to you.”
“In the first place,” said the Home Secretary stiffly, “we could not give you  
complete control of the police. That, as I say, is--um--impossible. I’m not so 
sure  that it isn’t against the Constitution.”
Jiggs nodded. “She’s a new one to me.”109
 
109 Edgar Wallace, When the Gangs Came to London, House of Stratus, 2001, ch. 7.
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In the same year that an American policeman was searching for 
a way of stemming the flood of gangsters into London, Carl Schmitt, 
whose ideas were probably inspired by Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution, was preparing the second edition of his Political The-
ology (1st edition 1922, 2nd edition 1933). Schmitt also published an 
expanded version of The Concept of the Political, as well as the no 
less well known essay Legality and Legitimacy (1932), and in all of 
these works we find what approximates to a juridico-political com-
mentary on what Captain Jiggs Allerman proposes in crude terms 
in Wallace’s When the Gangs Came to London, namely a theory of 
sovereignty and the “state of exception”. “Sovereign is he who de-
cides on the exception” reads the first sentence of Political Theol-
ogy110. And because the Ausnahmezustand or state of exception is 
simply another name for a crisis, it would be possible to draw on 
Schmitt’s considerations as the backdrop against which to examine 
Husserl’s  concept of crisis, nonlinear teleology, and above all the 
emphasis laid on responsibility.
Leaving terminology to one side, Schmitt’s  state of exception 
is a particular manifestation of the general phenomenon of crisis 
(though this formulation could be inverted) in the sense that it 
displays the same underlying structure. The link between crisis and 
a state of exception is clear to the legal scholar Clinton L. Rossiter, 
 as we see in the title of his Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis 
Government in the Modern Democracies (New York 1948), in 
which he writes: “... in time of crisis a democratic, constitution-
al government must be temporarily altered to whatever degree 
is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions 
(...) the government will have more power and the people fewer 
110 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1985, p. 5.
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rights...”.111 The “necessary degree” (clearly formulated in the de-
mands set by Jiggs Allerman) is vague: are we still talking of a legal 
state or, on the contrary, a complete suspension of the rule of law 
as handed down by precedent? Or is this a state in which political 
(state) and executive power has merged with legislative power and 
can no longer be distinguished? For this reason too, since the time 
of Roman law the state of exception has been associated with civil 
war, rebellion, an extreme threat to the state, states of emergency, 
etc. In brief, the problem is as follows: if the declaration of a state 
of exception were a purely political decision, it would be illegal and 
there would be a risk of chaos, because a state of exception must 
somehow be “legitimised” even though it suspends legality. This is 
where Carl Schmitt comes in, who understands the state of excep-
tion as a borderline concept, as the threshold of the law (the border 
or threshold implies ambiguity: neither-nor, both-and) 
 
Because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the 
juristic sense still prevails even if it is not the legal order. The existence of 
the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal 
norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the 
true sense absolute. The state suspends the law in the exception on the 
basis of its right of self-preservation, as one would say. The two elements 
of the concept legal order are then dissolved into independent notions and 
thereby testify to their conceptual independence. Unlike the normal situa-
tion, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum, 
the norm is destroyed in the exception. The exception remains, neverthe-
less, accessible to jurisprudence because both elements, the norm as well 
as the decision, remain within the framework of the juristic.112
 
111 Cited in Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Homo Sacer II). The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London 2005, p. 8.
112 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12.
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This is not simply to say that the crisis is something that can be 
encountered or experienced in reality (up to the very boundary of 
banality or familiarity: I will leave to one side life or economic cri-
ses and even worse examples), though this is not without interest, 
because in such cases the crisis is something like a borderline situa-
tion, a state of limitation that, like state and event, being and becom-
ing, is such that one cannot be separated from the other. This is why 
the “crisis” is also a situation of irreducible ambiguity. 
However, this complicates matters considerably, because the sim-
ple topological antithesis outside/inside implied in various theories 
of the state of exception is insufficient to explain the phenomenon it 
sets out to explain. Giorgio Agamben puts it thus in his monograph 
on the state of exception: 
 
If the state of exception’s characteristic property is a (total or partial) sus-
pension of the juridical order, how can such a suspension still be contained 
within it? How can an anomie be inscribed within the juridical order? And 
if the state of exception is instead only a de facto situation, and is as such 
unrelated or contrary to law, how is it possible for the order to contain a la-
cuna precisely where the decisive situation is concerned? And what is the 
meaning of this lacuna? In truth, the state of exception is neither external 
nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns 
precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do 
not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.113
 
But let us return for a moment to Schmitt and the quote from his 
Political Theology: “... the state of exception is something other than 
mere anarchy and chaos”. A state of emergency is declared and is 
therefore the subject of a decision, a sovereign decision, because it is 
a decision on an exception, which is always outside the norm, since 
the general norm can never cover an exception – neither indeed can 
113 Agamben, The State of Exception (Homo Sacer II), p. 23.
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the general norm justify the decision that the situation in question 
is a genuinely exceptional case. It is a decision that cannot be ex-
trapolated from any legal norm. Nor is it possible to claim that the 
state of exception arises necessarily from an emergency situation, 
since a state of emergency is not an objective fact: a state of emer-
gency is simply that which is declared to be a state of emergency.114 
This is why Schmitt says that the sovereign decides whether there 
exists a state of emergency.115 However, he also says: “The sovereign 
stands outside of the normally valid juridical order and yet belongs 
to it.”116 If this is true, then it is also true that the state of exception 
remains something other than anarchy and chaos. But how can this 
possibly be true? Easy – the state of exception is a borderline or 
liminal state, the threshold of the (juridical) order.  
Schmitt concretises and elaborates on the problem. A  decision 
that annuls the juridical order in this way manifests a specific legal 
moment: the norm requires a normal form of life circumstances or 
it cannot be applied, which is why a decision on a state of excep-
tion first creates a situation in which legal provisions can apply and 
therefore in which norms may be applied. Order must first be estab-
lished so that the rule of law be meaningful, and this in turn makes 
possible the declaration of a state of exception. Schmitt generalises 
this question as follows: 
 
Precisely a philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the excep-
tion and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest de-
gree. The exception can be more important to it than the rule, not because 
of a  romantic irony for the paradox, but because the seriousness of an 
insight goes deeper than the clear generalizations inferred from what or-
dinarily repeats itself. The exception is more interesting than the rule. The 
rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only 
114 Ibid., p. 30.
115 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 7.
116 Ibid.
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the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism 
that has become torpid by repetition.117
 
The norm is possible on the basis only of the exception: for Schmitt 
the fundamentum inconcussum of his legal theory, for Husserl the 
unintended yet possible consequence of his concept of crisis and tel-
eology, which, on the contrary, is supposed to avert the threat of com-
plete discontinuity in relation to tradition. In the case of Schmitt the 
Urstiftung or original foundation would be the sovereign decision 
that first creates the possibility of normativity and in its capacity 
as sovereign is itself without foundation, because there are no rules 
available pertaining to the decision to call a state of exception, and 
such a decision is not subject to any (juridical) control: however, as 
the boundary of juridical order it is both outside and inside. The 
state of exception is the moment when the order (law) detaches it-
self from its own power, suspending its power. In the case of Husserl 
this is in the name of a decision preceded by the suspension (in the 
sense of the problematisation) of the entire tradition heretofore as 
normalising, i.e. responsibility. However, in this case too we could 
say that this is an act that is both inside and outside. Husserl wants 
to retain the performance of responsibility within the framework 
or horizon of teleology, which is why he views it as a conscious en-
dorsement of the original idea – this is why each new establishment 
in the sense of Nachstiftung is inside. However, if this Nachstiftung 
is somehow productive – if it is a  response to crisis, i.e. if it cor-
responds to a historically arising situation – then it is not entirely 
clear whether it is possible to speak of a “ground” of responsibility 
inasmuch as no response can be passively inferred from the found-
ing idea. The non-groundlessness recognised by Schmitt is a threat 
to Husserl that he fails to avert convincingly. He might indeed para-
117 Ibid., p. 16.
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phrase Schmitt: in a crisis “the power of real life breaks through the 
crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.” 
This comparison could be transferred to a level of greater abstrac-
tion. In a highly original monograph, Michael Marder118 interprets 
Schmitt’s  “political ontology” on the basis of the relationship be-
tween line and point, i.e. a kind of proto-geometry of the original act 
of Landnahme, which Schmitt in his book Der Nomos der Erde119 
describes as his form of Urstiftung. The earth as the antithesis of 
the sea, in which no structuration can leave any permanent trace, is 
a realm allowing for the establishment of a fixed locus and border, 
a stable order of localisation. This establishment of a visible nomos 
is “a constitutive historical event – an act of legitimacy, whereby the 
legality of a mere law first is made meaningful.”120 Rechtsetzung is 
manifest in the fixed lines thus charted that are born of the “punc-
tuating” moment of establishment without this point being broken 
or surmounted by a line, since a line itself is nothing other than an 
infinite number of points. In Schmitt’s concept of the political this 
basic scheme (line-point) is mirrored in the sovereign decision on 
a state of exception, in the exception or the irrepressible potential-
ity of the point. The exception is part of the line and yet transcends 
it. Schmitt extrapolates from this a radical political idea in which 
the decision on a state of exception is a permanent reminder that 
continuity lives in intermittency or discontinuity.121 
 
To compensate for the normative groundlessness of its origination, the line 
appeals, in the last instance, to definite divisions (bestimmte Einteilungen) 
and demarcations engraved in the literal ground, the soil: the firm line and 
118 Michael Marder, Groundless Existence: The Political Ontology of Carl Schmitt, Continuum, New 
York 2010.
119 Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum. Dunckler & 
Humblot, Berlin 21974 (1950). Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. and annotated by 
G.L. Ulmen, Telos Press, New York 2003.
120 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 73.
121 Cf. Marder, Groundless Existence, p. 15.
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nomos that flourishes from it can always fall back on the earth for their 
onto-phenomeno-political support. Rooted in such solidity (...) are the acts 
of appropriation consonant with the most elemental sense of nomos as well 
as the “standards and rules”, die Masse und Regeln, for human conduct 
that, much later, will generate the abstractions of normativitiy forgetful of 
their grounding in the earth. The repression of the concrete similarly iso-
lated by Husserl as the cause of the crisis plaguing European sciences and 
collective consciousness, is further exacerbated by the extension of linearity 
to the whole planet. (...) The budding cold and uninhabitable abstraction 
of globality, which is but a geographic representation disengaged from the 
life-world of human beings, overrides the earth and the soil that bore the 
first lines of nomic demarcation.
Yet, the extension of linearity is, in an equal measure, a rupture, a “head-
long leap into the nothingness” that, strangely, mimics the accomplish-
ments of decision-making. It punctuates that which it extends, unhinging 
and ungrounding the line removed from its material support in the soil. 
Comparable qualitative leaps and punctuations will, henceforth, accompany 
every attempt at redrawing the global lines and remaking the international 
order (...) Akin to the decision that signals the end of indeterminacy and 
asserts its independence from infinite deliberations and rationalisations, 
the point is absolved from all relationality even as it negatively mediates 
the self-relatedness of space. This exceptional determination, this extra-
normative eruption, this performative declaration that is not buoyed up by 
anything but itself, aptly illustrates the sovereign decision on the exception 
in Political Theology.122
 
A comparison with Husserl’s idea of teleological history and its be-
ginnings in the establishment of the original idea will serve to dem-
onstrate this strange borderline position, a position that is not easy 
to understand. Unlike Walter Benjamin, who views the (juridical) 
order as permeated by the violence by means of which it was founded 
122 Marder, Groundless Existence, p. 16.
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and thus constantly in the power of fateful forces, capable of being 
annulled only by “divine” violence completely exterior to the history 
to which it will one day put an end123, Carl Schmitt inclines to the 
idea of discontinuous continuity as an inexhaustible potentiality of 
history, and so acknowledges both the continuity of the line and the 
radical discontinuity of the sovereign decision, without postulating 
any external factor. Husserl’s teleology also rejects and at the same 
time accepts both one and the other, but only inasmuch as both en-
sue from the potentiality of a  single origin and the idea founded 
within it; though it takes the moment of crisis seriously, the deci-
sion is only a decision if it is a response, if it responds to the original 
idea. Even here he applies to history (albeit in modified form) his 
concept of temporality, the flow of which guarantees the intentional 
interconnectedness of retention, impression and protention. How-
ever, impression here is something akin to a crisis that is a response 
bound anew to a  past story (tradition), while the response opens 
a future in which meaning will once again have the chance to limber 
up, as it were, a meaning that is to explain authentic traditionalisa-
tion. Hence recollection of the origin of event as responsibility for 
the history of meaning and as response. 
In simple, approximate, terms, the ambiguity of Husserl’s non-
linear teleology is concentrated in the semantic proximity of the 
words “responsibility” and “response”, which can become an irre-
ducible difference. Responsibility relates to a certain horizon – it is 
responsibility for traditionalisation in respect of its original estab-
lishment. However, the response is close to the performative utter-
ance: if I do not respond, I do not know how I respond and by what 
means in the singular moment of crisis I seize the original idea in 
order to reincorporate it into the history in which it has been for-
gotten. Only then can we say that the basis of history is present in 
123 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”, in: Gesammelte Schriften II.1, ed. R. Tiedemann – 
H. Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1999, pp. 179–204; Walter Benjamin, Über den 
Begriff der Geschichte. 
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history as long as it is made present again and again. However, this 
making present is always only ever possible in situationally relative 
and thus new responses. Each second time is somehow the first time. 
However, it is then difficult to understand this method of connec-
tion using the retention/protention model (primarily “passive”), in-
asmuch as the response simultaneously bears witness to what is yet 
to arrive and what is very possibly incommensurate with the existing 
horizons of expectations. Then, of course, the response would be far 
more a search for the traces of projects that until now could not be 




The present, if we take it seriously as present, is crisis. This is borne 
out by Husserl’s phenomenology, which constantly operates on the 
border of itself, because in relation to its own tradition as created 
by The Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations it adopts 
a critical approach, fearing that it has forgotten its founding idea 
and has forfeited its meaning. It comes face to face with a crisis: it 
finds himself repeatedly beyond the boundary of its original project 
and repeatedly attempts to avert this threat. Husserl wishes to pro-
tect the idea of reason and Europe, seemingly in vain. 
And yet Husserl’s descriptions and concepts allow for a suitable 
response. Not to crisis, but to the catastrophe that, like a shadow 
of that which is on the point of arriving, somehow indirectly an-
nounces itself in his texts from the 1930s, even though Husserl only 
circles around this shadow. The hitherto absent is now inside, but 
Husserl is forever attempting to force it out beyond the boundary of 


















Thinking after the end of the Second World War finds its origi-
nal establishment, its Urstiftung, in the categorical claim made by 
Theodore W. Adorno in 1949 that first appears in the essay Cultural 
Criticism and Society:
 
Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of 
culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this 
corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write 
poetry today.124
 
The emphasis here is on both parts of the sentence, which is clear 
when Adorno cites himself and in the essay Art and the Arts writes: 
 
While the present situation no longer has room for art – that was the mean-
ing of the statement about the impossibility of poems after Auschwitz – it 
nevertheless has need of it.125
 
Adorno never rescinded his original statement, though over time he 
clarified it: 
 
Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has 
to scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you 
could no longer write poems.126
 
This correction was in order if only because Adorno himself was 
a great admirer of the poetry of Paul Celan, as we see in his Aes-
thetic Theory, where we read that Celan’s poetry  
124 Theodor W. Adorno, “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft”, in: GS 10.1, p. 30. Regarding the context 
of and changes to Adorno’s statement on poetry after Auschwitz, see Klaus Hofmann, “Poetry After 
Auschwitz – Adorno’s Dictum”, German Life and Letters, 58, 2, 2005, pp. 182–194.
125 Theodor W. Adorno, “Die Kunst und die Künste”, GS 10.1, pp. 452–453. 
126 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative dialektik, GS 6, p. 355. 
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is permeated by the shame of art in the face of suffering that escapes 
both experience and sublimation. Celan’s poems want to speak of the most 
extreme horror through silence. Their truth content itself becomes nega-
tive.127
 
This then gives rise to a question that it would be possible to answer 
in a similar way, i.e. on the basis of Adorno’s own work: is philoso-











At the same time as Husserl was attempting to salvage Eu-
rope’s  identity on the basis of its original idea and find a way of 
reducing that which is exterior in respect of European rationality, 
a plan was being hatched for a final solution to this exterior, a plan 
for its physical elimination. Husserl grappled with ideality and phe-
nomenological historicity. What was about to arrive, however, was 
real history.
 
No matter when it may be written, every story will henceforth be before 
Auschwitz,
 
as Maurice Blanchot was to write much later.128 He is referring to 
a kind of paralysis brought on by the facticity of an event that cannot 
be incorporated within the existing horizon of rationality, cannot be 
explained and thus accorded a meaning, a meaning that, notwith-
standing, it must not be allowed to possess. This is not a logical con-
tradiction, but a trauma. The ability to think is not only occluded, as 
Adorno says, but is removed from the game by the time of an event 
by which we are marked, an event we are obliged to maintain an 
awareness of and are unable to rid ourselves of because we are un-
able to retrieve it within the imagination. It is irreparable, somehow 
lost for us, but for this very reason we are still implicated in it.129 
It is the original oblivion, the antecedent of the memory in which, 
nonetheless, it persists. However, if it is something irredeemable, 
this event can never be absent: that which we cannot encounter, we 
cannot escape from. Thinking can only testify. The outside is inside 
128 Maurice Blanchot, Après coup, Les Ed. de Minuit, Paris 1983, p. 99. “A quelque date qu‘il 
puisse être écrit, tout récit désormais sera d‘avant Auschwitz.”
129 See, for example, Steven Shaviro, “Complicity and Forgetting”, MLN, Vol. 105, No. 4 (1990), 
pp. 819–832, here p. 820: “But the deepening tendency of thought, its political situatedness, is 
precisely this: that it cannot escape the unexpected demands of the present moment, or the return, 
the uncanny insistence, of a longburied past. ”
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and remains before us. Not teleology, but the irruption of traumatic 
temporality into linear chronology. 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment is also 
a form of “retrospective questioning”, i.e. Rückfrage, in that it seeks 
a  response to the question of “why humanity, instead of entering 
a  truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism”.130 
This, too, is critical thinking in the Husserlian sense of the word Be-
sinnung, in that it involves a “reflection on the regressive moment”131 
by which reason consumes itself. This, too, reveals the loss of mean-
ing in the instrumentalisation of science and the mathematisation 
of qualities (with explicit reference to Husserl’s Crisis). However, its 
starting point is not crisis, but the catastrophe of the Holocaust. And 
in its response to the Holocaust it can no longer strive for a return, 
but for an openness in thinking for the future that cannot, however, 
be anything other than an openness to the radically other. This is 
not about preserving tradition, but rescuing hope. The place that for 
Husserl was home to remembrance is now occupied by the response 
to factual history. However, in both cases reflection on the meaning 
of rationality is a matter of responsibility. This can be corroborated 
very briefly with two quotes. The first is from Adorno’s Lectures on 
Negative Dialectics: 
 
But that after Auschwitz one cannot seriously speak of a world in which 
that was possible, and in which the threat of a repetition in some other way 
looms daily, and in some comparable guise – I am reminded of Vietnam – is 
probably happening this very second, as being meaningful; i.e. to maintain 
that this world in which we live is supposed to meaningful, that seems 
to me to express a  cynicism and a  frivolity which is, simply, in terms of 
pre-philosophical experience, no longer justifiable. And a philosophy which, 
imbued with a foolish arrogance of the spirit refusing to take cognisance of 
130 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectics of Enlightment, trans. E. Jephcott, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 2000, p. xiv.
131 Ibid.
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this reality – turns a blind eye to this and which insists, come what may, 
that there is meaning, that seems to me to be an exaction which cannot 
be imposed on anyone not entirely stupefied by philosophy; for philosophy 
can, without question, amongst the many other functions it fulfils, stupefy 
with success.132
 
The second is from Minima Moralia, in this case Adorno’s reflec-
tions at the very end of the war (autumn 1944): 
 
The thought that after this war life could continue on “normally”, or indeed 
that culture could be “reconstructed” – as if the reconstruction of culture 
alone were not already the negation of such – is idiotic. Millions of Jews 
have been murdered, and this is supposed to be only the intermission and 
not the catastrophe itself?133
 
The outside is irreducibly inside: a factual historical event has trans-
formed post-war philosophy by compelling it to respond to factual 
history. Thinking lost the self-assuredness provided by its foundation 
in the idea of reason. As a consequence, philosophy during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century is often difficult to understand. It 
invents new terms and searches for other traditions and other forms 
of argumentation. It will perhaps become more understandable if 
we read it as a response to the event that was Auschwitz, the very 
character of which excludes any rational assimilation. It would even 
be possible to show that the texts of many of philosophy’s most re-
nowned practitioners, from Adorno via Levinas, Blanchot and Der-
rida to Agamben and Didi-Huberman and so on, also have a kind 
of personal dimension inasmuch as they search for an appropriate 
philosophical language in which to express (personal) experience. 
132 Theodor W. Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Polity Press, 
Cambridge 2008, p. 19.
133 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, 
Verso, London and New York 2005, p. 55.
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The Holocaust is an event that has necessitated the radical trans-
formation of philosophical discourse, and unless we understand this 
transformation, their books will seem too complicated, paradoxical, 
or even capricious. However, the idea that they were merely involved 
in proposing academic solutions to academic problems could not 
be further from the truth. These writers are interested in the very 
meaning of thinking, and all of them share the conviction that philo-
sophical thinking is only present where philosophy transcends itself. 
Now it is about something else, it is about bearing witness. And yet 
this bearing witness represents a completely different type of show-
ing. This is the lesson of the Holocaust. Auschwitz is a radical event 
inasmuch as we have to ask ourselves whether our conceptual under-
standing, interpretation and analysis are appropriate responses to 
it. Thinking reconstructs nothing in such a way as to lend the event 
a narrative arc. It is touched by the event and responds to it, reflects 
upon it, while at the same time being a reflection upon the concept 
of the event and its own relationship to the event. All of this is part 
of the process of bearing witness. 
All of this is stated clearly and harshly in Adorno’s Negative Dia-
lectic: 
After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence 
as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind 
of sense, however bleached, out of the victims’ fate. And these feelings do 
have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the construction 
of immanence as endowed with a meaning radiated by an affirmatively pos-
ited transcendence. Such a construction would affirm absolute negativity 
and would assist its ideological survival – as in reality that negativity sur-
vives anyway, in the principle of society as it exists until its self-destruction. 
The earthquake of Lisbon sufficed to cure Voltaire of the theodicy of Leibniz, 
and the visible disaster of the first nature was insignificant in comparison 
with the second, social one, which defies human imagination as it distils 
a real hell from human evil. Our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because 
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actual events have shattered the basis on which speculative metaphysical 
thought could be reconciled with experience.134
 




Between the response and the event, the event and experience, ex-
perience of the event and testimony thereof, there is clearly a very 
close relationship, all the more so if it is necessary to respond to the 
experience from the order of de facto. The event is something that 
happens out of the blue. At the same time it touches us and awak-
ens us to life, inasmuch as that which we call life, as Jean-François 
Lyotard says, emerges from the violence that impacts upon our leth-
argy from without.135 Because we are not furnished with a special 
organ for perceiving the event, we have no choice but to describe 
our relationship to it in different ways. We are “struck by” the event, 
“caught unawares”, the event “relates to us”. These descriptions 
always contain an important lesson for thinking that ventures to 
deal with the event: philosophy must emerge from within itself and 
transcend itself. The fact of experience in relation to an event prob-
lematises the relationship between philosophical reflection and its 
subject matter. Experience of the event tests the boundary of think-
ing, and for this reason it seems that it bursts in upon the realm 
of philosophy like an unwelcome intruder from without. However, 
if the close relationship between event and experience is to be ac-
cepted, two conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, experience is present 
only where there is an event. Secondly, experience is the place from 
which an event is perceived.
But if the experience of Auschwitz transformed thinking in the 
second half of the twentieth century, a basic question arises: is expe-
rience of the Holocaust even possible? And if so, can it still be called 
experience? These are questions in which the transformation of 
thinking is both enacted and reflected. If we know that in modern 
philosophy the term experience is subordinate to the function of 
recognition, then only that which is cognitively relevant is deemed 
135 Jean-François Lyotard, Moralités postmodernes, Ed. Galilée, Paris 1993; idem, Postmodern 
Fables, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 235–250.
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to be the content of experience. Otherwise, to borrow from Adorno: 
concretely experienced reality is subordinate to instrumentalised ra-
tionality (or the “positivism” of the modern world). The concepts 
that experience organises separate it from that which Husserl 
named the life-world or Lebenswelt. 
These questions are therefore basically self-evident, and on the eve 
of the Holocaust and still under the sway of the First World War, 
philosophy anticipated them in the texts by Walter Benjamin that 
relate to the specific experience of twentieth-century Man. 
Right at the start of his long essay The Storyteller (1936), Benja-
min observes a certain decline in the traditional art of storytelling 
(the essay examines the work of Nikolaj Leskov) and writes:  
 
experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it is continuing to fall 
into bottomlessness (...) With the (First) World War a process began to 
become apparent which has not halted since then. Was it not noticeable 
at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent – 
not richer, but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later 
was poured out in the flood of war books was anything but experience 
that goes from month to mouth (...) the communicability of experience is 
decreasing.136
 
The experience of the First World War was already such that it 
paralysed experience and its link to the chronicling of that experi-
ence, for which it was no longer possible to find adequate (commu-
nicable) expression. Closely related to this is the inability to relate 
in the manner of erstwhile storytellers. In Benjamin this is a theme 
that is subject to many variations, for instance in his earlier essay 
Experience and Poverty (1933), where we read:  
 
136 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings 3, Belknap Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 143–144.
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this much is clear: experience has fallen in value, amid a generation which 
from 1914 to 1918 had to experience some of the most monstrous events 
in the history of the world...137
 
(Benjamin uses the same formulation almost word for word in The 
Storyteller, but now expresses his idea on the very boundary of self-
contradiction.) However, we then read something that seems almost 
to anticipate Adorno and Horkheimer’s  Dialectic of the Enlight-
ment, albeit from a different perspective:  
 
Indeed (let’s  admit it), our poverty of experience is not merely poverty 
on the personal level, but poverty of human experience in general. Hence, 
a new kind of barbarism.138
 
Benjamin, however, has something different in mind. He is allud-
ing to the “positive concept of barbarism”. The barbarian, starved 
of experience, must begin anew, he is faced by a tabula rasa (Klee 
and Loos, among others, turn to “the naked man of the contem-
porary world who lies screaming like a newborn babe in the dirty 
diapers of the present”). Poverty would therefore entail people at-
tempting to rid themselves of experience in order that they might 
apply their internal and external poverty so purely that something 
decent emerges from it. 
This perhaps explains the “contra-dictoriness” referred to above: 
wartime “experience” is incommunicable because it has deprived 
man of everything in which he believed. He begins anew, and yet 
it is doubtful whether this will lead to his being able to return to 
experience in some original sense of the word. Rather, it involves 
the complete annihilation of tradition in the sense of the inherited 
traditionalised horizons of understanding (see Benjamin’s The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, the loss of aura, etc.) 
137 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings 2, p. 731. 
138 Ibid., p. 732.
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Whatever. The fact is that Benjamin discerns a clear connection 
between war and the erosion of experience, even if he still regards 
the etiolation of experience as embodying the possibility of reversal 
(stepping outside of tradition, i.e. in the final analysis outside of his-
tory) and ultimately the abolition of history. 
Freud is preoccupied by a  similar crisis of experience, and this 
leads him to a reformulation of psychoanalysis. In Beyond the Plea-
sure Principle (1920), in which he introduces the concepts of the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle, he works with the phe-
nomenon of “trauma” as illustrated by war-induced neuroses.139 
Freud discovers that the war caused a significantly high number of 
traumatic neuroses and that these cannot any longer be explained 
simply as organic damage to the nervous system.140 The striking 
symptom that accompanies this type of neurosis he terms Wieder-
holungszwang or repetition compulsion: 
 
the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which in-
clude no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have 
brought satisfaction.141
 
Repetition compulsion – and herein resides its paradox – trumps 
the pleasure principle (its source being older). It appears when an 
excessively powerful experience breaks the natural barrier protect-
ing the sensory organs against a “shock”.142 According to Freud, in 
this way that which is older than the pleasure principle, namely the 
death drive (the urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier 
state of things), makes its presence felt: 
 
139 Freud dealt with such neuroses separately, cf. “Zur Psychoanalyse der Kriegsneurosen”, 1919.
140 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, W.W. Norton and Company (Standard Edition), 
New York, London, 1990, p. 6.
141 Ibid., p. 14.
142 “We may (…) regard the common traumatic neurosis as a consequence of an extensive breach 
being made in the protective shield against stimuli.” Ibid., p. 25.
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it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity 
has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by 
the circuitous paths along which its development leads. If we are to take it 
as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal 
reasons becomes inorganic once again then we shall be compelled to say 
that “the aim of all life is death” and, looking backwards, that “inanimate 
things existed before living ones”.143
 
Freud goes on to develop this idea in The Ego and the Id. 
 
However, so as to ensure the context is complete, we should re-
call that Freud had of course already examined “traumatic neuro-
sis” in his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, especially in the 
eighteenth lecture “Traumatic Fixation, the Unconscious”, in which 
he discusses the fixation on a certain segment of the past, which, 
though a significant symptom of every neurosis, is demonstrated es-
pecially powerfully by the war:  
 
The closest analogies to these conditions of our neurotics are furnished by 
the types of sickness which the war has just now made so frequent – the 
so-called traumatic neuroses. 
It is as if these patients had not yet gotten through with the traumatic 
situation, as if it were actually before them as a  task which was not yet 
mastered...144
 
After the war, what Freud terms “Nachträglichkeit” – “afterness” 
or deferred action – becomes one of the key intersections of the dif-
ferent lines forming the (new) philosophical discourse. At the same 
time, it is clear that this is not speculation but an attempt to capture 
143 Ibid., p. 34.
144 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey, W.W. Norton, 
New York 1977, p. 241.
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the experience and the strange temporality contained therein that 
disrupts linearity. 
This was confirmed in the aftermath of the horrors of the Second 
World War and the Nazi genocide. 
Otto Dov Kulka, who recollects life in Auschwitz in his book 
Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death, says: 
 
I  am after all a  child, who was bound with those chains as a  child and 
remained bound by them throughout every stage of growing up: I say that 
I was bound and remained bound, or fettered by chains, but that is because 
I was never there, because my foot never stepped into those courtyards, 
inside those buildings. I circled them as a moth circles a flame, knowing 
that falling into it was inevitable, yet I kept on circling outside, willingly or 
unwillingly – it was not up to me – all my friends, the butterflies, not all of 
them, but almost all of them were there and did not come out of there.145
 
His whole life bound to an experience he did not have and could 
not have had. “Bound”, i.e. he continues to live with it (it is still 
present), it returns again and again. However, we’re still not quite 
there... It’s more radical than that. What we are talking about is 
non-experience, an absence of experience. If this is experience, it is 
constantly being experienced outside the place within which the ex-
perience would have been possible (the crematorium at Auschwitz). 
However, it is for this reason (the absence of experience, the impos-
sibility of experience) that he who recounts this experience/non-
experience is someone who bears witness (to the experience of the 
absence of that experience to which he is “bound”). That which re-
turns is the impossibility of having any experience of that to which 
I bear witness and which, paradoxically, legitimises me as witness. 
Kulka’s text thematises the return, the repetition. It is not driv-
en by an endeavour to understand or explain, but on the contrary 
145 Otto Dov Kulka, Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death, trans. Ralph Mandel, Belknap Press, 
Cambridge 2013, p. 10.
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reflects upon the inexplicability of experience. For this reason his 
book features an ongoing internal conflict between the reflexive 
language of memory and the method by which the historian appre-
hends events.146 The reflexive language here, though not “enlight-
ening” experience, is nevertheless still inclined towards experience, 
forever re-returning experience. 
Traumatic narrative on a more general level is examined, for in-
stance, by Michael Rothberg, author of Traumatic Realism, who 
reveals the specific traumatic temporality in which that repetitive-
ness and “afterness” of experience asserts itself strongly. Within this 
framework he then investigates the possibility of the representation 
of the Holocaust as event. The endeavour of re-presentation is to 
document (so that the event is not forgotten), but also somehow to 
reflect. Whence a return of the “old” genre of realism, which would 
appear to be the genre best suited to both tasks. However, the event 
of the Holocaust drives classical realism to its furthest limit, because 
that which is to be re-presented can only be submitted “traumati-
cally”, i.e. by means of the registration of the repetitive structure of 
time (Nachträglichkeit and Wiederholungszwang). Hence the “dis-
course of extremity”, hence traumatic realism. 
 
Traumatic realism develops out of and in response to the demand for docu-
mentation that an extreme historical event poses to those who would seek 
to understand it (...) (it) is an attempt to product the traumatic event as an 
object of knowledge and (...) to transform its readers so that they are forced 
to acknowledge their relationship to posttraumatic culture.147
 
The narrative (storytelling, the narrative text) points to the event, 
but does so by means of a very special form of indexical relation-
ship. The traumatic index does not point to the present, but to the 
146 Ibid., “Introduction”, p. xii.
147 Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation. University of 
Minnesota Press. Minneapolis, London 2000, pp. 100–101.
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irrevocable absence of its referent (from Kafka to Beckett and other 
authors in whom philosophy took a keen interest during the latter 
half of the twentieth century). 
So what we have is something like a  collapse, the implosion of 
linear (historical) time. We have an event that is not within this 
time, as thought it were itself “temporalising” from a different tem-
porality that the event itself establishes, an event that conjugates 
itself differently. It is present as past, endlessly deferred in relation 
to itself, and yet only “present” in this deferral. 
Is experience of the Holocaust really experience? Or more precise-
ly: how “is” the event of the Holocaust in experience? Not simply in 
the sense of being present, initially as fact and then endlessly defer-
ring its own presence in its capacity as fact, but somehow transcend-
ing itself by virtue of the fact of its having happened (it is possible 
only at the point it has happened). In fact, as Claude Romano says, 
in the case of traumatic time the antithesis of memory is not forget-
ting but repetition. The event insists, persists, it is “stuck” within 
repetition. It is intolerable, and the impossibility of remembering 
(the configuration of the event as retrievable) is manifest in the rep-
etition of the unappropriated and inappropriable event (the trau-
ma). We are not in a position to remember freely what happened 
as having already taken place (completed, literally past). Or we are 
incapable of experience, i.e. that distance that memory provides. The 
past has not passed but continues to haunt the present (scaring it, 
stalking it, following in its footsteps, as Derrida will later write). 
The forgotten survives as a vector of repetition that does not retain 
the fact of the event but attempts (in vain) to break free from this 
fact, to escape it. 
Otto Dov Kulka again captures this perfectly when he describes 
a dream that recurs with slight variations. After many years he re-
turns to Auschwitz and goes downstairs. He has the feeling he has 
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as in those recurrent dreams in which I descend these stairs together with 
all my friends and all those who are close to me. It’s the dream that always 
takes me back there, when I know that there is no way to avoid that place, 
that everyone is bound to arrive at that place because it is an inalterable law 
of the place, one from which there is no escape, and there is no chance for the 
fantasy we conjure up about liberation and an end, like playful childish fanta-
sies, for an iron law leads everyone there and no one will escape from there.
I  also knew... that at the last moment I would be saved. (...) That night 
dream always brings me back to the same immutable law by which I end 
up back inside the crematorium and, by some roundabout way, through 
canals of dark water, through trenches and hidden openings, I dig beneath 
the barbed wire and reach freedom and board a train, and at one desolate 
station at night a  loudspeaker calls my name, and I  am returned to the 
place I am bound to reach: the crematorium. And however much I know 
that I must be caught, I always know, too, that I must be spared. It’s a kind 
of circle, a cycle of Tantalus or Sisyphus, or of whatever myth we choose to 
invoke that is germane here, which returns in an endless vicious circle to 
the same place.148
 
Escape ... is possible. But every escape is simply the first step on 
the path back to that from which he is escaping. And so that from 
which there is no escape is constantly present, albeit forevermore in 
absence. 
However, this dream is a form of experience because it “repeats” 
the real experience. Experience is “given” as a dream. When the so-
called family camp at Auschwitz is liquidated, the children are taken 
elsewhere. Their journey leads to the crematorium.  
 
We gazed at the smokestacks of one of the crematoria there. Step by step 
we drew closer. That primal experience of looming horror and of being 
sucked into it, swallowed within it – that is what persisted; that, and not 
148 Kulka, Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death, pp. 13–14.
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the relief, the overwhelming feeling of relief as we walked past the gate and 
continued toward the ‘sauna camp’ and entered it and through the win-
dows could even see into the crematorium compound – all this I somehow 
remember, but this experience did not persist in the memory. The primal ex-
perience, the one that persisted, is the trauma, recurring numberless times 
and encapsulating, like a highly concentrated essence, the immutable law 
of the Great Death. A law that prevailed and applied to each and every one 
of us. Grappling with it – hopelessly – yet aspiring compulsively to escape 
its clutches, was a formative experience.149
 
Though Benjamin’s pre-war theme of experience and its paralysis 
returns after the war in the writings of Adorno, the words remain 
but the meaning is completely transformed. In Minima Moralia 
Adorno writes: 
 
The sheer incommensurability of the body to the war of attrition the previous 
time around already made authentic experience impossible. No one could 
have talked about it the way the battles of the artillery-general Napoleon 
Bonaparte were recounted. The long interval between war memoirs and 
the armistice is not an accident: it testifies to the laborious reconstruc-
tion of memory, which remains conjoined to something powerless and even 
inauthentic in all those books, regardless of whatever horrors the writer 
witnessed. (...) World War II however is as completely devoid of experience 
as a machine is to the movements of a body, (the less can it leave behind) 
a continuous and unconsciously preserved picture of memory. Everywhere, 
with each explosion, it has broken through the protective shield in which 
personal experience formed, the duration between the healing forgetting 
and the healing memory. Life has transformed itself into a timeless succes-
sion of shocks, between which gape holes, paralysed intermediary spaces 
(...) No one will be able to think of this, that every trauma, every unpro-
cessed shock of that which recurs, is a ferment of coming destruction.150
149 Ibid., p. 33.
150 Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 54–55.
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The experience of the Holocaust is perceived as a traumatic experi-
ence. This means that its very re-presentation (leaving to one side 
the problematic nature of this term) by a philosophical discourse 
that draws on the language of tradition is impossible if it does not 
want to falsify the event that this experience – in shock – encoun-
tered. Although this involves grasping something past historically, 
any attempt to reflect upon this experience makes it clear that the 
very structure of linearly conceived time is incommensurate with 
this experience. In brief: we are faced with the experience of the im-
possibility of experience. The past is not securely deposited in mem-
ory. The event is still with us, but not in the manner of something – 
literally – past, but as something that coming to terms with is a task 
we are forever faced with. 
It is for this reason that philosophical discourse seeks a foothold 
in the Freudian concepts of repetition compulsion (Wiederholungsz-
wang) and afterness, or deferred action (Nachträglichkeit), since it 
is clear that with their help a more acceptable description of “trau-
matised” experience is possible. However, philosophy then comes 
up against temporality, which excludes the possibility of identifica-
tion, since understanding comes up against the evasiveness of that 
which it is attempting to re-cognise, its irreducible absence in pres-
ence. This temporality is manifest in different ways and very often in 
paradoxes (which, given the traditional language of philosophy, is to 
be expected). For instance, the first sentence of Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics reads as follows:  
 
Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to 
realise it was missed.151
151 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 3.
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The Holocaust is thus a kind of consequence of the radical crisis of 
European rationality. If we wish to find causes, we must return and 
search in the tradition of European reason for that which remained 
overlooked until the outbreak of this radical crisis. We must reflect 
on the European tradition of rationalism. Inasmuch as the start-
ing point of Husserl’s critical reflection (Besinnung) is crisis, and 
crisis itself calls for retrospective questioning (Rückfrage) aimed at 
the original establishment and the remembrance thereof, then for 
Adorno the starting point of a no less critical thinking (Nachden-
ken) is catastrophe. Though Adorno’s  retrospective questioning is 
also directed at the “original establishment”, which is what he terms 
the Enlightenment and is basically identical to European rationality 
(even though its origin resides elsewhere, with Bacon, at the crosso-
ver point to myth or in myth itself), this is not in order to resuscitate 
some original idea but to find in it the “regressive moment” that 
caused the idea of the Enlightenment to repudiate itself. This does 
not entail – and in this respect there is an analogy with Husserl, 
though Adorno is far more radical  – rejecting this idea, because 
freedom is inseparable from enlightened thinking. No, the therapy 
is more complicated than that. If the Enlightenment does not want 
definitively to seal its own fate, it must also include in itself a criti-
cal reflection upon this “regressive moment”.152 Clearly this does 
not imply teleology. However, like Husserl, Adorno identifies a crisis 
leading to catastrophe in the fact that science, as a consequence of 
its instrumentalisation, has lost its meaning. In this respect Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment is the continuation of 
Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences through the prism of 
the event that was the Holocaust, and thus marks the beginning of 
a radical transformation of philosophical discourse. 
The title Dialectic of Enlightenment tells us clearly what direction, 
pace Husserl, this Rückfrage conducted by Adorno and Horkheimer 
152 Theodore W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, Stan-
ford UP, Stanford 2002, p. xvi ("rückläufiges Moment").
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will take (the preface is dated May 1944, and the entire volume was 
published in 1947, which means it came out in the same year as 
Primo Levi’s  If This is a  Man). The Enlightenment of its title is 
much broader in scope. The word is usually associated with the idea 
of “progress”. However, if this is how we choose to understand it, we 
are soon brought up short by the following sentence: “The curse of 
irresistible progress is irresistible regression.”153 From this we glean 
that, whereas for Husserl crisis is something that appears at a cer-
tain moment in history, for Adorno and Horkheimer the crisis is the 
very idea of the Enlightenment in that form in which it has devel-
oped up until the present day. The aim of the Enlightenment in the 
most general sense of the term was to release people from fear and 
grant them mastery. “Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant 
with triumphant calamity.”154 Or in other (better) words: the cause 
of the crisis is contained in the very establishment of the idea of en-
lightenment, i.e. in the very basis from which that rationality evolves 
in which the “regressive moment” is contained from the start.  
Adorno and Horkheimer are at their most provocative and radical 
when they overthrow the whole idea of a chasm separating myth and 
(rational) science. An example of this is when they claim that the 
Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalised,155 which now emerges in 
the manifest form of an always latent crisis, right now as we pose the 
question of “why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, 
is sinking into a new kind of barbarism”.156 Another example would 
be when they say that “the myths which fell victim to the Enlighten-
ment were themselves its own products”.157 This is a paradox only 
if we cleave to the idea of a discontinuity between myth and reason. 
If, however, we take reason to mean explanation, then myth already 
153 Ibid., p. 28 (“unaufhaltsame Regression”).
154 Ibid., p. 1.
155 Ibid., p. 11.
156 Ibid., p. iv.
157 Ibid., p. 5.
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fulfils this function, myth is already science (and on the contrary sci-
ence succumbs to myth, e.g. the “myth of progress”). What is to be 
achieved through explanation? The answer to this question involves 
a critical reflection on the “regressive moment” when it shows that 
the ultimate goal of explaining is to achieve mastery over nature. 
Just as for Husserl the history of Europe is identical with a certain 
idea of reason, so the same is true of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
However, at the same time the two ideas are virtually incommensu-
rate. For Husserl, science is identical with responsibility for the evi-
dence of cognition, with insight, with an “intrusion” into the essence 
of the thing itself. However, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, 
science establishes itself as the attempt to gain dominion over real-
ity by explaining it. The aim of science is to overcome a mythicised 
world characterised by a fear of nature in its capacity as unfathom-
able exterior, which is why power and knowledge are synonymous 
(though this is the basis of the tradition of enlightened rationality). 
Reason is instrumentalised, and this then means that it is not superi-
or to purposes (sovereignty over nature), but is subordinate to them. 
Leaving aside the different frameworks, in many respects this 
analysis of the instrumentalisation of reason builds on Husserl, at 
times explicitly (Adorno’s dissertation was concerned with the tran-
scendence of the noematic object, i.e. it was intended to reveal the 
implicit “materialism” of phenomenology through the irreducibility 
of the empirical moment in an intentional relationship). Adorno 
and Horkheimer cite Husserl and his account of how mathematics 
gained independence:  
 
An infinite world, here a world of idealities, is conceived, not as one whose 
objects become accessible to our knowledge singly, imperfectly, and as it 
were accidentally, but as one which is attained by a  rational, systemati-
cally coherent method. In the infinite progression of this method, every 
object is ultimately attained according to its full being-in-itself (...) Through 
Galileo’s  mathematisation of nature, nature itself is idealised under the 
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guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes – to express it in 
a modern way – a mathematical manifold (Manningfaltigkeit).158
 
In its way the Dialectic of Enlightenment is saying something simi-
lar: the Enlightenment establishes only formal rationality because 
instrumental reason prioritises mathematical formalism and formal 
logic without reflecting on the goals to be achieved. Thinking be-
comes an automatic process (it competes with the machine, which it 
would like to replace159). The idea of science is positivistically dimin-
ished and becomes indifferent to questions of meaning. The problem 
is that only questions of meaning mean anything to Man. The world 
is a gigantic analytical judgement. 
However, as I mentioned, the framework is different and this mod-
ifies the perspective. According to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
the driver of enlightenment is reason, rationality, science as power 
over nature (the outside), i.e. Herrschaft or sovereignty, dominion. 
However, both the nature without and the nature within, i.e. “hu-
man nature”, must be mastered in this way. At the same time, rea-
son controlled by reality is rationalisation (the level of the general), 
to which the individual (or everything particular or specific) must be 
subordinate: a new collapse into myth, because a universe controlled 
by general necessity then necessarily appears as fatum. Society, too, 
is “rationalised”:  
 
The generality of the ideas developed by discursive logic, power in the 
sphere of the concept, is built on the foundation of power in reality... Pow-
er confronts the individual as the universal, as the reason which informs 
reality.”160
The generalisation of instrumental rationality rules here and there. 
158 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 22.
159 At the very start of his career, Husserl had already subjected the first attempts at the formalisa-
tion of logic to the same critique and called for a logic of content.
160 Adorno, Horkheimer, Dialectics of Enlightenment, p. 10, 16 ("rückläufiges Momen").
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This already anticipates the thesis of Negative Dialectics that “the 
whole is untrue”, since the philosophical concepts by which the 
world is interpreted and that are instruments of power raise the 
social conditions that justify them to the level of true reality by de-
manding general recognition (just as only the world as it is re-pre-
sented by science is raised to the status of “true world” by means 
of mathematisation). The idea of the Enlightenment contains the 
seeds of its own destruction in the form of instrumentalised ration-
ality. This is the “regressive moment”, reflections upon which must 
be embraced by reason if it does not want to seal definitively the fate 
of the founding idea. In other words, reason must reflect upon its 
outside-in and not eliminate it by passing it off as something that is 
“outside” it. (This is Husserl’s gesture, a gesture that, one might say, 
wants to force the “regressive moment” out into the outside). Rea-
son must somehow be true to that which so-called progress destroys. 
This is because 
 
enlightenment must reflect on itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayed. 
(…) What is at stake is not conservation of the past but the fulfilment of 
past hopes.161
 
It is impossible to quit the Enlightenment or to remain within it 
without reflection. This paradox can only be resolved if historical de-
velopment understands itself differently, if it follows the path to this 
other understanding illuminated by the catastrophic culmination of 
the history of European rationality. One might say that the history 
of European reason has from the very beginning been controlled by 
a strange dialectic – strange, because it is neither the Hegelian dia-
lectic (the gradual sublation of contradictions on increasingly high-
er levels of consciousness, or “spiritualisation”), nor it is the Hus-
serlian “dialectic”, which in the final analysis is not a dialectics at all 
161 Ibid, p. xvii.
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since empirical history only derives meaning from the perspective 
of ideal teleology. A strange dialectic indeed... it is difficult so much 
as to consider it as “movement”. Every progress goes hand in hand 
with regression. The revelation of the beginning reveals the end, 
overcoming myth is a myth, catastrophe illuminated the Urstiftung 
of rationality as crisis. Auschwitz does not mean a return to a point 
prior to the modern era, but is somehow the moment of just this 
era. After Auschwitz the mutual “constellation” of culture and bar-
barism swap places, and this helps us understand the claim that “to 
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”. Without reflection upon 
the “regressive moment”, every example of progress is the progress 
of barbarism. The assiduous cultivation of culture can only mask 
the fact that we are once again falling back into barbarism. All this 
is complicated by the fact that the Holocaust is incomprehensible 
and unnameable and therefore in the realm of the incommensurable 
while at the same time being within rationality. 
Henceforth Adorno’s dialectic will work within a different, “trau-
matic” temporality. Adorno is uncompromising in this respect and 
his texts are often accompanied by a complicated network of pro-
lepsis and analepsis (in film language: flashback and flash forward). 
Take, for example, this aphoristic observation from Minima Moralia: 
 
What the Germans have committed is beyond comprehension, even the 
psychological kind, given that the horror seems to have been perpetrated 
more as blindly planned and alienated measures (Schreckmassnahmen) of 
terror than as spontaneous gratification. According to the reports of eye-
witnesses, the torture and murder were carried out without enthusiasm, 
and perhaps for that reason went so far beyond all bounds. Nevertheless, 
the consciousness which would like to withstand the unspeakable sees 
itself thrown back again and again to the attempt to understand, so that 
it does not subjectively fall prey to the madness which objectively rules. 
The thought irresistibly obtrudes that the German horror was something 
like a  revenge taken in advance. The credit system in which everything, 
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even world conquest, can be advanced, determines also the actions which 
prepared its end and the end of the entire market society, all the way to the 
suicide of the dictatorship. In the concentration camps and gas chambers 
the downfall of Germany is, as it were, being discounted (...) At the begin-
ning of German imperialism stands Wagner’s Twilight of the Gods, the rap-
turous prophecy of their own doom, whose composition was undertaken si-
multaneously with the victorious war of 1879. In the same spirit, two years 
before WW II, the German public saw a film of the downfall of their zep-
pelin in Lakehurst. Calm, posed, the ship went on its way, only to suddenly 
plummet straight down. If there remains no way out, then the destructive 
drive becomes completely indifferent as to what it never firmly established: 
as to whether it is directed against others or against its own subject.162  
162 Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 103–104.
137
19
Traumatic temporality is that in which the impossibility of experi-
ence is experienced, an experience that endures in consciousness as 
an unassimilable exterior. And so reason, as founded in the enlight-
enment project, can only be saved if a method is found of remind-
ing us of this experience. For this experience is paralysed, it must 
be brought to speech within philosophical reflection. Because this 
reflection moves within the element of concepts, it is necessary that 
a concept become its expression without ceasing to be a concept, i.e. 
it is essential that it also become an index of its exterior.
Traumatic experience is (the experience of) suffering – Leiden. 
This word, which has many different meanings, is also used by 
Adorno as the keystone of different registers of reflection. Generally 
speaking, Leiden is the consequence of violence perpetrated against 
everything individual or other insofar as it is identified as such, i.e. 
apprehended in re-cognition by intellectual categories and concepts. 
However, Leiden is also experienced by the subject as an identifi-
able part of rationalised society. Leiden ultimately refers to the final 
solution, to the physical elimination of the unidentifiable exterior. 
European history is the history of suffering that surpasses identify-
ing thought while at the same time being the last condition for the 
possibility of the transformation thereof. 
Within critical reflection upon itself, conceptual thinking must 
become an expression of suffering. The crisis of conceptual thinking 
consists of a misconception (in the case of Hegel) of contradiction as 
an index of the falsehood of identity, which is why it always left to one 
side that which escaped it. This explains the necessity for the negative 
dialectic: at the very instant the concept fails, it illuminates that which 
experience prevented it from expressing, and everything that had been 
suppressed and rejected by concepts comes to light. In respect of the 
concept this sedimented exterior is sedimented Leiden, and the truth 
is only articulated by the decaying remains of conceptual thinking. 
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The basic terms of Adorno’s philosophy – experience, nonlinear-
ity, expression and concept – are constellated, as it were, in this way. 
However, every idea contained within and owing its existence to this 
constellation has a specific meaning. Each idea refers to a range of oth-
ers, without the significance of any of these terms being dominant or 
central. The constellation has no centre or, as Adorno says, in a philo-
sophical text everything should be in the same proximity from the cen-
tre. Each moment contains traces of all other moments within itself. 
From a different perspective, the method by which thought proceeds 
has no reason for proceeding thus but is legitimised by its outcome. 
It is undeniable that constellation is a word with a Benjaminian 
pedigree. An “idea” that is neither illustrative nor immediately com-
municable since it belongs to a  temporality other than historical 
temporality only makes an appearance if it is possible to organise 
the concrete fragments, i.e. the elementary elements of phenomena 
that remain when their false unity is shattered. This is because for 
Benjamin, “... the value of fragments of thoughts is all the great-
er the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea.”163 
Benjamin thus locates a point of departure from the following par-
adox: we have to respect the uniqueness of the fragment without 
projecting it into some kind of whole as a part thereof, because then 
the unique significance it has as a fragment would be invalidated.164 
(Adorno’s “The whole is untrue” points in the same direction.) In 
Adorno the constellation is intended to offer a glimpse of that which 
disappears in the concept. It is in its way a complex indexical sym-
bol.165 The constellation 
163 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Epistemo-Critical Prologue, trans. John 
Osborne, Verso, London and New York 1978, p. 29.
164 Regarding Benjamin’s concept of the constellation see especially Takao Tsunekava, “Konfigu-
ratives Denken und Allegorie”, in: Klaus Graber, Ludger Rehm (eds.), Global Benjamin 1 (Internati-
onaler Walter-Benjamin-Kongress 1992), Fink Verlag, München 1999, p. 192 et seq.
165 Siegfried Kracauer works analogously with the idea of the “ornament”. However, it is his Pass-
sagen-Werk that most approximates to Benjamin’s work with fragment. A more remote response can 
also be found in G. Didi-Huberman, e.g. in Devant l’image, Ed. de Minuit, Paris 1990.
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illuminates the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying 
procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden. (...) By themselves, 
constellations represent from without what the concept has cut away with-
in: the ‘more’ which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of be-
ing. By gathering around the object of cognition, the concepts potentially 
determine the object’s  interior. They attain, in thinking, what was neces-
sarily excised from thinking. (...) Instead, what is indissoluble in any previ-
ous thought context transcends its seclusion in its own, as nonidentical. It 
communicates with that from which it was separated by the concept. It is 
opaque only for identity’s claim to be total; it resists the pressure of that 
claim. But as such it seeks to be audible. Whatever part of nonidentity de-
fies definition in its concept goes beyond its individual existence; it is only 
in polarity with the concept, in staring at the concept, that it will contract 
into that existence. The inside of nonidentity is its relation to that which it 
is not, and which its managed, frozen self-identity withholds from it. (...) 
The object opens itself to a monadological insistence, to a sense of the con-
stellation in which it stands; the possibility of internal immersion requires 
that externality. (...) Becoming aware of the constellation in which a thing 
stands is tantamount to deciphering the constellation which, having come 
to be, it bears within it. The chorismos of without and within is histori-
cally qualified in turn. (...) As a constellation, theoretical thought circles the 
concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open like the lock of 
a well guarded safe-deposit box: in response, not to a single key or a single 
number, but to a combination of numbers.”166
 
However, Adorno’s Nachstiftung, the new establishment of concep-
tual thinking as thinking in constellations, has radical implications. 
Philosophy does not resign itself to systematic interpretation. In-
stead, interpretation now has a strange and unique architecture that 
is described very effectively by Hermann Broch at the beginning of 
The Sleepwalkers (in the episode dated 1888, though the novel was 
166 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 3.
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written between 1928 and 1932, almost in parallel with Husserl’s The 
Crisis of European Sciences), when Joachim von Pasenow is assailed 
by the feeling that “some pillar or other of life had become shaky, 
and though everything still remained in its old place, because the 
parts reciprocally supported each other, yet along with a vague wish 
that the vaulted arch of this equilibrium might cave in and entomb 








167 Hermann Broch, The Sleepwalkers, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Vintage, New York 1966, 
p. 11. This image probably finds its origin in Heinrich von Kleist’s letter of 16 November 1800 to 
Wilhelmine von Zenge: “Engrossed in my thoughts I returned via the arched gate to the city. Why, 
I wondered does the arch not collapse given that it is not supported by anything? It remains standing, 
I answered, because all the blocks want to come tumbling down upon each other.” Kleist also used 
the image in the tragic drama Penthesilea, v. 1348–9.
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That which is only hinted at in Husserl is made explicit in Adorno, 
beginning with the Dialectic of Enlightenment, namely that critical 
theory tracks rationality from the start of its journey to the catas-
trophe that is its shocking, traumatising outcome. This outcome is 
shocking and traumatising because it is irrational. The only possible 
philosophical response is relentless self-reflexive thinking.
 
Having broken its pledge to be as one with reality or at the point of realisa-
tion, philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticise itself.168
 
If philosophy is not in agreement with reality because that which 
is real (the traumatising reality of the Holocaust) is not rational, 
and that which would appear to be reasonable is clearly not real, 
then the prerequisite of the identity of thinking (rational “science” 
in the sense in which Hegel uses this word) and being is unsustain-
able because it is refuted by reality. Reflection upon the genuine his-
tory of rationality opens the way to criticism of the basic condition 
of classical ontology. If Dialectic of Enlightenment responds to this 
reflection (analogously to Husserl’s Besinnung) with a request for 
self-criticism on the part of reason, then one of the central themes 
of Dialectic of Enlightenment is self-criticism on the part of the con-
cept169, which discovers in Hegel’s positive dialectic the possibility 
of negative dialectic. The aim will not be to hypostasise the concept 
of the non-conceptual, but rather to show that the non-conceptual 
moment is the guarantor of the material congruity of the concept 
(its Sachhaltigkeit, or substantiality), and that it must therefore also 
be a measure of such thinking that, precisely for material reasons, 
relinquishes the classical claim to “totality”. 
168 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 3.
169 Ibid, p. 136.
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The thoughts of transcendental apperception or of Being could satisfy phi-
losophers as long as they found those concepts identical with their own 
thoughts. Once we dismiss such identity in principle, the peace of the con-
cept as an Ultimate will be engulfed in the fall of the identity. Since the 
basic character of every general concept dissolves in the face of distinct 
entity, a total philosophy is no longer to be hoped for.170
 
At this juncture it is worth nothing that Adorno often calls as wit-
ness Samuel Beckett and his Endgame: 
 
Hence interpretation of Endgame cannot pursue the chimerical aim of ex-
pressing the play’s meaning in a form mediated by philosophy. Understand-
ing it can mean only understanding its unintelligibility, concretely recon-
structing the meaning of the fact that it has no meaning.
After the Second World War, everything, including a resurrected culture, 
has been destroyed without realizing it; humankind continues to vegetate, 
creeping along after events that even the survivors cannot really survive, on 
a rubbish heap that has made even reflection on one’s own damaged state 
useless.171
 
It is from this seed that Adorno’s Negative Dialectic gradually grows. 
It is notoriously “difficult”, not least because it features a particular 
“composition” (the musical term is entirely appropriate in this case): 
 
Ideas should be driven to testify not by the logical necessity of systemati-
cally organised arguments, but by the configuration of moments within their 
context... Philosophy is not essentially “referencable”... Adorno’s language 
is dramatically escalated, as though catastrophe or salvation depended on 
170 Ibid., p. 136; cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Ontologie und Dialektik (1960/61), ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 2008, pp. 325–326.
171 Theodor W. Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1981, pp. 283 and 286.
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the completely minute movement of thought. His guiding principle is exag-
geration.172
 
If we return to the quote from the beginning of Negative Dialec-
tic, it becomes clear that the “negativity” of the dialectic refers to 
nothing more than the necessity of integrating the outside inside, 
without this meaning that the resulting whole is ever an enclosed 
whole.  
The promise that philosophy (thinking, reason) is/will be at one 
with reality is contradicted by the fact that the concepts by which 
reality was/is to be understood diverge in an irreducible way from 
reality. The idea that thinking would one day be able (conceptual-
ly) to grasp reality in its entirety (with no remainder) is not only 
unsustainable, but dangerous, because it postulates that cognitive 
reason is (in the final analysis) identical with the order that it re-
veals in reality, i.e. that reality is rational along the lines of rational 
thinking inasmuch as it postulates the identity of thinking and be-
ing. However, this means that the assumption that establishes the 
Enlightenment version of reason must be subject to criticism, and 
the irreconcilability of concept and thing must be borne in mind. 
The promise that enlightenment reason made (in the sense of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, i.e. Western philosophy) is broken in 
the most shattering way in the complete and utter irrationality of 
the Holocaust, an event that is incomprehensible by reason that was 
played out within a history that was thought to be leading towards 
the definitive permeation of reality by reason. 
The contours now become clearer of that revealed by the analy-
sis of the genesis of enlightenment and instrumental reason under-
taken in Dialectic of Enlightenment. The concept that “identifies” 
a thing also violates it (the thing “suffers” identification) and reveals 
that the driving force of conceptual thinking is power, namely the 
172 Interpretationen. Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert, Reclam, Stuttgart 1992; Die-
ter Birnbacher, “Negative Dialektik” pp. 336–337. 
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attempt to control and eliminate the uncontrollable. Not even Marx 
escapes censure. In his Lectures on Negative Dialectics Adorno says 
that, for Marx too, the unlimited control of man over nature is be-
yond question, which is why his dream of a classless society is akin 
to a giant joint-stock company for the exploitation of nature.173 The 
remedy to this situation must be just as remorseless, but at the ex-
pense of the concept, the system, and the act of identification (i.e. 
the belittlement of a unique entity by means of a general concept), 
at the expense of systematic, controlling, totalising thinking that 
forbids anything to remain outside. The task is to protect this out-
side. 
Adorno’s  philosophy, i.e. his negative dialectic, is thus on the 
boundary of the modern and postmodern. It is about rescuing the 
“modern” (the idea of the Enlightenment) through a reinterpreta-
tion of it that takes the form of a  certain overthrow: “...consum-
mate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image 
of its opposite”174 This would be the elementary form of the search 
for traces of the possibility of another modernist project within mod-
ernism itself. The authors who emerged in the 1960s differed from 
Adorno in that they were operating on the other side of this bound-
ary (Lyotard, Levinas, Derrida, Blanchot, Agamben et al.)175 
But why should this involve another modernist project? Because 
it involves the search for a different rationality to that which was 
not only unable to prevent the Holocaust, but actually made it pos-
sible, while acknowledging that reason cannot be surrendered. It is 
173 Theodor W. Adorno, Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik. Fragmente zur Vorlesung 1965/66, 
ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2008, p. 89. Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Frag-
ments of a Lecture Course 1965/1966, Polity Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 89.
174 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 247.
175 Perhaps as (from the perspective of “postmodernism”) post-metaphysical thinking. In the case 
of Adorno is it relatively clear: it is the consequence of the maximum tightening of modern concepts 
to their limit (which is how he treats Hegel); pushing modern and classical philosophical concepts to 
their limit. Openness also means going beyond these limits. In philosophy it is therefore necessary 
to protect something from the system, namely that phenomena create coherence objectively, and not 
only on the basis of the classification to which the cognising subject subordinates them.
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therefore essential to find the traces of another reason within ratio-
nality itself. This is clearly the sense of the passage from Minima 
Moralia quoted above (“mirror-writing of its opposite”). Reflections 
upon history should reveal the traces of another modernism, or, as 
Husserl might put it, should be a recollection of its original primary 
establishment. This is a good way of interpreting Adorno’s negative 
dialectic. Philosophy is thinking in concepts. It emerges from the 
act of identification (the recognition of the individual by means of 
the concept). However, the underbelly of the act of identification is 
that something inevitably leaves its trace in it, something that resists 
identification, something unidentifiable, i.e. the outside in relation 
to the identifying concept. Adorno calls this das Nicht-identische or 
non-identical. (And for that reason the “other” modernism referred 
to above would be unidentifiable within the context of the histori-
cal since its traces would only be visible later.) This reflection allows 
us to perceive in the act of identification the exercise of power (the 
acquisition of knowledge for the purpose of control, Herrschaftswis-
sen), and thus the fundamental ambivalence of modern rational-
ity. Furthermore, insofar as only one aspect of rationality prevails, 
namely that of power, we also perceive in that rationality the basis 
of the catastrophe of reason: the dominion of that claim to power 
that leads to rationality in the form of instrumental reason. Or to 
put it another way: rigorous reflection will lead us to recognise the 
disregard paid to ambivalence, the disregard paid to the dialectic of 
the Enlightenment. According to Adorno, this neglect can only be 
confronted or remedied by dialectical reason, regarding which he 
states very “dialectically” in Minima Moralia:  
 
Dialectical reason is, when set against the dominant mode of reason, un-
reason: only in encompassing and cancelling this mode does it become 
reasonable.176
176 Adorno, Minima Moralia, pp. 72–73.
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We therefore need to examine in detail what Adorno means by “dia-
lectical”. In the lectures Einführung in die Dialektik of 1958 Adorno 
offers the following explanation: the concept must be appropriate 
to the thing, it should be the expression of the thing, since concepts 
are formed through their confrontation with that which they “con-
ceive”. This means that 
 
The dialectic is indeed a method which refers to the proces of thinking, but 
it also differs from other methods insofar as it constantly strives not to stand 
still, constantly corrects itself in the presence of the things themselves. We 
could define dialectic as a kind of thinking which does not content itself 
merely with the order of concepts but, rather, undertakes to correct the 
conceptual order by reference to the being of the objects themselves (…). 
Dialectic is the method of thinking which is not merely a method, but the 
attempt to overcome the merely arbitrary character of method and to admit 
into the concept that which is not itself concept.177
 
The word “dialectic” implicitly presupposes that thought equals con-
ceptual thinking. However, the concept must be appropriate to the 
thing. The concept should be an explanation of the thing and there-
fore the thing must (constantly) correct itself, because concepts are 
formed through their conflict with that which they “apprehend”. 
The concept should not overcome the resistance of the thing (which 
is the struggle of instrumental reason serving “control”), but should 
unfold by means of this resistance. Though Adorno’s concept of dia-
lectic is clearly inspired by Hegel, it represents a muscular reinter-
pretation, since Hegel’s dialectic assumes, in the last instance, the 
absolute identity of all designations thus obtained about the thing. 
This is why in the end Hegel’s dialectic assumes a whole in which 
all of the thing’s resistance has been annulled and the concept and 
the thing become as one (truth is the whole, the outcome; this is the 
177 Theodor W. Adorno, Einführung in die Dialektik (1958), ed. Ch. Ziermann, Nachgelassene 
Schriften, IV: Vorlesungen, 2, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2010, pp. 10–11.
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significance of the term “totality” used by Adorno). For Adorno, 
on the other hand, the meaning of the dialectic derives from the 
fact that the “dialectic of the concept” is placed in opposition to the 
traditional ontology of the highest categories (the defining attribute 
of which is timelessness, immutability, a constant structure178), in 
other words that the concept must follow its thing, it must forever 
compare itself with what it intends (the “intention” of the concept), 
and it must do this in such a way that a difficulty (Schwierigkeiten) 
emerges between the concept and the thing that obliges us to change 
this concept during the process of thinking (without its being neces-
sary to relinquish earlier designations): the divergence of concept 
and thing, Begriff und Sache auseinandertreten. Adorno’s dialectic 
is characterised by the priority granted the object. 
 
Perhaps I may add here that what motivated me personally to turn to dialec-
tics in a decisive sense is precisely this micrological motif, namely the idea 
that if we only abandon ourselves unreservedly to the compulsion exercised 
by a particular object, by a particular matter, and pursue this single and 
specific matter unreservedly, then the ensuing movement is itself so deter-
mined out of the matter that it possesses the character of truth even if the 
Absolute, as an all-embracing totality, can never be given to us.179
 
It should now be clear why Adorno refers specifically to “negative” 
dialectics. Firstly, something is revealed in this movement, some-
thing substantive (Sachhaltiges), something that is not identical 
with thinking. Secondly, this movement is inexorable, it can never be 
178 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, p. 40:“Thinking would be a form of thinking that is not 
itself a system, but one in which system and the systematic impulse are consumed; a form of thinking 
that in its analysis of individual phenomena demonstrates the power that formerly aspired to build 
systems. By this I mean the power that is liberated by blasting open individual phenomena through 
the insistent power of thought. This power is the same power that once animated the system, since it 
is the force which enabled individual phenomena, non-identical with their own concepts as they are, 
to become more than themselves.” 
179 Theodor W. Adorno, Einführung in die Dialektik (1958); idem, An Introduction to Dialectics, 
trans. Nicholas Walker, Polity Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 21.
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terminated. From which we may conclude (pace Hegel’s phenom-
enology of spirit): the whole is untrue. The form in which we think 
of the thing is not the form of the thought thing itself. Dialectical 
thinking is the consequence. It is a sustained critique of those very 
concepts with which thinking works conceptually. It must forever 
act with the concept in the name of the concept.180 
Perhaps, therefore, we are justified in claiming that Adorno is on 
a quest to find the traces of a different modernist project, the traces 
of a different rationality. The first trace: Begriff und Sache ausein-
andertreten, or the divergence of concept and thing. This is virtually 
the “fundament” of the different thinking that will appear in a vari-
ety of forms, especially in thinking of and from difference. And here 
we find a  second important trace: reason (rationality) is intrinsi-
cally linked with the idea of justice, since it is about constantly being 
true to the thing as apprehended by the concept, while justice is the 
knowledge of the irreducibility of the non-identical moment, i.e. it is 
the unrealisable extent of the reality of our thinking.181 
Thinking that is not measured against the idea of justice cannot 
prevent something like the Holocaust: nay, it bears responsibility for 
Auschwitz. It is thinking that eliminates, annihilates the outside, to 
oversimplify matters somewhat. In negative dialectics the outside is 
in a certain sense both outside and inside, inasmuch as truth is both 
a process and the outcome of this process that, however, is open, 
open for and to the outside.182 
And here is where we find the third trace, namely the priority 
granted the object in negative dialectics. Everything (recognition, 
180 According to Adorno a version of this traditional ontology is Heidegger’s use of “existentiells”, 
i.e. categories by which the “structure of the being of Dasein” can be described. 
181 Jacques Derrida: deconstruction is justice, because justice cannot be converted to law, “there 
is always a remainder”, c.f. Force of Law et al.
182 In his essay on Eichendorff, a poet in the tradition of German idealism, Adorno cites a passage 
in which Eichendorff reproaches the whole of post-Kantian philosophy for omitting everything dark, 
dissonant, i.e. that which cannot emerge in the glow of rationalism, the moment of the “irrational” 
(An Introduction to Dialectics, p. 37) as the ground of another thinking that implies a different ra-
tionality. 
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the articulation of experience) takes place in the element of think-
ing, but always with reference to the real (contemporary) world. 
Negative dialectics is the path to the articulation (expression) of the 
experience of the fundamental historicity of the world. In reality it is 
nothing more than Bewegtes und Werdendes, or movement and be-
coming; history (real history), i.e.the events of a world in which the 
same is constantly becoming its own other, its own antithesis, takes 
priority over being. The price paid for failing to understand and act 
upon this is what the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School (in-
spired by Lukacs) termed reification (Verdinglichung). 
These three “traces” are artfully woven together so as to bring out 
their mutual implications by Roger Foster in his book Adorno: The 
Recovery of Experience, when he writes: 
 
This failure opens a breach within immanence, in which the transcendent 
appears within it as what cannot be said (and therefore as external to con-
cepts). What Adorno calls the ‘unfreedom’ of philosophy is its dependence 
on historical experience, which, in turn, is not the idealist story of a self-
realising subject, but rather the subordination to ‘nature’, by which Adorno 
means that it is driven by blind, nonrational forces. But because interpreta-
tion retains the striving of thought to say the unsayable, even though it is 
impossible within current experience, it maintains the possibility of redemp-
tion in the form of hope. It is therefore the constant exertion of thought to 
say what it cannot say that preserves the transcendent within thinking.183
 
The divergence of thing and concept monitored and elaborated on 
by negative dialectics can in simple terms be expressed thus: there 
is never any equivalence between the concept and the thing. How-
ever, this very fact reveals  – ex negativo  – equivalence as a  basic 
tool of a controlling knowledge, of instrumental rationality: equiva-
lence is the original principle of conceptual thinking that, through 
183 Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience. State University of New York Press, New 
York 2007, p. 84.
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the identification of the particular by means of the concept, levels 
off the diverse as non-identical: identificatory thought is thought in 
equivalents (of things themselves) – the word Gleichschaltung is not 
far off. And so like goods, something like a construct emerges by 
means of abstraction from qualities and use value (reduction to an 
exchange value that allows for the comparability of the incompara-
ble), and so the most diverse realities are comparable whensoever 
they are mediated by a concept. Total convertibility permits nature 
to become controllable (the result on the level of society is “the ab-
stract monotony of the administered world”, according to Negative 
Dialectics).184 Adorno of course adopts the concept of general equiv-
alence from Marx’s analysis of the function of money,185 but gener-
alises it and in particular elicits further consequences from it: philo-
sophical expression seeks to communicate something that is outside 
the plane of convertibility (it is not tied to “existing relations”) and 
must therefore reflect the method by which it is expressed. The phil-
osophical text must be capable of communicating a philosophically 
articulated experience of reality – of being its “equivalent”, albeit 
incommutable: it will help that which has no equal to itself to find 
expression. So again the problem of justice arises and with it a ques-
tion: how not to speak of the Holocaust, to paraphrase Derrida. 
Perhaps this would suffice to legitimise the assumption that 
thinking after Auschwitz cannot be understood as a  break with 
184 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 6.
185 Nevertheless, mention is made of the principle of equivalence even by Georg Simmel: “money, 
with its colourlessness and its indifferent quality, can become a common denominator of all values, 
it becomes the frightful leveller – it hollows out the core of things, their peculiarities, their specific 
values and their uniqueness and incomparability in a way which is beyond repair. They all float with 
the same specific gravity in the constantly moving stream of money. They all rest on the same level 
and are distinguished only by their amounts. In individual cases this colouring, or rather this de-col-
ouring of things, through their equation with money, may be imperceptibly small. In the relationship, 
however, which the wealthy person has to objects which can be bought for money, perhaps indeed 
in the total character which, for this reason, public opinion now recognises in these objects, it takes 
on very considerable proportions.” Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, Blackwell, Oxford 
2002, p. 16.
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modernism but as a search for the traces of a different project of 
modernity. The discovery of these traces leads to the transformation 
of philosophical discourse. Identificatory thinking in its capacity as 
eliminatory thinking, the deconstruction of which leads to a situa-
tion in which an other rationality is revealed in it, is the basic char-
acteristic of modernist thinking, i.e. that against which philosophy 
of the latter half of the 20th century turns. 
Adorno’s  negative dialectics slot perfectly into this context be-
cause his texts, by virtue of their style and their relationship to con-
ceptual thinking and systematicity, exemplify the transformation of 
philosophical discourse. In order to demonstrate this I would like to 
take a typical passage from Negative Dialectics. 
 
A  new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree 
mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not 
repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. When we want to find 
reasons for it, this imperative is as refractory as the given one of Kant was 
once upon a time. Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the 
new imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum – bodily, 
because it is now the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony 
to which individuals are exposed even with individuality about to vanish as 
a form of mental reflection. It is in the unvarnished materialistic motive only 
that morality survives. 
The course of history forces materialism upon metaphysics, traditionally the 
direct antithesis of materialism. What the mind once boasted of defining 
or construing as its like moves in the direction of what is unlike the mind, 
in the direction of that which eludes the rule of the mind and yet manifests 
that rule as absolute evil. The somatic, unmeaningful stratum of life is the 
stage of suffering, of the suffering which in the camps, without any consola-
tion, burned every soothing feature out of the mind, and out of culture, the 
mind’s objectification.186
186 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 365–366.
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The formulation of this idea is characteristically complicated. Our 
understanding of it depends on our finding in it a figure outlined 
by the relations between individual moments. It is to be found in 
Part 3, “Models”, of which it is the third, entitled “Meditations on 
metaphysics”, which begins with the “section” (though Adorno does 
not sectionalise but uses brief indications in the form of headers) 
“After Auschwitz”. We can therefore read this as “metaphysics after 
Auschwitz”, though if metaphysics is traditionally prima philosophia 
or “ontology”, then we can also read it as philosophy after Auschwitz. 
However, Adorno’s “meditation” is upon the impossibility of ontol-
ogy after Auschwitz (in the sense that philosophy after Auschwitz 
must be different and must rest on foundations other than tradition-
al or modern philosophy consisting of metaphysics and ontology). 
The word “meditation” is deliberately ambiguous inasmuch as the 
best known “meditation”, i.e. Descartes’, (re)laid the foundations of 
modern systematic ontology or metaphysics. 
Adorno advocates thinking in models rather than thinking in 
a  system (“thinking after Auschwitz” is a  kind of model analy-
sis). How should we understanding “model”? In the introduction 
to Negative Dialectics under the heading “Argument and Experi-
ence” Adorno offers a general critique of Systemphilosophie, which 
is based on a given intellectual order (categories and first principles, 
i.e. the tradition of Aristotelian prima philosophia), into which in-
tellectual content is inserted. However, this method eliminates its 
“own content”: the thought as bearer of (real) experience is sub-
jected to regimentation. For this reason the opposite applies: the 
unregimented idea is by elective affinities connected with the dia-
lectic that as criticism of the system reminds us of that which is 
outside the system. The force that in the act of cognition releases the 
dialectical movement is the force that revolts against the system.187 
Models (in the plural) replace system (always in the singular). What 
187 Cf. ibid., p. 31.
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is fundamental in models is the “force field” that arises through the 
configuration of moments that, like iron filings in a magnetic field, 
create a certain “figure” on their surface, an “image” that is its own 
“content” and that refers to the experience that the model is to ap-
prehend. For this reason, too, the essay is the privileged form of 
philosophical discourse for Adorno: 
 
It is not so much that the essay neglects indubitable certainty as that it 
abrogates it as an ideal. The essay becomes true in its progress, which 
drives it beyond itself, not in a treasure-hunting obsession with foundations. 
Its concepts receive their light from a terminus ad quem hidden from the 
essay itself, not from any obvious terminus a quo, and in this the method 
itself expresses its utopian intention. All its concepts are to be presented in 
such a way that they support one another, that each becomes articulated 
through its configuration with the others. In the essay discrete elements set 
off against one another come together to form a readable context; the es-
say erects no scaffolding and no structure. But the elements crystallize as 
a configuration through their motion. The constellation is a force field, just 
as every intellectual structure is necessarily transformed into a force field 
under the essay’s gaze.188
 
The basis of the discourse of traditional philosophy must be the “sys-
tem”, since the idea cannot be contingent, but necessary, i.e. binding 
in some way – this guarantees its place in the system. However, if 
the (negative) dialectic represents thinking that reflects traces of 
the resisting exterior of the system, then its presentational form 
(Darstellungsform) cannot be a  systematic interpretation, though 
this does not make it “unbinding”. And again we find ourselves at 
the “model”: 
 
188 Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, p. 21.
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The call for binding statements without a system is a call for thought mod-
els (...) A model covers the specific, and more than the specific, without 
letting it evaporate in its more general super-concept. Philosophical think-
ing is the same as thinking in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of 
analyses of models.
 
Regarding this binding quality Adorno adds: 
 
(T)he stringency (Stringenz) of a philosophical thought requires its mode 
of proceeding (Adorno is careful to avoid the word “method”) to be mea-
sured by the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is the effort to give 
statements a  binding quality by making them commensurable with the 
means of discursive thinking.189
 
Expression, i.e. the attempt to express experience, is the deictic 
field, i.e. the field open towards the outside. On the one hand, it 
is the “rhetorical moment” (concretising, individualising, specify-
ing), and on the other the “mimetic moment” (the concept is shaped 
by that which it wants to apprehend). Philosophical Darstellung or 
presentation is the objectivisation of this entirety. 
After this localisation it also is possible to define the introductory 
quote under the heading “Metaphysics and Culture” in the third 
part of Negative Dialectics in light of its context. The immediately 
preceding considerations headed “After Auschwitz” clearly show 
that, for Adorno, Auschwitz is a  fundamental event to which he 
must devote his thinking if he is not to part company with his own 
presence, i.e. “reality”. His criticism of “metaphysics” or “ontolo-
gy” now becomes implicitly understandable: it is essential we revise 
our relationship to god, freedom, immortality, etc. as eternal ideas 
guaranteeing the intelligibility of that which we encounter. Above 
all, we must review the claim that truth equals “permanence” and 
189 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 64.
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transience (history) equals appearance. This is something that leads 
to the “binding character” as the criterion of another rationality 
that differs from the “necessity” of the system – the rationally non-
legitimisable is clearly that which is emotionally intolerable by virtue 
of being unbearable. This means that Auschwitz did not only de-
stroy, but, on the contrary, revealed the emotional basis of rational-
ity – the attempt to lend genocide some kind of meaning by means 
of interpreting it already feels completely irrational. To do so is to 
perpetrate violence against its victims (whence the feeling of guilt 
of its survivors). The feeling is something that points to the non-
conceptual in that which we are attempting to apprehend. 
And in this respect Auschwitz is the “model”, an event that can-
not be subsumed or classified without remainder under some ratio-
nal principle. Not even a simple causal principle suffices. The task is 
to research the entire web of conditioning factors through which (by 
means of reflection) the contours of a different thinking will hopefully 
shine through. 
Adorno’s description of the situation is as follows: 
The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never 
yet to fear in just this fashion. There is no chance anymore for death to 
come into the individuals’ empirical life as somehow conformable with the 
course of that life. The last, the poorest possession left to the individual is 
expropriated. That in the concentration camps it was no longer an individual 
who died, but a specimen – this is a fact bound to affect the dying of those 
who escaped the administrative measure. 
Genocide is the absolute integration. It is on its way wherever men are 
levelled off – “polished off”, as the German military called it – until one 
exterminates them literally, as deviations from the concept of their total 
nullity.190
190 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 362.
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Adorno describes the event that was Auschwitz in such a way that it 
becomes clear in his description (which quite deliberately omits con-
crete “facts”) how in this event the basic tendency of instrumental 
rationality (administration, Verwaltung), as well as the systematic 
thinking associated with it, becomes reality, and by doing so points 
to something that could roughly be called “the conditions of the pos-
sibility of Auschwitz in modern rationality”. His description is also 
interesting in that it takes us to the very boundary of abstraction 
(the philosophical concept of identity, the paradigm genus-species, 
the basic themes of his negative dialectics), and it is precisely in this 
way that his thinking touches upon something concrete, namely that 
the outcome of the system is the extermination of the individual. 
And so the “concept” (e.g. the concept of the “theory of knowledge”, 
the concept of “identity”) disintegrates completely. It becomes un-
sustainable, its origin in “power” (administration, Verwaltung) ex-
posed. And this in turn takes us back to the introductory quote: 
 
A  new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree 
mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not 
repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. When we want to find 
reasons for it, this imperative is as refractory as the given one of Kant was 
once upon a time. Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the 
new imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum – bodily, 
because it is now the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony 
to which individuals are exposed even with individuality about to vanish as 
a form of mental reflection. It is in the unvarnished materialistic motive only 
that morality survives. 
The course of history forces materialism upon metaphysics, traditionally the 
direct antithesis of materialism. What the mind once boasted of defining 
or construing as its like moves in the direction of what is unlike the mind, 
in the direction of that which eludes the rule of the mind and yet manifests 
that rule as absolute evil. The somatic, unmeaningful stratum of life is the 
stage of suffering, of the suffering which in the camps, without any consola-
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tion, burned every soothing feature out of the mind, and out of culture, the 
mind’s objectification.
 
What we observe here (at least on the level of “discourse”) is a strik-
ing use of rhetoric as a  form of argument (Hitler imposed a new 
imperative upon people by virtue of the fact that what he caused 
became unacceptable): something positive emerges from a rejection 
of the existing. Adorno takes interpretation to be something like 
the practice of resistance (in language itself) to communicative ten-
dencies. This is another reason why Adorno’s  text is always more 
process than thesis. 
1. The reason why it is necessary “to arrange [our] thoughts and 
actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing simi-
lar will happen”, is not a  reason in the sense of a principle from 
which something (a certain kind of conduct) necessarily ensues, but 
a physical resistance to something factual, which is why it cannot 
be established “discursively”. What is essential is das Hinzutretende 
or the addendum (the moment that must accede). However, this is 
also das Austretende or escape, because it deflects us from the order 
of principles on the basis of which we are to act. A large theme in 
Derrida’s deconstruction of justice: to act in accordance with a pre-
scription cannot be “good”. 
2. That which “accedes” in this way and allows for the boundar-
ies of the system (clearly distinguishing between exterior and in-
terior) to be breached is the “body” (the rejected outside inside). 
If instrumental reason eliminates individuality, which it reduces to 
that which is convertible from the individual subjected to Gleich-
schaltung, or unification, then only the physical feeling remains (ir-
reducible precisely because it is physical, i.e. beyond the reach of the 
“spirit”) of suffering as the site of resistance to “power” (whether 
this be the power of the concept or the power of the administrative 
world, etc.). “It is in the unvarnished materialistic motive only that 
morality survives.” (We also encounter this motif in Lyotard.) 
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3. Another formulation of the “priority of the object” over the 
subject thinking it: the response to Auschwitz must be “other think-
ing”, because the traditional (modern) is somatically intolerable. 
4. This is how identity thinking itself is problematised (“what the 
spirit produces as being equal to it” is that from which we always 
escape physically). It is disjointed into its exterior, to that which is 
dissimilar to it, which is the body. Though the body is outside inside, 
it is also something that is in real history, so that it is impossible 
to conceptualise history as something external to bodily anchored 
thought. But this “outside” is that in which the dominion of the spir-
it still exclusively appears in its true form, i.e. as controlling power, 
as “evil”. 
This was how the whole of modern culture was destroyed in the 
concentration camps (the site of unbearable physical suffering), 
a culture that had until that moment been able to conceal the fact 
that its paradigm of cognition (science, philosophy) resided in vio-
lence perpetrated against that which it re-cognised. 
The imperative thus formulated is already an “other rationality”. 
It cannot be justified, firstly because it is beyond the order of jus-
tification, and secondly because its origin resides in concrete his-
tory, i.e. concrete, real historical events and our reflection thereon, 
reflection that is at the same time the self-reflection of reason. Not, 
therefore, the necessity of system, but historical necessity: there is 
nothing left but to..., I can do nothing else but.... On the very bound-
ary of the concept we have no choice but to transcend the boundary 
of the concept. 
In other words, this quote reveals Adorno’s  relationship to the 
philosophical concept in general, and in this particular case to the 
concept of “metaphysics” and to the associated concept of the “the-
ory of knowledge” within the framework of a  certain concept of 
the “system” and the postulate/concept of “identity” (the identity of 
thinking and being, or of thinking identifying the thought thing). 
The concept is confronted with historical reality in the latter’s   
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instrumentally irredeemable experience in the body. It thus comes 
face to face with its own boundary, from which that which is “en-
shrined” in it is suddenly illuminated, and this then allows for the 
entire system in which these concepts are arranged to be transcend-
ed. Adorno himself describes this very precisely in the essay Zur 
Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie (which begins as a critique of Hus-
serl’s phenomenology) 
 
Even the decaying concepts of epistemology point beyond themselves. Right 
up to their highest formalisms and, before that, in their miscarriages, they 
are to be rescued as a bit of unconscious transcription of history. For they 
must be helped to procure self-consciousness against what they explicitly 
mean. This salvation, mindfulness of the suffering that sedimented itself in 
concepts, waits for the moment of their ruin. It is the idea of philosophical 
critique. It has no other measure than the ruin of illusion. … It is time not 
for first philosophy but last philosophy.191
Here we also see the influence of Walter Benjamin and his essay The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama. The world of the baroque poet is 
located in the chasm between a fallen world and salvation.192 Ratio 
is unable to create the concept of reality as a whole. What is left 
are the ruins of the philosophical system, and philosophy’s task is 
to interpret and arrange these fragments. As soon as the ruination 
is clear, the truth content of systematic philosophy is revealed, as 
Adorno wrote in his lectures of 1964/65, in which Benjamin’s con-
cept of allegorical interpretation appears in the form of a  “deep 
allegorical insight” (allegorischer Tiefblick).193 But he has already 
arrived at this point in his interpretation of Husserl: 
191 Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology. A Metacritique¸trans. Willis Domingo, Polity Press, 
pp. 39–40.
192 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, p. 78.
193 Adorno, Vorlesung über die negative Dialektik, p. 188. See the commentary by Foster, Adorno: 
The Recovery of Experience, p. 79.
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The concept of natural history does not appear in this passage gratuitously. 
Husserl believes he is giving a phenomenology of spirit by presenting and 
cataloguing its cabinet of natural history specimens. Just as in natural his-
tory museums, relics of vanished life are assembled into a collection and 
put on show, though ‘nature’ in these specimens just allegorically means 
past history, and their history is nothing other than a simple natural past-
ness (Vergängnis)  – so there is also a  phenomenological exhibit of its 
‘excursions’, which has to do with fossils and fossilized syntheses whose 
‘intentional life’ faintly reflects the past-real.194
 
By plucking its items from existence and historical change, phe-
nomenology deadens them (the ideals of the bourgeois era as relics), 
but at the moment of the fall  – the crisis  – theoretical creations 
allow for a  glimpse of their utopian impulse, whence is born the 
endeavour to protect such a  form of knowledge that would be an 
expression of the world of things.195 
 
Philosophical thought that can be reduced to its bare bones or net profit is 
useless. The superficiality of many philosophical works that take no account 
of this is more than just aesthetic insufficiency: it is an index of their own 
falsehood. Wherever a philosophical idea, in the most important texts, lags 
behind the ideal of unremitting renewal, it is defeated. To think philosophi-
cally means to think the intermittent, to be disturbed by that which is not 
thought itself. In vigorous thinking the analytical judgement that must inevi-
tably be used becomes untrue. The power of thinking so as to swim against 
one’s own current is the power of resistance to that which has already been 
thought. Proper thinking requires civil courage.196
 
194 Adorno, Against Epistemology, p. 217.
195 Cf. Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, p. 110.
196 Theodor W. Adorno, “Anmerkungen zum philosophichen Denken”, GS 10.2 (Kulturkritik und 
Gesellschaft), pp. 603–604 (trans. here by Phil Jones).
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It is necessary to push the antagonism of concepts to the very bound-
ary of that which they are still capable of saying and to subordinate 
concepts of the theory of knowledge to the “logic of disintegration”. 
In this way, concepts operate as an expression of the experience 
that permits this theory of knowledge (the separation of subject and 
object). The concepts come to a halt and become images. They begin 
to attest to the experience enshrined within them. They are as intel-
ligible as the surface upon which the whole is legible in the figure as 
it is created by the interpretation of its elements. 
This is also a  procedure not without a  certain proximity to 
Bergson,197 and this is important, for instance, in relation to De-
leuze. According to Bergson, perception is the selection of the instru-
mentally useful features of a thing that allows for the commensura-
bility of the non-identical. Perception is structured habit (habitual 
responses to stimuli), and habit is the plane from which general ideas 
emerge, including concepts (the concept is a habit rising up from the 
sphere of action into the realm of thought). Perception, which con-
sists of “habitual memory”, is placed in opposition to pure memory: 
though habitual memory dominates in each current experience, the 
experience is always tinged by the entire memory. In light of Ador-
no’s deconstruction of the concept, we can say, à la Bergson, that be-
neath the concepts that it is possible to “dilate”, i.e. expand into ever 
larger circles that contextualise the concept in question by means of 
its “memory” in such a way that the concept begins to be dissolved 
and that which is otherwise retraced beneath the instrumental or-
ganisation of perception (the encounter with reality) shines through 
it. In this way the boundary between habitual response (a sensomo-
197 Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience. Cf. Adorno’s reformulation of Bergson’s “intuition”: 
“Only lightning bolts of knowledge are saturated with memory and prescience. Official and ‘obli-
gatory’ knowledge (...) fall as such directly out of time and memory. The cogniser is overwhelmed 
at the moment of intuition and delivered out of subsumption alone and from the current present of 
past judgements, conclusions and especially rleations whose unifification brings to light what in the 
object is more than a placeholder in the systematic.” See also the chapter devoted to this in: Foster, 
Adorno: The Recovery of Experience. (“5. Failed Outbreak II: Bergson”). 
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toric mechanism) and pure memory disintegrates; homogenous mul-
tiplicity is permeated by heterogeneous multiplicity (pure memory, 
duration), which is a different concept of the “whole” or “totality”. 
The whole is transformed in its entirety by the addition/subtraction of 
a certain element. Perhaps this is what Adorno’s “constellation” and 




Adorno’s Minima Moralia came out in 1951, though individual sec-
tions had been written between 1944 and 1947, i.e. at the same 
time as Adorno was working with Horkheimer on the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. It closes with an aphorism (or Denkbild) entitled 
“Zu Ende”, “At the end”, which is at once a brief summary and 
broad outline of Adorno’s thinking. Moreover, as Alexander Garcia 
Düttmann wrote, in this work philosophy “converges with art, 
since understanding it does not involve grasping its arguments but 
comprehending its gestures.”198 He is referring to Aesthetic Theory 
and its concept of the unattainable promise of happiness. However, 
since Adorno’s thinking must be understood as an attempt to anal-
yse non-discursive rationality, it is clear that aesthetic experience 
as a dimension other than discursive truth will play a pivotal role 
(as Adorno himself says in his early essay on “The Actuality of Phi-
losophy”). 
Aphorism 153 reads as follows: 
 
Finale. – The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face 
of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present 
themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light 
but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere 
technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the 
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted 
as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives 
without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects – this 
alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the 
situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because consum-
mate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror image of its 
198 Alexander Garcia Düttmann, So ist es. Ein philosophischer Kommentar zu Adornos >Minima 
Moralia<, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, p. 12.
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opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes 
a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, from the scope of 
existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not 
only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, 
for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks 
to escape. The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the 
sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it 
is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last com-
prehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed 
on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself 
hardly matters.199
 
This demonstrates the basic gesture of thinking after the Holocaust: 
the ultimate acceptance of the radical exterior into the interior, with-
out a self-enclosed whole resulting from this operation, i.e. without 
the Other being reduced to the Same, to borrow terms from Levi-
nas’s Totality and Infinity. The noticeably theological framework of 
Adorno’s reflections, which links him to Walter Benjamin and which 
philosophically thematises the “damaged” life at the end of the war, 
is suspended – or perhaps erased – by the last sentence. “Erasure” 
is a semantic operation that appears in Heidegger (indeed it could 
be said to be Husserl’s form of “bracketing”). Later on it will fea-
ture large in the work of Jacques Derrida: something is so, but sous 
rature (deconstruction is justice, justice is something impossible). 
This too is negative dialectics – the sentence as the index of the uni-
dentifiable non-identical. The last words act as a kind of punctuation 
after which there is nothing more to say. However, in this way an 
internal dynamic is opened of this brusquely concluded whole, and 
paradoxically confirms the thesis that the whole is untruth. In this 
constellation of beginning and end we can observe a sublation (Auf-
hebung) that does not retain anything from that which is overcome, 
199 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 247.
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but liquidates it in order that something radically different is able to 
rise up against it.200 
Likewise, one could say that Husserl’s teleology of history is pres-
ent here as erased. Philosophical thinking is not situated outside 
real history, even though the concept of history that here provides 
the background and against which the meaning of events is under-
stood from the radical end of history is radically other in respect 
of the history of progress. Adorno carries Benjamin’s  inspiration 
forward over the boundary of the Holocaust. The shock that Sta-
lin’s pact with Hitler represented to Benjamin and which led him 
to formulate his Theses on the Philosophy of History is compounded 
at the end of the war. We have no choice but to understand history 
differently. Similarly, it is essential we subject even philosophical 
language itself to criticism.  
 
The power of the facts has become so appalling that all theory, even true 
theory, seems ridiculous by the side of it. This has been burnt into the organ 
of theory, namely language, and has left its mark on it.201
 
A different relationship to history is called for. We no longer need 
to explain history but to find a philosophical response to it that is at 
the same time a change of attitude. We must look at things as they 
would appear from the perspective of the end of history, from the 
standpoint of redemption. Parting company with their current man-
ifestation means seeing them as they are not. In this, as Gerhard 
Richter so perceptively observes, there is something of Benjamin’s 
understanding of allegory as being radically different to that which 
it allegorises. However, Adorno’s text actually highlights its own al-
200 For an interpretation of this text, cf. especially Gerhard Richter, “Aesthetic Theory and Nonpro-
positional Truth Content in Adorno”, in: Gerhard Richter (ed.), Language Without Soil: Adorno and 
Late Philosophical Modernity, Forham University Press, New York 2010, pp. 131–146.
201 Theodor W. Adorno, “Bar Harbor Notebook”, Frankfurter Adorno Blätter 4 (1995), p. 7; cited 
from Richter (ed.), Language Without Soil, pp. 2–3.
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legoricality by explicitly “thematising” the standpoint of redemp-
tion as unattainable. The paradoxical figure with which Adorno 
works in this aphorism thus doubles the Nachträglichkeit (afterness) 
by means of its anticipation of the unavailable. However, that which 
is outside history has always left its traces in the existing world and 
appears in it through “cracks and fissures”. This is also why thinking 
whose true home is elsewhere can operate here: it transposes nega-
tive traces of that which it cannot incorporate into itself into philo-
sophical discourse by means of the mirror writing of its opposite, 
even though it is able to express this legacy through its concepts. If 
this thinking does not want simply to reproduce or prolong reality, 
it must have its measure elsewhere. In fact, the aphorism “Finale” 
serves simply to radicalise the Dialectic of Enlightenment: if enlight-
ened thinking fails to take into account its own residual connection 
with that which it wishes to overcome (to sublate), then it is una-
ware of its own position within regressive tendencies and will, on 
the contrary, not be a sublation or turn, but a re-turn to the darkness 
that it wished to illuminate. 
The final aphorism in Minima Moraliais is characterised by 
a kind of internal surge of energy: we must seek recourse in that 
which in knowledge necessarily eludes this knowledge as unpresent-
able. However, what is important is not some kind of “content” that 
evades knowledge, but the process of escape itself, as though philo-
sophical thinking were characterised by a permanent state of emer-
gency. This is also why the aphorism is one of the privileged forms of 
philosophy. Adorno explains this in brief in a note in the margins 
of Heinz Krüger’s On the Aphorism as Philosophical Form: 
 
While Krüger is indebted to German philology for the thematic and meth-
odological bases of his work, his intention was to reveal the aphorism to 
be a specific, independent philosophical form. In other words, he wanted to 
develop the aphorism and its unique qualities from the content of the very 
philosophy that discloses itself by means of this form... He laid an emphasis 
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on the antithesis of open and closed thinking, on “ignorance” reflecting 
itself, on the intensification of the exception to the rule and on the paradox 
as a medium of truth and enemy of convention, so as to uncover the inner 
unity of that which appears to banal preconceptions to dissolve in a com-
pletely undisciplined way into plurality.202
 
If, as Krüger claims, the aphorism evades formal logical understand-
ing because it chops in two the question of how it justifies its own 
existence in the position of judgement before even raising it, then 
it is clear what is at stake, both in the literary form of the aphorism 
and in the unattainability of that last measure of thinking. This is 
thinking that does not stand within any fixed realm, though this 
does not mean that it is random; it is necessary in some other way 
since it does not have the guarantee of the “foundation”. This is 
one of the characteristics of post-war thinking, i.e. thinking without 
foundation that is nevertheless “established” on the absent founda-
tion in its capacity as the erased foundation. In Derrida this takes 
the form of “ellipticity”, in Lyotard the “dispute” between two le-
gitimate claims, and in Michel Foucault the “impossible” position 
of his archaeological knowledge. It is also manifest in a philosophi-
cal interest in writers such as Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, 
Samuel Beckett and others, since a similar shift is visible in their 
work. “The essence of literature is that it has no essence,” says 
Maurice Blanchot. If, as Adorno is convinced, the possibility of 
thinking forces thinking to understand its impossibility, then it 
must remain open to that which is on the point of arrival so as to 
be open from within to the outside – an essay, a fragment, a con-
figuration. Where language is disrupted, the form of communica-
tion is itself the expression. The reference to the theological concept 
of redemption is the index of the need for something other than 
an Enlightenment-based or modern concept of history, the need to 
202 Theodor W. Adorno, "Heinz Krüger zum Gedächtnis", GS 20.2, p. 473.
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rescue the openness of thinking which, however, in Adorno’s case 
(and in this he is close to the “cracks and fissures” in Husserl’s texts, 
though this was not his intention) does not surrender the idea of the 
absolute, notwithstanding the fact that the relationship with it is 
reversed: it is a mistake to close oneself off to one’s own contingency 
because of the non-contingent, since thinking beyond the borders is 
only possible from within. 
At the same time, Adorno’s version of unfounded thinking, the 
measure of which is beyond its reach, displays a striking kinship 
with Kracauer and his waiting for the last things before the last. 
There is also a link with the radicalisation of that relationship to 
that which is coming in Blanchot’s L’Attente L’Oubli. The concept 
of redemption here designates the position of radical criticism that 
prevents any premature appropriation of the truth, i.e. of all con-
cepts of universal history that would like us to have the basic mo-
saic of history in front of our eyes right now if we know upon what 
goal history is supposed to focus. But more importantly, a criticism 
that reveals the falsity of everything existing and that sees that 
any framework of universal history with its teleology necessitates 
the suffering of those whose life was not about this life because it 
was subordinate in advance to the goal, i.e. those who suffered be-
cause their life could not attain its expression, is at the same time 
a criticism saving the past. It wants to be true to that which history 
(according to this interpretation) eliminated. However, this salva-
tion requires a  fundamental transformation of the philosophical 
discourse, something that is abundantly clear in the conclusion to 
Negative Dialectic: 
 
Nothing on earth and nothing in the empty heavens is to be saved by 
defending it. The ‘yes, but’ answer to the critical argument, the refusal 
to have anything wrested away – these are already forms of obstinate in-
sistence of existence, forms of a clutching that cannot be reconciled with 
the idea of rescue in which the spasm of such prolonged self-presentation 
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would be eased. Nothing can be saved unchanged, nothing that has not 
passed through the portal of its death. If rescue is the inmost impulse of 
any man’s spirit, there is no hope but unreserved surrender of that which is 
to be rescued as well as of the hopeful spirit.203
 
 
203 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 391–392.
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The transformation of philosophical discourse that is the response 
to the event of the Holocaust includes as retrospective questioning 
(Rückfrage) sui generis both reflection upon conceptual thinking 
and reflection upon the language of philosophy itself, and in addi-
tion the rehabilitation of expression or the “rhetorical moment”: 
the concept must at the same time become an expression of histori-
cal experience, an expression of suffering. The concept is open to 
expression, which attempts to become concept. All of this in light of 
the necessity of the relationship to that which, on the boundaries of 
the phenomenological definition of phenomenality, surpasses these 
boundaries. This involves showing what misses the phenomenon and 
escapes from it within this escape itself, by means of which it eludes 
identification. Since it involves experience resisting its own reifica-
tion, objectifiability and convertibility, it is the act of testimony that 
finds itself at the forefront rather than cognition. In the conflict be-
tween real experience and philosophical discourse their incommen-
surability must be attested to. Husserl’s semiology continues to be 
unsustainable inasmuch as, beginning with Logical Investigations, 
it excludes indexicality as the original modus of the relationship and 
subjugates it to intentionality focused upon fulfilment. Now, on the 
contrary, the significant relationship is the index: the trace or testi-
mony, often in a radical escalation, as is so in the case of Emmanuel 
Levinas, when he speaks of the trace of a past that has never been 
present. However, we find something similar in other writers, for in-
stance Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida, who take up Adorno’s 
negatively dialectical critique of the concept (either consciously or 
not) with an emphasis on the radical diversity of the Same and the 
Other. It might therefore seem that the exterior finds itself once more 
irreducibly outside the inside. This is not so. Both resistance and es-
cape are meant as distinctive methods of relating. In other words, 
this is a unique relationship, a relationship that, as a relationship 
across difference, is both relationship and separation simultaneously. 
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The calm, the burn of the Holocaust, the annihilation of noon – the calm of 
the disaster.204
 
Though Maurice Blanchot may have summed it up in one word, 
disaster, désastre, this most extreme form of the outside, is an idea 
whose entire significance acquires its contours only gradually and 
within a variety of contexts. In 1940, it was the word most frequently 
used to describe the military defeat of France. After the war, espe-
cially in Blanchot’s book L’ecriture du désastre, it refers directly to 
the horrors of the final solution. More generally it refers to some-
thing unthinkable by thinking: to the trace of the encounter with 
the radical exterior, which is non-actualisable because it is outside 
memory (and inasmuch as it exhibits signs of trauma). 
If we want to understand this use of the word désastre (from the 
Italian disastro, dis + astro “star”, from Latin astrum), which origi-
nally referred to the deviation of a star from its orbit or to a star 
that had ceased to exert a  positive effect, we must return to the 
structures of thought within which it is inscribed. However, we must 
then turn once more to Edmund Husserl and to the early articles by 
Emmanuel Levinas, in which he was one of the first to introduce 
phenomenology to France and in which his own conception of ethics 
as the “first philosophy” began to take shape. 
In Husserl’s work, whose “truly new accents will never reverber-
ate to any but the sensitive or the practiced ear, but – obligatorily – 
alert”,205 Levinas, as he later said, was attracted above all by the dis-
covery of the intentionality of consciousness and its broader scope: 
 
204 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock, University of Nebrasca Press, 
Lincoln and London 1986, p. 1.
205 Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael 
B. Smith, Northwestern UP, Evanston, Illinois 2000, p. 111.
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Without the idea of intentionality understood in a more originative sense 
than in objectification, without intentionality removed from the logic of ob-
jectification because it traces out truly transitive relations, all the contempo-
rary philosophy of art would have been impossible or incomprehensible.206
 
Intentionality, the intentional relationship, is the movement of step-
ping out of itself, and as such (insofar as this movement implies 
that consciousness is somehow forced to submit to the objects to 
which it relates) would liquidate the concept of the representing 
consciousness establishing the exteriority of the exterior (a concept 
in which interiority controls exteriority207). However, Husserl him-
self operates on the periphery of this discovery. He somehow re-
tains the model of representation at the moment it allows itself to 
be seduced by the endeavour to establish a new objectivism (and to 
return European science to its original idea). However, this has the 
effect of pushing into the background the fact that, in its analyses of 
intentionality, phenomenology reveals a  deeper movement behind 
objectivations, a concrete life focused on exteriority that is not ob-
jective – the equivalent in fact to Wahl’s movement to the concrete 
world, vers le concret.208 
On the one hand, therefore, Levinas regards the discovery of the 
intentionality of consciousness to be liberating, since consciousness 
is forever beyond its own boundaries, its primary act being to step 
outside of itself, which underpins all its other acts209 – conscious-
ness equals presence in the world. A second important moment then 
arises: the correlation of intentional thought and its subject, which 
is unregulated by any a priori schema. However, there is a certain 
price to be paid: the intentional object is in this way constituted as 
206 Ibid., p. 199 note.
207 Cf. ibid., p. 53–54.
208 Cf. Jean Wahl, Vers le concret, Vrin, Paris 1932.
209 Cf. Levinas, Discovering Existence, p. 135.
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ideal and intentionality is characterised as idealising (this on a pre-
predicative level). 
 
For Husserl, the object, even in cases where it is sensible and individual, will 
always be what is identified through a multiplicity of intentions. To say that 
all consciousness is consciousness of something is to affirm that across 
these correlative terms of a multiplicity of subjective thoughts, and thus 
transcending them, an identity is maintained and affirmed. The intentional 
object has an ideal existence in relation to the temporal event and spatial 
position of consciousness.210
 
It is clear that time is implied in this relationship, the temporality 
essential for the ideal object to reveal itself to consciousness (per-
ception runs through various aspects of the intended thing, i.e. it 
performs acts of synthesis and identification of this thing as this 
thing): something identical (hence ideal) can only reveal itself in 
time. On the other hand, according to Levinas this represents a cer-
tain problem as far as the status is concerned of that which from 
Ideen I onwards Husserl calls “hyletic givens” (“primary contents” 
in Logical Investigations). Husserl uses the term “hyle” to refer to 
sense data that operates as a “substance of intentional shaping or 
Sinngebungen on different levels” (III/1, 193). The material of inten-
tional functions (colourful, olfactory, tactile, etc.) is not the same as 
the objective moments (the colourfulness of a thing, the roughness 
of a thing), which can only become evident through this material. In 
Husserl’s concept, therefore, intentional form is, as it were, above 
the sensory substance as a “revitalising” or sense-giving layer, and 
so the concrete sensory experience emerges from sensory material 
that in itself has nothing of intentionality. Late Husserl then clarifies 
and complicates this interpretation, especially in connection with 
210 Ibid., p. 203.
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his analysis of “affection” within the framework of analyses of pas-
sive syntheses.211 
Levinas examines the problem of “hyletic givens” in great detail, 
firstly devoting his attention to the “character” of this hyle (and not-
ing that the significance of this reel moment increases in Husserl 
over time), and then in connection with temporality. The connection 
of the first and second is clear from his description of intentional 
consciousness. 
Intentions that mean and identify a transcendent object are not 
like simple windows onto the outside, but contents filling a certain 
duration: intention is “temporal reality”. Furthermore, conscious-
ness that renders objects present to us is also present to itself. It 
is lived (experienced), which is what enables us to speak of “expe-
riences” (Erlebnisse): consciousness, which is consciousness of an 
object, is at the same time non-objectifying consciousness of itself. 
“The intention is Erlebnis”. However, this term “is also applied to 
contents that are not acts, to non-intentional contents.... there exist 
states of consciousness that are not conscious of anything!”212 and 
herein lies the problem of sensory or hyletic contents. 
In short, Levinas reveals in the fissures of Husserl’s intentional-
ity something like a trace of alterity (the exterior), and this allows 
him (though he is still operating within Husserl’s  texts and often 
answers questions Husserl has posed himself) to discern a kind of 
double modality in intentionality. 
1) Intentionality in the mode of idealising identification, which 
makes it possible for the “impression” (or sensation) to be experi-
enced as a certain identifiable unity (as the same) appearing within 
a  multiplicity of moments, because this impression is retained in 
“outline” (and in abbreviated form, as it were) as a whole in each 
(different) moment thanks to specific, immanent intentionality (re-
211 Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, ed. Margot Fleischer (Husserliana XI), Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, Haag 1966, p. 148 et seq.
212 Levinas, Discovering Existence, p. 139.
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tention). The impression is a “shadowing” or Abschattung, which, 
however, gives itself through Abschattungen in the immanence (of 
intentional consciousness that is forever being “temporalised”) in 
which it is alive. This is the origin of Husserl’s concept of the inner 
consciousness of time, which is consciousness itself. Time as a con-
tinuous flow or passage is the condition of the possibility of con-
sciousness being able to reveal (by means of gradual self-profiling) 
something identical to itself, i.e. that as this. 
2) However, in the case of “hyletic” data, something is shown that 
is somehow to the side of this idealising and identifying intention-
ality. The object showing itself is possible only in that intention in-
tends, i.e. it “revives” a “sensation”, an impression, which, however, 
must already have elapsed to a minimal extent in order for inten-
tion to have been able to revive it. The act of its “apprehension” 
(Auffassung) arrives only after the material of the constituted object 
(see the roughness and colour as hyletic data). This means that con-
sciousness is delayed, it lags behind the past, that is, it lags behind 
that which must be presumed to be the Urimpression, the “primary” 
or “original” impression. As escaping or preceding it is free of any 
ideality, it is non-ideality par excellence.213 It is non-identifiable and 
as such is the perpetually escaping basis of identification.  
 
The unpredictable novelty of content that emerges in this source of all con-
sciousness and being is the original spontaneous generation (Urzeugung), 
the transition from nothingness to being (to being that is transformed into 
being-for-consciousness, but is never lost), the spontaneous generation 
that deserves to be called absolute activity, genesis spontanea; however, it 
is also completed outside of any anticipation, expectation, outside any em-
bryonic origin, any continuity, and as a consequence it is complete and utter 
passivity, the receptivity of the “other”, which penetrates the “identical”, it 
is life and not “thought”. As “inner consciousness” it becomes conscious-
213 Ibid., pp. 215–216. 
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ness by means of the temporal modification of retention, which perhaps 
characterises the essence of all thinking as the retention of a certain fleet-
ing fullness. Consciousness is the process of growing old and the search 
for lost time.214 
 
The secrecy of intentionality resides in the “deviation from...” or in 
the modification of the time flow. 
In this respect Levinas would agree with what Derrida writes in 
“Violence and Metaphysics”: 
 
The absolute alterity of each instant, without which there would be no time, 
cannot be produced – constituted – within the identity of the subject or 
the existent.215
 
The outside is somehow inside, which it permeates through the in-
terstices of the intentional relationship to the world without being 
explicitly present as a  pre-reflexive level of consciousness for this 
consciousness itself, since the activity of the identifying (re)cognition 
aimed at objectivisation and thematisation incessantly pushes this 
otherness into the background. Phenomenology reveals the world 
and at the same time tacitly eliminates all non-intentional mo-
ments. To put things in the more expressive language of Levinas, 
in which one of the important themes of Derrida’s deconstruction 
is also expressed, phenomenology’s  reflection upon the phenom-
enon violates and does not acknowledge the secret. However, the 
intentional relationship always, albeit only implicitly, includes 
something that sees by means of consciousness without catching 
sight of. In showing, the disappearance is present of that which 
shows itself as unseen. 
However, as far as thinking after Husserl is concerned, the close 
connection between this involuntary discovery of radical alterity (of 
214 Ibid., p. 216.
215 Jacques Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique" in: Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 113.
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the outside-in) and the perforation of the continuity of time is impor-
tant, and is addressed by both Levinas and Derrida. This is also why 
Levinas speaks of consciousness lagging behind itself and whence 
the highly complex network of references and other links begins to 
unfold as though from a spring. And so, for example, it is evident 
we can interpret this escape as unassimilated experience linked with 
shock and trauma (Freud and Benjamin). However, it is equally pos-
sible – and this will be Levinas’s strategy – to focus on a description 
of this level prior to Sinngebung, prior to the apprehending identifi-
cation, i.e. to focus on a description of the absolutely other before it 
is lost by being absorbed by the interior or totality.  
It is this that forms the “hard core” of Levinas’s essay Existence 
and Existents of 1947, in which that which the level of the identifi-
able and nameable covers is designated using the French idiom il y 
a or “there is”. The essay is therefore also an escalation of the polem-
ic against Heidegger’s ontology as expounded in Being and Time, 
since il y a, this “barren, haunting and horrible nature of being”216, 
is both beneath the threshold of the ontological difference between 
being and existence and beneath the threshold of the world as the 
(Husserlian) horizon of all horizons. 
However, a description of this being before being requires an ex-
treme escalation of conceptual thinking (the concept is form), i.e. it 
is no surprise that Levinas here appeals to the “exoticism” of art, 
since the hyletic data already referred to appears in it. This is because 
in artistic creation, materiality or sensory qualities are not subject to 
representation and do not refer to the world, but return perception 
to the impersonal element in which the outside and inside cannot 
be differentiated and which involves “not only the disappearance of 
every object, but the extinction of the subject.“217 
216 Preface to the 2nd ed. Emmanuel Levinas, De l‘existence à l’existant.
217 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 
1978, p. 67.
178
Something analogous must apply to Levinas’s  language, which 
wants to approach this radical otherness without depriving it of its 
otherness. This language, too, must be “obscure”, because it relates 
to a sphere that is outside the light that is the prerequisite of iden-
tification (it is only in light that shape or form can emerge, that 
something may reveal itself to be something and thus become appre-
hendable), outside the light that is the phenomenological condition 
of the phenomenon and that is therefore simply another word for 
the world or totality, objectivising intentionalities, and the horizons 
thereof. The night, which is complementary to this light, means sim-
ply obscurity, illegibility, confusion. For this reason, the night of the 
element, the night of the il y a, must be a different night, night as 
the content of the space without horizons, essential anonymity, in 
which anything applies to anything, the night that bears down upon 
us in the form of fatigue and insomnia and in which (outside the 
antitheses of day and night) we experience how our “I” is flooded 
with anonymity.  
 
The exterior – if one insists on the term – remains uncorrelated with an 
interior. It is no longer given. It is no longer a world. What we call the I is 
itself submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalised, stifled by it. The 
disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what cannot disappear, the 
sheer fact of being in which one participates whether one wants to or not, 
without having taken the initiative, anonymously.218
 
However, we must view this il y a as simply a “rustling“ or “mur-
muring” (murmure) of silence, a word and an “experience” that we 
will henceforth frequently encounter in the work of Michal Fou-
cault and many others. 
It was around this time that Levinas’s  lifelong friend Maurice 
Blanchot appeared on the scene, not only in the novels (the first 
218 Ibid., p. 58.
179
version of Thomas l’Obscure was written in 1941, and Aminadab 
came out a year later), but also in the essays on literature collect-
ed and published as L’Espace littéraire (1955). Both genres involve 
an encounter between writing, écriture, and language. The writer 
who writes is at the same moment dragged down into the depths 
of speech, into his own being, i.e. into language that is not tied to 
a representation of the world and which is free of references and 
designations, but in and out of which an incalculable game between 
words is constantly flitting that does not depend on any speaker. The 
“whisper” in the background confusion of the written text does not 
refer to a human being, but is the operation of language itself out-
side of that speech that refers by means of its precisely convertible 
signs to our world (thus articulated in the instrumental utilisation 
of language): it is the operation of the endless deferral of meaning 
that cannot be stabilised in any interpretation. It is therefore the 
movement of constant deferral or différance of meaning, as Jacques 
Derrida puts it. It is for this very reason, claims Blanchot, that the 
writer is unable to read his own work, which for him too is a mys-
tery from which he is separated (later variations on the theme of 
the “death of the author” clearly find their antecedents here). This 
mystery, though it hints that it exists without allowing itself to be 
deciphered, only makes itself known by means of rustling or mur-
muring beneath denotative speech. 
 
To write is to make oneself the echo of what cannot cease speaking – and 
since it cannot, in order to become its echo I have, in a way, to silence it. 
I bring to this incessant speech the decisiveness, the authority of my own 
silence. I make perceptible, by my silent mediation, the uninterrupted af-
firmation, the giant murmuring upon which language opens and thus be-
comes image, becomes imaginary, becomes a speaking depth, an indistinct 
plenitude which is empty.219
219 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln, London 1982, p. 27.
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As Blanchot sees it, literature seeks to be the expression of the expe-
rience of that which precedes life. To put it even more precisely, lit-
erature is this very experience, since, as he says in L’Entretien infini: 
“How can I, in my speech, recapture this prior presence that I must 
exclude in order to speak, in order to speak it?”220 This is experience 
“structured” by revealing the disappearing in its disappearance, i.e. 
in its resistance to being revealed, experience as testimony to the 
absolute exterior, to which it relates as separated from it. 
However, this is still insufficient for an understanding of the term 
désastre. 
This is how things stand at present. Firstly, we have il y a as expe-
rience, as something that penetrates experience without being able 
to become experience. Secondly, we have the thought of the rela-
tionship that is also an absolute separation, a relationship across ir-
reducible difference, by means of which even the phenomenological 
concept of showing is fundamentally modified: in the foreground is 
the revelation of that which evades revelation, or the revelation of 
that which disappears in its disappearance. This is roughly the line 
along which Blanchot’s thinking, and that of others, moves. 
However, to begin with Blanchot approaches this non-phenom-
enon through literature and its relationship to language. This is 
about experience exposed to the inexpressible murmure (rustling, 
whispering or droning) behind words that refer to things by means 
of general meanings. That which allows literature to be literature 
and which Blanchot designates using the word écriture fundamen-
tally modifies our understanding of language in philosophy, which 
gradually becomes almost the norm as soon as Roland Barthes, Mi-
chel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles De-
leuze and others begin to move away from structuralist linguistics as 
a model. Blanchot arrives at this other concept during the course of 
a polemic with Hegel, and his argument runs something like this: in 
220 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis and London 1993, p. 36.
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speech aimed at communication the concreteness of the thing com-
municated is negated and replaced by a general meaning or idea. 
The language of communication is “essential” language. However, 
if language is freed from this function and if words do not refer to 
things, speech becomes an autonomous element, a neutral dimen-
sion (neither a thing nor an idea) without subject. A speech without 
subject that has no speaker and that the speaking subject drags into 
his murmur (murmure). This is the outside, which is the bedrock of 
the language of communication that refers to things by identifying 
them. The work, the œuvre, as the manifestation of écriture, is at 
the same time désœuvrement or worklessness, the corrosion of isola-
tion, within whose interstices appears that which cannot be named 
and apprehended (mystery, absolute otherness). This dimension of 
speech – the rustling, whispering, droning or murmure – is clearly 
that apparition of the linguistic expression that Husserl’s semiology 
wants to eliminate.  
Il y a  is experience in which we confront that which always al-
ready threatens to absorb this experience as the radical outside. 
Novels may evoke it, bear witness to it, insofar as the reader is ex-
posed to speech that says something and simultaneously denies its 
communicative function. Many passages in Blanchot’s novel Thom-
as l’Obscur can be read in this way, and it is impossible not to recall 
Levinas’s il y a and its combination with the “second night” referred 
to in Levinas’s essay Existence and Existents: 
 
Whereas just a moment ago I felt nothing, simply experiencing each feeling 
as a great absence, now in the complete absence of feelings I experience 
the strongest feeling (…) am at grips with a feeling which reveals to me 
that I cannot experience it, and it is at that moment that I experience it with 
a force which makes it an inexpressible torment. And that is nothing, for 
I could experience it as something other than what it is, fright experienced 
as enjoyment. (…) I discover my being in the vertiginous abyss where it 
is not, an absence, an absence. (…) The darkness hides nothing. My first 
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perception is that this night is not a provisional absence of light. Far from 
being a possible locus of images, it is composed of all that which is not 
seen and is not heard, and, listening to it, even a man would know that, if 
he were not a man, he would hear nothing. (…) Along with the feeling that 
everything has vanished, this night brings me the feeling that everything is 
near me.221
 
In the words of Michel Foucault from his essay entitled The Thought 
from Outside, Blanchot’s écriture refers to the being of speech itself 
at the moment that “language appears as a leave-taking from that 
which it names”: Upon reaching the brink of itself, 
 
what it finds is not a positivity that contradicts it, but the void that will 
efface it. Into that void it must go, consenting to come undone in the rum-
bling (murmure), in the immediate negation of what it says, in a silence 
that is not the intimacy of a secret but a pure outside where words endlessly 
unravel.222
 
Why, however, in the case of Blanchot should the word désastre – 
something inauspicious but also immemorial – be another name for 
Levinas’s il y a? This is a question to which there does not have to 
be a clear answer. It must be clear that that which Blanchot named 
in this way, observed from various angles, necessarily shows itself in 
different ways and embodies different aspects of that which cannot 
be subordinated to a  single meaning. But this is exactly why this 
word is appropriate, since, like il y a, it is outside the antithesis of 
positive and negative. It refers to otherwise than being, to quote the 
title of Levinas’s second large book. And Blanchot himself speaks of 
221 Maurice Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure, trans. Robert Lamberton, Station Hill Press 1998, 
Barrytown, New York, pp. 102–105.
222 Michel Foucault, “The Thought from Outside”, trans. Brian Massumi, in: Foucault Blanchot, 
Zone Books, New York 1987, p. 22.
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the loosening of the meaning of words that in his texts seem to oc-
cupy the position of concepts: 
 
These names, areas of dislocation, the four winds of spirit’s absence, breath 
from nowhere – the names of thought, when it lets itself come undone 
and, by writing, fragment. Outside. Neutral. Disaster. Return. Surely these 
names form no system. In their abruptness, like proper names designating 
no one, they slide outside all possible meaning without this slide’s meaning 
anything – it leaves only a sliding half-gleam that clarifies nothing, not even 
the outside, whose frontier is nowhere indicated. These names, in a devas-
tated field, ravaged by the absence which has preceded them – and which 
they would bear within themselves if it weren’t that, empty of all inferiority, 
they rise up exterior to themselves (stones petrified by the endlessness 
of their fall and forming the walls of an abyss) – seem remainders, each 
one, of another language, both disappeared and never yet pronounced, 
a language we cannot even attempt to restore without reintroducing these 
names back into the world, or exalting them to some higher world of which, 
in their external, clandestine solitude, they could only the irregular interrup-
tion, the invisible retreat.223
 
Il y a  is thus radical exteriority, just as Levinas’s “face” is radical 
exteriority. In both cases the encounter with the outside is played 
out in a past that was never present, because the encounter with the 
other is inscribed in me, as Levinas would say, before I encounter it 
in reality. The other is somehow always already in my place and this 
original co-implication explains the consciousness of vulnerability. 
This always involves the event of separation that is present only in 
forgetting: “The disaster is related to forgetfulness – forgetfulness 
without memory, the motionless retreat of what has not been treat-
ed – the immemorial, perhaps. To remember forgetfully: again, the 
outside.”224 Désastre, therefore, as absolute loss (but also as original 
223 Blanchot, Writing of Desaster, pp. 57–58.
224 Ibid., p. 3
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passivity and the unattainability of immediacy). These are also signs 
of trauma (désastre in the sense of disaster), as well as a deviation 
to a radical, since non-totalisable, asymmetry (dés-astre, disconnec-
tion from the stars, dis-orientation). However, it is only a traumatic 
experience inasmuch as it makes its presence felt in a world (the 
horizon of all horizons) that has a centre and in which that which 
is is that which “is thought about, seen, acted on, willed, felt – an 
object”,225 in a world already formed by the intentional (i.e. symmet-
rical, noetic-noematic) relationship of the interior to the exterior 
that Levinas calls the totality, the basis of which is the possibility of 
owning, i.e. suspending otherness.226 
A preliminary summary: désastre refers simultaneously to two fun-
damental transformations of philosophical discourse. Above all, the 
relationship must be thought of as a relationship across irreducible 
difference. The basic form of showing is the showing of that which is 
escaping from the phenomenon in the very act of its escape. But now 
we have a problem. The outside is somehow inside. 
 
225 Levinas, Existence and Existents, ch. 2.
226 Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini. Essai sur lexteriorité. Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1961, p. 8. 
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However, in the word désastre there is also an echo of the Holocaust: 
The calm of the holocaust, the burn of the holocaust, the annihilation 
of noon – the calm of the disaster (désastre).
The second novel by Maurice Blanchot is called Aminadab. It 
bears the name of Levinas’s  brother, who, along with his father, 
stepmother, another brother Boris and other relatives, was mur-
dered by the Nazis in Lithuania. Levinas’s mother and daughter in 
France were saved from transportation by Maurice Blanchot, Levi-
nas’s  classmate from the University of Strasbourg and a  lifelong 
friend, who hid them with friends in the Normandy countryside. 
Levinas himself, serving from 1939 in the French army, was cap-
tured and interned, first in Rennes and then in Germany in Stalag 
11 B. 
 
The Bergen-Belsen concentration camp was very close: we met prisoners 
from it. We knew that people were disappearing in a strange way in Poland. 
We knew that they were rounding up Jews and deporting them. But we 
simply couldn’t believe it…227
 
Levinas’s teacher, the sociology professor Maurice Halbwachs, also 
died in Bergen-Belsen. Levinas called the dog that greeted the pris-
oners with pleasure every day the last Kantian in Nazi Germany. 
“We were stripped of our human skin... [and only] a small inner 
murmur (...) reminded us of our essence as thinking creatures.”228 
From the perspective of traditional philosophy Levinas is often 
associated with an almost scandalous thesis: ethics takes precedence 
over ontology, because the fundamental situation is the relationship 
227 La conscience juive face à l’histoire: le Pardon, ed. Eliane Amado Levy-Valensi, PUF, Paris 
1965, p. 75.
228 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. Seán Hand, Johns Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore 1997, pp. 152–153. 
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of man with his fellow man as the radical other, his relationship 
to exteriority. If this alteritas or otherness is to be sustainable, we 
must conceive of this relationship as asymmetrical: I am here only 
if addressed by another, though I am always already in the position, 
vulnerable and naked, of he who answers. Unlike the founding acts 
of consciousness or subjectivity, which both phenomenology and the 
modernist tradition both privilege, in Levinas the primary “rela-
tionship” is one of passivity, because it accentuates the moment of 
response or patience. 
However, the idea as reduced in this way leaves unanswered the 
question of what philosophical concepts are actually supposed to 
communicate. What testimony do they offer? To what do they refer? 
Philosophical thinking is exhausted neither by reflections upon its 
own history nor the creation of systems, because then it would be 
difficult to show how it relates to real experience. However, for this 
very reason each transformation of philosophical discourse is a spe-
cific philosophical response to a certain historical experience. If this 
were not so, then concepts would not emerge and evanesce, and it is 
only in this way that they are legitimised. 
Penetrating the thicket of Levinas’s  thinking is not easy. It is 
rooted in the Judaic tradition, though Levinas is careful always to 
distinguish his philosophical books from Judaic exegesis. Neverthe-
less, it is impossible to make such a separation and, on the contrary, 
a certain overlap offers a kind of key to his “ethics” in his texts deal-
ing explicitly with the Holocaust, because this is an event that rep-
resents a challenge to both theology and philosophy. Levinas rises to 
the challenge not only in Totalité et Infini and Autrement qu’être, but 
in other texts too. 
Born in Lithuania to a rabbinical family, in 1946 Zvi Kolitz wrote 
a short story entitled Yosl Rakover Talks to God. The original ver-
sion, published in Argentina, was in Yiddish. In the story, a work 
of fiction, Yosl Rakover recounts how he is spending the last hours 
of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. In a dramatically realist style that 
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does not shy away from depicting the inordinate cruelty of the Ger-
mans and sometimes the Poles, he describes the fate of his family 
(including his six children, all of whom die), and that of his other 
relatives and friends. And then at the end of the story he says some-
thing strange: “I believe in the God of Israel, even when He has done 
everything to make me cease to believe in Him.” The text was trans-
lated into English (and later into Hebrew) and from English into 
other languages. However, the English translation did not feature 
the name of the real author (a fact repeated in many translations), 
and for a long time the text was thought to be an authentic docu-
ment. Only much later was it “returned” to its true author. Levinas 
read it and called it “both beautiful and true, true as only fiction 
can be” (indicating that he had his doubts regarding its authenticity 
as a document but, as is clear, felt that the question of authorship 
was not of crucial importance). His essay “Loving the Torah More 
Than God” makes reference to the story. Three points are crucial 
here. Firstly: what is the suffering of innocents actually supposed to 
mean? Is it not proof of a world without God? In which case would 
not atheism be the proper response?  
Secondly: according to Levinas the answer presupposes that we 
are aware of the specific nature of the Jewish concept of God. To 
resort to atheism is the response of those who live in a childish fan-
tasy of a God who punishes evil, distributes rewards and forgives 
sins, a God who treats people as thought they were children. If Yosl 
Rakover does not lose his faith in God, it is because his faith has its 
origin in the religion of adults. The heavens are empty, the God of 
adults is revealed in the emptiness of the heavens of children. Yosl 
is alone, God has concealed his face, the just are without succour. 
However, Yosl has been left alone precisely in order to shoulder 
the burden of God’s own responsibility for others. The path to God 
must pass across a section without God (which is why true atheism 
must find a response to the legitimate requirement of atheism). And 
thirdly: the specifically Jewish meaning of suffering as an invitation 
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to man to become adult. This represents a rejection of theodicy as 
a remnant of a mythical understanding of God. 
 
Theodicy, in other words, was never a fact of life. But if we ever thought 
it was and needed a demonstration of its insufficiency, the Holocaust was 
such a  demonstration with a  vengeance. The Holocaust as an event for 
Levinas aligns itself with the deepest order of human catastrophe. It is the 
return of the moment of the exile, the beginning of the first diaspora. All 
responsibility is in our hands, not because there is no God, or because God 
has concealed or veiled His Face, but because, he tells us, there never was 
such a God to begin with, because the dream of such a God is the dream of 
children who would deflect human responsibility onto the divine. To become 
adult for Levinas is to assume a full responsibility for human behaviour that 
is not the product of my freedom but ironically its condition, that is given 
in the created fabric of the world. And to become such an adult – infinitely 
responsible for the other individual (and here is really the second part of 
it) – is clearly in fact to engage God in relationship, a God who is other-
wise than being, a God who demands of us nothing less than shouldering 
God’s  own responsibility for others, for their lives, for the responsibility, 
even for their deaths.229
 
The experience of suffering is fundamental. For instance, Levi-
nas says that the just may only live separated in this way from God 
through his consciousness that necessarily includes suffering. If we 
want to understand Levinas’s  philosophy it is important to know 
that for him “conscience” is not part of consciousness (conscious-
ness that in the distance explores the world as it shows itself to him, 
for instance during reflections upon himself): on the contrary, con-
sciousness is made whole by virtue of “conscience” (the French word 
conscience means both consciousness and conscience). In philosophi-
229 Sandor Goodhart, “Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness. Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust 
and the logic of witness.” In: J. Roth, E. Maxwell et al., Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust 
in an Age of Genocide, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 98–113. 
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cal language: without moral consciousness there is no consciousness. 
However, this means that consciousness is somehow established 
through suffering, exposure, not by intentionality but by means of 
a readiness and openness to encounter the Other. 
This provides us with an entrée into another of Levinas’s  texts 
dealing with the Holocaust, A Religion for Adults230, closely related 
to the first text by title. Again, at first sight Levinas would appear 
to be grappling with a  theological problem, namely, the different 
conception of God in Judaism and in connection with the question 
of human freedom. The voice of Israel is usually heard as the voice of 
an ancestor, and this has its own tradition, because the particularity 
of Jewish monotheism resides in its oral tradition, which is crystal-
lised in the Talmud and the commentaries thereto. It eschews the 
path taken by Christianity and does not view man as being party to 
a drama that arises independently of his will (from divine power), 
because according to Judaism this is an offence to human freedom 
and has another source, namely the numinous idea of the sacred that 
empowers man and carries him (actually a form of violence). The 
god of the Jews is not he who is most powerful, and therefore the 
survivors emerged from the contest of these numinous, mythical dei-
ties. Judaism rejects these deities, which is why it is always open to 
the threat of atheism. However, atheism (absolute separation from 
god) is essential if the relationship to the transcendent is to be un-
derstood as a relationship. Several important points need to be made 
here. Firstly: the theological problem is simultaneously a philosophi-
cal problem. What is crucial is the interpretation of suffering, i.e. 
that which gave rise in Christianity to the idea of theodicy. The invi-
tation to the religion of adults marks the end of theodicy. According 
to Levinas the Holocaust represents  
 
230 Both in Levinas, Difficult Freedom, p. 17.
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the destruction of all balance between the explicit and implicit theodicy 
of Western thought and the forms which suffering and its evil take in the 
very unfolding of this century. (...) The disproportion between suffering and 
every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with a glaring, obvious clarity.231
 
Theodicy is a response to the search for the meaning of the “scan-
dal” of evil in the overall plan of creation. Suffering is therefore 
subordinate to a certain “metaphysical expediency”. When Adorno 
rejects any attempt to “understand” the Holocaust as an insult to 
the victims, then, indirectly, like Levinas he rejects theodicy. And in 
the case of both writers the theological idea of theodicy is somehow 
inscribed into the Enlightenment idea of progress as its own type 
of “overall plan” of history. Secondly: the relationship to God is an 
ethical one, because the presence of God can only be experienced 
through my relationship to the other, to another person and within 
this relationship. Thirdly: the meaning of separation. Man is pri-
marily “egoism”. However, he must not persist in this. Unlike the 
Western, Christian tradition following on from ancient times (Ploti-
nus and later Augustus and the contemplation of the soul within), 
Judaism emphases real transcendence, without which the soul can-
not be for itself. The separated I senses a chink in itself. It discovers 
itself as (always already) affected by the other both arbitrarily and 
violently. Egoism: everything the “ego” has within range is trans-
formed into “its own”. However, in order to own it, it must accept – 
take – it, which is in itself problematic, because the discovery of its 
own “abilities” is simultaneously the discovery of their illegitimacy 
in respect of the Other. “Self-consciousness inevitably surprises it-
self at the heart of a moral consciousness” without the other being 
a new edition of myself. Through the other I am in touch with God 
(in a relationship of transcendence). The ethical relationship is pri-
231 Emmanuel Levinas, “La souffrance inutile“, in: Entre nous. Grasset, Paris 1991, pp. 114–115.
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mary. Justice towards the other drives me towards an unsurpassable 
proximity to God. 
There is only a hint of “suffering” here. Though I suffer if an injus-
tice is done to another, I am also primarily “sufferance” (passio and 
patientia) inasmuch as I can only be self-conscious if I am already 
“subverted” in my egoism as always already “affected” by the Other. 
If we still take phenomenology as our referential framework, we 
could, along with Levinas, formulate the same thing once again 
in the following way: I meet someone; they issue a command with 
their face; their vulnerability prevents me from murder; along with 
this instruction there is astonishment that I cannot understand the 
other: I cannot kill, I cannot assimilate, I am bound to the other by 
an endless obligation. The intentionality of consciousness is over-
turned: the other “intends” me, I myself am “accused” by the other. 
The isolated I is breached by the other, the intentionality of someone 
else, the I is extra-verted:232 
 
Suffering is surely a given in consciousness, a certain “psychological con-
tent”, like the lived experience of colour, of sound, of contact, or like 
any sensation. But in this “content” itself, it is in-spite-of-consciousness, 
unassumable. It is unassumable and “unassumability”. “Unassumability” 
does not result from the excessive intensity of a  sensation, from some 
sort of quantitative “too much”, surpassing the measure of our sensibility 
and our means of grasping and holding. It results from an excess, a “too 
much” which is inscribed in a sensorial content, penetrating as suffering 
the dimensions of meaning which seem to be opened and grafted on to it. 
For the Kantian “I think” – which is capable of reuniting and embracing 
the most heterogeneous and separate givens into order and meaning un-
der its a priori forms – it is as if suffering were not only a given refractory 
to synthesis, but the way in which the refusal opposed to the assembling 
of givens into a meaningful whole is opposed to it: suffering is at once 
232 Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig und Levinas, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
1992, p. 26.
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what disturbs order and this disturbance itself: a backwards conscious-
ness, “operating” not as “grasp” but as revulsion. It is a modality, or the 
categorical ambiguity of quality and modality. Taken as an “experienced” 
content, the denial and refusal of meaning which is imposed as a sensible 
quality is the way in which the unbearable is precisely not borne by con-
sciousness, the way this not-being-borne is, paradoxically, itself a sensa-
tion of a given. This is a quasi-contradictory structure, but a contradiction 
which is not formal like that of the dialectical tension between the affirma-
tive and the negative which arises for the intellect; it is a contradiction by 
way of sensation: the plaintiveness of pain, hurt.233
 
Suffering as a  given in consciousness is a  feeling, a  “sensation”, 
which means that it too is something akin to a  “hyletic datum”, 
inasmuch as it defies synthesis, i.e. the act of identification. How-
ever, its resistance is stronger because it rejects “intentionality”. It 
is “inside-out consciousness”, the consciousness of something that 
refuses to be consciousness (it is unacquirable or unassumable). It is 
also therefore the experience of this unacquirability (unassumabil-
ity), unbearability. But what does inside-out consciousness mean? It 
means openness to the outside, into the outside – in relation to the 
Other (albeit on the level of “feeling”). The outside is thus always 
already inside. 
And the text continues as follows: 
 
Suffering, in its hurt and its in-spite-of-consciousness, is passivity. Here, 
“taking cognisance” is no longer, properly speaking, a taking; it is no longer 
the performance of an act of consciousness, but, in its adversity, a submis-
sion; and even a submission to the submitting, since the ‘content’ of which 
the aching consciousness is conscious is precisely this very adversity of 
suffering, its hurt. But, here again, this passivity – in the sense of a mo-
dality – signifies as a quiddity, and perhaps as the place where passivity 
233 Levinas, “La souffrance inutile”. In: Entre nous, p. 107.
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signifies originally, independent of its conceptual opposition to activity. (...) 
The passivity of suffering is more profoundly passive than the receptivity 
of our senses, which is already the activity of welcome, and straight away 
becomes perception. In suffering sensibility is a vulnerability, more passive 
than receptivity; it is an ordeal more passive than experience. It is precisely 
an evil. It is not, to tell the truth, through passivity that evil is described, but 
through evil that suffering is understood. Suffering is a pure undergoing.
 
The ethical relationship is established on a pre-reflexive level, on the 
level of sensibility, i.e. on a deeper level than intentional conscious-
ness.  
Let’s return for a moment to the story of Yosl Rakover. For me it 
is intolerable to share in (the co-experience of) his suffering: I am 
aware of his vulnerability. But where does my understanding of vul-
nerability come from? From the openness of the human being that 
is not openness of the consciousness of characterised intentionality 
(an openness to everything that is shown to me), but openness as 
“the denuding of the skin exposed to wounds and outrage. This 
openness is the vulnerability of a  skin exposed, in wounds and 
outrage, beyond all that can show itself...”.234 This is the core of 
Levinas’s concept of subjectivity, of the subject, which in classical 
(and modern) philosophy is defined by consciousness and its reflex-
ive relationship – by a closing off – within itself. Levinas is searching 
for the origin of subjectivity prior to this consciousness: its source is 
the experience (sensation) of radical passivity, of that which is im-
plicated in vulnerability.  
 
The subjectivity of the subject is a radical passivity of man, who also posits 
himself, declares himself to be, and considers his sensibility as an attribute. 
234 Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Nijhoff, Haag 1987, 
p. 146.
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This passivity is more passive than every passivity; it is repressed in the 
pronominal particle self (se) which has no nominative form.235
 
Clearly an extraordinarily complex “experience”. Vulnerability is 
the “capability” to receive a strike. Openness. However, this is open-
ness as the relationship to another Other. I am injured by the other, 
injured by his suffering, which I understand from my own vulner-
ability. This is why for me Yosl’s  fate is intolerable, unacceptable. 
Subjectivity is primarily this sensitivity, sensibility.  
 
Vulnerability is obsession by the other or an approaching of the other. … 
To suffer from another is to have charge of him, to support him, to be in his 
place, to be consumed by him. … Nothing is more passive than this being 







However, in the word désastre there is an echo of the Holocaust: 
 
The unknown name, alien to naming:
The holocaust, the absolute event of history – which is a date in history – 
that utter-burn where all history took fire, where the movement of Meaning 
was swallowed up, where the gift, which knows nothing of forgiving or of 
consent, shattered without giving place to anything that can be affirmed, 
that can be denied – gift of very passivity, gift of what cannot be given. How 
can it be preserved, even by thought? How can thought be made the keeper 
of the holocaust where all was lost, including guardian thought?
In the mortal intensity, the fleeing silence of the countless cry.237
This echo is to be heard most clearly in an understanding of “human-
ism” that is different to Sartre’s  existential version or Heidegger’s 
ontological version by virtue of being highly impacted by the expe- 
rience that the concentration camps survivors recorded and that 
can be summed up as follows: Man is the indestructible that can 
be destroyed, l’indestructible, qui peut être détruit. This was how 
Blanchot responded upon encountering Robert Antelme, who in 
1947, after his return from Buchenwald, published L’espèce hu-
maine, his testimony of experiences that he describes as “surpass-
ing all imagination”.238 For Blanchot, who soon became acquainted 
with the author, this book became a kind of bridge to thinking the 
outside through the relationship to the other as a “relationship with-
out relationship”, a relationship via irreducible difference, as well 
as another opportunity to offer a dialogic commentary on Levinas’s 
concept of ethics. 
237 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 80.
238 Robert Antelme, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler, The Marlboro Press, 
Evanston, 1992, p. 2.
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In this text, part of the collection L’Entretien infini, Blanchot first 
examines Antelme’s book from the broader perspective of the “final 
solution of the Jewish Question” in order to base his reading on 
a consideration of what it means “to be a Jew”. Crucial to this is the 
idea of exodus and exile as an essentially nomadic idea,239 an exis-
tence unfettered by appropriation and ownership (identification), 
i.e. the idea of a positive relationship to exteriority in which another 
dimension opens up to Man, namely a relationship to that which is 
beyond his reach. The true meaning of this relationship is suggested 
by the prefixes to the words that describe it: exile, exodus, exterior-
ity, ex-istence (or separation, dés-astre). 
 
The Jew is the man of origins, who relates to the origin, not by dwelling, 
but by distancing himself, in this saying that the truth of beginning is in 
separation.240
 
(Derrida’s commentary on The Origin of Geometry, more Husser-
lian in style than Husserl himself, infers something very similar.) 
Antelme’s book contains an extreme form of the relationship to 
another, namely the relationship to the Other in myself, i.e. a rela-
tionship by means of which, without its being possible for me to be 
aware of the fact, I always already am. In a state of extreme crisis, 
Man (a concentration camp prisoner) found himself on a boundary 
on which he was deprived of the power to say “I”. He was deprived 
of the world and there is now nothing but this Other, by which he 
“is not”. Existence in the first person singular is outside him, i.e. it is 
affirmed only in this (his) anonymous presence without speech. He 
lives an egoism without ego, his adherence to life is an adherence to 
239 Baudrillard and especially Deleuze later revived the idea of “nomadicism”, linking it more closely 
to Nietzsche than Blanchot.
240 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis and London 1993, p. 125.
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an impersonal life – and yet it is this that is experience of ex-istence, 
experience of the il y a. 
 
As though the inexorable affirmation in man that always keeps him standing 
were more terrible than universal disaster (désastre). (…) Having fallen not 
only below the individual, but also below every class and every real collec-
tive relation, the person no longer exists in his or her personal identity. In 
this sense the one afflicted is already outside the world, a being without 
horizon. And he is not a thing; even useless, a thing is precious. The de-
ported person is not a  thing belonging to the SS: when still working as 
a labourer, his work gives him, however little, the value of a man exploited; 
but for the essentially deported person, the one who no longer has either 
a face or speech, the work he is forced to do is designed only to exhaust his 
power to live and to deliver him over to the boundless insecurity of the ele-
ments. Nowhere any recourse: outside the cold, inside hunger; everywhere 
an indeterminate violence.241
 
The destruction of existence in an actualising world in which 
the relationship of the appropriated and identified holds sway, i.e. the 
relationship of power eliminating everything inappropriable, reveals 
the indestructibility of ex-istence, inasmuch as it returns it to the ele-
ment from which it was torn as “hypostasis” (the term is Levinas’s), 
inasmuch as it returns it to the impersonal and neutral il y a (nei-
ther subject nor object, neither inside nor outside, neither night nor 
day but another night, neither speech nor silence but a murmur). It 
finds itself outside the relationship of control, it is the experience 
of the relationship to the Other as Other. Separated from itself it 
relates to the strangeness of otherness, it is this relationship to that 
which is indestructible in it by virtue of being non-actualisable. 
This can also be read as a commentary on Levinas’s equation of 
ontology and war or totality. Désastre: the negative lesson of the Ho-
241 Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 130.
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locaust, but also désastre as the separation that is the prerequisite or 
condition of the relationship to the Other and otherness. 
A more careful reading of the texts by Blanchot reveals an impor-
tant shift in comparison with Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy. 
In the case of Blanchot the relationship to another is not meant 
solely as the relationship to the Other, but is generalised. It is a re-
lationship to the unknown as unknown, in which the unknown is 
affirmed in that which makes it unknown. Unveiling it leaves it in 
its veiledness. That which is thus “unveiled” must remain intact. 
The unknown is neutral. Not only does it not belong to our hori-
zon, but it does not belong to any representable horizon (in the 
Husserlian sense of the word).242 As so often in Blanchot, here too 
the experience returns of literature, the work, writing as écriture: 
every interpretation inter alia points to what is apprehensible only 
at the moment of ineluctable loss – the rustle or drone of speech, 
the murmur that captures the work, is the presence of things prior 
to the existence of the world (as the horizon of all horizons).243 
To formulate this conservatively: the meaning of the work is inex-
haustible, not as a consequence of the deep thinking of its author, 
but thanks to the historical depth and autonomous life of speech.244 
Derrida will go on to say that no interpretation is capable of hold-
ing back the deferral of meaning in its articulations. And prior 
to this, Charles Sanders Peirce had already intuited at the end of 
the semiotic process the constantly escaping final interpreter. The 
uniqueness that interpretation wishes to highlight is always already 
lost in said uniqueness as mediated by interpretation. Désastre: im-
mediacy is unattainable, it is outside. 
242 See “Connaissance de l’inconnu”, in The Infinite Conversation, p. 51.
243 Also in the essay “La littérature et le droit de la mort”, in: Maurice Blanchot, La part du feu, 
Gallimard, Paris 1949.
244 For more on this see Ulrich Haase, William Large, Maurice Blanchot, Routledge, London and 
New York 2001, p. 55.
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Immediacy not only rules out all mediation; it is the infiniteness of a pres-
ence such that it can no longer be spoken of, for the relation itself, be it 
ethical or ontological, has burned up all at once in a night bereft of dark-
ness. In this night there are no longer any terms, there is no longer a rela-
tion, no longer a beyond – in this night God himself has annulled himself. 
Or, one must manage somehow to understand the immediate in the past 
tense. This renders the paradox practically unbearable. Only in accordance 
with such a paradox can we speak of disaster. We can no more think of the 
immediate than we can think of an absolutely passive past, but patience 
in us vis-à-vis a  forgotten affliction is the mark of this past, its oblivious 
prolongation. When we are patient, it is always with respect to an infinite 
affliction which does not reach us in the present, but befalls by linking us 
to a past without memory. Other’s affliction, and the other as affliction.245
 
The philosopher is not marked by astonishment but by fear, fear 
as a “disposition” in which, flung out of himself, he experiences the 
Outside, the Unknown. However, in this respect Blanchot refers to 
the question posed by René Char: How can we live without the un-
known before us? 246 If the unknown is outside the horizon of all 
horizons, that is, outside our understanding, apprehension and au-
thorisation, outside the field of the visible (including both the visible 
and its symmetrical counterpart the invisible), and if it cannot ever 
be part of any whole, then it can only be that which is forever on the 
point of arriving without in any way being possible to anticipate and 
without ever being able to become presence – the relationship to 
the unknown is une relation de non-présence, a relationship to which 
identity, unity and presence is foreign. Désastre is another name for 
difference (and in Derrida différance). Both implicate the relation-
ship in radical separation. And so humanism may be destroyed, but 
a trace of it lingers as resistance outside the relationship of control. 
245 Maurice Blanchot, Writing of Disaster, trans. Ann Smock, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 
and London, 1986, pp. 24–25.
246 “René Char et la pensée du neutre”, in Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 298 et seq.
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Désastre: Man is inseparable from his otherness, but only inasmuch 
as he is inassimilable by history. Désastre: the trace shows that to 
which it refers, in its escape and as escaping. However, for this very 
reason the outside is somehow inside and we are forever in the prox-
imity of that which is on the point of arriving. 
Kracauer and Adorno still in a certain sense hold fast to an idea 
of redemption, though as paleonymy or under erasure (sous rature). 
However, Kracauer’s wait in the hotel lobby for the “last things be-
fore the last” displays a striking resemblance to Blanchot’s thought 
from the outside, however different their starting points. Both 
Levinas and Blanchot speak of original passivity that is the sign of 
an asymmetric relationship. The appropriate response is waiting, 
l’attente, not in anticipation but as a display of the absence of the 
last foundation (the past that was never the present) or the non-
actualisability of that which is on the point of arriving. This involves 
waiting for the sake of waiting, i.e. waiting as patience. 
 
the impatience at the heart of error is the essential fault, because it miscon-
strues the very trueness of error which, like a law, requires that one never 
believe the goal is close or that one is coming nearer to it. One must never 
have done with the indefinite; one must never grasp – as if it were the im-
mediate, the already present – the profundity of inexhaustible absence (...) 
it is impatience which makes the goal inaccessible by substituting for it the 
proximity of an intermediary figure. It is impatience that destroys the way 
toward the goal by preventing us from recognising in the intermediary the 
figure of the immediate.247
 
247 Maurice Blanchot, Literární prostor, pp. 98 and 99–100. The Space of Literature, trans. Ann 
Smock, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, London 1982, p. 79.
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The transformation of philosophical discourse is a process that is 
played out on many levels simultaneously. It is not linear and in-
cludes the interaction of a large number of elements, the effects of 
which only become apparent from a distance. A description of this 
transformation should therefore examine the dynamic of the com-
prehensive system rather than the structure. One starting point is 
a method that could be summarised in the form of a single principle: 
the same again but differently. Only by means of the re-layering of 
different perspectives in which the first description is repeated dif-
ferently is it possible to see broader contexts shining through while 
at the same time noticing details, charting shifts in emphasis, moni-
toring other trajectories of lines, and being permanently aware of 
the openness of the field undergoing this transformation. Borrow-
ing from mathematical topology, we might also call this method 
the baker’s  transformation. The distant finds itself in immediate 
proximity through a process of folding, while the proximate recedes 





If we pursue our exploration of the unknown to its limit, we en-
counter what not only Blanchot but Derrida too called the secret. 
If, inspired by phenomenology, we ask ourselves how the secret is 
manifest (if we know of the secret then it has been manifested in 
some way while remaining a secret in this manifestation), the an-
swer would be: the secret discloses itself by resisting its own disclo-
sure. This is a surprising modality of the relationship of inside and 
outside: we know the inside of a secret that outwardly remains un-
known. In a sense, the secret as the unknown is a crisis of disclosure, 
an example of a relationship through difference.
This relationship can be demonstrated in various ways. Let us re-
turn to Walter Benjamin and his examination of the middle class 
interior in nineteenth-century Paris.248 The interior is a  place in 
which a living space is established. An apartment is a person’s uni-
verse, his salon a private theatre box, its owner’s enclosure. It is the 
interior, insulated from the exterior, fenced off from the exterior, 
the exterior that is present in it but deprived of its exteriority in the 
manner of collectible items. Its occupant controls the without from 
within by means of sophisticated optical equipment, for instance us-
ing a spy mirror, very popular at the time, on a window. The owner 
thus usurps the outside, which is domesticated by means of the mir-
ror.249 
However, the spy mirror finds us not only in a middle-class draw-
ing room functioning as a  means of situating the exterior inside 
as the interior, but back at Husserl’s phenomenology. The mirror 
is a highly accurate diagram of phenomenological reduction as the 
founding act and precondition for an investigation of the constitu-
248 Walter Benjamin, DasPassagen-Werk, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1983, pp. 281–300.
249 Negatively in the case of the Straßenfilm: the shadows of the strange, desolate world of a city 
street are projected into the ceiling of a room. This is how the famous film Die Straße by Karl Grune 
of 1923 begins.
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tion of the world. One might hang the inscription “transcendence in 
immanence” or “reduction to pure phenomenon” beneath this win-
dow mirror, which projects the outside world into the room. If we 
are to understand wherein resides the mysteriousness of mysteries 
and eventually of the secret, we must clearly pass through classical 
phenomenology. However, let us bear in mind that this mirror could 
also be seen as a warning regarding philosophy itself. I will leave it 
to others to find examples of how this might be so. 
Couched in the language of phenomenology and its concepts: 
I cannot doubt that I perceive, for when reflecting upon this experi-
ence I have in front of me (before the eyes of a reflecting or observ-
ing consciousness) the unmediated givenness of the reel parts of this 
experience (be that the experience of perception, fantasy, remem-
brance, etc.). Whether or not there is something outside the experi-
ence that really exists is a question I shall not ask. I did not lose the 
world after this reduction, because as well as reel immanence (the 
moments that are a reel part of the experience, that are in it), there 
appears ideal or intentional immanence (this is summarised by Hus-
serl’s definition of intentionality: every experience is an experience 
of something, means something). Both, i.e. the immediate givenness 
of the experience and that which is meant as intended, are an undis-
puted part of that which Husserl calls the phenomenon and which 
will be (the sole and exclusive) theme of phenomenological descrip-
tion and analysis.  
 
To have an appearance before one’s eye, which refers to something that is 
not itself given in the phenomenon, and to doubt whether it exists or how 
its existence is to be understood that makes sense. But to see and to intend 
nothing other than what is grasped in the seeing, and yet still question and 
doubt – that makes no sense at all.250
 
250 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. Lee Hardy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dodrecht 1990, p. 38.
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Husserl is now in a position to claim that we must distinguish be-
tween a  reel analysis of phenomena and an intentional (or ideal) 
analysis, between reel immanence and ideal or intentional imma-
nence.  
 
Perception includes perceiving the flowering tree, i.e. the tree so desig-
nated: this can be extracted from it by means of intentional analysis: the 
description of a tree qua tree by this perception of the perceived extracts 
something from the perception, something that belongs to it, something 
that “lies within it”, but does not lie reely and does not have to have any 
“genuine being”. The transcendent in some way, therefore, obviously be-
longs to the phenomenon, as perceived, conjured up, imaged in fantasy or 
otherwise cogitated.251
 
In other words, the outside is inside, but not as the outside, not as 
something that could be transcendent in respect of consciousness. 
Neither real nor reel transcendence, nothing of that kind can in-
trude into the phenomenological approach. Thanks to this imma-
nence the problem of knowledge is “free from all mystery”, as Hus-
serl claims in The Idea of Phenomenology, i.e. the mystery is resolved 
by virtue of the outside being inside as the interior, transcendence 
transformed wholly into immanence. 
However, this will not suffice. We must follow Husserl a lot fur-
ther and in much greater detail. 
Feelings, experiences, Erlebnisse, along with everything contained 
within them – these are phenomena, a kind of safe space that can 
be investigated and analysed using the phenomenological approach 
(excluding all external assumptions). A very important term in this 
investigation is “apperception”, since this concept unites the delin-
eation of the intentional relationship, i.e. the fact that every experi-
ence is always an experience of something. For instance, “I perceive 
251 Edmund Husserl, Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (1909), ed. Elisabeth Schuh-
mann, Husserliana VII, Springer 2005, p. 56 (trans. here Phil Jones).
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something”. To be even more precise, this means: “I perceive some-
thing as something”. Apperception is this “as”. I perceive a building 
if I perceive it as a building, if, as Husserl also says, in the percep-
tion of building I intend a building. In Husserl’s lexicon a synonym 
for apperception is Auffassung or concept, or Deutung or something 
like (in a weaker sense of the word) interpretation: the intentional 
object, intentionally immanent objectiveness, is “constituted” (an-
other key term in classical phenomenology) through apperception 
(which, however, usually takes place without our knowing: it is not 
a conscious act) from the material of sensory perception; that which 
is thus experienced content acquires its meaning, it is endowed with 
meaning (Sinngebung). This is then the topic of the investigation of 
the noetic-noematic correlation, which is the level of static phenom-
enology because it involves the investigation of essential structures 
within the framework of an intentional relationship. 
However, this is still too brief. Two questions still need to be an-
swered. Firstly: experience must be able to go back to “something, 
anything”, and therefore we must investigate this “givenness of 
something”. And secondly: apperception (interpretation) cannot be 
without some kind of guidance; if apperception (Auffassung, Deu-
tung) is conceived of as the identification of something as some-
thing, there has to be something here with which it is identifiable 
(within certain limits), i.e. something like an advance prefigure-
ment, on which the apperception of something can be based. 
One, of course, leads to the other. And we are still operating on 
the level of “passivity” (“I  mean a  tree”: quite simply I  perceive 
a tree), and so everything takes place without explicit consciousness 
or explicit participation. Or on the level of “pre-predicative” experi-
ence.252 Husserl resolves all of these problems (I am simplifying, but 
not much) within the framework of genetic phenomenology, usually 
252 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1973. Part I . Prepredicative (Receptive) Experience.
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associated with his later writings even though the very possibility of 
static phenomenology presupposes genetic phenomenology.  
Perception is always the exemplary experience for Husserl. Per-
ception is the perception of something, i.e. something must be giv-
en. This means that something must detach itself from a uniform 
background, it must be abgehoben or lifted, profile itself, stand out 
against the background as an approximately identical unit. If it is 
“to arise” (let us note in passing, so as not to push things beyond the 
bounds of the tolerably complex), it is clear that “time” is a condition. 
This means that consciousness is most deeply the “temporalisation 
of time”, consciousness is the “stream of consciousness”, the con-
sciousness of time is the original site (Urstätte) of the constitution 
of something as something. And this “something” must somehow 
be identity, because if it were not, it would merge into something 
else. The fixing or retention of something is process, movement, 
and therefore (already) presupposes temporality, time, a  duration 
within which it can take place. Only in this way does analysis arrive 
at something that stimulates perception by virtue of detaching itself 
from the field from which it “affects” us, as Husserl says.  
Originally, then, there is the homogenous, uniform field from 
which “something” can emerge. However, even within this homo-
geneity something may be in contrast to something else: red stripes 
on a white background, for instance. In general, then, something de-
taches itself from the background and in contrast to the background. 
However, it is not static, because if this involves “standing out” from 
the background, it means that originally affinity and merger func-
tion as limits in every contrast (something almost merges with the 
background, but now it is also “something”). These are elementary 
visual givens. The limit here is sameness or Gleichheit, against which 
“something” emerges in “gradual cover” thanks to repetition and 
summarisation, but always in the familiarity-strangeness dynamic. 
If the “similar” is here, which detaches itself from the non-similar, 
it is the product of the “cover” or Deckung (which is why it is nec-
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essary that the last foundation be time). Husserl summarises the 
whole of this complex act in Erfahrung und Urteil thus: associa-
tive genesis controls the genesis of passive prefigured givennesses.253 
For the sake of basic orientation I would merely add, with caveats: 
that which is described in this way is something like the creative 
interplay of subjectivity and the world. However, I add this only in 
order to make clear what Husserl had in mind when he says that 
phenomenology is the uncovering of “hidden subjectivity”, the leis-
tende Subjektivität in whose acts the world as always already given to 
us becomes our world by virtue of what it is for us, etc.254 I use the 
word “interplay” so that it is clear that this does not mean that the 
subject produces its own world. It “constitutes” its world, “reveals” 
it  – this would perhaps be the most accurate description (and it 
would be possible to return to the Crisis, to the theme of responsibil-
ity for the inspection, fulfilment of the idea, etc.). However, at the 
same time it is clear that all of this still stands on the fundamental 
principle of transcendence in immanence in the form of intentional 
immanence, because it is impossible to abandon this dimension with-
out abandoning phenomenology itself.  
The whole of this initial phenomenological theme can be brought 
to a close with a much discussed quote regarding “association”. In 
Erfahrung und Urteil, which deals extensively with the importance 
of associations, Husserl says the following: 
 
Affinity or similarity can have different degrees within the limits of the most 
perfect affinity, of likeness without difference. Wherever there is no perfect 
likeness, contrast goes hand in hand with similarity (affinity): the coming 
into prominence of the unlike from a basis of the common. If we pass from 
likeness to likeness, the new like presents itself as repetition. Its content 
253 Regarding Husserl’s concept of association see Elmar Hollenstein, Phänomenologie der Assozi-
ation. Zur Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Haag 1972.
254 Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 46–47.
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comes into completely perfect coincidence with that of the first. This is 
what we refer to as blending. (…) What in a purely static description ap-
pears to be likeness or similarity must therefore be considered in itself 
as being already the product of the one or the other kind of synthesis 
of coincidence, which we denote by the traditional term association, but 
with a change of sense. It is the phenomenon of associative genesis which 
dominates this sphere of passive pregivenness, established on the basis of 
syntheses of internal time-consciousness. The term “association” denotes 
in this context a  form belonging essentially to consciousness in general, 
a form of the regularity of immanent genesis. That association can become 
a general theme of phenomenological description and not merely one of 
objective psychology is due to the fact that the phenomenon of indication 
(Anzeige) is something which can be exhibited from the point of view of 
phenomenology. (…) Association comes into question in this context ex-
clusively as the purely immanent connection of “this recalls that“, “one calls 
attention to the other.”255
 
So what exactly is phenomenology capable of telling us?  
 
Every experience has its own horizon; every experience has its core of ac-
tual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determina-
tions which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, 
of the truly given as “itself-there”, it has its own horizon. This implies that 
every experience refers to the possibility – and it is a question here of the 
capacity (Ver-mőglichkeit) of the ego – not only of explicating, step by 
step, the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity with what 
is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience 
continues, new determinations of the same thing. Every experience can be 
extended in a continuous chain of explicative individual experiences, united 
synthetically as a single experience, open without limit, of the same.256
 
255 Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, pp. 74–75
256 Ibid, p. 32.
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Husserl very appositely calls this “and so on” “induction” in the 
sense of Vordeutung – in the sense of anticipatory intentionality (the 
internal and external horizon). 
So why the need for this digression? This is the connection point 
of both: apperception, thanks to which I  perceive something as 
something, is “guided” by this (habituated) structure of reference, 
remembrance and suggestion. It is a strange “circle”. “Something is 
reminiscent of something” is the demonstrable moment of experi-
ence (as Husserl wants). It becomes our guide to the analysis that 
ascertains the “conditions of possibility”. At the end of this analysis 
we understand how apperception is possible. In other words, it is im-
possible to escape from the structure of “something refers to some-
thing different”, which, however, is the same as sealing the outside 
inside. This different is different because something similar refers 
to it (both are the “same” within limits). The question is whether it 
would not be possible to find traces of another limit in this structure, 
which, it does not need to be emphasised, is guided by the model of 
identifying knowledge. 
If it were not possible to discover any trace of something like this, 
if it were not possible to discover the hidden origin of some serious 
“crisis”, this would mean that something like an intentional rela-
tionship to secrecy would be an absurdity for Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy in the same ways as, for instance, Freud’s unconscious. How-
ever, this does not mean that we have not obtained something. On 
the contrary, we now have a lexicon at our disposal using which we 
can very precisely formulate questions such as: how can we imag-





The mystery that emerges in phenomenology is the mystery of how 
something mysterious can disclose itself. And mindful of limits: how 
can the secret or, borrowing from Blanchot, the unknown, show 
itself? The problem resides in the very concept of the limit, that we 
might characterise very simply: if something is defined by its limit, 
then upon attaining this limit that which is thus defined is annulled 
and disappears. And this is how it is with secrecy as the limit-form 
of mystery.
Husserl’s  analysis of experience in the end reveals the particu-
lar ground of the pre-predicative experience that is structured by 
“horizons” that allow for anticipation and guide our understanding 
of that which is showing itself as showing itself in apperception. 
However, this texture is something that is constituted procedurally, 
by means of the sedimentation of the already experienced and the 
association of that which emerges in this process and differs by vir-
tue of being in contrast to it. It is the level of passive functioning 
that is nevertheless the basis or footing for all other acts following 
on therefrom: perception, cognition, and finally science itself, which 
deals in general concepts. 
Before I  continue, I  would like to take the liberty of a  certain 
interpretative intervention and sketch out what in my opinion is 
a fundamental problem that has accompanied phenomenology from 
its very beginnings to recent texts. Phenomenological analyses are 
possible only given a certain approach. This does not simply concern 
impartiality (epoché, reduction); this approach must be free of all 
expediency and special interests. The phenomenologist is not inter-
ested in discovering something pertaining to the being of the so-
called real world. In the final analysis his approach is detached even 
from that which is associated with the empirical I of the analysing 
philosopher, etc. For instance, in the Introduction to Husserlian Phe-
nomenology by Bernet, Kern and Marbach the authors state very 
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clearly that the last realm to which phenomenology descends, i.e. 
the world of our life, is given prior to the stipulation of all practical 
purposes and, according to Husserl, may be concretely and univer-
sally seen only in an attitude that is disengaged from all purposes.257 
From 1891 to 93, Husserl worked intensively on an investigation into 
the character of formal logic. Especially instructive in this respect 
is his critique of Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, 
1 (1890), which Husserl reviewed in 1891.258 One of Husserl’s objec-
tions runs as follows: purely formal deduction does not refer to the 
specific content of terms in a judgement. Formalised logic includes 
only that which can be deduced on the basis of pure form. However, 
logic consists of mental operations that are beyond the realm of pure 
deduction. In contrast, Husserl demands, inter alia, a logic of pure 
content, all the more so since, in his opinion, every extensional logic 
is necessarily supported by intentional logic. It is clear how the study 
of arithmetic gives rise to the Logische Untersuchungen, in which 
(partly under the influence of Frege’s  critique) Husserl wishes to 
recognise logical and mathematical concepts as objective, namely 
ideal objects that have their own individual being independent of 
the psyche. An analysis of their originary givenness in consciousness 
becomes that which will be termed (static, descriptive) phenomenol-
ogy, in which Husserl tries to prove the legitimacy of the “opinion of 
generality” and hint at a path leading to the constitution of generali-
ties, i.e. pure logical content, and thus to correct logic as the basis 
of our relationship to the world. In other words, Husserl’s interest, 
which is never suspended though is often only implicit, is in the 
establishment of “content” logic – Weltlogik in the final analysis – 
which presupposes a precursory, albeit completely peculiar “logic” 
of the natural world, the idealisation of which allows for logic and 
science. This is the birth certificate of his phenomenology. However, 
257 Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach, Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. North-
western University Press, Evanston 1993.
258 Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen, ed. Bernard Rang, Husserliana XXII, pp. 3–43.
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alongside this is the fact that for Husserl the last vanishing point 
of Erkenntnis, knowledge as the most fundamental relationship 
to the world, and, to put things as generally as possible, the last 
“horizon”, is the modern world in the sense of the Enlightenment 
project (content logic as Weltlogik is the last version of the French 
revolutionary Encyclopédie). However, this means that, though his 
phenomenological approach is reduced, this intention inexplicably 
remains present in it, i.e. the unreflected assumption of the priority 
of cognition as re-cognition (identification), which phenomenology 
legitimises by virtue of the fact that its Wesenschau is a method of 
obtaining the pure content of our thinking (while at the same time 
revealing its intersubjective validity). The French would say that the 
basic position, the Grundhaltung, of classical phenomenology, is 
logocentrism. Husserl says the same thing, albeit in a more compli-
cated fashion:  
 
(It is necessary) to traverse the path which leads from mute, conceptless 
experience and its universal interweavings; first to typical, vague, primary 
universality, which is sufficient in everyday life; and thence to the genu-
ine and true concepts, such as genuine science must presuppose them to 
be.259
 
However, what this interest opens up in phenomenology is the ir-
reducible dimension of crisis. In order to clarify matters, we must 
return to the quote above. In fact, I left out one sentence that in this 
context is highly significant. Husserl looks in detail at the horizontal 
structure of the pre-predicative, passively self-establishing realm of 
every experience in which every explicit, to wit, conscious relation-
ship must be founded and thanks to which the “apperception” of 
something as something is possible. This must be borne in mind if 
we want, using this lexicon, to formulate the question of what and 
259 Ms. F 1 32, p. 39b/40a, quoted from Bernet et al, Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1993, p. 221.
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how the intentional relationship to secrecy as the limit-designation 
of something radically unknown should be “intended”. In the pas-
sage, now cited in full, Husserl says: 
 
Affinity or similarity can have different degrees within the limits of the most 
perfect affinity, of likeness without difference. Wherever there is no perfect 
likeness, contrast goes hand in hand with similarity (affinity): the coming 
into prominence of the unlike from a basis of the common. If we pass from 
likeness to likeness, the new like presents itself as repetition. Its content 
comes into completely perfect coincidence with that of the first. This is 
what we refer to as blending. If we pass from the similar to the similar, 
a kind of coincidence also takes place, but it is only partial, being subject to 
the simultaneous opposition of the unlike. In this overlapping in conformity 
with similarity there is also something on the order of a blending, but rela-
tive only to the element which is like; there is no pure and perfect blending, 
as with complete likeness. What in a purely static description appears to be 
likeness or similarity must therefore be considered in itself as being already 
the product of the one or the other kind of synthesis of coincidence, which 
we denote by the traditional term association, but with a change of sense. 
It is the phenomenon of associative genesis which dominates this sphere 
of passive pre-givenness, established on the basis of syntheses of internal 
time-consciousness.
The term “association” denotes in this context a form belonging essentially 
to consciousness in general, a form of the regularity of immanent genesis. 
That association can become a general theme of phenomenological descrip-
tion and not merely one of objective psychology is due to the fact that the 
phenomenon of indication (Anzeige) is something which can be exhibited 
from the point of view of phenomenology (...) Association comes into ques-
tion in this context exclusively as the purely immanent connection of “this 
recalls that”, “one calls attention to the other”.260
 
260 Husserl, Experience and Judgement, pp. 74–75.
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What follows is the sentence I omitted: “If we pass from the similar 
to the similar, a kind of coincidence also takes place, but it is only 
partial, being subject to the simultaneous opposition of the unlike 
(Widerstreit des nicht Gleichen)”. 
Husserl here describes in detail the passively proceeding (i.e. with-
out the participation of the consciousness) performance of identifi-
cation: the similar emerged that, in the flow of consciousness (in the 
temporality of the flow of consciousness), coincides with the simi-
lar (if the similar emerged, than this was because another similar 
emerged in this flow) – and the identifiable is identified. I do not see 
different red stains or shades of red, but the red colour of the object 
(homogenous). The unidentifiable is (without the participation of 
consciousness) eliminated. This is a condition of our being able (in 
conscious perception) to perceive the objectivity of any kind, and 
this is Husserl’s  interest linked with this analysis, this is the con-
dition of the possibility of further objectivisation and idealisation. 
However, in these passively ongoing acts horizons are also formed, 
on the basis of passive associations, gradually, through the settling 
or sedimentation of identifications (or to put it another way: habitu-
ality or “custom”), which are like (limitlessly infinite and therefore 
insurmountable) extensions of similarities through their associa-
tion. And in these horizons (the world according to Husserl is the 
“horizon of all horizons”) they move (not completely consciously) 
within the framework of the intentional relationship of appercep-
tion, i.e. understanding, Deutung, “interpretation”, because we are 
always moving in the texture of “something is reminiscent of some-
thing else”. And it is also for this reason that in 1921, in one of the 
appendices to his early lecture An Introduction to Phenomenology 
from 1905, in which he analyses the example of “perceiving some-
thing as a tree” that I see for the first time, Husserl writes:  
 
The unknown is experienced more in an apperception that is furnished with 
a horizon and within this horizon with an intentional structural form that 
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in the lines of intentional genesis extends to earlier individual universal 
apperceptions of “well known trees”, etc. The earlier, genuine knowledge 
originally established its own habitual experience and this experience is in 
the new cases awakened “through analogy” and tacitly implies the apper-
ceptive horizon – in analogy. It is not re-cognition individually of the same 
tree, oven, etc., but of the same or similar tree and then with awareness of 
the distance from similarity, covered in difference.
 
Apperception (the perception of something as something) is possi-
ble only on the basis of Weckung or awakening, i.e. by virtue of the 
fact that the given “impression” awakens certain close “horizons” 
with which it is associated. 
 
Awakening of the known (with phenomenological differences: the awaken-
ing of a certain individual knowledge, then of an uncertain concatenation 
of such knowledge) can then take place in such a way that something new, 
something unknown simultaneously awakes different series that are not 
connected by coverage to any type. The object resembles a fir tree, also 
a spruce, different conifers, etc. Under the title “fir tree” typical designa-
tions were formed, others under the title “pine tree”, etc. However, the new 
does not correspond to any of these types, and yet it resembles all of them 
and has something in common with all of them. How is this possible? The 
pine tree I see for the first time reminds me of a “fir tree” – a certain order 
of typical coverage with a certain type, which, however, is not in genuine 
agreement with that tree which is seen and does not match it even upon 
further acquaintance.
We therefore have to say: everything we familiarise ourselves with can enter 
into series in which a type takes shape, either in its own, fully demonstra-
tive comparison, or a “re-awakening” of an old apperception and through 
coverage by virtue of the transposition of empty ideas of the old percep-
tion onto empty ideas of the new experience. Every perception (like every 
originary appearing experience) leaves behind an “unconscious” remnant 
as permanent experience. This remnant is awoken as “empty idea”, which 
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is covered with a new opinion, one that is both in accordance with that 
which is actually perceived and in accordance with its horizons that through 
coverage become designated. The same takes place during its own com-
parison if during the transition the experience activated is already gone as 
a live act and the still vivid retention is already empty but accompanied by 
a relative larger empty designation that is translated via the sense of the 
new experience. This is how open series are created in passivity, as soon as 
in the necessary process of atrophy they lose their certainty of the awoken 
old experience and their subjects lose their individuality, the relationship to 
a firmly given temporal surrounding, i.e. their temporal position. This uncer-
tainty lends the awoken the character of “some A”, where A is a complex of 
moments that are awoken by a new perception in a certain way.261
 
Whence Husserl’s  oft repeated sentence from Section 80 of Er-
fahrung und Urteil: the unknown is a  mode of the known, Unbe-
kanntheit als Modus der Bekanntheit. 
It is perhaps now clear what the purpose has been of this close 
reading of Husserl’s texts and what point we have arrived at. We 
have made it possible to formulate the following question: In what 
sense is this level of passive, pre-predicative experience, this last 
realm, genuinely the final level beneath which there is nothing 
more? Husserl’s text seems to encourage a strange hypothesis: the 
eliminated has not disappeared but is somehow (still) beneath the 
horizon of all horizons. It is something that, paradoxically, finds 
itself on the other side of the horizon, beyond the horizon, which 
is unsurpassable and which, in its capacity as the endless, cannot 
logically have any “beyond”. This is how the “exterior” might “ap-
pear” (though we should by rights, following Heidegger, place the 
word “appear” under erasure) if it is true that the unknown is pos-
sible only as a mode of the known. But perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that the non-identified in the act of overlapping 
261 Husserl, Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis, pp. 84–86, note 1 (trans. here Phil 
Jones).
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of the similar is somehow mixed in said act, blends (verschmelzt) 
with the identical. And so the last field would be heterogeneous 
in a  dual, very different, sense. 1) It would be heterogeneous if 
contrasts emerged in it or it stood out against the background and 
something detached itself from something similar, etc. However, 
in terms of limits this heterogeneity is the homogeneity of asso-
ciatively entwined textures, since everything similar has its origin 
in the same, emerges from the same. And 2) it would be heteroge-
neous to the extent that in its folds it is – being pushed away – the 
radical exterior, radical heterogeneity in respect of the homogene-
ity thus constituted. This of course is something completely differ-
ent to transcendence in the immanence of phenomenological re-
duction. It would be the intentionally reel moment of consciousness 
as escaping this consciousness: that which within the phenomenon 
can never become a phenomenon, radical resistance to the (identify-
ing) identification. 
Modern science resides in this dual heterogeneity. The first guar-
antees its possibility, while the second implies its ongoing crisis. 
Modern science, as Ladislav Hejdánek wrote in the 1960s, is objec-
tive thinking and in order for it be possible to exist, it must push 
resistance back “beyond” the horizon. 
The originality is clear from this confrontation  – albeit only in 
hindsight  – of what Ladislav Hejdánek in various articles writ-
ten in the mid-sixties called “non-objective thinking”. (The first of 
these articles was published in 1964, which is quite remarkable if we 
compare what Hejdánek was saying with French philosophy of that 
time.) At least a brief mention is necessary because, I believe, He-
jdánek’s intention is very similar to that which we are following here, 
while the only difference (which make these texts so fascinating) is 
that his ideas are neither for nor against phenomenology. Basically, 
Hejdánek is saying the following. Yes, every thought is necessarily 
a thought of something. A thought that does not relate to some ob-
ject is impossible. However, a pitfall of objective thinking is that it 
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confuses that which, as phenomenology would say, is constituted by 
identifications, i.e. intentional objectivity, with “ontological” objec-
tivities (Hejdánek). In other words, objective thinking ignores the 
non-objective components that all thinking includes, whether this be 
by ignoring them, not reflecting upon them, or not even seeing them. 
One of the examples Hejdánek offers that illustrates his concept of 
non-objectivity is an event, or the event-character of an event – not 
an event as outcome, but a “live” event. A live event would be, for 
example, the emergence of something new that renders the past by 
means of its past. However, this means that neither that necessary 
component that is the past as it is transformed by an event repre-
senting the arrival of the new, nor the future, is “objectively” given, 
because that is non-objective: the event opens itself to something that 
is not here. And so we can say:  
 
Nowhere is it guaranteed (on the contrary, the opposite is quite easily dem-
onstrated) that everything to which we relate essentially in our ideas and 
without which we could not meaningfully think and speak is objectively 
comprehensible, i.e. is conceivable as a subject, an intentional subject.262  
 
And one further quote (from 1982, though for our purposes the 
chronology is unimportant): 
 
Genuinely objective thinking fully and exclusively focuses on these subjec-
tive intentions and connotations and eradicates from its awareness any 
interest and any deliberate or merely conscious relationship to its non-
objective intentions and connotations. This of course does not mean that 
it lacks such non-objective intentions and connotations, but more that it 
does not consciously heed them and does not forget them, that it does not 
262 Ladislav Hejdánek, Nepředmětnost v  myšlení a  ve skutečnosti, OIKOYMENH, Praha 1997, 
p. 52.
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deem them important and therefore leaves them in the shadows, in the dark 
corners that “nobody attends to”.263
 
I would now like to attempt to tie these strands together so as to 
obtain the material for further considerations and above all for the 
more precise formulation of questions. 
The displacement of life “beyond” the horizon or, as Ladislav 
Hejdánek would say, into the shadow and dark corners (something 
akin to “folds”) results in the exterior becoming something beyond 
reach. It is something that de jure may not appear inside if the order 
of objective reality is not to collapse. Whence the various, intuited 
ciphers of this exterior, its (only possible) form inside, a phantom 
arriving “from behind” the horizon of all horizons. But also the 
critical threat of science in its “folds”, whence the fear aroused by 
the unidentifiable or non-identical. It is everywhere and nowhere, it 
might be anything. Fear as an index of the world, which wants to 
have the unknown simply as a mode of the known. This is the effect 
that Feuillade’s film of Fantômas has on us: 
 
Reality is no longer that which it is. By its transformation it is earlier than 
figures are hidden and objects change (...) It is a world in which the home 
is radically negated: man cannot settle anywhere. That which is supposed to 
operate as home produces something strangely unwelcoming (das Unheim-
liche). Flowers are not flowers but convenient places for secretly installed 
microphones, an ambulance is not an ambulance but a car that participates 
in raids, gloves are not gloves but a spine filled with narcotic (...) Doors 
are simply ornamental accessories. Entry to buildings is by windows, chim-
neys and cellars. Anyone who carelessly enters via the doors immediately 
collapses in a  heap (...) Every déjà vu evokes something unpredictable. 
Feuillade brings public anxiety into the salons and testifies to what Walter 
Benjamin has already implied: 
263 Ibid., p. 55.
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“The bourgeois interior of the 1860s to the 1890s – with its gigantic side-
boards distended with carvings, the sunless corners where potted plants 
sit, – fittingly houses only the corpse. “On this sofa the aunt cannot but be 
murdered.” The soulless luxuriance of the furnishings becomes true comfort 
only in the presence of a dead body.264
 
On the other hand, the enthusiasm of avant-garde artists for pulp 
fiction (the sensation novel) bears witness to the potential of the 
“non-objective” in folds, an openess to the future, the event. 
The reduction of the exterior to intentional immanence also im-
plies the elimination of empirical history. In this respect it is instruc-
tive to recall how Hejdánek speaks of the event and its unattainabil-
ity by means of objective thinking. Phantoms appear on the reverse 
side of every Weltlogik, which presupposes a secondary position of 
everything empirical (contingent) in light of the “essential”. 
The relationship to mystery and secrecy. What type of intention-
ality is this? We would know nothing of secrecy, the unknown, the 
other, if we had not come across its traces. However, the intentional 
relationship to the trace is necessary non-objective intention because 
the trace, in the strict sense of the word, is a trace of the unidentified, 
a trace of the unidentifiable. 
 
264 Thomas Brandlmeier, Fantômas. Beiträge zur Panik des 20. Jahrhunderts, Verbrecher Verlag, 
Berlin 2007, pp.  25–26. Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, NLB, 1979, p. 48.
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Beneath the world as the horizon of all horizons, but actually already 
in its interstices, which are only seemingly covered by the continuity 
of associative references or inductions, is the outside. The uniden-
tifiable is not the background of the identifiable in the manner of 
Gestalt psychology. Though the unrecognisable disappears beneath 
the known and though the outside is always already eliminated, it is 
genuinely the past that was never the present, trauma, or, more im-
portantly, the désastre. However, it cannot be otherwise if the postu-
late is to apply of the identity of thinking and being respectively (as 
Husserl would have it), the “universal covering or match-up (Deck-
ung) between language and thinking”,265 and if it is to be possible 
to recall the original meaning in the form of its continual returnable 
clarification (Besinnung and Rückfrage).
Nevertheless, these traces of the outside are somehow visible in-
side, now registered under different names, such as Levinas’s il y a  
in fatigue and insomnia, or Blanchot’s other night and whispering 
behind the words, murmuring. It is for this reason that testifying, 
witnessing and testimony characterising the thinking of the outside 
becomes an important means of showing. 
However, in this case we can say that thinking of the outside is 
a response to the founding elimination of the base, to the trace as an 
irreducible reference to that “remainder” for which Derrida coins 
the neologism restance non-présente,266 i.e. that which remains when 
the thing is recognised without being actualised because it resists 
its own showing. Consciousness qua consciousness, in other words, 
consists of the consciousness of loss. Thinking the outside evades 
mourning, in which the lost is gradually replaced by something else, 
but cultivates a melancholy that refuses to lose the loss. 
265 Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik. GS 7, ed. Elisabeth Ströker, Felix Meiner 
Verlag, Hamburg 1992, p. 28. 
266 E.g. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., Galilée, Paris 1990, p. 33.
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In this respect, Foucault’s  texts on literature, written between 
1962 and 1966 and seemingly isolated in his work as a whole, acquire 
added significance. Their central theme, the ontology of speech, fol-
lows on in many ways from Maurice Blanchot, while hinting at the 
“discourse analysis” using which Foucault will demonstrate how ev-
ery order of discourse is supported by the outside, which both estab-
lishes said order while being covered by it.267 When Foucault argues 
that the statement “I speak” subjects the whole of modern literature 
(as well as philosophical discourse, we might add) to a  test, he is 
paraphrasing or indirectly citing Blanchot, whose book L’attente 
L’oubli begins as follows: 
 
Here, and on this sentence that was perhaps also meant for him, he was 
obliged to stop. It was practically while listening to her speak that he had 
written these notes. He still heard her voice as he wrote. He showed them 
to her. She did not want to read. She read only a few passages, which she 
did because he gently asked her to. “Who is speaking?” she said. “Who, 
then, is speaking?” She sensed an error that she could not put her finger 
on. “Erase whatever doesn’t seem right to you.” But she could not erase 
anything, either. She sadly threw down all the pages. She had the impres-
sion that although he had assured her that he would believe her implicitly, 
he did not believe her enough, with the force that would have rendered 
the truth present. “And now you have taken something away from me that 
I no longer have and that you do not even have.” Weren’t there any words 
that she accepted more willingly? Any that diverged less from what she 
was thinking? But everything before her eyes was spinning: she had lost 
the center from which the events had radiated and that she had held onto 
so firmly until now. She said, perhaps in order to save something, perhaps 
because the first words say everything, that the first paragraph seemed to 
267 See Arne Klawitter, “Von der Ontologie der Sprache zur Diskursanalyse moderner Literatur”, in: 
Foucault und die Künste, ed. Peter Gente, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, pp. 122–140. 
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her to be the most faithful and so did the second somewhat, especially at 
the end.268
 
This is a strange dialogue. Strange, because it takes the form of 
an asymmetrical relationship and a  relationship across an unsur-
passable difference. The speech seeks to hear what it itself is saying 
and what is escaping from her words. The murmur, the whisper of 
speech, is like a guide,269 whose words are audible only in the (dis-
torting) answers of the one who speaks or writes. 
The words not only (and less and less) refer to meanings, but re-
flect themselves, and as Foucault says, in this folding there suddenly 
arises “a kind of stubborn, amorphous anonymity”, which deprives 
the subject of his simple identity (i.e. the position of the originator of 
the spoken, or the author), “divests it of its unmediated right to say 
I, and pits against its discourse a speech that is idissociably echo and 
denial”.270 From the murmur of speech there is heard the constant 
demand that he who speaks cannot meet, and that is a burden he 
would like to rid himself of. Murmur: “‘language’ is only a formless 
rumbling, a streaming; its power resides in dissimulation”271 behind 
words. A space opens up between the clear and distinct, generally 
recognisable meanings of words and the unidentifiable murmur of 
speech, a space of waiting, patience, Warten. 
 
The impatience at the heart of error is the essential fault, because it mis-
construes the very trueness of error which, like a  law, requires that one 
never believe the goal is close or that one is coming nearer to it. One must 
268 Maurice Blanchot, L‘attente L‘oubli, Gallimard, Paris 1962, p. 7.
269 There is more than a hint of this in the very title of Blanchot’s book Celui qui ne m’accompagnait 
pas, Gallimard, Paris 1953.
270 Michel Foucault, “The Thought of the Outside”, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, ed. by James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (Essential Works of M. Fou-
cault, Vol. 2), The New Press, New York 1998, pp. 163 and 167.
271 Ibid., p. 67.
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never have done with the indefinite, one must never grasp – as if it were the 
immediate, the already present – the profundity of inexhaustible absence.
(...) it is impatience which makes the goal inaccessible by substituting for 
it the proximity of an intermediary figure. It is impatience that destroys the 
way toward the goal by preventing us from recognising in the intermediary 
the figure of the immediate.272
 
272 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln, London 1982, pp. 78–79.
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Philosophy does not explain the event, it responds. Its response is 
itself a transformation of the philosophical discourse. If the event 
is that which does not coincide with existing horizons of under-
standing that allow for recognition, and if the event is the irrup-
tion of reality into the world and if it is that which carries its ho-
rizon of understanding in itself, then the event is the recognition 
of the incomprehensibility of the event, its discursive absence. But 
one could also say that the transformation of philosophical dis-
course is a response to the experience of loss that necessarily, albe-
it unreflectedly, accompanies every act of identification inasmuch 
as this act eliminates that which does not correspond to the known 
in the habitualised form of inductive reference within the struc-
ture “something as something”. But is it experience? It is more the 
trace of a lack in experience, or a deficit that can only be removed 
by its erasure. For this very reason thinking of the event is thinking 
of the outside.
Within this thinking it is possible to discern various, albeit paral-
lel lines. 
Philosophy must first shine a  light into the shadows and dark 
corners that the modernist project left behind it insofar as it drew 
on the Enlightenment ideal of rationalism, subscribed to the clas-
sical concept of a  language purged of indications, and pledged al-
legiance to the idea of mathesis universalis (exact science). Whence 
the search for traces of other, unrealised projects of modernity in 
modernity itself. Indeed, we might interpret postmodernism in this 
way. Secondly, other forms of showing must be found in the name 
of saving not phenomena, but that which necessarily escapes from 
phenomena. The importance of indexicality, testimony as forms of 
showing. And thirdly: philosophy must search for a relationship to 
the other in its otherness – the transformation of philosophical dis-
course is essential if this otherness is to be respected. 
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What is the backdrop to all of these lines? The event of the Ho-
locaust as the radical elimination of the event. And along with this, 
the elimination of any possible relationship to that which is on the 




A prerequisite of the relationship to that which is on the point of 
arriving is patience, i.e. non-anticipation; patience inasmuch as this 
designates a  state beyond the passive/active opposition; patience, 
i.e. waiting in the ultimate antechamber focused on the last things 
before the last, the restrained openness of the waiting, as Siegfried 
Kracauer would say, in a place that is both outside and inside. This 
patience does not attempt to recognise, it does not “intend”. It sus-
pends intentionality, and for this reason both Levinas and Blanchot 
speak of radical passivity, exposure to the experience of the neu-
tral – neither inside nor outside. And this is another aspect of the 
experience of literature, écriture, if transposed to the question “Who 
is speaking?”, which can then be concretised in various different 
ways. 
For instance: who is speaking in the books of Samuel Beckett?  
This is all the more exemplary an example when we consider that 
Blanchot’s texts, and not only by virtue of their diction, often bring 
to mind Beckett. This is especially so in the case of the original 
form of asymmetrical dialogue that stages the Beckettian narrative, 
pursuing that which cannot be apprehended through narration. If 
the radical non-representability of that around which the dialogue 
circles is somehow to appear, non-representability itself must be 
represented.273 “For what is it that remains representable if the es-
sence of the object is to hide from representation? It remains to 
represent the conditions of this hiddenness (dérobade).”274 This is 
exactly what happens in Blanchot’s dialogue, which thus acquires 
a performative character. We do not know whether he who speaks 
is simply repeating that being said by another voice, a voice that, 
273 Cf. Simon Critchley, “Who Speaks in the Work of Samuel Beckett?” Yale French Studies, 
No. 93, The Place of Maurice Blanchot (1998), p. 114.
274 Samuel Beckett, “Peintres de l’Empechement” (1948), in: Samuel Beckett, Disjecta: Miscel-
laneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn, John Calder, London 1983, p. 136.
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moreover, constantly claims that it has not been heard correctly. The 
result is that the speaker is haunted by the feeling that the meaning 
of that he is hearing is constantly eluding him. At the same time, 
however, he is 
 
led on by a wandering speech, one that is not deprived of meaning, but de-
prived of centre, that does not begin, does not end, yet is greedy, demand-
ing, will never stop, one couldn’t stand it if it stopped, for that is when one 
would have to make the terrible discovery that, when it does not speak, it 
is still speaking, when it ceases, it perseveres, not silently, for in it silence 
speaks eternally.275
 
The links between the two are obvious. However, Blanchot’s  text 
literally effectuates the situation of the speaker, dramatises it, estab-
lishes it performatively. It is a dialogue and at the same time a mon-
ologue. Or to be more precise, neither one nor the other. And this is 
why the question “Who is speaking?” is aporetic, like the question: 
 
Why do you listen to me as you do? Why, even when you speak, do you 
keep listening? Why do you attract in me these words that I must then say? 
And never do you answer; never do you make something of yourself heard. 
But I will say nothing; be aware of this. What I say is nothing.
Undoubtedly she wanted him to repeat what she had said, merely repeat 
it. But never did she recognise her words in mine. Did I unwittingly change 
something in them? Did something change on their way from her to me?
275 Maurice Blanchot, The Book to Come, trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford 2002, p. 210. For an example of the similarities between the diction of Blanchot and Bec-
kett, cf. “The ex-pression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing 
from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to 
express.” (Samuel Beckett, in: Disjecta, p. 139) and Blanchot: “The writer finds himself in the inc-
reasingly ludicrous condition of having nothing to write, of having no means with which to write it, 
and of being constrained by the utter necessity of always writing it.” (Maurice Blanchot, Faux pas, 
trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2001, p. 3). More on this see Curt 
G. Willits, “The Blanchot/Beckett Correspondence: Situating the Writer/Writing at the Limen of 
Naught”, Colloquy: text theory critique 10 (2005), pp. 257–68.
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In a low voice for himself, in a lower voice for him. An utterance that must 
be repeated before it has been heard, a traceless murmur that he follows, 
wandering nowhere, residing everywhere, the necessity of letting it go.
It is always the ancient word that wants to be here again without speak-
ing.276
 
Who is speaking? Who is speaking if speaking and hearing almost 
overlap and the “speaker” – situated within an irreducible differ-
ence between both – is thrown into what Blanchot calls “my con-
sciousness without me”, and so experiences the failure of speech in 
relation to that which echoes behind his words as their guide, who, 
though he does not accompany his speech, does not so much as for 
a moment abandon it? 277 
That which the speaker (of Blanchot’s dialogues) says is a reply 
striving to capture the voice whose speech is a murmur, thus pen-
etrating the inside from outside like a phantom that does not permit 
the work ever to be completed, since the difference of this voice in 
light of the speech is irrevocable and every speech is in an asymmet-
ric relation to it. “Murmuring in the mud”, to quote Beckett, since 
the origin of this word (not only in Blanchot’s texts) is clearly his 
Comment c’est. Yet murmur is another name for il y a, which brings 
us back to Blanchot and the experience of literature or expérience 
littéraire. It is clear that the locus of his dialogues (no less than his 
novels or fragments) is the literary space, l’espace littéraire, which 
in the act of writing opens itself up into another night: “To write 
is to make oneself the echo of what cannot stop talking”. “Night 
is the book.” 278 Literature (and the thinking based on this funda-
mental experience) consists of the unattainability of its base: “This 
discourse, as speech of the outside whose words welcome the outside 
276 Maurice Blanchot, Awaiting Oblivion, trans. John Gregg, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 
and London 1997, p. 4.
277 Cf. Blanchot’s book the title of which is Celui qui ne m’accompagnait pas (Gallimard, Paris 
1953).
278 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, pp. 20 and 27.
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it addresses, has the openness of a  commentary: the repetition of 
what continually murmurs outside. (...) discourse, as a speech that 
is always outside what it says”,279 as Foucault describes it. 
Though Blanchot is close to Levinas and adopts many of the lat-
ter’s ideas while adding his own commentary, we should not over-
look the important shifts and transfers of emphasis. These are clear 
both in the privileged status of writing or literature (écriture), and in 
the original phenomenology of the voice implied in his understand-
ing of Levinas’s il y a. 
Levinas sees a crucial distinction between the Saying (le dire) and 
the Said (le dit).280 This is based on the primacy of the encounter 
with another as the Other as a  relationship involving separation, 
while the relationship of reciprocity in which the other is the ad-
dressee of a communication by means of language as a semiological 
system (Dit) is secondary. The encounter with another person (face-
to-face in a situation of one for/on behalf of the other) is the event 
of exposure to the proximity of another and the fracturing of the 
closed “I”, an uncovering of vulnerability: the experience of passiv-
ity, a passivity that precedes the passive/active distinction. 
In Levinas’s work proximity is another name for the relationship 
across irreducible difference, but also the field establishing the very 
meaningfulness of the meaning of the preceding semiotics. Proxim-
ity is the original dimension or primordial saying as Dire, which is 
beyond all acts of thematisation or identification and which precedes 
consciousness inasmuch as it (as in phenomenology) is defined by in-
tentionality, i.e. by the noetic-noematic correlation. This is because 
the relationship to the other in proximity cannot be described by 
categories of consciousness, which mean something qua something 
and which are always already embedded within participation in gen-
279 Michel Foucault, Essential Writings, Aesthetics, Methodology, and Epistemology, p. 153.
280 At this point we might wish to consider analogous constructions (all of which find their source 
in the differentiation natura naturans versus natura naturata): Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "parole par-
lante“ and "parole parlée", and Georges Didi-Huberman: figure figurante and figure figurée. 
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eral and generally transparent universality (the level of le Dit). In 
contrast, the relationship to the other is a relationship to singularity 
that is always (already) situated beyond the theme of discourse and 
as such is non-representable. 
 
This relationship of proximity, this contact unconvertible into a noetico-no-
ematic structure, in which every transmission of messages (…) is already 
established, is the original language, a language without words or proposi-
tions, pure communication.281
 
Speech in the sense of Dire affects the interlocutor, without show-
ing him in the sense of phenomenological showing, a showing that, 
Levinas is convinced, always has the structure of discourse to the 
extent that that which appears is necessarily mediated by meaning 
and cannot appear outside it. The other makes sense immediately, 
i.e. prior to our conferring meaning upon it in an intentional and 
thematicising relationship. And if consciousness is wholly intention-
ality, then in respect of the encounter with another as the other it is 
in an always (already) delayed proximity. The level of symbolic com-
munication is the level of the said, le Dit. 
In contrast, in the case of Blanchot the event problematising the 
relationship is not the correlation of an encounter with the other, 
but a literary experience that exposes both the reader and the writer 
to otherness in its capacity as “uncognisable” and is thus a privileged 
place for the experience of separation or difference. This is why his 
texts are dominated by écriture, the word, which denotes not only 
the letter and writing, but literature as an experience open to the 
murmur of il y a, which it listens to in such a way as to become its 
echo or response, similar to Levinas’s responding and responsibility. 
Both cases involve the experience of that which manifests itself only 
by virtue of the fact that it flees its own manifestation or showing 
281 Emmanuel Levinas, “Language and Proximity”, in: Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster 1987, p. 119. 
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(its thematicisation and identification). In the case of Blanchot the 
critical importance of écriture ensues from the fact that it filters 
Levinas’s  thinking through literary experience, the experience of 
the incompleteable work, which as performative text refers neither 
to fiction nor to representable (articulated because already endowed 
with meanings) reality. The work is at one with its incompleteabil-
ity and, like the author, the reader experiences in it the very exis-
tence of speech, bears witness to a consciousness without subject in 
which things are liberated from that instance that shrouds them in 
meaning. The encounter with the murmure, with the il y a through 
écriture, thus becomes thinking of the outside, whose “discourse” 
can only be that which Beckett termed the literature of the un-word, 
since the existence of speech is experienced in it as a thing. Ecriture 
is that literature that wants “to draw into the light of day the el-
emental deep which the world, in order to affirm itself, negates and 
resists.”282 Its element is fascination. 
Fascination as the experience of exteriority, though something 
like touch, is a vision of that which fascinates us, foists itself upon 
our gaze as though this gaze were understood by it. “What fasci-
nates us robs us of our power to give sense. It abandons its ‘sensory’ 
nature, abandons the world, draws back from the world and draws 
us along. It no longer reveals itself to us, yet it affirms itself in a pres-
ence foreign to the temporal present and to presence in space.” An-
other way, in other words, of describing the literary experience, the 
encounter with absolute otherness. Writing means enduring this 
experience in which “fascination threatens”.283 
If, to the question “Who is speaking?”, Blanchot seeks an answer 
in writing, this does not mean that the voice has disappeared com-
pletely. However, it is essential the question be reformulated: “Who 
is speaking if the voice is speaking?” The speaker is not a subjective 
interior. The voice (in its materiality or sonance) is that which lib-
282 Blanchot, The Space of Literature.
283 Ibid., pp. 28 and 30.
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erates the discursive utterance universalised by meaning, the voice 
of nobody. That which speaks is the element il y a  itself, whisper-
ing, murmuring, droning and vibrating thus in the impersonality of 
the voice that has no duration within which it could be completed, 
which vanishes as soon as the words are uttered and escapes into 
the depth in which it neither began nor will it end. However, again 
and again it permeates everything said and echoes in literature inas-
much as it is turned to the outside, it resonates in speech inasmuch 
as it is waiting. 
So we must still wait. And in waiting what is there to be done? What do 
we do?
Well, waiting, we chat.
Yes, listening to the voice. But what is this voice?
Not something to hear, perhaps the last written cry, what is inscribed in the 
future outside books, outside language.
But what is this voice?284
A scream. That most human utterance by which man defies identifi-
cation. Graffiti on walls. 
So the Jews shut up and the guard moved off. Then the Jews started talking 
again, in their language, as he says, ra-ra-ra, and so on 
What’s he mean, ra-ra-ra, what’s he trying to imitate?
Their language.
No, ask him: was the Jews’ noise something special?
They spoke Jew.
Does Mr Borowi understand “Jew”?
No.285
 
284 Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 331.
285 Shoah. An Oral History of the Holocaust. The Complete Text of the Film by Claude Lanzmann. 
Pantheon Books, New York 1985, pp. 30–31.
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Thinking after the Holocaust definitively abandons the postulate 
of the identity of thinking and existence and with it the violence 
of identification. In doing so it reopens the question of the inside 
and the outside. The outside is inside as a  trace of that which is 
escaping. If thinking relates to the outside, then this is an asym-
metric relationship and one that also includes separation, radical 
difference and resistance to showing itself as these are understood 
by phenomenology. Philosophy responds to this event by transform-
ing its discourse. By doing so it testifies to the experience that the 
existing discourse eliminates. If the philosophical response seems to 
be a paradox, this is only because it must investigate the very bound-
aries of understanding and teach itself to listen before it begins to 
speak. The experience of the Holocaust is above all the experience 
of a radical discontinuity, rupture or cut, radical because the linear-
ity of time collapses in this experience and the before-after rela-
tionship implodes. This means that this experience itself makes the 
linear experience of time impossible.
 
People arrive. They look through the crowd of those who are waiting, those 
who await them. They kiss them and say the trip exhausted them.
People leave. They say goodbye to those who are not leaving and hug the 
children.
There is a street for people who arrive and a street for people who leave.
There is a cafe called “Arrivals” and a cafe called “Departures”. There are 
people who arrive and people who leave. 
But there is a station where those who arrive are those who are leaving, 
a station where those who arrive have never arrived, where those who have 
left never came back.286
286 Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After, trans. Rosette C. Lamont, Yale University Press (2nd ed.) 
2014, p. 3.
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This is the first paragraph of the first volume entitled None of Us 
Will Return of the trilogy Auschwitz and After by Charlotte Delbo. 
Delbo and her husband were arrested on 2 March 1942 in Paris, 
because both belonged to the French resistance. Her husband was 
executed in France and Delbo was moved to Romainville and then 
deported to Auschwitz on 24 January 1943. She spent time in the 
Birkenau women’s camp before being transferred to Ravensbrück, 
where she remained until the camp was liberated on 23 April 1945. 
Her trilogy is remarkable not only as “testimony”, but by virtue of 
its original literary form, namely an attempt at “literature after 
Auschwitz”.
The first half at least of the passage above describes a mundane, 
quotidian situation. A station that exists simply so that people ar-
rive and depart, a station that is not the destination of any journey 
that is not a place to stay. The station clock shows only the time of 
departure or arrival, but does not measure duration. This is an ordi-
nary experience. All stations look like this. This is what they are like. 
A station is a junction between lines coming from somewhere and 
continuing somewhere else, between farewells and welcomes. The 
station has no intrinsic meaning beyond simply being a place to be 
passed through. But suddenly there are the “two streets” and those 
arriving who are departing: the quotidian is suddenly breached by 
the extreme experience of non-returnability. Arrival is the same as 
departure. According to Michael Rothberg, it is precisely this co-
existence of the everyday and the extreme that is a trait of litera-
ture after the Holocaust, of traumatic realism.287 In his introduction 
Rothberg describes very realistically the entrance to the concentra-
tion camp, the entry into death. “Arrival” is suddenly something 
that does not have its own name. There exists no before if there is 
no after, no after if there is no before. And not even the largest sta-
tion in the world has a name – because it is called Auschwitz. Delbo 
287 Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation. University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London 2000.
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avoids looking for names for what must remain nameless and thus 
unthinkable. The name would grant acceptance, the intertwining 
of the mundane and mass extermination. It is for this reason that 
Primo Levi wrote: 
 
At a distance of years, one can today definitely affirm that the history of the 
Lagers has been written almost exclusively by those who, like myself, never 
fathomed them to the bottom.288
 
However, the unobtrusive word “we” has also collapsed. Who writes 
of this experience if none of “us” who have it return, as the title of 
the first part of Delbo’s trilogy implies? Arrival/departure: the rup-
ture is the moment that separates them but in such a way that what 
follows, cannot follow. If there is anything after this separation, it is 
something that is after the end. Like the designation “survivor” that 
quickly surfaces in the preposition “after” – Nachleben, survivre, liv-
ing forth. 
I would add merely a short observation regarding the “end” that 
is the station. 
Husserl’s  The Crisis of European Sciences, which is concerned 
with crisis, is actually a reaction to the threat of the end, an end that 
Husserl seeks to avert by means of his phenomenology. And yet it is 
unable to resolve the problem by returning to the beginning, by re-
viving it and continuing in the direction that was established at the 
start. In other words, it would like, without much success, to save 
the teleology of history. However, something paradoxical emerges 
athwart Husserl’s attempt: the end is something that is constantly 
being deferred because “ending” is more like a moment of history, 
a “crisis” that is a part thereof. However, Husserl is unwilling to ac-
cept this. 
288 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal, Abacus, London 2013, 
p. 9. 
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Adorno speaks explicitly of philosophy after the end of philoso-
phy. However, all of this is actually simply a giant prelude to a very 
complicated investigation of temporality in the philosophy of the 
second half of the twentieth century. One possibility is suggested 
in the trilogy by Charlotte Delbo, who seeks the language of the 
testimony of survivors. She alternates forms, e.g. autobiographical 
sections with micro-stories. Repetition does not indicate any move-
ment. If philosophy qua discourse is bound to language, then it has 
no option but to constantly transcend language if it is to deal with 
that which cannot be named.  
However, all of this is closely related to the act of responding and 
bearing witness, since it is possible to show that this rupture, this 
implosion of the before-and-after relationship, relates to the theme 
of the Holocaust and, by extension, to the theme of the “end”. The 
theme of what follows after the end is not an abstract philosophi-
cal construction but a response to the responses to the trauma of 
Auschwitz. Perhaps the witnesses themselves demonstrate this most 
convincingly – or, to be more precise, the absenting testimony. The 
psychologist Dori Laub, co-founder of the Video Archive for Holo-
caust Testimonies at Yale University and himself a  child survivor, 
says that, in the final analysis the event of the Holocaust was a sin-
gularity in that it “did not create its own witnesses”. The unfathom-
able psychological structure of this event prevented its victims, and 
indeed any of its participants, from being able to testify.  
 
It was also the very circumstance of being inside the event that made un-
thinkable the very notion that a witness could exist, that is, someone who 
could step outside of the coercively totalitarian and dehumanising frame of 
reference in which the event was taking place, and provide an independent 
frame of reference through which the event could be observed.289
 
289 Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Testimony. Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History, Routledge, London and New York 1992, p. 81.
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This unfathomability paralyses everyone involved, both executioner 
and victim, as well as those who lived during those times and must 
have had some idea of what was going on (typical in this respect is 
the distrust of the isolated “testimony” of those who managed to 
escape and offer reports of the extermination camps).290 The vic-
tims who lost even the ability to turn to the other with the saluta-
tion “you” were unable to relate to themselves as to “you”, i.e. they 
were unable to bear witness as to themselves. Their experience as 
victim became incommunicable even to themselves. But then this is 
extermination: the extermination of memory and history. Attempts 
to testify (albeit very belatedly) always transcend the boundary of 
the human capacity to understand. An “eyewitness” is someone who 
sees and yet does not see. In Lanzmann’s film Shoah there is a scene 
that offers tragic proof of this. Richard Glazar describes the journey 
by train to the concentration camp: 
 
Then, very slowly, the train turned off of the main track, and rolled at a walk-
ing pace through a wood. While we looked out, we’d been able to open 
a window. The old man in our compartment saw a boy... Cows were graz-
ing... And he asked the boy in signs, “Where are we?” And the kid made 
a funny gesture. This! Across the throat. A Pole? A Pole. Where was this? At 
the station? Not in words, but in signs, we asked “What’s going on here?” 
And he made that gesture. Like this. We didn’t really pay much attention 
to him. We couldn’t figure out what he meant. (...) He says the Jews didn’t 
believe it.291
 
They try to bear witness to something that escapes even them, 
the experience of which is rendered impossible, wiped out. They are 
290 The Holocaust as philosophical theme first appears in the seventies. The texts that existed in 
the forties were isolated, albeit well known (Arendt, Jaspers, survivor testimonies). The “invisibility 
of Auschwitz” is well captured by, for instance, Enzo Traverso, L’Histoire déchirée : Essai sur Aus-
chwitz et les intellectuels, Les Ed. du Cerf, Paris 1997.)
291 Lanzmann, Shoah, pp. 34–35.
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separated from the “before” by the moat of extermination. But this 
means that they also have no “after”. The fates of the survivors docu-
ment this imprisonment in “rupture”. 
The testimony we are considering here is not the testimony of 
a crisis but the testimony of a catastrophe. Or rather, we are living 
in an age of testimony, because this catastrophe caused a crisis of 
testimony. But this is how the act of testimony becomes a privileged 




So what have we learned to date? That the Holocaust is an event 
that was supposed to remain without witnesses and be forgotten. 
The plan was to make the victims invisible, even if this meant de-
nying the reality of dead bodies, which the Nazis called Figuren or 
Schmattes (rags). This invisibility is inadvertently confirmed even 
by revisionist historians: “I studied thousands of documents. I bad-
gered specialists and historians with my questions. I tried in vain to 
find a single ex-convict who would be able to prove to me that they 
genuinely saw a gas chamber with their own eyes.”292
A witness offers their testimony to this event, bearing witness in 
the present to a past that should never have become the present. 
This is a  limit-situation. However, in the age of testimony, i.e. in 
the age of the crisis of testimony,293 it is essential to understand 
the act of bearing witness as a completely specific means of show-
ing, with its own special temporality. Is it in some way analogous 
to intentionality? Only to a certain extent. The witness is haunted 
by an event, the memory of which they cannot shake off, and offer 
their testimony regarding an “outside” that they wish to actualise. 
However, they bear witness to something that defies understanding 
and that must not be rationalised by identification: Auschwitz must 
not be explained or represented (Elie Wiesel), since any endeavour 
to understand this event is obscene (Claude Lanzmann). The wit-
ness comes up against the impossibility of any re-presentation of the 
event regarding which he is giving testimony. A chasm separates the 
witness with his testimony and those who are present to hear said 
testimony. The experience he recounts makes no sense. Testimony 
regarding the Holocaust is no Sinngebung (meaning), because that 
which it shows is the very absence of meaning. The witness refers 
292 Robert Faurisson, Le Monde, 16. 1. 1979.
293 Cf. Felman – Laub, Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History.
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to his experience in order to give expression to that which eludes 
it and in order to make of those before whom he bears witness wit-
nesses to this elusion. The witness is the trace of that event. He is 
the sign that claims its own interpreter. It is for this reason that his 
testimony does not take the form of proof that would consist of an 
incontrovertible base of evident givenness. 
The designation “after the Holocaust” is not a reference to cal-
endar time, as Blanchot pointed out when he said that every story, 
whenever it is written, will henceforth always already be prior to 
Auschwitz since it refers to the collapse of linear temporality, the 
continuity of which guarantees the capacity of retention and pro-
tention. The event that fractures this time as though it were itself 
the source of a different temporality is present as past. In relation 
to itself it is always somehow deferred and only thus is it shown. 
This means that temporality is not a theoretical problem. It is not 
a condition of the possibility of the synthetic operations of the rec-
ognising (cognising) conscious, but is itself a structural requirement 
that is its own being endowed with speech and established “accord-
ing to the time” inasmuch as its being in time lives through récit, 
narration. This is because, as Jean-Toussaint Desanti writes, only 
by virtue of the fact that we speak of yesterday do we live today as 
those we became yesterday, and in an always possible and updated 
discourse we thus summarise in time the disjointed moments of our 
lives that would otherwise disappear irrevocably. However, this is 
not as simple as it might appear at first glance: 
 
In time we must constantly reckon with time, in such a way that time finally 
seems to speak to itself, organises itself in relation to itself as a discourse 
in which present, past and future refer mutually to each other, meld into one 
another, become reconciled, distance themselves from the other by mutual 
rejection, and yet interpenetrate each other in the development of an end-
lessly new story, the identity of whose narrator we do not know. Is it I who 
recounts my life or this life that is recounted in me? And am I something 
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other than that which remains and preserves itself from this uninterrupted 
narration?294
 
A  transforming philosophical discourse clearly understands time 
within a different context and grouped within a constellation with 
other questions. However, the possibility of a description of this oth-
er temporality is again implied or prefigured in Husserl’s “analyses 
of the internal consciousness of time”, in the paradox of continuity 
and discontinuity that phenomenology is incessantly confronted by 
and that it is unable to deal with. And here too phenomenology must 
somehow be nudged beyond its boundaries, so allowing us to un-
cover the traces of possible projects of a different thinking that will 
correspond to the new reality. Jacques Derrida will go on to claim, 
entirely legitimately, that Husserl’s phenomenology is thinking on 
the very boundary of the deconstruction of the “metaphysics of pres-
ence”, while Rudolf Bernet, who conducted a detailed examination 
into the interpretations of time in various phases of phenomenology, 
argues convincingly that Husserl’s statements on time are often very 
non-metaphysical while not being independent of the metaphysical 
(the terms “metaphysical” and “non-metaphysical” can be read as 
distinguishing between tradition and transforming philosophical 
discourse), and thus his analyses of time operate on several different 
levels simultaneously. 
 
Few of Husserl’s analyses offer what Husserl expected from them, and his 
texts for the most part have a different effect to that intended by him. What 
Husserl wished to achieve is usually determined metaphysically, and often 
what he describes is directed against his own metaphysical understand-
ing.295
 
294 Jean-Touissant Desanti, Réflexions sur le temps. Conversations avec Dominique-Antoine Griso-
ni, Bernard Grasset, Paris 1992, pp. 90–91.
295 Bernet, “Die ungegenwärtige Gegenwart", p. 42.
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The unexpected beyond the horizon of the expected is the starting 
point of a transformation in the concept of time and heralds a much 
deeper transformation of the philosophical discourse. 
However, the significance of the unexpected as the unidentifiable 
in the sense of unforeseeable is, like the significance of the trau-
matic past without presence, initially blurred, because interpreta-
tions of temporality that are situated before the threshold of the 
transformation of philosophical discourse, as well as those that op-
erate on this threshold (as in the case of Husserl’s phenomenology), 
lay emphasis on the continuity of time, on the flow of time. In The 
Principles of Psychology, William James coined the term stream of 
consciousness, and the technique of the same name this gave rise to 
in literature indicates that metaphors involving a flow or river are 
not a coincidence in philosophical texts either. With this in mind, 
the initial question that Husserl asks himself – how is it possible to 
perceive temporal objects such as melody in their entirety, i.e. within 
the whole of their temporal extension? – becomes comprehensible 
as soon as he realises that the temporality of consciousness is clearly 
the deepest problem phenomenology will have to confront. Since 
phenomenology places empirical or objective time in brackets, the 
origin of that which we call time must be found in consciousness 
and its constitutive acts, i.e. an investigation is necessary into the 
phenomenological content of the experience of time. The question 
is: where does our sense come from for that which for us has a sense 
of time (in Husserlian terminology something of the sort is meant 
by the word “constitution”). If the problem of temporality is formu-
lated thus, one might surmise that the temporality of consciousness 
will be something like the final basis of all acts of the consciousness 
if it is not to be a disjointed sequence of its own immanent content. 
The internal temporality of consciousness is not only the condition 
of the possibility of the constitution of temporal objects, but equally 
of the preservation of the identity of that which appears through ex-
perience in different acts (perceiving, imagining, willing, etc.), and, 
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equally, the condition of the possibility of memory and anticipation. 
However, the range of this deeper understanding of temporality will 
clearly be wider. It is the prerequisite for an understanding of the 
meaning of historicity, i.e. including the concept of teleology, and 
the essential framework of an investigation that aims to resolve the 
historical crisis afflicting the meaning of the return (across time) to 
the original establishment, and will aim to explain the very possibil-
ity of a crisis of meaning as (random or necessary) stories in time. 
However, if we place ourselves within an already transformed philo-
sophical discourse, we can expect a different question: is it possible 
to describe the temporality of testimony on the basis of a phenom-
enological interpretation of time? 
If phenomenology analyses intentional experiences and the noet-
ic-noematic correlation in which the intended objectivities are mani-
fest and understood “as” this and that, then time is clearly implicated 
in this investigation. The acts of consciousness must themselves have 
some temporal extension without which, for example, comparisons 
and “coverage” (co-incidence) of the diverse or the accomplishment 
of the intended, which are all synthetic acts, would be unthinkable. 
Identification requires time. This means that perception (temporal 
just like any other) of an object is itself a  temporal object. Con-
sciousness is temporal. However, we cannot say that it operates in 
time, because the origin of the temporality of consciousness must be 
located in its operations. Consciousness is thus, somehow, time. Its 
fundamental character is this internal consciousness of time. If this 
origin is to be uncovered and the constitution of time explained, it is 
appropriate to focus first on those experiences that make accessible 
the temporality of consciousness, i.e. on the experiences of temporal 
objects such as tone or melody.  
The second step of our analysis must therefore be to reflect on the 
experience of the temporal object. This analysis will uncover the ba-
sic structural moments, namely the primary impression (Urimpres-
sion), retention and protention. These mark out the time horizon 
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of (every) experience: the melody begins, continues and ends as the 
same melody. The first note is held as that resonating now and antic-
ipation of the forthcoming note is linked to the held phase (phases). 
“Now” is this actuality, presence as a (certain field of) presentation. 
It is for this reason that Husserl does not designate this “now” only 
with the word presence (Gegenwart), but sometimes with the word 
presentation (Gegenwärtigung). The note is consciousness now. In-
asmuch as certain of its phases are conscious as “now”, the entirety 
of its duration is conscious as elapsed. The past continues to shine 
in the “now” as a field of presence as conscious of its having expired 
right now. 
So how is it possible to perceive a melody in its entirety? Appar-
ently thanks to retention and protention, which are specific in the 
sense of non-objectivising (non-thematising) intentions linking 
phase to phase and experience to experience in such a way that they 
form a connected nexus of a  single flow, a continuity of flux into 
a temporal background (Husserl’s well known comet’s tail of reten-
tions and the retentions of retentions). At every instant conscious-
ness is a current into which new actualities constantly enter (from 
the “source point”, which is the primary impression), which imme-
diately become part of this compact flow, which does not begin and 
end, though it allows for a  temporal unit (such as melody) to be 
perceived as beginning and ending. 
In this way three levels of the constellation of time are gradu-
ally identified (along with the problem of their mutual interaction): 
1)  the level of transcendental theses (melody in objective time), 
2) the level of immanent temporal objects and their appearance in 
the stream of time (the experience of the melody and reflections 
thereupon), and 3) the stream of consciousness that is the final base 
of the constitution of time and simultaneously constitutes itself. It is 
thus that I am able to explain, inter alia, that I perceive the melody 
in its entirety, since it is also clear that what the analysis of the 
internal consciousness of time finally discovered were the a priori 
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conditions of all appearance, whether the experience has already 
thematised (intended and grasped) objects that are temporal or not. 
Husserl’s texts devoted to temporality are spread over a long pe-
riod of time. He worked intermittently on them from approximately 
1905 to 1934.296 The basic perspective does not change, though the 
terminology achieves a sharper focus and complexity. The analysis 
aims to go deeper. However, above all Husserl must deal with the 
problems or even paradoxes that emerge time and time again during 
this process. This relates mainly to the final level of the constitution 
of time, the level of the ur-phenomenon or primal phenomenon, 
regarding which in 1932 Husserl wrote: 
 
We thus soon come up against a  “pra-phenomenon”, which has never 
been exposed, still less interpreted, and in which everything that can in 
any sense whatsoever be called a  phenomenon has its source. It is the 
standing-flowing self-presence, the absolute ego present to itself in flowing 
in its standing-flowing life, which is still flowing through experience, inten-
tionality and knowledge.297
 
296 Published gradually in the Husserliana edition: Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des in-
neren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917), ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X. Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 
1966; Edmund Husserl, Die ‘Bernauer Manuskripte’ über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18), Husserli-
ana XXXIII, ed. Rudolf Bernet, Dieter Lohmar, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2001; Ed-
mund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte. Husserliana 
Materialienband 8, ed. Dieter Lohmar, Springer, New York 2006. Regarding the phenomenology 
of temporality cf. Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzen-
dentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Phaenomenologica 
23, Nijhoff, Haag 1966; Toine Kortooms, Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of 
Time-Consciousness. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2002; Ernst Wolfgang Orth (ed.), 
Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger, Phänomenologische Forschungen 14, Verlag Karl 
Alber Freiburg, München 1983; D. Lohman, I. Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time – New Contributions to 
the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, Phaenomenologica 197, Springer Science-Business Media, 
2010; Alexander Schnell, Temps et phénomène. Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 
2004. Jean-Toussaint Desanti, Réflexions sur le temps. Conversations avec Dominique-Antoine 
Grisoni. Bernard Grasset, Paris 1992.
297 Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution, p. 145. "So stoßen wir bald vor auf das nie he-
rausgestellte, geschweige denn systematisch ausgelegte "Urphänomen", in dem alles, was sonst 
Phänomen heißen mag und in welchem Sinn immer, seine Quelle hat. Es ist die stehend-strömende 
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This brief example of Husserl’s struggle with the possibilities of the 
language of phenomenological description supports the legitimacy 
of the observation he expressed in his early Vorlesungen: we lack 
a name for all of this. However, the formulation referred to is com-
pletely consequent. The final level must be something like a stand-
ing stream or nunc stans, a  “place” in which experience (life) is 
embedded in such a way that it extends beyond this “now” into the 
flowing and arriving (retention is always already observed by proten-
tion). Consciousness is in the transcendence of itself. However, it is 
clear that on the level on which spatiality and temporality are first 
constituted it is impossible to use words like “place” or “presence” 
(lebendige Gegenwart), and so in his later works Husserl inclines to 
the neutral term “primordium”, which in a less misleading way des-
ignates this constantly gushing source of (conscious) life. However, 
the expression nunc stans is revealing: by using it Husserl wishes to 
indicate that the outside is unthinkable in order to transcend con-
sciousness via consciousness and that nunc stans potentially contains 
within itself everything thinkable (alles Erdenkliche). It is therefore 
something like the horizon of all horizons, which is why the same 
world appears constantly to us (and why the unknown is a modus of 
the known). 
However, this level, though in principle distinct, cannot be com-
pletely separated from the constituted flow of immanent acts (tem-
poral objects), because the absolute, i.e. constituting stream, namely 
consciousness, is “present” only in the experience of experiences, 
and experiences are eo ipso simply as experienced. The flow of con-
sciousness is aware of itself, if it is aware of the constituted temporal 
unities. It is therefore essential that a specific property of life be this 
identity it possesses with the consciousness of time. This is also why 
the term lebendige Gegenwart, live or living presence, is replaced 
in the later texts by more complex terms, e.g. “stehend urtümliche 
Selbstgegenwart bzw. das sich selbst strömend gegenwärtige absolute Ich in seinem stehend-strö-
menden Leben, einem Leben, das ständig strömendes Erleben, Intentionalität, Bewussthaben ist ".
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Lebendigkeit” (lit: primally standing vitality) or “Urgegenwart” (ur-
presence or primary presence).298 However, an appropriate term is 
missing for a reason: that which is not a modality of time cannot be 
designated by names valid for that constituted in time. 
The paradoxical idea of a flow that stands still is inevitable, be-
cause only it, along with the mutual implication of life and experi-
ence, the transitivity of life, guarantees that the postulate of the 
identity of thought and (appearing to it) being still applies and be-
cause only in this way is it possible to avert the threat of infinite 
regression, albeit at the cost of Husserl operating on the very edge 
of phenomenological demonstrability in this pre-reflexive layer of 
consciousness. All the more reason why conspicuous traces of the 
outside in the inside emerge from time to time in his texts. 
This is above all the case with that structural moment of the field 
of presence or presentation (as we might translate the word Ge-
genwärtigen), which is the primary impression that is and is not 
the same as “now”. Though something must differentiate past and 
present, this difference is part of the flow and can therefore only be 
expressed by means of abstraction as a continually shifting boundary 
(or “betweenness”) in the movement of constant shifting, by means 
of which singularities entering consciousness are differentiated (this 
will be one of the possible keys to understanding Derrida’s neolo-
gism différance), i.e. in a movement behind which reflection is al-
ways delayed without ever being able to hold the primary impression 
as such, unmodified by retention (and protention). The primary im-
pression, or what Husserl calls the source point, is  
 
the running-off mode with which the immanent objects beings to exist. It is 
characterised as now (...) The “source-point” with which the “production” 
of the enduring object begins is a primal impression. This consciousness 
is in a state of constant change: the tone-now present “in person” con-
298 Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Husserliana XV, p. 668.
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tinuously changes into something that has been; an always new tone-now 
continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. But 
when the consciousness of the tone-now, the primal impression, passes 
over into retention, this retention itself is a now in turn, something actu-
ally existing. While it is actually present itself (but not an actually present 
tone), it is retention of the tone that has been (...) Every actually present 
now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It 
changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, 
a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is 
retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. 
The tone begins and “it” steadily continues.299
 
If the primal impression is to designate the temporal forms of that 
which in consciousness emerges first of all as absolutely new and 
singular, then this very newness and singularity is problematised by 
the interpretation of the constitution of time flow. It is “present” 
for understanding only if held (additionally) by retention, i.e. if it 
appears as already modified by the entire structure of the temporal 
presentation, not in the mode of immediacy but as the already past. 
The primal impression may be present for its understanding in ex-
perience simply as a trace of (an escaping) singularity and newness, 
i.e. only as an indexical reference to the exterior. The now is here, 
but is not located in the movement of receding, and if it is held re-
tentionally, it is only held as escaping. However, if this flow is the 
final base on which rests all showing to our consciousness (as well as 
consciousness showing to itself) and the establishment of meaning, 
then we have no choice but to say that the condition of this show-
ing is the original escaping, because the last, which reflection on 
the flow of consciousness encounters, is this: what it still has within 
reach is already unarrestingly disappearing. Via primary retention 
the showing object is identifiable only when it is disappearing and 
299 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Collected 
Works IV), trans. John B. Brough, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dodrecht 1991, pp. 29–31.
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thus eluding identification. This is why Klaus Held used the word 
Entgleitenlassen to describe retention as a passive operation of the 
consciousness: the synthetic presentation of that which is shown is 
possible only because consciousness permits its ongoing escaping 
from the present. 
 
The primary impression in its constant transformation is always an escap-
ing fulfilment, since it is inexorably replaced and overlapped with ever new 
current presentations. For this reason the tendency to fulfilment is never 
satisfied. The “ego” during perception is always also with something that is 
constantly arriving, because the constant flowing is forever pulling the rug 
of constant pra-impressional presence from under its feet, as it were.300 
 
The last, founding level of showing, which is consciousness as the 
“temporalisation of time”, is a special base, because its character is 
not firm. The final realm that Husserl’s phenomenology reaches is 
elapsus, escape as the basis of all appearance and everything that can 
be thought. Showing is based on a retreat from the phenomenon as 
a special mode of resistance to recognition – as a sign of the outside, 
the past, that was never the present. The transcendental I (which is 
the same as transcendental consciousness) as constituting is at the 
mercy of the flow in which it is and which it is. It permits escape in 
order that it be able on all levels to carry out synthetic acts – cover-
age, identification, ideation. 
Emmanuel Levinas has already drawn attention to these (unin-
tended) consequences of the phenomenological analysis of the inter-
nal consciousness of time in texts from the sixties appended to later 
editions of his essay Discovering Existence with Husserl and Hei-
degger. Completely in character with his way of thinking, Levinas, 
like Husserl, deems the primary impression a key moment in the 
300 Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei 
Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Phaenomenologica 23, Nijhoff, Haag 
1966, p. 44.
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constitution of time, a “new beginning”, a “continuous restarting 
ex novo” (this is also the meaning of his concept of “diachrony”). 
It is for this reason that in his early texts he examined the phenom-
enon of tiredness and exhaustion. A condition of a new beginning 
is the “death” of the previous moment. However, unlike Husserl, 
his concept of the original impression refers to discontinuity as the 
origin of the temporalisation of time (the moment is that by which 
something new always begins). This interpretation of time, precisely 
because it involves “impression”, for Levinas begins on the level of 
sensation (though he does not differ here from Husserl), or Emp-
findung. However, he believes that the “newness” of each impres-
sion, its singularity, is precisely that which contradicts the idea of 
time as flow, because it is something that constantly precedes its 
own pre-predication (protention), precedes the very possibility of 
itself.301 Like Derrida, Levinas sees the problem of Husserl’s Lec-
tures as being that intentionality is still understood as a model of an 
idealising identification: that which I intend surrenders itself to me 
through Abschattungen cast on the horizon of intended objectivity. 
In other words, I always intended something like an ideal pole, on 
which I constantly orientate via a multiplicity of aspects and which 
is gradually “constituted” as “ideality” in the experience.302 Ideality 
transcends the flow of sensation, it is beyond time albeit constituted 
in and thanks to time. Husserl’s descriptions of sensation are there-
fore problematic: if the original impression (singularity, newness, 
new beginning) is held by retention and understood in a certain way, 
then it is already “idealised” (I perceive redness as a quality intrinsic 
to the intended object and the noematic pole moves in the direction 
of coincidence with the neotic): the ideality of objectiveness pushes 
301 Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence. Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1978, 
p. 41. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond the Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1991, p. 32.
302 Husserl’s conception of retention and protention is clearly modelled on the idea of subtle grada-
tion.
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the “sensed” newness and singularity of the sensed (impression) 
into the background. However, there is something more important 
at play. I feel the impression, I am aware (consciousness is necessar-
ily intentional) of this feeling. In other words, the intentional rela-
tionship implied in the sensation of impression necessarily, albeit 
minimally, separates the sensing from the sensed: here we are not 
talking of coincidence but of time.  
 
Time is not only the form that houses sensations and lures them into a be-
coming, it is the sensing of sensation, which is not a simple coincidence of 
sensing with the sensed, but an intentionality and consequently a minimal 
distance between the sensing and the sensed – precisely a temporal dis-
tance.303
 
To Husserl, for whom consciousness is necessarily present to itself, 
this is unacceptable. For Levinas, on the contrary, it is the very mys-
tery of time and consciousness: consciousness lags behind itself.304 
“The mystery of intentionality lies in the divergence from (...) or in 
the modification of the temporal flux. Consciousness is senescence 
and remembrance of things.”305 
 
303 Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael 
B. Smith, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1998, p. 142.
304 Ibid., p. 144.
305 Ibid., p. 145. A later formulation of the origin of temporality is to be found in Autrement qu‘être: 
“Even at this primordial level which is that of lived experience, in which the flow, reduced to pure 
immanence, should exclude even any suspicion of objectification, consciousness remains an inten-
tionality, an ‘intentionality of a specific kind’ to be sure, but unthinkable without an apprehended 
correlate. This specific intentionality is time itself. There is consciousness insofar as the sensible 
impression differs from itself without differing; it differs without differing, is other within identity. The 
impression is illuminated by ‘opening up’, as though it plugged itself up; it undoes that coincidence 
of self with self in which the ‘same’ is smothered under itself, as under a candle extinguisher. It is not 
in phase with itself; just past, about to come. But to differ within identity, to maintain the moment 
that is being altered, is ‘protaining’ and ‘retaining’”. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 32. From here, 
Husserl constitutes time that is not lost and that can always be returned: however, this is how it is 
possible to get from here to the primary impression that precedes every protention.
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On the one hand, Husserl’s  concept of time is an attempt to re-
solve an eminently philosophical problem that cannot be avoided, 
especially when a “paradigm” changes (the impending philosophy 
of finality). On the other, Husserl cannot leave the problem of time 
to one side because he comes up against it again and again in his 
analyses, even though he nudges to one side the phenomenon of 
temporality at the start. He is not interested in the problem of the 
empirical or psychological genesis of idealities, but is nevertheless 
unable to rid himself of the problem of time, and whenever faced 
with the problem of history, attempts to resolve it through a  “te-
leological” conception, i.e. the “ideal temporality” of the non-tem-
poral establishment of history. However, as time passes it becomes 
clear that the phenomenological analysis of time is his fundamental 
problem inasmuch as the field of phenomenological investigation is 
consciousness as the field of evidence in reflection upon experience.
If phenomenology is thinking that aspires to be presupposition-
less, then, somewhat paradoxically, it must be able to anticipate the 
possibility of the full presence that guarantees this evidence (i.e. the 
indivisible presence of the “now” without any trace of absence, un-
contaminated by any exterior or any “otherness”). This is the condi-
tion that it has to demonstrate to be substantiated, i.e. to demon-
strate consciousness as a realm that allows for the unmediated grasp 
of the experienced within reflection upon this experience. The con-
tents and structures of the experience must be immediately given, in 
such a way that it is possible to apprehend and investigate them and 
thence to arrive at idealities and ideal laws. 
This means that phenomenology must disclose consciousness as 
presence in itself, of itself and for itself. In other words, the prereq-
uisite of phenomenology is the field of immanence (or the exterior 
without interior, or even better, the interior without exterior in-
side), the sphere of that which is reelly immanent in the experience 
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of cognition,306 i.e. an “absolute and clear givenness”,307 which is 
the genuine opinion of the thing itself at the moment that the rela-
tionship to something transcendent (the perception of the thing in 
the world) is the internal character of the phenomenon (perceived 
as the noematic correlate of acts of noesis: immanence in the inten-
tional sense).  
But along with this approach to the problem of time and its phe-
nomenologically necessary preconditions (the paradigm of percep-
tion and intentional focus, intention as grasping), a paradox appears: 
reflection on the experience has the character of the perception of 
this experience, i.e. it is again an intentional act that now intends 
not a  temporal object (melody), but its temporal determinacy, i.e. 
the constitution of the “temporalisation of time” itself as it appears 
in this experience. It detects/discovers the constituted stream, the 
flow of the stream. However, if this reflection as perception and in-
tentional intentionality grasps, then it constitutes, while itself (as 
a certain specific perception) possessing a temporal extension: 
 
The actions of the intentional life, i.e. noesis, in which the transcendental 
noema are given, are themselves revealed under the gaze of reflection as 
givenness in “immanent time”, i.e. they are inserted in the temporal flowing 
of the “current of consciousness” (...) noesis are also temporal objects…308
 
It therefore presupposes an even deeper level of temporality. In oth-
er words, analyses of the internal consciousness of time threaten an 
endless regress descending behind that “third” level as constantly 
receding. A possible solution might be found in the relationship of 
the second and third level as a completely specific relationship. 
306 Edmund Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Husserliana II), ed. Walter Biemel, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Haag, p. 35.
307 Ibid.
308 Held, Lebendige Gegenwart, p.  48 (Later on Husserl abandons the original content-appre-
hension schema in his analyses of time: see Alexander Schnell, Temps et phénomène, Georg Olms 
Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 2004.
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In Section 36 of the Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness, 
which summarises the outputs of his analyses, i.e. “time-constituting 
flow as absolute subjectivity”, Husserl writes: “For all of this we 
have no names” and must resort to “images”.309 In doing so he is 
saying something fundamental about “concepts” and “conceptual 
thinking”. He has stumbled upon something that eludes conceptual 
understanding and is problematising the very possibility of trans- 
historical concepts. He points the way forward that leads to Deleuze: 
philosophy is the creation of concepts. This is because Husserl’s phe-
nomenology is located on the edge of a  major transformation of 
philosophical discourse in respect of a currently felt need to under-
stand time and take finitude seriously as a dimension of thinking.  
The deeper Husserl goes in his analyses of the internal conscious-
ness of time, the more the necessary assumption becomes clear that 
these investigations are supposed to arrive at while at the same time 
establishing the legitimacy thereof, namely to overlay this initial gap 
between the assumption and the thinking without preconceptions 
that phenomenology claims to be. To put this slightly differently: 
with each further step of the investigation it becomes more and 
more clear why these analyses are essential and what they should 
aim at. They have to show how and whether that which must be 
given in order that phenomenology be possible is given: the basis of 
consciousness as presence in itself for itself and of itself.  
The presence of consciousness in itself guarantees the epoché pro-
cedure and reduction to the sphere of immanence in which the out-
side becomes apparent inside as a phenomenon, i.e. a reduction to 
what and how consciousness is shown as presence in consciousness 
and for consciousness – consciousness precisely because it is in itself, 
309 “It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated me-
taphorically as ‘flow’; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, 
‘the now’, and so on. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity 
of reverberation. For all this, we lack names.” (Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Con-
sciousness, §36, p. 79.
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it is of itself and is thus able to reflect upon its content and acts 
and to turn in itself to itself in movement, which does not abandon 
the field of immanence as the field of evidence. Consciousness is 
immediately present to itself, to its content and to its operations. 
However, consciousness is a  stream, a  flow, a  flux (the condition 
of the possibility of syntheses, identifications and associations, the 
constitution of idealities, the completion of intentional opinion), 
and so it is essential that presence be retained in this flow that is 
also a flowing into the past. This important task of retaining that 
which is passing and has just passed (but not by means of re-pre-
sentation, which would introduce a  certain discontinuity into the 
continuous stream of consciousness) is carried out by retentional 
and protentional (passively functioning) intentionality. This is why 
we cannot say that consciousness is in time (because it would then 
be necessary to find some other level of time prior to consciousness 
and the analysis would be threatened by infinite regress). Instead, 
it is necessary to show that the internal consciousness of time is in 
the end constituted and constitutive, i.e. that consciousness is time 
as perpetual “temporalising” or Zeitigung. However, this would 
mean that flowing, the stream, is somehow the same as nunc stans, 
standing time as “the moment from which consciousness radiates, 
reaching out to what is, what has been, and what will be”,310 and 
so every “now” has in a certain sense the dimension of the whole 
of time as lived presence (lebendige Gegenwart), a definition that 
is tightened up in Husserl’s later texts as stehend urtümliche Leben-
digkeit. This is something like Urgegenwart, which is not a modality 
of time and is not therefore the same as simply “the current imme-
diate form of consciousness”, as Husserl still called this “live pres-
ence” in the Lectures,311 but is im Strömen verharrende vieldimen-
310 John B. Brough, “Notes on the Absolute Time-Constituting Flow of Consciousness”, in: D. Lo-
hmar, I. Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time – New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, 
Phaenomenologica 197, Springer Science-Business Media, 2010, p. 44.
311 Husserl, Vorlesungen, Husserliana X, p. 83.
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sionale Gegenwart,312 which for the sake of differentiation Husserl 
also sometimes called Primordium and described it as “the primally 
original standing streaming (das urtümlich stehende Strömen).313
This consciousness as the most original lebendige Gegenwart (as 
the Primordium) does not only allow for – as the continuum of inten-
tional modifications of the primal “now” (to which the ur-impres-
sional “now” corresponds in the specific experience) – the potential 
transcending of current consciousness via itself, and thus for recur-
rent recollection, but also – and this is important from the perspec-
tive of Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences – the retrospective 
questioning of the original establishment and its restitution, as well 
as the concept of history as the fulfilment of the original telos and, fi-
nally, the element of evidence in which identification, Wesensschau, 
eidetic variation and a glimpse of idealities is possible. The fold in 
the reflexive relationship to itself is thus not a fold: the world as the 
horizon of all horizons has its final form of temporalising as the 
horizon of all temporal horizons, and in this way (transcendental) 
consciousness potentially includes everything that can be thought 
(alles Erdenkliche).314
312 Edmund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934), Husserliana, Materialien 
VIII, p. 129.
313 Edmund Husserl, Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserliana XXXIV, ed. Sebastian Luft, 
Springer 2002, p. 384. (1) Die Rückfrage von der Epoche aus führt auf das urtümlich stehende 
Strömen - in einem gewissen Sinne das nunc stans, stehende "Gegenwart", wobei das Wort "Gegen-
wart", als schon auf eine Zeitmodalität verweisend, eigentlich noch nicht passt. Eine erste Struktur-
analyse ist also die der Form dieses Strömens als eines nur nach allgemeiner Form identifizierbaren. 
2) Die erste Aussage ist: stehendes Strömen, stehendes Verströmen, stehendes Heranströmen. Im 
stehendem Strömen konstituiert sich der Strom; das Stehen besagt Ständigsein als "Prozess" – 
Prozess der Urzeitigung, Prozess der Zeitmodalitäten, der Wandlung, die ständig unterschieden hat 
Gegenwart, die in Vergangenheit sich wandelt (und Vergangenheit, die sich ihrerseits in Vorver-
gangenheit wandelt usw.), andererseits Zukunft, die sich wandelnd zu Gegenwart wird u. ff. Darin 
aber Konstitution von ständiger Zeit, ständigen Einheiten als zeitlichen Einheiten, die je in ihren 
Zeitmodalitäten strömend sich "darstellen", im zeitmodalen Strömen "stand"-halten, Stand haben, 
sich als Einheiten (Selbigkeiten) konstituieren.“
314 Die Gegenwart ist allüberspannendes, sozusagen allwissendes Bewusstsein von sich selbst 
und all seinen intentionalen Bestanden - potentiell birgt ihre Struktur Allwissenheit der Welt in 
sich – als ideale Moglichkeit, wofem wir nur in Rechnung ziehen , dass der Dunkelheitshorizont, 
258
It is for this reason that we can claim that everything unknown is 
a modus of the known. 
However, would it not thus be possible to claim that the project of 
rationality, which effaces the incommensurability of the incommen-
surable and that works with concepts as the ur-form of objectivising 
thinking thanks to which man rids himself of fear by eliminating 
everything unknown from thinking, remains implicated in the very 
foundations of phenomenology, in its establishment of time, in its 
identification of time with consciousness that is in itself of itself and 
for itself, as the authors of the Dialectic of Enlightenment might say? 
 
Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the “outside” 
is the real source of fear.315
 
Husserl’s concept of time wants to eliminate the event as the exte-
rior with regard to the living present – and cannot do otherwise. 
For if the structural analogy still applied between the interpretation 
of the primary impression (Urimpression) forever retained by the 
order of retention, and the original establishment of the meaning or 
objective (Urstiftung) of a certain tradition that continually follows 
on from it, and if the idea was to show that this movement in itself 
and of itself (which is also the definition of teleological historicity) 
is irreducibly contaminated by some exterior – for example by the 
incalculable event that transcends existing horizons of understand-
ing, or by a quality that is beyond our grasp – then this would mean 
that the very possibility of Rückfrage, the restitutive return to the 
in dem Vergangenheit und Zukunft des Bewusstseinsstroms verschwimmen, und der (die) Vollko-
mmenheit der Selbstwahmehmung des Bewusstseins beschrankt, eine zufallige Schranke ist, die in 
infinitum erweitert gedacht werden kann, so dass als "Idee" erwachst ein allwissendes "gottliches" 
Bewusstsein, das sich selbst in vollkommener Klarheit umspannt. Auch das "endliche" Bewusstsein 
ist allwissend, auch seine Intentionalitat umspannt seine ganze Vergangenheit und Zukunft, aber nur 
partiell klar, im Ubrigen in einer Dunkelheit, die eine Potentialitat fur Klarheiten und Wiedererinne-
rungen ist“ Husserl, Bernauer Manuskripte, pp. 45–46.
315 Adorno, Horkheimer, Dialectics of Enlightenment, p. 11.
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original establishment of meaning (that would in that case always 
only be attainable “then”, supplementarily (nachträglich), as always 
already modified in some way) would be at threat, and the Urstif-
tung would by analogy be something like the escaping quality of the 
ur-impression, a trace of meaning irrupting into the order of its ap-
prehension/interpretations, without revealing itself in its presence 
in any of them. It would continue to differentiate itself and defer its 
full presence for consciousness. In other words (Derrida’s  in this 
case), tradition would be subject to the movement of différance. Or, 
as Derrida might also say: the meaning of Europe would be this 
“secretum” of its history, its re-founding in every moment of “crisis” 
(which is, however, every present). 
Emmanuel Levinas will go on to say that Husserl’s consciousness 
sleeps a dogmatic, because objectivising, sleep, but that it is a step 
away from its awakening precisely there where phenomenological 
reduction penetrates Life as such as it is present, albeit covered by 
its forced synchronisation with the “somnambulism of identifying 
reason” in the concept of live or living presence, i.e. in the basic ob-
jective of phenomenology to interpret experience, Erleben. If, there-
fore, phenomenology is not to break faith with this objective, the 
true meaning of phenomenological reduction must be rescued, i.e. 
this “permanent revolution”, a  revolution that will “reanimate or 
reactivate the life that is forgotten or weakened in [thematicising, 
objectivising] knowledge.” This is the most intrinsic establishment 
of phenomenology, its “style”. It turns the attention to that which 
shines from behind consciousness, which is the length and breadth of 
subjective life as layered by thinking that thematises, i.e. represents. 
In Levinas’s reading of Husserl, reduction in the final analysis lib-
erates thinking from the norms of adequation, from “obedience to 
the completed work of identification“.316 He then immediately poses 
316 Emmanuel Levinas, “La philosophie et l’évei", in: Entre nous, p. 84. Levinas makes reference to 
Husserl‘s distinction between apodicticity and evidence in § 6 of Cartesian Meditations: apodicticity 
can obtain even when the evidence is not complete and adequate.
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a question that hints at the non-mandatory link to Husserl that is 
peculiar to Levinas: 
 
Is it, under the label erleben (to live (something)) just a confused or ob-
scure consciousness, merely something preparatory to the distinction be-
tween subject and object, a pre-thematization, a preknowledge? Must we 
not affirm our psychism otherwise? Does not the adjective living, from the 
beginning of Husserl’s  work on, underscore the importance of the word 
Erlebnis as expressing the way of the subject? The I’s prereflective experi-
ence, designated by the term Erlebnis – the lived, is not just a moment 
of pre-objectification, like the hulé prior to the Auffasen (apprehending). 
The ‘living present’: we know the importance this term took on in Hus-
serl’s manuscripts on time. Its explosive and surprising character (similar to 
that of the present in the Bergsonian durée) is expressed in The Phenom-
enology Internal Time-Consciousness as the primal impression. Unforesee-
able, it is in no way prepared in some germinating seed that would bear the 
past. The absolute traumatism that is inseparable from the spontaneity of 
its upsurge is of as much importance as the sensible quality that it offers to 
the adequation of knowledge. The living present of the cogito-sum occurs 
not only on the model of self-consciousness, absolute knowledge; it is the 
rupture of the equanimity of the ‘even mind’, the rupture of the Same of 
immanence; awakening and life.317
 
In other words, the lebendige Gegenwart is not the same as self-
consciousness, but is an element of the emergence of the forever 
new (the ur-impression), perforating its presence in itself of itself 
and for itself, irrupting into immanence inasmuch as this invasion 
of the outside inside is an awakening to an alert life which is sensibil-
ity, which is living prior to hylé being transformed into the function 
of Abschattung. Our attention is therefore now turned to this point 
(and not only in the case of Levinas), to the pre-predicative sphere, 
317 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening”, in: Entre Nous, p. 85.
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to the non-intentional operations of consciousness prior to the acts 
of thematisation, i.e. to its original openness to the outside, more 
to protention than to retention. This then returns, for instance, in 
Levinas’s emphasis on suffering, i.e. a more passive experience that 
the passivity of receptivity, which through vulnerability refers to the 
presence of another as the other, and whence the only indisputable 
ethical principle of the 20th century that survived the “Holocaust as 
the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, where evil appears in 
its diabolical horror.”318 
This shift of focus, which nevertheless remains a form of the con-
tinuation as well as of the non-continuation of phenomenology and 
which takes place conspicuously in connection with the “internal 
consciousness of time”, continues in Derrida’s exposure of the re-
sistance within the framework of immanence or difference within 
auto-affection (or self-affection). Though it might at first glance 
seem that Derrida’s  thinking is closely linked to structuralist (or 
post-structuralist) semiology, a simple chronological list of his work 
shows that its starting point was in fact phenomenology.319 His doc-
toral thesis The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy320 was 
written in 1953–54 and its choice of topic already makes reference 
to the problem of historicity, the history of meaning and by exten-
sion to temporality. Then there is his lecture “Genesis and Structure 
in Phenomenology” of 1995321 and to a certain extent the preface to 
the translation of The Origins of Geometry,322 one of the appendices 
to Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences. Derrida deals explicitly 
318 Emmanuel Levinas, “La souffrance inutile”, in: ibid., p. 115. Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suf-
fering”, in: Ibid., p. 97.
319 For detailed information gleaned from archives, see Edward Baring, Young Derrida and French 
Philosophy 1945–1968. Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2011.
320 Jacques Derrida, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, trans. Marian Hobson, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 2003.
321 Reprinted in Jacques Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, Ed. du Seuil, Paris 1967.
322 Jacques Derrida, Introduction et traduction de “L’Origine de la géométrie”, de Husserl, P.U.F., 
Paris 1962.
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with consciousness and its temporality in Voice and Phenomenon.323 
In general we can say that, at first indirectly, Derrida is constantly 
examining the very possibility of originally giving evidence as the 
presence of meaning in the original opinion of the thing itself, i.e. he 
asks whether this possibility is guaranteed by this concept of pres-
ence as elaborated by Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the 
last level of consciousness/time as lebendige Gegenwart. However, 
his “deconstruction” is not criticism, but rather a  search for the 
traces of other possibilities of reading in the texts themselves. Inas-
much as Husserl is convinced, as he puts it in Cartesian Meditations, 
that the purely intuitive, concrete and apodictic way that phenome-
nology reports its findings “excludes all ‘metaphysical adventure’, all 
speculative excesses”,324 then Derrida seeks to verify whether this is 
the case. He asks whether the concept of presence in Husserl’s texts 
is indeed non-metaphysical in relation to temporality and whether, 
on the basis of this concept, an eidetic science would be possible, 
capable of guaranteeing the ideality of its concepts and claims. 
In other words he examines the sustainability of the principle of 
all principles.  
It would be sustainable if it were not possible to prove the role 
of irreducible absence during the constitution of idealities or the 
impossibility of the contamination of the expression by indication. 
It would be sustainable if there existed something like a phenomeno-
logical sign and phenomenological voice: a physicality stripped of its 
physicality, i.e. of the outside. 
Because Husserl must work with the “sign”, he must simultane-
ously reduce the signification of the sign as outside, because the sign 
is traditionally the element of absence, non-originality. The sign is 
a  sign of something because it takes the place of the thing in its 
absence. The sign cannot be the beginning or vice versa. In the 
323 Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomène. P.U.F., Paris 1967.
324 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion 
Cairns, Springer 1960, p. 139.
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element of signs there is no beginning, we are always “in the mid-
dle”. If phenomenology aims at a presentation of the thing itself, 
it must reduce re-presentation or convert it into a repetition of the 
identical. Whence Husserl’s concept of “expression” as opposed to 
“indication” and whence the strategy that begins in the Logical In-
vestigations: Husserl shifts the problematic of expression to the im-
manence of consciousness.  
Derrida describes the specific approach to this reduction of the 
sign as follows: In order to distinguish expression from meaning (or 
signification), Husserl uses the German word “bedeuten” (nomina-
tive “Bedeutung”). When he says that the expression has Bedeu-
tung, that etwas bedeutet, that it is bedeutend, he is saying that it is 
the expression of that which the speaker has immediately in mind, 
that which he intends to say, i.e. in Husserl’s usage, which does not 
distinguish between Sinn and Bedeutung or meaning, “meaning”, 
or to put it more precisely: the ideal meaning as the content of ex-
pression (see also Ideas I). However, this cannot apply in real com-
munication, in which Bedeutung is always woven into the network 
of significations. The act of communication for Husserl is external 
to the act of “bedeuten”; it therefore only applies in speech without 
communication, in “monolithic discourse”, in absolute silence (de-
prived of all materiality) of the voice of the solitary mental life, in 
which the relationship to the outside is suspended (though generally 
speaking this is the act establishing phenomenology). 
In Husserl’s semiology, expression is a sign bestowed with a sig-
nifying intention, i.e. bedeutsames Zeichen. “Bedeuten” is a key act: 
ideal objectivity (that which the speaker had in mind) is expressed 
without deserting, by virtue of its own exteriorisation, the interior, 
because everything takes place in the field of consciousness (the nec-
essarily forever present in itself, of itself and for itself), which Hus-
serl describes as einsames Seelenleben, the solitary life of the soul. It 
ensues from this that expression does not have to be genuinely artic-
ulated by speech, communicated (to someone else). Only conscious-
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ness itself is communicated (everything takes place, to draw on later 
terminology, within the noetic-noematic sphere of consciousness, 
within the framework of the international relatedness to the out-
side inside). A non-productive duplication is involved: the expressive 
intention emerges outside of itself only in the form of the phenom-
enological voice, while the content of the expression is ideality that 
does not exist in the world. If the expression as exteriorisation pre-
supposes sui generis some kind of Deutung, then this is something 
like an “understanding listening”:325 everything is still under the 
control of “bedeuten”, because all “involuntary associations” linked 
with factual communication are excluded. In other words:  
 
Sense wants to be signified; it is expressed only in a meaning (vouloir-dire) 
which is none other than a wanting-to-tell-itself proper to the presence of 
sense.326
Let us summarise for the sake of clarity. In his Logical Investiga-
tions Husserl attempts to lay the foundations of the scientism of 
science, formal logic. He must therefore demonstrate the possibility 
of a purely scientific speech, the unalloyed expression of ideal mean-
ing or Bedeutung, i.e. the possibility of a purely expressive speech in 
which signifiers lead without equivocation to the signified. In this 
way, expression or Ausdruck would be “non-productive” (neither 
adding anything to nor subtracting anything from the ideal), simply 
“mirroring”. It would be the double of ideal Bedeutung. It would 
retain the veracity of Bedeutung, which is not dependent on expres-
sion since Bedeutung belongs to a pre-expressive level. Its veracity 
is guaranteed by the illustrative “presence” of the object to which 
this Bedeutung is intentionally related. The veracity (objectivity) 
of testimony is thus transferred to the illustrative presence of the 
325 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. 
David B. Allison, Newton Garver, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, p. 34.
326 Ibid., p. 35.
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object, i.e. the illustrativeness of the object for thinking that precedes 
speech (the aspect of that which Derrida terms “logocentrism”). 
And Derrida shows that the possibility of purely scientific speech is 
conditional upon what Husserl gradually eliminates from the game 
(the indicatory utilisation of signs, the impossibility of isolating the 
pure pre-expressive level of “labelling” and thus thinking).327 
But what is the purpose of Derrida’s  observations regarding 
Husserl’s concept of sign and signification? They point to a host of 
seemingly obvious eliminations. The physical side of speech is gradu-
ally excluded, along with everything that finds its origin in bona 
fide communication (the conveyance of something to someone else), 
because real communication is a dimension of (mere) meaning, i.e. 
also the atrophication of Bedeutung (of ideal meaning, which then 
returns in The Crisis of European Sciences as the cause of the “cri-
sis” in meaning, namely the forgetting of the original looking in 
its real traditionalisation). Everything is orientated on the last field 
becoming consciousness relating to itself in an internal monologue, 
since, as seems clear, if I speak to myself, I simultaneously hear my-
self, and do not communicate anything to myself. Husserl’s descrip-
tion of the sign pushes to one side its signification and with it its 
materiality. It eliminates the very moment of re-presentation, since 
(Husserl is convinced) consciousness does not need to re-represent 
its experiences to itself, because on the field of consciousness “every 
experience is presently existing”. We relate to the acts of conscious-
ness at the same moment that we experience them. Consciousness 
does not have to make anything known to itself from the power of 
the sign.328 We are in the sphere of pure auto-affection, the outside 
has disappeared inside. 
To put this in Derridean terms: Husserl wants to avoid all “meta-
physical adventures” while at the same time repeating the founding 
gesture of the metaphysical tradition, which is the subordination of 
327 See Bernet, “Differenz und Anwesenheit”.
328 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 60.
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the sign to logo, language to logic (to pure logical grammar). The 
one stands in opposition to the other, each contaminates the other, 
without its being possible to exclude either one or the other. Ideality 
should be able to retain its Bedeutung within the flow of time, even 
to appear as ideality within the stream of consciousness that is the 
internal temporality of life itself (through the operation of ideali-
sation and synthesis in the coverage of the diverse). However, this 
appearance itself implies the exclusion of everything non-identical. 
But it is impossible to exclude the non-identical if we are to speak, 
for instance, of the primary impression. On the other hand, this 
is only “present” for consciousness subsequently (nachträglich), in 
retentional modification and after its materialism has, by virtue of 
being apprehended (something as something) become quality (of 
something as something). The presence of objectivity for conscious-
ness is paid for by the absence of that which, in this manifestation 
as material, is its condition. It is as though we now read two texts 
without being able to decide which of them is the original. Ideality 
is unthinkable without its intersubjective communicability, thanks 
to which it only now becomes the ideal objectivity repeatable in 
its identity and only thus transcends empirical and individual con-
sciousness (see Derrida’s  introduction to Husserl’s  The Origin of 
Geometry). This means genuine ideality is only in the element of 
language, in the order of meaning, i.e. exteriorisation, because its 
ideal being is nothing outside the world. “Sense, being temporal in 
nature, as Husserl recognised, is never simply present; it is always 
already engaged in the ‘movement’ of the trace, that is, in the order 
of ‘signification’. It has always already issued forth from itself into 
the ‘expressive stratum’ of lived experience.”329 
To be more precise: this is not about pitting one text against an-
other. It is about a double text and its internal movement in which 
its beginning, of which there should be only one, eternally returns, 
329 Ibid., pp. 85–86.
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and this return is its trace. This is what Derrida characterises with 
his neologism différance, in which the temporality of the internal 
consciousness of time is transformed. 
 
For the ideality of the form (Form) of presence itself implies that it be infi-
nitely re-peatable, that its re-turn, as a return of the same, is necessary ad 
infinitum and is inscribed in presence itself. It implies that the re-turn is the 
return of a present which will be retained in a finite movement or retention 
and that primordial truth, in the phenomenological sense of the term, is only 
to be found rooted in the finitude of this retention. It is furthermore implied 
that the relation with infinity can be instituted only in the opening of the 
form of presence upon ideality, as the possibility of a re-turn ad infinitum. 
(...) the presence of the present is thought of as arising from the bending-
back of a return, from the movement of repetition, and not the reverse (...), 
bending-back is irreducible in presence or in self-presence (...), this trace 
or différance is always older than presence.330
 
It is no coincidence that Derrida first uses the neologism “diffé-
rance” in his essay “Freud and the scene of writing”331 in reaction 
to structuralist formalism, which pushes to one side the question 
of genesis, i.e. temporality (and the problem of history more gener-
ally). The term was also clearly inspired by Maurice Blanchot’s “lit-
erary experience”: the exterior of language is not outside the text, 
meaning does not precede the work. The basis of literature is that 
it has no basis until the text is interpreted, becomes significant, be-
cause the work escapes into the murmur of speech, its significance, 
which can never be stabilised with final validity, but is forever shift-
ing. The “I” that speaks is flooded from within and without by an 
impersonal voice, writing in the sense of écriture differs from the 
written, etc. However, his reading of Freud led Derrida to a more 
330 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, pp. 67–68.
331 Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, in: Writing and Difference, trans. Alan 
Bass, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 2001.
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radical formulation of the temporality everywhere implied, of time 
before time through identification, escape from the presence, at that 
point where psychoanalysis, in connection with traumatic neurosis 
and repetition compulsion, comes up against “afterwardsness” or 
Nachträglichkeit. In his commentary on Freud, Derrida turns his at-
tention to the central motif of Freud’s later psychoanalysis, i.e. a con-
cept of life in which, confronted by reality, life protects its survival by 
postponing the fulfilment of wishes demanded by the pleasure princi-
ple. However, is not that which establishes the relationship of pleas-
ure to reality, primarily this shift, this postponement (Aufschub)? 
And is not death implied in the very principle of life, inasmuch as 
life cannot resist death otherwise than through an economy of death, 
differentiation (différance), repetition?332 Derrida offers the most 
detailed answer to these questions thirteen years later in the second 
part of La Carte Postale entitled “Spéculer – sur Freud”,333 which 
can be read as one of the clearest demonstrations of the “concept” of 
deconstruction and différance. This again is another extraordinarily 
close reading of Freud, this time his essay Beyond the Pleasure Prin-
ciple. Derrida poses what at first sight seems a simple question: did 
Freud ever arrive at something “outside” the pleasure principle; did 
he ever manage to step “outside” the realm of its control? 
For it is noticeable that whenever Freud in his speculative meta-
theory dares to take a step in the direction of this principle and adds 
another moment or instance to his considerations – the reality prin-
ciple, displacement, transference and countertransference, repeti-
tion compulsion leading to the discovery of the death drive, etc. – he 
opens up a new digression or postponement. And so the process of 
consideration is on the one hand diverted from its direction up until 
that point, and on the other repeatedly returns to older hypotheses 
that must now be corrected, and as a consequence repeats this repeti-
332 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 249.
333 Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London 1987.
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tion again and again. One is forced to conclude that there is nothing 
in this movement (highly reminiscent of the fort/da of little Ernst) 
that returns as identifiable and continually links to its beginning. 
What is even more remarkable is that, when looking back to the 
starting points of psychoanalytic theory, Freud repeatedly re-inter-
prets its foundations (without giving them up), to such an extent that 
the path he is following cannot be distinguished from the deviations 
therefrom. He himself is finally aware that he is actually working 
with an equation “of two unknowns”. Derrida’s deconstruction – or 
to be more precise, the texts that deconstruct themselves in his read-
ing – thus brings to the surface the strange “athetic” structure of 
Freud’s discourse, its “athetic” functioning (Blanchot and Levinas 
would speak of thematisation without theme, a completely elliptical 
construction of an argument), which prevents us from finding any 
last instance in it, “that is to say, any instance whatsoever.”334 
That in turn is to say: any instance of beginning or origin. Der-
rida’s reading of Freud is thus also the transformation of the early 
modern idea of tradition or traditionalisation as a  continual link-
ing up, an idea which persists in part in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
An athetic or elliptical construction of the text ... the movement of 
reference now has nothing from which to deviate from, unless from 
its absenting focal point in the sense of principle or arché. The move-
ment of deferral and transfer of différance dominates. Or perhaps 
destinerrance, another Joycean neologism, which designates the irre-
vocable possibility that a destination specified in advance may never 
be attained, that the original semantic intention is lost in indications 
and references in which only its traces will be retained without its 
ever being possible to restitute or re-present it. This is not a play on 
words but a consequent imagining of the openness to that which is 
arriving as that which cannot be anticipated and integrated with-
out remainder into existing horizons of understanding. It involves 
334 Derrida, The Postcard, p. 261.
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revealing the event or “adventurous” temporality that was, albeit 
everywhere and completely, covered by the Husserlian consciousness 
of time and that means that in his analyses Husserl, too, must return 
at the very moment he wishes to transcend their boundaries. And this 
implies a thinking of history that differs from teleological history, in 
which the primal establishment (Urstiftung) of tradition is supposed 
to be the addressor of a certain aim (telos), and which is supposed to 
branch out and realise itself within history and lead it in “a meaning-
ful, final harmony”335 to the final destination or addressee. 
 
But to every primal establishment (Urstiftung) essentially belongs a final  
establishment (Endstiftung) assigned as a task to the historical process. 
This final establishment is accomplished when the task is brought to con-
summate clarity and thus to an apodictic method which, in every step of 
achievement, is a constant avenue to new steps having the character of 
absolute success, i.e., the character of apodictic steps. At this point phi-
losophy, as an infinite task, would have arrived at its apodictic beginning, 
its horizon of apodictic forward movement.336
 
However, if the original establishment of meaning, like the original 
semantic intention (Bedeutung), does not produce contexts that it 
will have under its control and in which it will be “identified” (i.e. 
interpreted), and if the original task or reference is addressed to 
all of those who will receive, develop and fulfil it, i.e. to all the fu-
ture couriers of this deed of foundation, we cannot avoid conclud-
ing that the recipient or heir will hand over “only the basics”, i.e. 
“underlined, cut out, translated, commented, edited, taught, reset in 
a chosen perspective”,337 constantly replacing the escaping “origin”, 
335 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 73.
336 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 72.
337 Derrida, The Postcard, p. 373. Derrida’s metaphor of postal relations and the postcard or letter 
(in French lettre, i.e. both letter and all “literature”), which is a continuation of what he had already 
analysed in connection with semiology and the sign, is intended to imply that the letter is a letter be-
cause it does not always have to reach the person it is addressed to. One thinks of Laclos’ Dangerous 
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which in traditionalisation in-sists not as instance but as restance-non-
présente,338 as the constant trace of the missing origin that resists 
its actualisation. In this way, the “purposefulness” of transcenden-
tal historicity is transformed into a movement of return, in which, 
however, no-thing identical with itself is returned, but remains the 
movement of the returning of returns. This, too, is différance: the 
differentiation and deferral of the end of that movement, another 
thinking of tradition, another thinking of history, another think-
ing of time, of that whose traces Derrida discovers both in Husserl 
and in Freud’s essay on the pleasure principle, when Freud rejects 
both philosophy and empirical speculation and prefers to speak 
of “speculation”, realising that the very inevitability of the transi-
tion from observation to description, the very transfer of empirical 
givenness into specialist discourse, opens up a realm of problematic 
ambiguity, and that theory is always provisional and therefore neces-
sarily speculative, because it is deprived of the possibility of naming 
the things itself in a  special (to itself) way. Nothing remains but 
for Freud to progress by means of retrospective questioning (Hus-
serl’s Rückfrage, which is now lost), and each step outside ends in-
side in a movement that Derrida calls the movement of expropria-
tion that problematises the value of “one’s own”. Is Freud convinced 
of the accuracy of his speculative hypotheses? “My answer would be 
that I am not convinced myself (...) I do not know how far I believe 
in them.”339 
Liaisons, in which letters drive the action precisely because they do not always reach their intended 
addressee, or arrive in the wrong sequence or late, and their interpretation is difficult because the 
sender is obliged in his next letter to rectify the misunderstandings caused by the previous letter, etc.
338 Cf. in: Derrida, Marges de la philosophie ("Signature, évenément, contexte"): "This structural 
possibility of being severed from its referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its 
context) seems to me to make of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as we have 
seen, the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged "production" or origin. 
And I will extend this law even to all "experience" in general, if it is granted that there is no experi-
ence of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks. Margins, p. 318.




An interest in tradition and traditionalisation that, indirectly, is 
without doubt a response to Husserl’s concept of history and its im-
plied concept of time thus becomes a privileged site of the transfor-
mation of philosophical discourse. This takes the form of the decon-
struction of assumptions regarding the continual temporality of the 
stream of consciousness, and, in the last instance, of horizontality 
as the last framework of synthesising identification. Unlike Husserl, 
Derrida views tradition using the “model” of inheritance and above 
all through the non-evidentiality of that which is traditionalised as 
testament (the legacy is a  very paradoxical “beginning”), since if 
there exists some unity to inheritance, it 
 
can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing (...) one must 
filter, sift, criticise, one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit 
the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion around a se-
cret. If the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, 
if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would never 
have anything to inherit from it. We would be affected by it as by a cause – 
natural or genetic. One always inherits from a secret – which says “read 
me, will you ever be able to do so?” The critical choice called for by any 
reaffirmation of the inheritance is also, like memory itself, the condition of 
finitude. The infinite does not inherit, it does not inherit (from) itself. The 
injunction itself (it always says “choose and decide from among what you 
inherit”) can only be one by dividing itself, tearing itself apart, differing/
deferring itself, by speaking at the same time several times – and in several 
voices.340
 
However, inasmuch as Derrida shows that in the phenomenon of 
the legacy the return to the origin is always a new beginning, the 
340 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Paggy Kamuf, Routledge, New York and London 
1994, p. 18.
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purpose of his considerations is not a polemic with Husserl’s Rück-
frage as the restitution of the original establishment of a  certain 
tradition that deviated from its telos. His (deconstructive) reading 
of texts is not about revealing contradictions, gaps in arguments or 
unsubstantiated assumptions, but rescuing the possibility of another 
way of thinking, traces of which are as clear in these breaches as the 
manifest meanings themselves. Where Husserl attempts to bring an 
idea to a conclusion and give it systematic form, for instance even 
in the form of teleological history explicating in time that which is 
implied in its original establishment, Derrida shows that a  genu-
ine adherence to tradition (the legacy) consists in openness, that 
its time is not a continuity absorbing its own crises, but a continual 
discontinuity of creative reaffirmation, i.e. of productive continua-
tion by the new. In other words, time must be thought from diffé-
rance, from the movement of difference, which is open to the com-
ing of that which is on the point of arrival. Or perhaps: thought is 
there where happening is taking place, it is not ergon, but energeia. 
Retrospective questioning of the origin is always its renewed up-
dating, its establishment anew, which becomes apparent if we link 
traditionalisation with the legacy or the fulfilment of the testament. 
We must therefore do everything we can to receive the legacy (and 
phenomenology itself is a legacy), which is impossible other than by 
means of its reaffirmation, i.e. a decision as to what we deem to be 
alive in it. Confirmation of tradition is both its continuation and its 
interruption, since the heir is a finite being: 
 
If our heritage assigns contradictory tasks to us (to receive and yet to 
choose, to welcome what comes before us and yet to reinterpret it, etc.), 
this is because it is a testimony to our finitude. Only a finite being inherits, 
and his finitude obliges him. It obliges him to receive what is larger and 
older and more powerful and more durable than he. But the same fini-
tude obliges one to choose, to prefer, to sacrifice, to exclude, to let go and 
leave behind. Precisely in order to respond to the call that preceded him, to  
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answer it and to answer for it – in one’s name as in the name of the other. 
One is responsible before what comes before one but also before what is to 
come and therefore before oneself.341 
The paradigm of inheritance is reaffirmation of the Husserlian con-
cept of responsibility. This is a situated response in which the legacy 
is transformed into an event, the interpretation of which compels 
a withdrawal from the existing horizons of understanding. Inherit-
ance is something like the givenness of the gift. However, though 
the word “situatedness” could be read as a reference to Heidegger, 
in this case too it is a completely Derridean acceptance of the tes-
tamentary legacy. This is best illustrated by Derrida’s book Spectres 
of Marx. The framework of responses to the legacy is justice, in the 
name of which I ask the question of how to respond to the legacy of 
rights. However, justice establishes the principle of responsibility 
outside of all present living, I answer to the “phantoms” of those 
who are already dead or have not yet been born, and our present 
is inhabited by these very spectres, who demand that we respect 
them. In this way another temporality of tradition emerges. If we 
ask (thus situated between presently absent spectres, visitors to our 
present) where we want to head, then that which this question is 
driving at also always already precedes it. To put it slightly differ-
ently: the inheritance as a form of givenness is a gift, i.e. basically 
discontinuous time, time that is forever out of joint, outcast, dis-
located, forever exiting continuity, the time of events. Our presence 
is constantly being visited by the other, which means that “There is 
first of all the doubtful contemporaneity of the present to itself”.342 
As gift, the legacy is this task: 
 
341 Jacques Derrida, Elisabeth Roudinesco: For What Tomorrow?, trans. Jeff Fort, Stanford Univer-
sity Press, Stanford 2004.
342 Derrida, Specters, p. 39.
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It remains before us just as unquestionably as we are heirs of Marxism, even 
before wanting or refusing to be, and like all inheritors, we are in mourning 
(...) To be (...) means (...) to inherit. All the questions on the subject of 
being or of what is to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance. There 
is no backward-looking fervour in this reminder, no traditionalist flavour. 
Reaction, reactionary, or reactive are but interpretations of the structure 
of inheritance. That we are heirs does not mean that we have or that we 
receive this or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or 
that, but that the being of what we are is first of all inheritance, whether 
we like it or know it or not. And that, as Hőlderlin said so well, we can only 





Why must the transformation of philosophical discourse be tracked 
in the transformation of the concept of time and temporality? Be-
cause the condition of the possibility of a teleological understand-
ing of history and the meaning guaranteed by history to be trans- 
historical, which is lebendige Gegenwart or living presence, i.e. the 
continuous unity of now and its subsequent retentions and proten-
tions, is unsustainable face to face with real history – the crisis has 
inexorably morphed into catastrophe. The time is out of joint and 
open to the incalculable. Thinking after the Holocaust rewrites 
Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences: the living present is co-
present with the dead and, thus, with the still unborn. The origin 
(Ursprung and Urstiftung) is a legacy, traditionalisation takes place 
as the acceptance of the inheritance, the meaning of which will 
again be decided anew at the moment of its acceptance, because its 
reaffirmation is always a unique response in history. This is not an-
ticipation, but expectation, a receptiveness to that which is forever 
to come and beyond the horizons of expectation not only de facto, 
but de jure. Temporality therefore implies a relationship via irreduc-
ible difference, a relationship to the event, the openness of the inside 
to the outside. As Derrida explains in uncommonly succinct fashion, 
this is because the event,
 
must not be seen arriving. The event is that which arrives; the arrival of 
another as an event is only worthy of the name, i.e. it is an explosive, 
inaugural, singular event, if we do not see it coming. The event that we 
anticipate, that we see arriving and that we predict, is not an event, or 
rather it is an event whose character is neutralised, amortised, withheld 
by anticipation. The experience of an event is a  passive experience, to 
which and, I would say, against which, arrives that which we do not see 
arriving and that is to begin with completely unpredictable, unforesee-
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able; part of what makes an event an event is that it arrives in an utterly 
surprising way, a l’improviste.344
 
This event- (or “adventure”-) time is now inscribed in the identity of 
Europe. It is present, for instance, in Derrida’s Given Time,345 which 
inter alia examines Patočka’s  “European” interpretation of “care 
for the soul”, and in the essay L’autre cap (translated as The Other 
Heading), which can be read as a direct response to Husserl’s legacy 
since its central theme is that “what is still called Europe even if we 
no longer know very well what or who goes by this name”.346 Here, 
too, the transformation of discourse cannot be ignored: culture is 
necessarily special in that it is never identical to itself, it never has 
a single origin, and so any idea of “mono-genealogy” in its history is 
always mystification. The deviation from itself in an identity with it-
self resides in the double bind that a certain tradition must conform 
to: as “Europe” it anticipates something as objective (direction, the 
promise, etc.), though at the same time (as historical tradition) it 
anticipates that this objective is not given either in advance or once 
and for all. At this point we cannot fail to hear a  discreet refer-
ence to how Husserl works with the concept of “idea in the Kantian 
sense”. However, for Derrida this concept already belongs under 
the rubric of analogical logic, for which identity is that which, in 
its direction or aim, transcends the boundary of the empirical and 
is open to the infinite, and inasmuch as it accepts this logic, does so 
with a fundamental reservation: 
 
It is a logic (…) that I do not wish to criticize here. I would even be ready to 
subscribe to it, but with one hand only, for I keep another to write or look for 
344 Jacques Derrida, Penser à ne pas voir. Ecrits sur les arts du visible. Textes réunis et établis par 
Ginette Michaud, Joana Masó et Javier Bassas. Collection Essais, Ed. de la Différence, Paris 2013, 
p. 55.
345 Jacques Derrida, Donner le temps. 1. La fausse monaie. Galilée, Paris 1991.
346 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading, trans. Michael B. Naas, Pascale Anne Brault, Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p. 5.
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something else, perhaps outside Europe. Not only in order to look – in the 
way of research, analysis, knowledge, and philosophy – for what is already 
found outside Europe, but not to close off in advance a border to future, 
to the to-come /à-venir/ of the event, to that which comes /vient/, which 
comes perhaps and perhaps comes from a completely other shore. 347
 
Once again we have a relationship via irreducible difference in-
scribed in temporality. However, this prudent reservation on Der-
rida’s part must be read against the backdrop of the phenomeno-
logical establishment of identity on the basis of the “coverage” of 
(simply) the analogous, i.e. against the backdrop of the world as the 
horizon of all horizons. Genuine openness (and another concept of 
time and history) is guaranteed only by the possibility that the ho-
rizon will be interrupted by something, though this does not imply 
an event that is by definition incompatible with the horizontal struc-
ture of showing and understanding.  
Is this a polemic with Husserl? Absolutely not. Transformation, 
reaffirmation, response, acceptance of the inheritance, the gesture 
of responsibility toward tradition that is not irresponsible because 
it does not abide by a programme given in advance that it would 
simply fulfil, respect for the legacy. The origin is not givenness, but 
a gift. 
 
347 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 69.
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Factually speaking, all of these provocative or seemingly esoteric 
themes in which the legacy of phenomenology is nevertheless con-
stantly reaffirmed are already contained in Derrida’s deconstructive 
reading of the structuralist semiology of the sixties, a reading that is 
a symmetrical counterpart to the problematisation of Husserl’s dif-
ferentiation between sign and indication, inasmuch as in both cases 
Derrida lays emphasis on the irrevocable interplay of presence and 
absence to which the neologism différance he had already devised 
refers, even though in connection with the sign the starting point is 
the Saussurian dictum that language is “a system of differential ele-
ments and not substance”. Whence derives the primordiality or pro-
ductivity of the trace and non-identity: in the system of language the 
value of the sign is defined by its difference from other signs, which 
means that the sign is marked by its presence in the form of absence, 
or by the trace of the other. In other words, the trace is a special “phe-
nomenon”. It must appear in the absence of that which left it (i.e. 
the trace), because otherwise it would not be a trace/sign, which in 
Peirce’s terminology is called index, a pure, uncodified relationship 
(secondness). An example would be the language of semiology as 
Derrida works with it in his analysis of Austin’s and Searle’s theory 
of speech acts. Every sign must be capable of being cited, i.e. “it can 
break with every given context, and engender infinitely new con-
texts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion”, because it has no valid-
ity outside (independent) of context. Therefore, there exist “only 
contexts without any centre or absolute anchoring”. Citationality is 
not a random property, since what “would a mark be that could not 
be cited? And whose origin could not be lost on the way?”348
348 Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context”, in: Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
Alan Bass, The Harvester Press, The University of Chicago 1982, pp. 320 and 321. 
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Inasmuch as Derrida on the one hand reveals the ellipticity or 
atheticity of various texts (see Freud’s  essay Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle),349 while on the other hand himself writing such texts, 
his strategy is clearly already pointing to the deconstruction of the 
semiological concept of the sign. It is also hinting at a broader con-
text: here, now, is the source of his mistrust of “centralisation” or 
the “original (primal) establishment” (Urstiftung). It is also worth 
noting that, in connection with his analysis of the concept of the 
sign (as the inheritance of modern philosophy, the metaphysical 
primacy of presence and the concept of temporality deriving there-
from), he cites Levinas’s “past that has never been present”.350 And 
so we are not so far from the late books, which circle the phenom-
enon of the gift and the secret. This is why we already find neolo-
gism being used as a way of pointing to that which is absent without 
betraying that which resists appearance: the restance non présente 
already referred to, a way of denoting that which maintains in the 
phenomenon a resistance to becoming present and insists on its own 
disappearance.351 To put it another way, the concept restance lays an 
emphasis on that which cannot be expressed within the framework 
of a theory of presence, a theory of identity, or within the framework 
of an interpretation of time that priorities the determination of 
permanence, succession and coexistence. In relation to texts, then, 
deconstruction shows that there always remains a certain trace of 
that which was subject to deconstruction and that a deconstructive 
reading “educes” without actualising (whence the link between the 
secret and the gift, the possibility of understanding deconstruction 
as a response to tradition, etc.). Each reading points to a certain re-
mainder (reste), which resists its own dissolution and leaves a trace. 
This is why there cannot be any talk of re-presentation in the sense 
of a new presence, since the trace is never able to restore and resti-
349 See “Ellipsis”, in: Derrida, Writing and Difference.
350 Derrida, "Différance", in: Margins of Philosophy, p. 21.
351 Derrida, “Signature événement contexte”, ibid., p. 318.
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tute that which is a trace, namely restance non présente. Resistance 
as a mode of showing. 
It is no coincidence that at the start of Of Grammatology Derrida 
cites Peirce’s description of an “infinite semiosis”, which precedes 
not only the connection between sign and trace, but also that res-
tance that does not allow the process of signification (thinking) 
to find closure and is the irreducibly absenting base (knowledge, 
meaning, the present of that which is shown). In addition, it is the 
trace of another project of modernity in modern thinking itself. 
The thinking of Peirce, as Derrida perhaps felt when he welcomed 
him as an ally in the deconstruction of structuralist semiology, can-
not be reduced to his theory and classification of signs. It has its 
assumptions and consequences. Its assumptions are perhaps most 
cogently formulated in two published articles: “The Fixation of Be-
lief” (1987) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). On the one 
hand, Peirce claims that it is necessary that the cause of our convic-
tion (belief, but also knowledge) be something exterior, completely 
independent of us (an “external permanency”), and this means that 
reality shows itself to us exclusively by virtue of its resistance to cog-
nition. And on the other hand, he says that knowledge has no begin-
ning, since anyone who makes an effort to cognise is burdened by 
the mass of the already known, i.e. that regarding which there has 
(until now) been no doubt. For this reason cognition takes place 
in the form of the passage from one conviction (belief as habit) to 
another, and we are obliged to acquire this new habit by a sudden 
doubt regarding our existing knowledge. Life gradually leads us to 
new convictions and gives us the strength to question old beliefs. 
Derrida and Deleuze sometimes use the slightly strange phrase 
“transcendental empiricism”, and it would be possible to apply this 
term to Peirce’s  philosophy, since to the question of how reality 
shows itself we would look to the close links between the theory of 
meaning, concept and thinking and the theory of the sign. Real-
ity makes its presence felt there where it resists expectations or 
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hypotheses and it is in this way that it is able to repeatedly disrupt 
our habits. However, we can encounter this resistance on the part 
of reality only when we act, i.e. we experiment. On the other hand, 
it is clear that this resistance is not a message regarding the prop-
erties of the resisting, but simply obliges us to think, to change 
our conduct, modify our image of the world, experiment in our 
thoughts and practice. As far as Peirce is concerned we relate to 
reality that gives itself to us in its denial, via irreducible difference. 
And this returns in his theory of endless semiosis and his under-
standing of the sign. 
One of his definitions, the one cited by Derrida, reads in full as 
follows: 
 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, 
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons 
and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed na-
ture; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new 
symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols 
that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once 
in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning 
grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very differ-
ent meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. The symbol 
may, with Emerson’s sphinx, say to man, ‘Of thine eye I am eyebeam.’352
 
Derrida cites this passage from Chapter III (Section 3 “The Char-
acter of Symbols”) of Peirce’s  unpublished Speculative Grammar 
in order to demonstrate just what is implied in the concept of the 
symbol. Beneath the “game” of symbols there is no other level to 
which it would be possible to gain immediate access, for instance 
352 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Ch.S. Peirce, I-VI ed. Ch. Harsthorne and P. Weis. 
Harvard U.P., Cambridge Mass. 1931–35; VII-VIII ed. A.W. Burks, Harvard U.P., Cambridge Mass. 
1958, here 2.302. Cited from Jacques Derrida: De la Grammatologie, Ed. de Minuit, Paris 1967, 
p. 70.
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a phenomenological opinion of the thing itself, since the meaning 
of the symbol is not “motivated” naturally but by the system of lan-
guage. However, if we examine Peirce’s  comprehensive theory of 
signs in more detail, we soon discover that we can find harbingers 
in it of what would only arrive a hundred years later, and not only 
in Derrida’s texts. It is perhaps therefore easier to understand why 
later on the phenomenon of the gift, secrecy, non-identity and non-
foundedness play such a role, i.e. a relationship via irreducible differ-
ence or the ineradicable traces of the outside inside and the method 
by which that which escapes the phenomenon and reveals itself only 
in this escape from the present shows itself. For instance, the “gift” 
is closely related to that which Derrida takes to be the movement of 
supplementarity and to the paradoxical temporality by which this 
movement appears. Time must be understood as that which gives 
(differentiation) and immediately takes, since it postpones until lat-
er – it is this that is différance. However, we are now close to endless 
semiosis: the interpreter “supplements” the symbol, but by revealing 
one aspect he postpones the revelation of others to later. This has 
been described very accurately by François-David Sebbah: 
 
all operations of ‘saying’ are intercalated between us and the thing itself, 
deferring it; but it thus gives, since givenness occurs only in concealing. 
The text, which Husserl calls a spiritual object, is spirit in the sense of the 
phantomic, is fundamentally a phantomic object, a mixture of presence and 
non-presence, given in the very refusal of givenness. The text itself, an un-
reimbursable debt constituted by the infinite delay of what it speaks about, 
as a result lacks generosity, transferring the debt to the receiver – and this 
is therefore what it gives: debt. In a sense, if we can speak of total pres-
ence while still recognising that it is not total presence; if we can speak of 
ghosts – that is, to let them speak, or to let them speak in us – this is in 
order to retain a little of what is lost to and in them if they are nothing but 
their escape, their flight, and thus to recognise them as such. Is not allow-
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ing to escape that which remains, fully itself in its escape, to be given it, as 
such? What remains is a trace.353
 
The link between semiotics and the phenomenological concept of 
showing and appearing is most apparent when Peirce specifies an 
infinite semiosis in relation to the fundamentally traditional charac-
ter of the sign. 
 
A Sign or Representant is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to the Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining 
a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the triadic relation to its Object in 
which it stands itself to the same Object.354
 
However, we must keep in mind the fact that for Peirce every 
thought is a sign inasmuch as the sign mediates between its object, 
which it is supposed to specify and whose cause it is supposed in 
some sense to be, and the meaning. The object and interpretant are 
two correlates of every sign: “the object is the antecedent, the inter-
pretant the consequent of the sign.” (MS. 318) This is obviously not 
a description of a static structure, for instance because of the need 
to show how new, hitherto unknown things might emerge, i.e. that 
it is a dynamic, open structure, and so we must clarify still further 
what is meant by the word sign. 
 
Since a sign is not identical with the thing signified, but differs from the 
latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characteristics which 
belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function.
 
That is to say: 
 
353 François-David Sebbah, Testing the Limit: Henry, Levinas, and the Phenomenological Tradition, 
Stanford UP, Stanford 2012, p. 101.
354 Peirce, Collected papers, 2.274.
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Now a sign has, as such, three references: first, it is a sign to some thought 
which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that 
thought it is equivalent, third, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which 
brings it into connection with its object.355
 
If the sign is not identical with the thing signified, it is impossible 
to close the process, and in semiotics something is opened that 
Derrida (as far back as Grammatology) calls the movement of sup-
plementarity: the supplement (Peirce would probably use the word 
interpretant) gives a certain text something in addition. However, 
we are equally entitled to say that it supplements that which is miss-
ing in the text inasmuch as the supplement is both inside and out-
side. This is a  relatively accurate description of Husserl’s  aporia: 
when, for example, he takes written discourse as a supplement of 
speech but does not concede that he could add to the spoken word 
that which it lacks. If understood in this way, it is a threat to imme-
diacy and causes crisis. In hindsight, however, from the perspective 
of the transformation of philosophical discourse, we can say that the 
irreducibility of the supplement, its productivity, had already been 
described by Peirce in connection with the endlessness of the semi-
otic process.  
Here we need a more detailed description of this process: 
 
I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the 
latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the In-
terpreter. But it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects and 
more than two interpretants. We have to distinguish the Immediate Object, 
which is the Object as the sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus 
dependent upon the representation of it in the Sign from the Dynamical 
Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine 
the Sign to its Representation. In regard to the Interpretant we have equally 
355 Ibid., 5.287 and 5.283.
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to distinguish, in the first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the 
interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, 
and is ordinarily called the meaning of the sign; while in the second place, 
we have to take note of the Dynamical Interpretant which is the actual ef-
fect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines. Finally there is what I pro-
visionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which 
the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object. I confess that 
my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist. 
(…) Thus the division into Icons, Indices, and Symbols depends upon the 
different possible relations of a Sign to its Dynamical Object.356
 
Firstly, as opposed to Saussurean semiotics, here there is no men-
tion of a code. The interpretant is an iconic relationship (or duality 
in Peirce’s ontology: the “code” is a related interpretant for which 
the first interpretant is a new sign.) 
Secondly, the relationship of the sign to its object is necessarily 
mediated by the relationship of the sign to the interpretant, without 
which there is no sign. The interpretant is itself a  sign. Meaning 
resides exclusively in the relationship between signs that, however, 
do not belong to a system but are encountered during the process 
of understanding – “interpreting” in the strictest sense of the word, 
which is more and more robust the less it is restricted to simple rep-
etition or synonymic substitution, since it is a new formulation from 
another point of view. Anything that arouses our interest in what-
ever way is therefore a Peircean sign. (It does not have to be inter-
preted: it suffices if I perceive it as interpretable. I feel that it would 
be necessary to exert some effort in order to get to know it, though 
the word effort in itself implies resistance on the side of the “giving” 
object. Resistance is implied wherever there is a sign.) Understand-
ing is always risky, since it is not guaranteed but “real” by means of 
resistance, which obliges us to abandon existing knowledge and seek 
356 Ibid., 4.536.
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another way of understanding. The interpretant is above all a  re-
sponse to the event of an encounter (Deleuze: the encounter with the 
sign obliges us to think). The relationship of the sign to its object is 
mediated by the relationship between the sign and the interpretant. 
Meaning does not reside and is not implied in the sign, but is found 
(looked for) in the relationship between signs. And in the case of 
Peirce this is intended to illuminate more closely the differentiation 
between the immediate and the dynamical object. 
We might simplify this difference using a trivial example. I am 
looking at an object that someone is holding in their hand and the 
word “book” crosses my mind (it is immaterial whether this is but 
a thought or spoken out loud). That which I see is a completely sin-
gular object. However, as soon as it occurs to me or say out loud the 
word “book”, the object is classified within a certain group of similar 
things, by means of which I interpret the thing as a “book” and thus 
generalise by means of the meaning “book”. I indicate it by means 
of a general meaning. “A sign, or representamen, is something which 
stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.”357 
The object that “determined” that I  denote it is now represented 
by a certain interpretant. It is an “immediate object”, though the 
potentially endless series of other interpretants linked to this first 
finds its basis in what Peirce calls the “dynamical object”. In other 
words, the dynamical object is something that is constantly revealed 
by virtue of escaping from its appearance (the immediate object).  
In a letter to William James, Peirce writes: 
 
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, – i.e. the Object as 
represented in the sign, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object 
is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather 
the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot 
express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by 
357 Ibid., 2.228.
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collateral experience. For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but 
I can’t make my companion know what I mean, if he can’t see it, or if seeing 
it, it does not, to his mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in 
the field of vision.358
 
This is why in an essay entitled Four Incapacities Peirce writes that 
every previous thought insinuates the thought that follows it, it is 
a sign of something for it. The following thought denotes that which 
was meant in the previous thought. It would be difficult to express 
Derrida’s movement of supplementarity better. The interpretant is 
neither outside or inside, the dynamical object is both part of the 
endless semiosis and outside it, because the interpretant relates to it 
via irreducible difference, seals it and unseals it (as Derrida will go 
on to say in texts in which he explores the phenomenon of secrecy 
and the gift, the trace and the ellipsis), reveals it in its resistance to 
being revealed and in this way retains its uniqueness. The dynamical 





Husserl works on the assumption that, if it is to be possible to treat 
Europe as a certain kind of “spiritual formation”, then it must have 
its identity, the identity of tradition, history and meaning. For this 
reason it must acquire its identity from its (specific) telos as ob-
jective and task in light of which it is an identifiable whole, even 
though this whole is not givenness but directed movement. It is not 
defined in relation to the other, but by the elimination of the other. 
However, Derrida intervenes at this point: if Europe is to be part of 
real history (history de facto), this telos cannot be given a priori and 
forever; if it has such a telos, then it is only that which is manifest in 
history and its peripeteias or vicissitudes. If Europe is not to disap-
pear in these peripeteias, its tradition must reside in the possibility 
of diverging from this tradition. A double bind. If Europe is to have 
its own identity, it must be equal to itself and to the other, unless 
tradition is to be same as the fulfilment of a programme. However, 
Husserl’s concept of responsibility is both a sign of the fact that he 
was aware of this double bind and that he attempted to neutralise it.
The project of modernity, whose direct heir is Husserl, links 
Adorno, Levinas, Lyotard and Derrida with the figure of the Ho-
meric Odysseus. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Hork-
heimer write that Odysseus is a hero who loses himself simply in 
order to find himself anew. He plunges into peril not in order to 
expose himself to the risk of becoming lost, but in order to prove to 
himself his ability never to lose sight of his objective. Odysseus is the 
story of a return, the overcoming of obstacles (the crisis) that pre-
vent a return to the origin. Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences 
reads the history of Europe in the same way: as an odyssey of the Eu-
ropean spirit. The Odyssey is a story of the identity of the beginning 
and end in which an encounter with the outside represents a con-
frontation with a randomness that is indifferent to the beginning 
and end. This exterior, Levinas says, is always neutralised as soon as 
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it is grasped rationally. In fact, Odysseus is still travelling around his 
island, and in the world through which he wanders he encounters 
himself everywhere. Levinas projects the economy of exchange into 
Odysseus’s travels (whence to Derrida, who places the non-economy 
of the gift in opposition to the economy of exchange), and when he 
speaks of the relationship “face to face” he describes it as a relation-
ship in which the “I”, on the contrary, rids itself of being closed 
within itself, of that existence in which all adventures are simply an 
“odyssey”, i.e. a return to the island.359 It is this Odyssean nostalgia 
that afflicts traditional (Western) metaphysics. However, the move-
ment towards the Other can never be a return to the same. I must 
give up the attempt to be a contemporary of the completion of my 
work. Lyotard adds that Odysseus lives in a world in which there is 
no such human being that would arrive “from elsewhere and from 
behind”360, i.e. in a world that is not marked by the experience of 
exile. “To the myth of Ulysses return to Ithaca,” he writes in one of 
the essays completing his interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger, 
“we would prefer to oppose the story of Abraham leaving his coun-
try forever for an as yet unknown land, and forbidding his servant to 
take back even his son to the point of departure.”361 
The break by which the transformation of philosophical discourse 
is marked could hardly be more striking. 
“By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a  place 
which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he 
went out, not knowing whither he went.” (Hebrews 11.8)  
 
Now the Lord had said unto Abram, “Get thee out of thy country, and from 
thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will shew thee.” 
(Genesis 12.1 King James Version)
359 Emmanuel Levinas, Alterité et transcendence, Fata Morgana, Paris 1995, p. 72.
360 Jean François Lyotard, “Return upon the Return”, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ 
1993, p. 192.
361 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other”, Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (Sept. 1963), p. 610.
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As Levinas writes in one of the texts commenting upon the Talmud, 
Abraham represents a “miracle of time”, i.e. time as openness to that 
which is arriving and which it is forbidden to imagine according to 
the past and memory,since it transcends all of this,362 time which is 
(already) liquidating human history, as Walter Benjamin would say. 
For this reason praise is due to those who wait without anticipating, 
i.e. without attempting to identify the future, and who thus differ 
from the prophets, because the latter are capable of foreseeing only 
events in historical time. Levinas’s commentary is, moreover, very 
characteristically set within a concrete situation, within the present. 
The unimaginability of that which is on the point of arriving is an-
nounced by unimaginable horrors and inhumane trials – the Holo-
caust, Hitler’s and Stalin’s concentration camps, borne witness to in 
the novel by Vasily Grossman Life and Fate, which Levinas quotes 
extensively. 
Abraham changes the situation, and much of that which during 
the 1930s and 40s is only hinted at finds expression once again. Thus, 
for example, Adorno’s final aphorism from Minima Moralia is more 
understandable in light of this event-time. In its last sentence it sus-
pends its base and is a performative demonstration of the thesis that 
the whole is untrue: “... the question concerning the reality or non-
reality of redemption is, however, almost inconsequential.” After the 
Holocaust there is nothing for it but to remind ourselves of the idea 
of redemption. And yet this idea has become highly problematic: the 
double bind. If it is still possible to think history, then it is not with-
in the framework of a  type of understanding that traces its roots 
back to modern, enlightened rationality. To look at things as they 
would be revealed from the perspective of redemption means forget-
ting them as we know them and proceeding from the inside (the 
Bannkreis des Daseins, the vicious circle of relations and existence 
within them) and finding the peace without. It means understanding 
362 Emmanuel Levinas, A l’heure des nations, Ed. de Minuit, Paris 1988, p. 48.
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history from the perspective of exile, i.e. as radical openness in rela-
tion to the “home” that is not given by the original foundation, but 
is a home where nobody is or ever has been. Derrida’s différance, dif-
ference as articulating deferral, but at the same time an extremely 
significant intellectual operation: the reading of the “thesis” under 
erasure. Presence together with absence, a  relationship via differ-
ence, ellipse, undecidability between outside and inside, because 
thinking must remain prepared for that which is on the point of ar-
riving and be thus within itself turned to the outside (though not its 
own), the unidentifiable. If Levinas wants these most remote things 
to be the rule of all present days, it is impossible in this exchange 
not to hear a remote echo of Kracauer’s patient waiting watchfully 
for the last things before the last, the non-anticipation of the “wait-
ing”, whose time is “hesitant openness”. And it is impossible not to 
observe that the thinker of exodus is Maurice Blanchot, who, in an 
essay dedicated to Robert Antelme and his testimony regarding the 
concentration camps, understands exile as true movement, because 
it is the movement of the nomad who knows that “to go out (to step 
outside) is the exigency from which one cannot escape if one wants 
to maintain the possibility of a  just relation.”363 Hence impatient 
anticipation, an identification of the future on the basis of the past, 
is, as Kafka knew,  
 
an essential fault, because it misconstrues the very trueness of error which, 
like a  law, requires that one never believe the goal is close or that one is 
coming nearer to it. One must never have done with the indefinite; one 
must never grasp – as if it were the immediate, the already present – the 
profundity of inexhaustible absence. (...) is impatience which makes the goal 
inaccessible by substituting for it the proximity of an intermediary figure. It 
is impatience that destroys the way toward the goal by preventing us from 
recognising in the intermediary the figure of the immediate.364
363 Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 125.
364 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, pp. 79 and 80.
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The interpretation of temporality, which is based not on flow and 
continuity, but on the event, and therefore emphasises discontinuity 
and heterogeneity, can be understand both as the terrain on which 
it becomes a clearly intelligible transformation of philosophical dis-
course generating new “concepts” (in inverted commas because af-
ter Adorno even the status of the concept has become problematic, 
to say the least, and differently defined after Deleuze) and their spe-
cific constellation within such a transformed philosophy, and a field 
allowing for the actualisation of another project of modernity whose 
traces have been hidden until now in modern thinking. This proves 
in an almost self-referential way the now virtually general belief that 
presence is not present itself, either because (as Derrida shows) it 
is always being visited by ghosts and that responsibility for an in-
heritance is not the reproduction of the origin but its re-production, 
which in tradition establishes a new starting point, as it were, or 
because it is open to the outside, to that which is forever on the point 
of arriving. If we were then to combine Derrida’s ghosts or spec-
tres from Spectres of Marx with his neologistic locution restance non 
présente (see above), i.e. with a past that was never present and that 
is, to simplify matters, a trace of escape or a trace of the unrealised, 
then this would be an “instance” that turns to us in every “now” and 
requires us to bear witness to it in our response. Here there can be 
no talk of the continuity of Husserl’s “living present” as the flow of 
retentions constantly linked via the present moment to protention, 
even though Husserl’s  phenomenon of crisis could be considered 
as one of the junctions of this transformation. Time is open to the 
“other” in both directions, i.e. to the incalculable past that can at 
any time irrupt into the present “now”. However, this is another 
example of actualisation, since we can encounter this concept of 
time as far back as Walter Benjamin, above all in his emphasis on 
the operation of “remembrance” (Eingedenken), partly inspired by 
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Proust’s mémoire involontaire and inspiring in its turn Adorno, who, 
for instance, in Minima moralia, writes: “No other hope is left to 
the past than that, exposed defencelessly to disaster, it shall emerge 
from it as something different.”365Adorno also speaks of the neces-
sity of remembering the suffering that is sedimented in concepts.366
To formulate this radically: time is for Benjamin something that 
only has meaning via history because primarily it is not a dimension 
of that which was but that which is not yet and perhaps never will 
be. Perhaps a key to understanding this idea is what he says in Sec-
tion II from On the Concept of History regarding happiness, namely 
that our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image 
of redemption. Adorno’s aphorism “Zu Ende” from Minima Mora-
lia suggests how this Messianism was understood by his contempo-
raries (and how it would later be understood by Derrida). This then 
ties in to what immediately follows: 
 
The past carries a secret index with it (führt mit sich einen zeitlichen In-
dex), by which it is referred to redemption... If so, then there is a secret 
protocol between the generations of the past and that of our own. For we 
have been expected upon this earth.367
 
Happiness points to redemption (and thus to another time), because 
on the one hand it is something that, though possible in the past, 
was wasted by us, and on the other it is precisely in this knowledge 
of its wastage that hope is maintained that it will be attained in 
some “other time” as a still genuine possibility. Time is almost by 
definition the time of missed opportunities that are not part of that 
series of events as presented by traditional history.368 
365 Adorno, Minima moralia, p. 167.
366 Adorno, Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, GS 5, p. 47.
367 Benjamin, Selected Writings 4, p. 390.
368 Cf. Werner Hamacher, “’Now’: Walter Benjamin on Historical Time.“ In: Heidrun Friese (ed.), 
The Moment. Time and Rupture in Modern Thought, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2001, 
pp. 161–196.
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If we were to transfer Benjamin’s  idea of happiness into think-
ing after the Holocaust, the result would in all likelihood be that 
which Derrida understands as justice, which, as he himself says, is 
undeconstructible.369 Or as he also says: deconstruction is justice. 
Throughout his many riffs on this theme, the following argumenta-
tion always returns: the law prescribes, and this means that a deci-
sion in accordance with the law (not only in the positivist sense 
of the word) reduces the moment of personal responsibility for the 
decision, the moment of personal guarantee. Derrida invokes Mon-
taigne and Pascal, both of whom claim that anyone who obeys the 
law simply because it is the law is not obeying it as they should. 
If a decision is to be just in the sense of justice, then in the act by 
which it takes place it must both be subject to the rule (it cannot be 
arbitrary or random) and at the same time must be outside of the 
rule, since the situation in which a decision must be taken is always 
unique, every case is sui generis (no two are identical, they do not 
“coincide” with each other) and requires a  unique interpretation 
which, for this reason – without it being purely arbitrary – cannot 
be guaranteed by any of the existing (past and present) rules. And 
yet as a decision that seeks to be true to the idea of justice, it can-
not be without any relation to the law. “(O)ne cannot speak directly 
about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is just’ and 
even less ‘I am just’.”370 Therefore justice can never be thought of as 
something realised: not in the past, present or historical future. In 
this sense a just decision would be an answer to a unique situation. 
When Derrida says that no first principle is the first, he also has in 
mind this critical situation and at the same time overturns the idea 
of the “principle of all principles” on which Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy is based. These are not simple aporia, but elliptical formulations: 
369 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law. The Metaphysical Foundation of Authority”, in: Drucila Cornell 
et al. (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Routledge, London 1992, p. 15.
370 Ibid., p. 10.
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I  cannot thematise justice by uttering the sentence “this is just”, 
because in doing so I deny its idea. 
Similarly, in the case of Benjamin happiness is knowable only 
through its absence; we know of happiness because we perceive it 
as a possibility that has passed us by. And this knowledge then casts 
another light on history: every possibility that was missed in the past 
remains an opportunity for the future precisely because it has not 
encountered its fulfilment. The past has a future, and it has this fu-
ture inasmuch as that which was missed seeks its realisation from 
a different “now” to that in which it was missed. This is undoubtedly 
the point to draw attention to the introductory sentence of Ador-
no’s Negative Dialectic: “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, 
lives on because the moment to realise it was missed.”371 
The true dimension of history is the past’s address to our “now”: 
“we were expected”. 
It is to the expectation of the unnamed and lost in the history of 
progress, which Benjamin identifies with catastrophe in Section IX 
of Theses on the Philosophy of History, that the concept of remem-
brance (Eingedenken) corresponds, a  remembrance in which the 
past first understands itself in the correct way, i.e. with regard to jus-
tice. It is via remembrance that the dimension of history is opened 
in which there is space for every singularity and in which the past is 
saved because its unique meaning returns to it, as opposed to histori-
cism, which “contents itself with establishing a causal connection 
between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is 
for that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, as 
it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands 
of years.” (XVIII A). The true meaning of the unique event or fate 
is not given by its identification in respect of some whole or “grand 
narrative”, as Lyotard would go on to call it. In other words, the 
measure of history is justice, which must do justice to that which is 
371 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 3.
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for historicism qua the non-identifiable outside the history of prog-
ress qua historical norms, and because it is inadmissible that we 
justify the present in the name of those who were eliminated from 
history. That which is irredeemable in history (as it is understood 
by historicism) can therefore only be saved in another dimension of 
time. The historian of historicism empathises with the victor (VII). 
Translated into the language of Derridean deconstruction, it is only 
under the erasure of the history of the victors that the history of 
their victims becomes intelligible. 
For Benjamin, that which fractures the continuity of the history 
of progress (which is in its own way teleological history) is the “dia-
lectical image”: 
 
It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is pres-
ent its light on the past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, im-
age is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the 
past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to 
the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. – 
Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic); and the 
place where one encounters them is language. The read image, by which is 
meant the image in the Now of recognisability, bears to the highest degree 
the stamp of the critical, dangerous moment which is at the basis of all 
reading. Awakening.
(...)
Every present is determined by those images which are synchronic with it: 
each “now” is the “now” of a particular recognizability.372
 
Remembrance is an act capable of bringing to light that which should 
be preserved from past events or destinies. In the act of remem-
brance, the present is unexpectedly (an “awakening”) connected 
372 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, The Belk-
nap Press, Cambridge 1999, pp. 462–463.
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to the past (the past that awaits it) and is capable of illuminating 
the singularity of the singular, which only possesses its own pur-
pose if there is within it a clear claim to a vindication other than 
that which the time of historicism offers it. This “tiger’s leap” from 
the past to the here and now creates a completely specific constella-
tion and averts the threat of an irretrievable image of the past that 
threatens to disappear “in any present that does not recognize itself 
as intended in that image” (V.). The constellation is something like 
a complex symbol (image, graph or mosaic) of an indexical nature. 
It indicates without discouraging the indicated. In the “Epistemo-
Critical Prologue” to The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin 
has similar things to say about truth. “(...) truth is not a process 
of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which does 
justice to it”,373 and thus far his Theses link up to his concept of the 
“idea”, which appears only when various fragments of the past find 
themselves in the correct arrangement. A simpler form of this idea 
would be Adorno’s Vexierbild or picture puzzle. However, if thinking 
in constellations replaces thinking in concepts, this does not entail 
an abandonment of the concept, but its re-construction. Along with 
Gilles Deleuze we might say that the concept is a  certain organi-
sation of components and gives them their coexistence. As such, 
a completely specific organisation of moments refers to a problem 
for which it is the response.374 
Benjamin’s conception of history clearly foreshadows themes that 
will characterise the philosophical discourse transformed by the 
event of the Holocaust, whether this be in Derrida’s texts (secrecy, 
the heterogeneity of time, justice), Lyotard’s differend (the problem 
of the suffering of the individual), or in the work of other writers. 
His “Messianism” refers to a relationship through irrevocable dif-
373 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, Verso, London, 
New York 1998, p. 31.
374 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell, Columbia University Press, New York 1994, ch. 1 “What is a concept?”, esp. p. 16.
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ference, and his concept of the constellation or dialectical image 
already implies a turn to showing that which escapes in the act of es-
caping: “The dialectical image is an image that flashes up. The image 
of what has been – in this case, the image of Baudelaire – must be 
caught in this way, flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The 
redemption enacted in this way, and solely in this way, is won only 
against the perception of what is being irredeemably lost.”375And if 
we recall Derrida’s reading of Freud, we cannot overlook the sec-
tion from the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” where Benjamin char-
acterises his preferred form of writing. What is characteristic of the 
treatise is the fact that “A writer must stop and restart with every 
new sentence.”376 
It is for this reason that the return to Benjamin’s  Theses (and 
Arcades) is at the same time an entry into thinking of the latter 
half of the twentieth century, or a sign of which this thinking is the 
interpretant. Take one example from Derrida’s Spectres of Marx as 
proof: 
 
If I  am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and 
generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others 
who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside 
use, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, 
where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and 
where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights. It 
is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from 
the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems 
possible and thinkable and just that does not recognise in its principle the 
respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not 
yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. No 
justice – let us not say no law and once again we are not speaking here of 
laws – seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsi-
375 Benjamin, Selected Writings 4, pp. 183–184.
376 Benjamin, The Origin, p. 29.
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bility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, 
before the ghosts, of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, 
be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, rac-
ist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the op-
pressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism.377
 
Above all, however, the Theses on the Philosophy of History are con-
cerned with the phenomena of crisis and catastrophe.378 Benjamin 
probably began working on the Theses in 1938 and intended them 
to form the theoretical framework of a book he was preparing on 
Baudelaire. However, progress on the work was shattered by the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact signed on 23 September 1939 between 
Hitler and Stalin. In a letter to Gershom Scholem, Soma Morgenstern 
writes that reports of this event caused Benjamin an “incurable 
wound”. Benjamin’s response to this crisis is clear in the Theses them-
selves, for instance when he writes of the “moment when the politi-
cians in whom the opponents of Fascism had placed their hopes are 
prostrate and confirm their defeat by betraying their own cause.” (X) 
His Theses now found themselves in a new situation and the concept 
of remembrance acquired a new dimension (“a memory ... flashes up 
at a moment of danger”), and the text a new independence. Benjamin 
continued working until the final weeks prior to his suicide on the 
Spanish border on 26 September 1940. If remembrance is an act that 
“leads the past to bring the present into a critical state”,379 then it is 
now clear that a crisis is essential if the time of historicism, the time 
377 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, p. xix.
378 The Theses exist in seven different versions, including a  French translation, of which none 
can be regarded as definitive. They were first printed in a mimeographed booklet entitled Walter 
Benjamin zum Gedächtnis (In Memory of Walter Benjamin) by the Institute in its American exile in 
1942. The title fluctuates around “On the Concept of History” (“Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, 
“Geschichtsphilosophische Reflexionen” and “Geschitsphilosophische Thesen”). A detailed analysis 
of the genesis, variants and notes is to be found in the 19th volume of Kritische Gesamtausgabe: 
Walter Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, ed. Gérard Raulet, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 
2010.
379 Benjamin, Selected Writings 4, p. 184.
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of the victors, is to be fractured. However, all of this was only illumi-
nated by the catastrophe that Benjamin presciently intuited from its 
first symptoms. “The concept of progress must be grounded in the 
idea of the catastrophe,” he wrote in his study of Baudelaire’s Cen-




Ghosts reveal time to be anachronistic. They are with us as both 
behind us and before us, and as that which fixes its gaze upon us: 
we are expected. When Derrida says that “it is necessary to do ev-
erything to appropriate a past even though we know that it remains 
fundamentally inappropriable”,380 this is the credo of Jacques Der-
rida as heir to a  long philosophical tradition. However, this credo 
is also a philosophical response to a recent past that expected this 
response. If it is the case that the concept of responsibility makes 
no sense outside of the experience of inheritance,381 then it is also 
the case that our relationship to the past and our response to the 
past are always situated in real history. And that to which a response 
must be given in the second half of the twentieth century, in “the 
calm that settles after all hope has died”, as Hannah Arendt puts 
it in the preface to Elements and Origins of Totalitarianism,382 is 
this manifestation of bare life, i.e. to the ghosts, which at present 
take the form of the “Musulman” (“deathly pale, exhausted zom-
bies that trudged weakly only a few centimetres from a fatal dose of 
phenol”383) and the “drowned”.
Bare life, la nuda vita, is Giorgio Agamben’s answer to the ques-
tion implied by the title of Primo Levi’s If This is a Man. It is a re-
sponse that concretises the claim made by Michel Foucault that 
forms the foundation of his concept of “biopower”: “modern man 
is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question”.384 It is a provocative answer, since according to Agamben 
380 Jacques Derrida, De quoi demain... Dialogue, Libraire Arthème Fayard et Galilée, Paris 2001, 
p 12.
381 Cf. ibid., p. 13.
382 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace, San Diego, New York, London 
1973, p. vii.
383 Rudolf Vrba, 44070 – The Conspiracy of the Twentieth Century, Star & Cross, Washington 
1989; I Escaped from Auschwitz, Robson Books, London 1964.
384 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. The History of Sexuality 1, trans. Robert Hurley, Pan-
theon Books, New York, p. 143.
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the biopolitical paradigm of the modern era is the extermination 
camp as a place in which the most terrible conditio inhumana the 
world has ever seen became reality. When he says, however, that the 
subterranean river of biopolitics only gushed to the surface in the 
twentieth century, but otherwise ran its course in a hidden but con-
tinuous fashion, he is closer to Hannah Arendt, who in the preface 
to the first edition of Elements and Origins of Totalitarianism speaks 
of the concealed tendency of the history of the West, which spilled 
over its manifest tradition in the twentieth century. The interpreta-
tion of the concept of “bare life” must therefore return to the an-
cient distinction between bios and zoé, where bios is a concrete form 
or way of life (belonging to the public sphere, to the polis), whereas 
zoé is the simple fact of life (in the private sphere, the oikos). This 
distinction is the key to opening the limit-concept of Roman law, i.e. 
the ambivalence of the word sacred in the concept of the homo sacer, 
as an individual was referred to, who was exiled from the commu-
nity after committing a serious crime. From the moment of ritual 
ostracism, i.e. the announcement he was “sacer”, such a figure could 
be killed by anyone but not be sacrificed in a  religious ritual. He 
could not be sacrificed for the community from which he was ex-
pelled because he no longer belonged to it. He was excluded from 
community law, and the sole justice applied to him was that which 
expelled him irrevocably from the community. From the perspective 
of the community, his life is not bios – if the rights associated with 
human existence are revoked, all that remains is the human being 
and his purely biological, i.e. bare life, la nuda vita. 
Homo sacer is a strange, ambiguous form of exclusion. A person 
is abandoned by the law. And yet it cannot be said that he is outside 
or that he is inside, since in his capacity as ostracised he is subject 
by virtue of this exclusion to the justice that ostracised him. This 
situation, in which the outside cannot be distinguished from the in-
side, then allows for a link to be made with the modern concept of 
sovereignty (e.g. as in the case of Carl Schmitt), and above all 
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with Benjamin’s state of emergency that becomes the rule. The state 
of emergency or “Verordnung zum Schutz von Volk und Staat”, 
which was enacted by the Nazis in 1933 (in the same year as Mar-
tin Heidegger gave his first address as Rector of the University of 
Freiburg), was never recalled during Nazi rule. If the sovereign is he 
who is entitled to declare Ausnahmezustand, by which the legal or-
der is suspended, this creates a strange sphere of jurisprudence that 
is capable of suspending itself – it is the threshold between inside 
and outside where the one does not exclude the other. However, it is 
here (according to Agamben) that the law manifests its pure form: 
it is applied by virtue of not being applied, it is power that refrains 
from exerting itself,385 it is valid without this meaning anything. It 
is in this space, and only in this space, that bare life appears, life 
abandoned by law, left to itself. Agamben thus reconstructs the hid-
den genealogy of biopower that Foucault situates in the modern era 
as the successor to sovereign power and discipline:  
 
one of the basic phenomena of the nineteenth century was what might be 
called power’s hold over life. What I mean is the acquisition of power over 
man insofar as man is a living being that the biological came under State 
control, that there was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might 
be termed State control of the biological. 386
Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century: a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplin-
ary. This technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude 
disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to 
some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself 
in existing disciplinary techniques. This new technique does not simply do 
away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists at a different level, 
385 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
Stanford UP, Stanford 1998, p. 23.
386 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76, 
trans. David Macey, Picador, New York, pp. 237–238.
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on a different scale, and because it has a different bearing area, and makes 
use of very different instruments. Unlike discipline, which is addressed to 
bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but 
to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-
as-species. To be more specific, I would say that discipline tries to rule 
a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be 
dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, 
used, and, if need be, punished. And that the new technology that is be-
ing established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that 
they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but affected by overall 
processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on. So 
after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualising mode, we 
have a second seizure of power that is not individualising but, if you like, 
massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species. Af-
ter the anatomo-politics of the human body established in the course of 
the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence 
of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but 
what I would call a “biopolitics” of the human race.387
 
Along with biopower appears something new, a  “person”, recog-
nised neither by law nor discipline (neither the individual under the 
terms of a contract, nor the individual as individual body), but a per-
son-population that appears as a political problem, as a biological 
problem, as a problem of power. “Biopolitics (...) tries to control the 
series of random events that can occur in a living mass.”388 And it 
is in this turn to life that the fundamental transformation of power 
resides: “And now we have the emergence of a power that I would 
call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in mak-





In an effort to demonstrate that, as a stable realisation of an ex-
ception, the concentration camp is a hidden matrix of the political 
arena in which we live, Agamben goes further back in time. 
 
The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, com-
pleted, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much 
the inclusion of zoē in the polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor 
simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projec-
tions and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, 
together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the 
rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of 
the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, 
and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and 
fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare 
life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception ac-
tually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which 
the entire political system rested.390
 
It now becomes clear at least in part why the third part of Homo Sacer 
is entitled “The Camp as Biopolitical Paradigm of the Modern”.391 
The concentration camp is a real fact, a historical fact. As such it is 
present, for instance, in Adorno’s claim that to write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric. Philosophy must reflect this fact and reassess 
the meaning of the Enlightenment project of the modern era. This 
line of thinking abandons the traditional philosophy of history, but 
emphasises (Adorno again) that concepts of reason must constantly 
be corrected by their own subjects, and that it is essential that the 
idea be “affected” by real history. Similarly, after the war the con-
390 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 12.
391 The book Homo sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino: Einaudi, 1995, is the first volu-
me of a long series that includes State of Exception; Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm; The 
Kingdom and the Glory; Homo sacer II, 2; The Sacrament of Language; Homo sacer II, 3; Opus Dei; 
Homo sacer II, 5; Remants of Auschwitz; Homo sacer III; The Highest Poverty; The Use of Bodies; 
Homo sacer IV, 2, etc.
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centration camp becomes a  “sign” around which the idea circles, 
concerned with cannot be named, what cannot be thought, what 
cannot even be understood, because understanding the Holocaust 
would mean the destruction of ethics. However, Agamben does not 
use the “concentration camp” as an empirical fact, nor as a sign, but 
as a paradigm. And so in order to understand his proposition fully 
we must remind ourselves of what he has in mind when he speaks of 
a paradigm. In a certain regard this term is one of the fundamental 
concepts of Agamben’s thinking, inter alia because it implies an am-
biguitiy vis-à-vis the inside and outside that is manifest at such time 
as a  state of affairs pertains during which the exception becomes 
the rule. Moreover, though it is not obvious on first glance, as soon 
as exception and rule take their place in the centre of philosophi-
cal attention, the classical (metaphysical) assumption of the identity 
of thinking and being is excluded from the game. Given that the 
“camp” is a historical fact or event in real history, it is impossible 
when attempting to understand it to reduce the quaestio facti to 
a quaestio iuris (a reduction that Husserl’s idea of teleology and the 
ensuing understanding of crisis is marked by). 
The idea of the paradigm and the paradigmatic method of in-
vestigation brings us to Michel Foucault. What is perhaps his best 
known analysis from Discipline and Punish sets out to demonstrate 
how Bentham’s prison reforms (the panopticon as a completely con-
crete architectural figure or dispositif) exemplify the new organisa-
tion of power at a certain point in time. The panopticon is a kind of 
diagram of power, an ideal form of political technology,392 which at 
any one moment in time is updated so as to meet the needs of many 
different institutions (school, factory, regulatory and administrative 
measures, scientific findings, etc.) as a  hidden network that con-
392 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York 
1995, pp. 276 et seq.
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nects them. This network or dispositif then mediates the relation-
ship between power and knowledge393. 
The dispositif in the position of exemplar or paradigm is thus both 
part of that of which it is an example and, in exemplary form, exclud-
ed from this subset. It is both the rule and the exception to the rule, 
both inside and outside. The peculiarity of the paradigmatic method 
as a means of knowledge is that it does not proceed from the particular 
to the universal, but from the universal to the particular. It remains 
on the level of the unique and thus problematises the antinomy of 
the particular or universal (which is, on the contrary, the basis of in-
duction and deduction). The exemplum is a singularly representing 
instance and does not relate to the exemplified by virtue of “belong-
ing to...”, i.e. not by virtue of what is common to the element of the 
exemplified subset in which everything is “covered”. The example is 
a unique case that is isolated from the context of which it is a part 
only until such time as it allows us to understand the whole by virtue 
of its singularity.394 In other words, the paradigm (the exemplum) 
does not allow for the identification of “that as that”, but recognises 
without converting singularity into the members of a certain class. 
 
On the one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; 
but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particular-
ity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that 
presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of 
the Greek term, for example: paradeigma, that which is shown alongside 
(like the German Bei-spiel, that which plays alongside). Hence the proper 
place of the example is always beside itself in the empty space in which its 
undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds.395
393 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus, Stanford UP, Stanford 2009.
394 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, trans. Luca D’Isanto with Kevin 
Attell, Zone Books 2009, pp. 16 et seq.
395 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, London 1993, p. 17. 
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The testimony of all those who survived the Holocaust can be read 
in this way, as an example in the Agambenian sense. And it is in this 
way, from the particular to the particular, without generalisation, 
without integration into an overarching narrative, that Claude Lan-




The testimony of the survivors – If This Is a Man (Primo Levi), The 
Human Race (Robert Antelme) – indicates in its titles the extreme 
limits whose extension is the concentration and extermination 
camps in which the modern form of “bare life” appears: häftling or 
zek (convict).
 
The conviction that life has a purpose is rooted in every fibre of man, it 
is a property of the human substance. Free men give many names to this 
purpose, and many think and talk about its nature. But for us the question 
is simpler.
Today, in this place, our only purpose is to reach the spring. At the moment 
we care about nothing else.396
 
People do not die in the camp, but corpses are manufactured here. 
Life is not life here, nor does death die here. Foucault’s biopolitics, 
as Agamben says, here coincides with thanatopolitics397, which is 
the result of what had until then been more a latent process, a de-
scription of which could be understood as a parallel or concretisa-
tion of Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialectic of enlightenment. 
In his lectures entitled Security, Territory, Population, Foucault 
sets out the initial phase of this process, namely the transition from 
sovereign power to an emerging biopolitics. During the era of sov-
ereign power the criminal, thief or murderer is punished exclusively 
on the basis of their crime, whereas in the era of disciplinary power 
they are punished only after a thorough analysis of their character 
and after ascertaining both individual and collective conditions un-
der which they perpetrated their crime. It is important these facts be 
ascertained in order that it be possible to predict whether they can 
396 Primo Levi, If This Is a Man, trans. Stuart Woolf, Orion Press, New York 1959, p. 79.
397 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive, Zone Books, New 
York 1999, p. 83.
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be remedied or not. This is why the criminal is subjected to psycho-
logical examination, surveillance and rehabilitation. New “tactics” 
of power appear: prison, psychiatric institution, suspended sentenc-
es, etc. A more detailed examination then ascertains the number of 
murders or thieves in the population as a whole, decides whether 
crime figures are rising or falling, in what demographic groups spe-
cific types of crime feature, and how it would be possible to regulate 
and control all of these variables in the optimal way. Discipline and 
biopower overlap: both represent a power over life (bios) that can be 
exerted on both individuals and groups: school workshops, prisons 
and psychiatric institutions relate to bodies inasmuch as they deviate 
from the norms, though there also exist population norms: fertility 
rates, death rates, public health and migration (average values and 
deviations therefrom). Though all of this takes place through the 
good offices of both institutions and the state, the state is already 
implicated in many institutions (e.g. schools and hospitals). We can 
therefore say that discipline relates to the micro-level of power re-
lations, while biopower operates on the macro-level. Biopower in 
the form of “care” then creates a situation in which death becomes 
a scandal and suicide is understood as a subversive act of resistance, 
since death is beyond the reach of biopower. Power does not impact 
on death, it impacts on mortality rates.  
 
In the right of sovereignty, death was the moment of the most 
obvious and most spectacular manifestation of the absolute power 
of the sovereign; death now becomes, in contrast, the moment when 
the individual escapes all power, falls back on himself and retreats, 
so to speak, into his own privacy. Power no longer recognises death. 
Power literally ignores death.398 
 
398 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 248.
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Biopower is therefore what we might call the administration of 
life, because it needs estimates, statistics, the specification of various 
demographic factors, population censuses, which, however, are not 
simply censuses, but the point of intersection of the population and 
the individual body. The Auschwitz crematorium for which the pris-
oners were simply statistical units or Stücke was able to burn up to 
ten thousand dead bodies a day.399 In the Soviet gulags, the number 
of victims was given in recommended figures specifying how many 
“boxes of soap” (which is how the prisoners were referred to) were 
to be delivered to the gulag slaughter house.400 
If sovereignty is characterised by the right to “take life or let live”, 
then modern biopolitics embodies the principle of “make live, let 
die”. However, according to Giorgio Agamben, in totalitarian re-
gimes both principles intersected in the paradox formulated by Fou-
cault himself when he posed the question of how biopower can let 
die if its objective is to let live, and yet be manifest in the form of 
murder. In order to explain this we need to follow the process 
of gradual separation and exclusion during the biologisation of the 
originally body politic, the moment the “people” is doubled by the 
“population”. This opens up a space for racial theory, the differentia-
tion of Aryan and non-Aryan, i.e. the singling out of an outside in 
the hitherto homogenous realm of life. From here it is but a short 
step to “homo sacer”. This general schema using which we must 
clarify Foucault’s analyses then only needs a concrete Massnahmen, 
a measure of the Nazi state. Extermination, annihilation, Vernich-
tung, begins at the moment that non-Aryans are excluded from 
economic and political life as Fremdkörper or a  foreign element, 
whose physical separation begins with exclusion into a ghetto and 
continues with deportations beyond the borders of the Third Reich. 
This is how, up until 1939 at the latest, the Germans managed to 
399 Filip Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz. Three Years in the Gas Chambers, ed. and trans. Susanne 
Flatauer and Helmut Freitag, Ivad R. Dee, Chicago 1979, pp. 59 et seq.
400 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago.
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make of German Jews socially dead persons,401a term that Goldha-
gen adopts from the book by Orland Patterson Slavery and Social 
Death (1962): “Members of a society conceive of the socially dead as 
being bereft of some essential human attributes and undeserving of 
essential social, civil, and legal protections.” 402 
The legal system gives up on them de facto and de iure; proof of 
this is, for example, the letter written (Richterbrief, which had the 
status of a  directive) by Otto Georg Thierack, Reich Minister of 
Justice from 1942 and president of the Academy for German Law 
on 13 September 1942: 
 
In order to liberate the German nation from Poles, Russians, Jews and Gyp-
sies and in order to release eastern territories joined to the empire as settle-
ment areas for the Germany people, I intend to submit criminal proceedings 
against Poles, Jews, Russians and Gypsies to the imperial chief of the SS. 
I am taking these measures on the basis that justice can only to a small 
extent contribute to the extermination of members of these nationalities.403
 
Along with the occupation of Europe, and above all after the in-
vasion of Western Poland by Germany and of Eastern Poland by 
the Soviet Union, stateless zones began systematically to emerge as 
extraterritoriality, non-places of concentration and extermination 
camps, which in a sense were nowhere. The mechanism of this pro-
cess is outlined by Timothy Snyder. It begins with the establishment 
of different racial institutions (to counter the racial threat) and con-
tinues with the destruction of states in an aggressive war that allows 
401 Daniel Johan Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, 
Alfred Knopf, New York 1996, pp. 90 et seq.
402 Cf. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, p. 168.
403 Ota Kraus, Erich Kulka, Noc a mlha, Naše Vojsko-SPB, Praha 1958, p. 16. After a meeting with 
Himmler on 18 September 1942, Thierack observed: “Korrektur bei nichtgenügenden Justizurteilen 
durch polizeiliche Sonderbehandlung. Es wurde auf Vorschlag des Reichsleiters Bormann zwischen 
Reichsführer-SS und mir folgende Vereinbarung getrofffen ... 2. Auslieferung asozialer Elemente aus 
dem Strafvollzug an den Reichsführer-SS zur Vernichtung durch Arbeit.” (cited from John M. Steiner, 
Power Politics and Social Change in National Socialist Germany, de Gruyter 1975, p. 325.)
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these institutions to operate outside Germany and in a legal vacuum 
in which property and civil rights guaranteeing legal protection are 
suspended. A case study in this respect would be Estonia. After be-
ing occupied by the Red Army, Soviet laws were retroactively applied 
“under the logic that the Estonian state not only did not exist, but 
had never existed.”404 As soon as Germany invaded this non-existent 
state at the start of July 1941, anyone who was murdered there did 
not legally exist. The concentration camp – a Bartholomew’s Eve 
that lasted twelve years – is a replica of statelessness; the survival of 
unidentifiable deportees would be a legal paradox. 
It was for this reason, however, that the “true backbone of the 
camp” (Primo Levi) was the person called in camp jargon the musul-
man; the tottering body, a living corpse, bare life, which is possible 
only in this extension of the extreme limits of the human where life 
and death become indistinguishable. “The living dead (...) whose eyes 
were empty, whose flesh had fled, whose blood was near to water”,405 
the “irereversibly exhausted, worn-out prisoner close to death”,406 the 
prisoner “who was giving up and was given up by his comrades, no 
longer had room in his consciousness for the contrast of good or bad... 
He was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last 
convulsions.” 407 “The drowned” of the title of Primo Levi’s final book. 
 
I must repeat – we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is a un-
comfortable notion, of which I have become conscious little by little, reading 
the memoirs of others and reading mine at a distance of years. We survivors 
are not only exiguous but also an anomalous minority; we are those who 
by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch the bottom. 
404 Timothy Snyder, Black Earth. Holocaust as History and Warning. Tim Duggan Books, New York 
2015.
405 Vrba, 44070 – The Conspiracy of the Twentieth Century; idem, I Escaped from Auschwitz, 
ch. 6 passim.
406 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal, Abacus, London 2013, p. 107.
407 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington 1980, p. 9.
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Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell 
about it or have returned mute, but they are the ‘Muslims’, the submerged, 
the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a general 
significance. They are the rule, we are the exception. Under another sky, and 
returned from a similar and diverse slavery Solzhenitsyn noted (it) … We 
speak in their stead, by proxy.408
 
In a place where the state of emergency is a quotidian rule, there 
emerges what Primo Levi called the “grey zone”, or (as translated 
by Agamben) the “zone of indistinction”. If it is essential to under-
stand this state as marginal or borderline, and if the border com-
monly refers to a line whose function is to separate (life and death, 
the outside and the inside), then its spatial extension in the form of 
zones does not allow for such differentiation. Neither life nor death, 
but both life and death, neither inside nor outside, but inside and 
outside. “We were all living beings in the process of crossing the 
frontier into death”, writes Shlomo Venezia.409 
Thus the musulman, this Derridean ghost, becomes what Agamben 
uses as a paradigm: the living dead (one hesitates to call their death 
death, as Primo Levi says), an example of the non-differentiabil-
ity of the human and not of the human as already simply human. 
However, always on this side of humanity, because to deny him as 
a person (as that which still belongs to the human species410) would 
mean adopting the perspective of the SS, repeating its gesture.411 
The bare life to which the human being is reduced is thus the norm. 
It does not confirm to any existing norms, because even categories 
408 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, pp. 89–90.
409 Shlomo Venezia, Inside the Gas Chambers. Eight Months in the Sonderkommando of Auschwitz, 
Polity Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 100.
410 “(H)eroes we know about, from history or from literature (…) we do not believe that they were 
ever brought to the point of expressing as their last and only claim an ultimate sense of belonging to 
the human race.“ Robert Antelme, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler, Marl-
boro Press 1992, p. 5.
411 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 63.
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of dignity and self-respect lost all meaning in this zone. However, 
it is unavoidable that we remain with the musulman and say that it 
is he that is “the guard on the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics 
of a form and life that begins where dignity ends”.412 It is a person, 
without our being able to label him as such within the categories of 
traditional anthropology and ethics. He is something irreducible, 
unthematisable, because he is outside discursivity. He is something 
like Derrida’s  restance non présente, a  pre-echo of which is to be 
found in the title of Agamben’s book Quel que resta di Auschwitz. 
Primo Levi was already aware of this when he wrote: 
 
Have we – we who have returned – been able to understand and make oth-
ers understand our experience? What we commonly mean by “understand” 
coincides with “simplify”: without profound simplification the world around 
us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to ori-
ent ourselves and decide upon our actions. In short, we are compelled to re-
duce the knowable to a schema (…) language and conceptual thought.”413
 
However, it is not enough to transform the philosophical discourse 
by introducing other (less discursive) categories. Another form 
of “showing” is necessary, a  showing of that which escapes being 
shown, wherein resides its escape. We must understand the re-
sistance to the phenomenon as a method of appearance and part 
company from a cognition consisting of identification. Experience 
banished from philosophy must be articulated, and in philosophical 
language.414 For instance, through the separation of ethics from on-
tology, as in Levinas and Lyotard. However, all of this is on the basis 
of testimony and bearing witness, into which Husserl’s responsibil-
ity for showing has been transformed. 
412 Ibid., p. 69.
413 Levi, The Drowned, p. 31.




That which governs the phenomenological discourse is the principle 
of all principles, to wit, the need to accept that which shows itself 
as it shows itself and within the limits set by this showing. We must 
bracket out everything we already know or only assume we know. 
The thing must show itself. This is the original ideal of descriptive 
phenomenology that, however, will always be retained as the base 
layer of the phenomenological approach. Objectivity thus showing 
itself bears witness to itself, it bears witness to its own presence. This 
is why in Husserl’s essays the verb “zeugen” (testify) or the noun 
“Zeugnis” (testimony) in the strict sense of the word almost never 
appear, and if so, then exclusively in the reflexive form “sich bezeu-
gen”. Testimony in the strict sense of the word is something that is 
necessarily subject to reduction. It has an indexical character, it is 
indication, Anzeige, and not an expression in the sense of bedeut-
sames Zeichen. However, the presence of that which is borne witness 
to is not manifest in itself, but through testimony, even the testimo-
ny of someone else, be this eyewitness testimony, an interview, pho-
tography, or some other type of document. In respect of showing or 
self-showing (Zeigen, Erscheinen) and the looking that corresponds 
to it (Schauen or watching, Anschauen or looking at), testimony, i.e. 
Zeugen, Zeugnis, is secondary. It actualises and represents, without 
presenting the thing itself.
Testimony as a form of showing is further complicated by the fact 
that it is (somehow) inseparable from the experience of the spe-
cific testifying subject. Testimony always implies the formula “I was 
there”, which clearly shows that the reality of the testified is insepa-
rable from the presence of the witness there and then. Through the 
grammatical category of the personal pronoun “I” (shifter), the wit-
ness draws attention to himself as the mouthpiece of verbal testimo-
ny and thus declares himself a witness. The preterite has a similarly 
deictic character in relation to the actual presence of the witness 
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“then” and “there” in relation to a specifically defined “here”. The 
character of pointing something out is then underlined by the fact 
that the witness somehow (perhaps even implicitly) must or should 
be able to say “believe me”, even though that in which we are to 
place our faith is not objectively verifiable. In short, that which is 
witnessed is phenomenologically undemonstrable, partly because of 
the irreplaceability of the witness who embodies the uniqueness of 
the testimony, and partly because the past does not in and of itself 
make itself present, bezeugt sich nicht (does not bear witness to it-
self), but is actualised only through the witness. Testimony is not 
proof.  
This is the formal structure of testimony. However, another dimen-
sion must be taken into account. If testimony is submitted to a court 
under oath, this means that the witness who appeals to those who are 
listening to him is responsible for his testimony, and so a challenge 
is implicit in his speech: trust me. The testimony is not only con-
stative but performative. This becomes abundantly clear when the 
witness is giving testimony regarding an event that was supposed to 
have remained without witnesses (in the “crisis of witnessing”415), 
since the extermination camp not only liquidated the witnesses, but 
sought to remove so much as any trace of their liquidation.  
 
Here, “you have to believe me” means “believe me because I  tell you to, 
because I ask it of you,” or, equally well, “I promise you to speak the truth 
and to be faithful to my promises, and I commit myself to being faithful.” In 
this “it is necessary to believe me”, the “it is necessary”, which is not theo-
retical but performative-pragmatic, is as determining as the “believe”. Ulti-
mately, it is perhaps the only rigorous introduction to the thought of what 
“to believe” might mean. When I subscribe to the conclusion of a syllogism 
or to the delivery of a proof, it is no longer an act of belief, even if the one 
who conducts the demonstration asks me to “believe” in the truth of the 
415 Cf. Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History, Routledge, London and New York 1992, pp. 76–77.
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demonstration. A mathematician or a physicist, a historian, as such, does 
not seriously ask me to believe him or her. He does not appeal in the last 
analysis to my belief, at the moment when he presents his conclusions.416
 
Whence the fundamental question: what is being borne witness to 
as “Auschwitz”, the “Holocaust”, “Shoah”?  
I have already mentioned the elusiveness, the incomprehensibility 
of that to which the survivors bear witness. However, here too we 
can differentiate. Adorno claims that any explanation would mean 
denying the exceptional nature of the event of the Holocaust. It is 
a traumatic event, i.e. its “apprehension”, its appropriation, its very 
acknowledgement is constantly being denied. It returns as a night-
mare, though this is also a sign of its unassimilability. Maurice Blan-
chot reaches a  radical conclusion: Auschwitz is that which is still 
before us. This points to an important aspect of testimony within 
the context of philosophical discourse, namely that we cannot push 
aside that which we do not understand even if the witness is speak-
ing of something that escapes even his understanding (the witness 
himself embodies the testimony in such a situation). Or, as Derrida 
would have it: we cannot avoid the ghosts, who are waiting to see 
whether we respond to them.  
All of is confirmed by the facts. The public was not willing or 
able to accept reports of the death camps submitted by those who 
managed to escape them (e.g. Rudolf Vrba). Thanks to the Polish 
resistance, the Allies had been informed of the Final Solution as 
far back as 1941, and a  similarly reserved stance to the survivors 
pertained even in the years immediately following the war. Reports 
were received with scepticism and disbelief during the war, even in 
Jewish communities:  
 
416 Jacques Derrida, “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, in: Jacques Derrida, Sovereignities in 
Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen, Fordham University 
Press, New York 2005, pp. 76–77.
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(T)hose who were lucid enough to warn the Jewish communities about the 
forthcoming destruction either through information or through foresight, 
were dismissed as ‘prophets of doom’ and labelled traitors or madmen.417
 
The unassimilability of the event is also addressed by Robert An-
telme:  
 
Two years ago, during the first days after our return, I think we were all prey 
to a genuine delirium. We wanted at last to speak, to be heard. We were 
told that by itself our physical appearance was eloquent enough; but we had 
only just returned, with us we brought back our memory of our experience, 
an experience that was still very much alive, and we felt a frantic desire to 
describe it such as it had been. As of those first days, however, we saw that 
it was impossible to bridge the gap we discovered opening up between the 
words at our disposal and that experience which, in the case of most of us, 
was still going forward within our bodies. How were we to resign ourselves 
to not trying to explain how we had got to the state we were in? For we 
were yet in that state. And even so it was impossible. No sooner would we 
begin to tell our story than we would be choking over it. And then, even to 
us, what we had to tell would start to seem unimaginable.418
 
Others could be cited in this regard: Améry, Levi, Richard Glazar 
and many many others. Susan Sontag generalises when she says that 
one’s first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate 
horror is a  paradigm of what “revelation” means for the twenti-
eth century: negative epiphany. That which is given as testimony by 
survivors is somehow radically untransferrable, an experience elud-
ing expression. Testimony regarding the Holocaust can never be 
bedeutsames Zeichen, because a horizon within which it could be in-
corporated cannot exist. Salmen Lewenthal, a member of the Aus-
chwitz Sonderkommando, who buried his notes in the grounds of 
417 Felman – Laub, Testimony, p. 83.
418 Antelme, The Human Race, p. 3.
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the crematorium (where they were discovered only in 1962), speaks 
of “events unimaginable for human beings”.419 
The Nazi extermination centres produced not only dead bodies 
as though on a  conveyor belt, but were also the site of a  war on 
memory. They thwarted the very possibility of grieving inasmuch as 
“to remember the death of other humans in spite of their annihila-
tion remains the last possible human act of ethical resistance against 
their desolation”,420and inasmuch as they systematically destroyed 
intergenerational continuity, i.e. the basis of lived or natural time, 
that wave that carries the individuals of each successive genera-
tion421, and even the possibility of being with the other that persists 
in mourning. 
 
To have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with your eyes, to admire 
him in friendship, is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always 
insistent, and more and more unforgettable, that one of the two of you 
will inevitably see the other die. One of us, each says to himself, the day 
will come when one of the two of us will see himself no longer seeing the 
other and so will carry the other within him a while longer, his eyes follow-
ing without seeing, the world suspended by some unique tear, each time 
unique, through which everything from then on, through which the world it-
self – and this day will come – will come to be reflected quivering, reflecting 
disappearance itself: the world, the whole world, the world itself, for death 
takes from us not only some particular life within the world, some moment 
that belongs to us, but, each time, without limit, someone through whom 
the world, and first of all our own world, will have opened up in a both finite 
and infinite – mortally infinite – way. That is the blurred and transparent 
testimony borne by this tear, this small, infinitely small, tear, which the 
419 Inmitten des grauenvollen Verbrechens. Handschriften von Mitgliedern des Sonderkommandos, 
ed. Jadwiga Bezwinska et al., Verlag des Staatlichen Auschwitz-Birkenau-Museums, 1996, p. 34.
420 James Hatley, Suffering Witness: The Quandary of Responsibility after the Irreparable. State 
University of New York Press, Albany 2000, p. 41.
421 Ibid., p. 60.
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mourning of friends passes through and endures even before death, and 
always singularly so, always irreplaceably.422
 
If the Holocaust is an event beyond all standards and referential 
frameworks to which our understanding relates, it is this way be-
cause it is an event that did not “create” witnesses. Firstly, its incom-
prehensibility made it impossible for the survivors to find it within 
themselves to bear witness to it (a characteristic of the traumatic 
event), which is a  condition of the possibility of their being able 
to bear witness before others. Secondly, the very institution of the 
death camp liquidates witnesses physically and without trace: only 
the dead victims would be genuine witnesses. Hence the title of the 
book oft-cited by Primo Levi: The Drowned and the Saved. The true 
witnesses are the “drowned”, while the survivors bear witness to the 
missing testimony of missing witnesses. The event itself is effaced. 
To the question of what is actually being borne witness to as the 
“Shoa”, “Holocaust” or “Auschwitz” we must therefore add anoth-
er: Who is bearing witness? On the one hand, it is he who survived 
and who can speak. However, this is an atypical häftling or inmate, 
an anomalous minority, in the words of Primo Levi (I sopravvissuti 
sono una minoranza anomala). On the other, it is he who touched 
the bottom and looked into the face of the Gorgon (visto la Gor-
gone) – he should be the one to speak, but cannot. The survivors rep-
resent him and speak on his behalf. He is dead until such moment as 
the living lend him their voice, until he testifies to what is being said 
through him; the witness’s speech transcends the witness (Levinas). 
Although the voice of silent victims is heard in the words of those 
who survived, there is nobody here who could say of themselves that 
they are a genuine witness. Silence is both at the very bottom and 
yet enters the speech of the survivors, which means that it is im-
possible to distinguish between the silent and the speaking in this 
422 Jacques Derrida, “The Taste of Tears”, in: The Work of Mourning, ed. by Pascale-Anne Braul, 
Michael Naas, Chicago University Press, Chicago, London 2001, p. 107.
323
testimony. This is an indistinguishability that in its highly radical 
way demonstrates the presence of the outside inside, the relation-
ship via irreducible difference. 
However, in the testimony of survivors not only man and speech 
find themselves in a problematic and risky relationship, but the very 
definition of man as zóon logon echón, or a  living being who has 
language, especially if the experience of the death camps is some-
times designated “unspeakable”, even though there are witnesses 
who talk about it. Levi’s paradox can only be resolved by a change of 
discourse, i.e. by a critical revision of our traditional understanding 
of speech. This forms the subject of Agamben’s Remnants of Aus-
chwitz.423 The chapter “The Archive and Testimony” touches tan-
gentially on Benjamin’s reflections on the atrophy of experience and 
directly on Émile Benveniste, who in his Problèmes de linguistique 
générale424 concludes that the “I” is primarily constituted as an in-
stance of speech, i.e. a human being becomes a subject when he or 
she enters the order of speech. Subjectivity is the speaker’s ability to 
position himself as the subject of speech, and it cannot, therefore, 
be defined either by some original perception or experience in itself, 
because this is but a  secondary effect dependent on the linguistic 
establishment of the “I”, or by some psychological substance. “ ‘Ego’ 
is he who says ‘ego’ ”.425 The singular first person pronoun does not 
relate either to the concept (in Saussure’s  terminology), or to the 
individual, but designates its speaker in the act of individual speech 
at the moment of its utterance. The reality to which it refers is the 
reality of this speech. Benveniste adds that if we are consistent in 
our considerations, then “there is no other objective testimony to 
the identity of the subject except that which he himself thus gives 
423 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz. 
424 Emile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale I. Gallimard, Paris 1966.
425 Emile Benveniste, “De la subjectivité dans le langage”, in: Problèmes de linguistique générale I, 
p. 260.
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about himself.”426 That which is designated the subject is the ma-
terialised shadow that his speech casts upon the speaker, and this 
is why various traditional ideas of “transcendental subjectivity”, in-
cluding Husserl’s, are chimerical. This is a rough approximation of 
the first stage in Agamben’s argument. 
In the second stage, in which he refers back to earlier publica- 
tions,427 he turns his attention to this discrepancy between the hu-
man being and language. The human being is that place in which 
we must localise that which we call experience, as well as the con-
nection between experience and testimony. That which opens up 
access to this dimension is experimentum linguae: the speaker ex-
periences the overthrow of the classical idea of man as a  being 
gifted with speech upon realising that language comes to him from 
without and that he must first embrace it. But then it would be 
possible to speak of silent inarticulate experience and of experi-
ence before it is expropriated by language. However, it is clear that 
only a person who already speaks, i.e. a subject, could thus describe 
his state prior to entering the regime of speech. In other words, 
only and precisely the ability to speak refers to the “base”, which 
Agamben names infanzia, i.e. to the experience of speech as pure 
potentiality. 
This non-speaking does not refer to some chronological preve-
nience or originality; infanzia coexists in the human being with 
speech. However, this has consequences within broader contexts. 
For instance, the “origin” (including Husserl’s Urstiftung or origi-
nal institution and including the early modern concept of the base) 
is not that which constantly recedes into the past, but that “which 
has not yet ceased to occur”.428 Experience from the perspective 
426 Ibid., p. 263.
427 Giorgio Agamben, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione dell’esperienza e origine della storia (1978) 
and La potenza del pensiero: Saggi e conferenza (expanded edition 2005). 
428 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History. On the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron, 
Verso 2007, Verso, London, New York, 2007, p. 57.
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of infanzia is the difference between the human and the linguistic, 
which is a claim that can be illuminated by contrast: if “experience” 
did not exist, speech would be the same as using language accord-
ing to rules. However, because man is not identical with language, 
speech is like the ex-position of experience, a place in which expe-
rience finds expression but is never identical to it – it is the site of 
a relationship via irreducible difference. 
Here, as in Agamben and elsewhere, an understanding of differ-
ence as a threshold or limit that does not belong to one or the other 
side (a separator links, a  link separates) and is a zone of indistin-
guishability (see, for instance, the relationship of the human and 
in-human in man) plays a fundamental role. This concept, in which 
the infanzia preceding speech is the potentiality of speech, i.e. both 
in-speech and speech, frees the transition from one to the other of 
incomprehensibility, for instance the transition (a problem inher-
ited from Saussurean structural linguistics) from langue to parole, 
from language to system to speech as communicating meaning, the 
transition that, according to Benveniste and Agamben, is essential 
if the subject is to constitute itself (from this perspective infanzia is 
the de-subjectivised possibility of subjectification).  
To express matters using Benveniste’s  terminology: it allows us 
to understand the transition from the semiotic to the semantic. If 
a mode of designation belongs to the semiotic that is particular to 
language, i.e. the sign designates, if it is recognised, identified as 
a sign with a certain value, then the semiotic is actually a designa-
tion that only comes into being in speech, in the act of testifying: 
significance is not recognised but understood. Between both is dis-
continuity – and Agamben’s concept of non-speech is supposed to 
explain how it is possible that in fact this hiatus is constantly being 
bridged. 
 
It is the fact of man’s infancy (in other words, in order to speak, he needs 
to be constituted as a subject within language by removing himself from 
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infancy) which breaks the closed world of the sign and transforms pure 
language into human discourse, the semiotic into the semantic.429
 
For this very reason, however, it is not possible to posit the semiotic 
and the semantic as two completely different realities. Instead, bear-
ing in mind infanzia as potentiality, they should be regarded as tran-
scendental limits. The semiotic would then be something like a pre-
linguistic vocalisation (an idea very close to the hum and murmur 
of speech; elsewhere in his speculations Agamben refers to glosso-
lalia), which becomes the essential substratum of the semantic the 
moment that man acquires speech and abandons his muteness. 
Because Agamben’s paradigmatic method is a method by analogy, 
this argument is aimed at both “ineffability” and at testimony as dis-
course imparting speech to the person who is not capable of speech 
as well as to the concept of the subject. For if the “I” is a subject only 
at the cost of accepting his de-subjectivisation, his inseparable link 
with the a-subjective infanzia, then analogously we might under-
stand the survivor as the subject of testimony that is de-subjectivised 
by virtue of having him speak in his testimony the experience of the 
bottom unattainable by him. Man is able to become a witness pre-
cisely because he has speech as a being capable of not having speech: 
 
because there is an inseparable division and non-coincidence between 
the inhuman and the human, the living being and the speaking being, the 
Muselmann and the survivor. Precisely insofar as it inheres in language as 
such, precisely insofar as it bears witness to the taking place of a potential-
ity of speaking through an impotentiality alone, its authority depends not 
on a factual truth, a conformity between something said and a fact or be-
tween memory and what happened, but rather on the immemorial relation 
between the unsayable and the sayable, between the outside and the inside 
of language. The authority of the witness consists in his capacity to speak 
429 Agamben, Infancy, p. 64.
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solely in the name of an incapacity to speak – that is, in his or her being 
a subject. Testimony thus guarantees not the factual truth of the statement 
safeguarded in the archive, but rather its unarchivability, its exteriority with 
respect to the archive – that is, the necessity by which, as the existence 
of language, it escapes both memory and forgetting. It is because there is 
testimony only where there is an impossibility of speaking, because there 
is a witness only where there has been desubjectification, that the Musel-
mann is the complete witness and that the survivor and the Muselmann 
cannot be split apart.430
 
This theme is expanded on in Remnants of Auschwitz, especially as 
regards the categories of potentiality and contingency. We can leave 
these aside, though not without pointing to their motivation, which 
is not a reinterpretation of traditional concepts, but an examination 
of the necessity for a  radical transformation of the philosophical 
discourse as a  response to the event of the Holocaust. Auschwitz 
means the collapse of the traditional ontological operators, namely 
categories, because it is the event “in which the impossible is forced 
into the real. Auschwitz is the existence of the impossible (...) The 
Muselmann produced by Auschwitz is the catastrophe of the subject, 
the subject’s effacement as the placer of contingency and its mainte-
nance as existence of the impossible.”431 In Potentialities Agamben 
states quite explicitly that the task of the next philosophy will be “to 
redefine the entire domain of categories and modality.”432 
Two brief comments in conclusion. 
Firstly: Agamben summarises a complex argument by saying that 
testimony places the inside and outside of language, the sayable and 
unsayable (indicibile), in a relationship. We might simplify matters 
thus: that which was thus or, to put it another way, was designated 
430 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, pp. 157–8.
431 Ibid., p. 148.
432 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. with an intro-
duction by Daniel Heller-Roazen Stanford, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999, pp. 76–5.
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by language as this or that; if we wanted to eliminate “as”, we would 
come up against unsayability or ineffability. Or to put things an-
other way (whence Agamben’s analyses of the concepts of potential-
ity, actualisation, contingency433): the existence of language itself is 
unsayable. Perhaps this is how we should understand the following 
paragraph from the “Prologue” to Infanzia e storia: 
 
The ineffabile, the unsaid, are in fact categories which belong exclusively 
to human language; far from indicating a  limit of language, they express 
its invincible power of presupposition, the unsayable being precisely what 
language must presuppose in order to signify.434
 
Among other things, however, Agamben also wants to say that un-
sayability is a category that tradition has long surrounded with an 
aura of the sacred. If we wanted to rid ourselves of it in this form, 
this would mean having to remain silent about Auschwitz, so sacri-
ficing its victims a second time. 
 
This why those who assert the unsayability of Auschwitz today should be 
more cautious in their statements. If they mean to say that Auschwitz was 
unique event in the face of which the witness must in some way submit his 
every word to the test of an impossibility of speaking, they are right. But if, 
joining uniqueness to unsayability, they transform Auschwitz into a reality 
absolutely separated from language, if they break the tie between an im-
possibility and a possibility of speaking that, in the Muselmann, constitutes 
testimony, then they unconsciously repeat the Nazis’ gesture.435
 
Secondly: the Prologue to Infanzia e storia cited above begins with 
a Blanchotesque consideration of the work. Agamben says that every 
written work must be understood as an introduction to that which 
433 Conducted most thoroughly in the chapter “Bartleby, or On Contingency“, in: Potentialities.
434 Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4.
435 Agamben, Remnantsof Auschwitz, p. 157.
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has never been written and which is destined to remain unwritten 
forever. All works that follow it will again be simply an introduc-
tion to others. The absent work defines each already written work 
as a prolegomenon or paralipomenon of the non-existent work. This 
too is a  description of an elliptical or a-thetic text and it too we 
may read as an analogy of irrevocable difference or discrepancy be-
tween language and experience, the outside (infanzia) and inside 
(language), or unsayability as the prerequisite of denotation, i.e. of 
a relationship via difference. However, were we to seek a wider anal-
ogy, we could interpret this ellipticity as unambiguous confirmation 
of the non-identity of thinking and being, and thus as a break with 
the classical philosophical discourse. This analogy would bring us 
back to Adorno’s response to the event of the Holocaust in Negative 
Dialectics (published in 1966) and in his university lectures from 
1963 entitled Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, in which he pre-
sents several of the ideas that appear in the final section of Negative 
Dialectics. As opposed to “metaphysics” (the contents of the spir-
it’s thinking is the spirit itself), Adorno demands we return to con-
cepts their embeddedness in time (in what Adorno calls Relevanz 
des Innerzeitlichen436), i.e. in real history. After Auschwitz this step 
is essential, since it is clear that that which was played out in time 
impacts fundamentally on thinking whose concepts and categories 
cannot be situated outside historical, event- or adventurist-time.  
 
436 Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysik. Begriff und Probleme, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt a.M. 2006, p. 159.
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The Auschwitz Musulman is he who finds himself in the centre of 
the concentric circles of a camp in a non-place, the last boundary of 
which is Selektion. Though every prisoner recognises himself in his 
disfigured face, if he does not want to be liquidated, he must con-
stantly hide him within himself. Even the first American soldiers to 
arrive at the Nazi concentration camps in Germany found looking 
at the prisoners’ faces intolerable. George W. King, who was pres-
ent during the liberation of the prisoners in Mauthausen, recorded 
his feelings as follows: “there was no way of distinguishing them. 
Shaved heads and sunken faces... it is impossible to see people in 
them. Under these circumstances one avoids looking at them. It is 
too painful.”437 Not even the prisoners spoke with the Musulman, as 
though not speaking and not seeing was the only reasonable conduct 
towards those beyond help.
The existence of the Musulman was corroborated by Primo Levi 
in If This is a Man. 
 
But with the mussulmans, the men in decay, it is not even worth speaking, 
because they have no distinguished acquaintances in camp, they do not 
gain any extra rations, they do not work in profitable Kommandos and they 
know no secret method of organising. And in any case, one knows that they 
are only here on a visit, that in a few weeks nothing will remain of them 
but a handful of ashes in some near-by field and a crossed-out number on 
a register (...) they suffer and drag themselves along in an opaque inteimate 
solitude, and in solitude they die or disappear, without leaving a trace in 
anyone’s memory. (...) All the mussulmans who finished in the gas cham-
bers have the same story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the 
slope down to the bottom, like streams that run down to the sea... Their life 
437 Cited from Cornelia Brink, “Bilder vom Feind. Das Scheitern der ´visuellen Entnazifierung´ 
1945.” In: Sven Kramer (ed.), Die Shoah im Bild. Edition text+kritik, Richard Boorberg Verlag, Mün-
chen 2003, p. 52.
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is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the drowned, 
form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed 
and always identical, of non-men (...) One hesitates to call them living: one 
hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, 
as they are too tired to understand. (...) They crowd my memory with their 
faceless presences, and if I could enclose all the evil of our time in one im-
age, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, 
with head dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes 
not a trace of a thought is to be seen.438
 
Giorgio Agamben, whose book Remnants of Auschwitz is a running 
commentary on Primo Levi’s work cited above, examines the way 
that this absence in the sense of the unrepresentability of the Mu-
sulman is borne witness to and can be regarded as a paradigm of 
testimony. He captures the echo of the empty centre of the death 
camp where Levi remembers a small, paralysed three-year old boy 
(a  child of Auschwitz, a  child of death), who didn’t know how to 
speak and whom the prisoners called Hurbinek because of the unin-
telligible sounds he made. However, suddenly Hurbinek began to re-
peat a word that nobody could understand and that Levi transcribes 
as “mass-klo, matisklo”439. Nobody knew what he was saying, even 
though the prisoners in Auschwitz came from all over Europe and 
spoke many different languages. 
Hurbinek died in March 1945 and Levi writes: “Nothing remains 
of him: he bears witness through these words of mine.” However, 
this would mean that that regarding which testimony is given no 
longer has to be language. The sound “matisklo” emerges from that 
“lacuna” in testimony. It is non-speech to which speech replies and 
in which speech is born. If Levi, even as a survivor, is unable to bear 
full witness (“by my words” his voice, which mumbles something 
438 Levi, If This is a Man, pp. 101–103. 
439 Primo Levi, La tregua, Einaudi, Torino 1989, p. 14 (“Non sapeva, una parola difficile, non un-
gherese: qualcosa come ‘mass-klo’, ‘matisklo’.”) 
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unintelligible), then Agamben infers the following: if language is 
to testify, it must free up the space of non-speech so that the impos-
sibility of testifying appears. 
But not even the survivor can bear witness completely, can speak his own 
lacuna. This means that testimony is the disjunction between two impos-
sibilities of bearing witness; it means that language, in order to bear wit-
ness, must give way to a non-language in order to show the impossibility 
of bearing witness. The language of testimony is a language that no longer 
signifies and that, in not signifying, advances into what is without language, 
to the point of taking on a different insignificance – that of the complete 
witness, that of he who by definition cannot bear witness. To bear witness, 
it is therefore not enough to bring language to its own non-sense, to the 
pure undecidability of letters (m-a-s-s-k-l-o, m-a-t-i-s-k-l-o). It is necessary 
that this senseless sound be, in turn, the voice of something or someone 
that, for entirely other reasons, cannot bear witness. It is thus necessary 
that the impossibility of bearing witness, the “lacuna” that constitutes hu-
man language, collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of bearing 
witness – that which does not have language.440
 
The voice of someone who themself cannot speak: the movement 
of traditionalisation, the acceptance of the legacy, like the act of 
testimony or responding and responsibility, can be (and often is) 
expressed metaphorically. For instance, James Hatley in his book 
Suffering Witness (dedicated to Hurbinek) says, in Derridean style: 
we live time in such a way that we reply to those who existed before 
us, and in this way become bearers of their voice. And responding, 
we turn to the voices of those who will arrive after us, “voices who 
arise out of one’s own flesh (be it bodily or figuratively) only to ar-
ticulate a time utterly beyond one’s own death.”441 
440 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 39.
441 Hatley, Suffering Witness, p. 62.
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However, this mode of expression both is and is not a metaphor, 
because the voice itself is and is not inside language. It is midway 
between two limits (molar and molecular, as Gilles Deleuze might 
put it), with which, however, it can never merge: language uttered 
out loud can escape to its wording and become sound, but precisely 
in this way it may at the opposite end be sublimated into pure con-
cept, become lost in the ideal significance of the spoken. It does not 
completely belong either to the semiotic or the semantic. As the in-
separable purport of language, the voice is the unattainable exterior 
of its unattainable interior. This is perhaps what Foucault had in 
mind when he was examining the ontology of literary language and 
wrote the following in the essay Language to Infinity:  
 
Writing, in our day, has moved infinitely closer to its source, to this disqui-
eting sound which announces from the depths of language – once we at-
tend to it – the source against which we seek refuge and toward which we 
address ourselves. Like Franz Kafka’s beast, language now listens from the 
bottom of its burrow to this inevitable and growing noise. To defend itself 
it must follow its movements, become its loyal enemy, and allow nothing 
to stand between them except the contradictory thinness of a transparent 
and unbreakable partition. We must ceaselessly speak, for as long and as 
loudly as this indefinite and deafening noise – longer and more loudly so 
that in mixing our voices with it we might succeed – if not in silencing and 
mastering it – in modulating its futility in the endless murmuring we call 
literature.442
 
This is what speech is for Agamben: the voice as the trace of a trace 
of the bottom of the camp. In its ambivalence (the spoken must 
merge with the element of semiotics in order to become audible) it 
is the “medium” of the relationship via irreducible difference. The 
voice is that which can never be the theme of language; in the spo-
442 Michel Foucault, Le langage à l´infini, Tel Quel, n° 15, automne 1963, pp. 44–53; in: Fou-
cault, Dits et écrits I, p. 255.
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ken it remains like an ossified echo. It disappears as soon as the 
word is uttered. Le dire is always already lost in le dit, as Levinas will 
go on to say. Language as the manifestation of this difference, this 
incommensurability or asymmetry (since, to use another example 
from Agamben, there does not exist a human voice that would be 
a sign of a man in such a way as the chirping of a cricket is the voice 
of a cricket), is the condition of the possibility of testimony.  
I shall not write about what all of these unhappy wretches told me... How-
ever, what I can say is that, if I had not seen everything with my own eyes, 
I would never have believed that something like this was possible. I was 
especially shaken by the report of a Polish Jew who spoke Yiddish. The very 
intonation of his voice embodied the horrific tragedy of our nation.443
But what is this voice?
 –  Not something to hear, perhaps the last written cry, what is inscribed in 
the future outside books, outside language.
 –  But what is this voice?444
The work that was never written, referred to by Giorgio Agamben 
in the prologue to Infanzia e storia as elliptical, because the absent 
centre of all of his written books could, as he himself suspects, carry 
the title The Human Voice or Ethics, an Essay on the Voice. After 
reading his book Remnants of Auschwitz this becomes more under-
standable: the voice allows speech to testify. However, we must not 
ignore the broader context. Language is not the same as speech. 
Speech needs a voice that is on this or the other side of “subjectiv-
ity” in order to become audible. These are not theoretical niceties, 
but an explication of human historical experience, the experience 
of non-coincidence, a fundamental experience, because it becomes 
a new measure of philosophical discourse traditionally linked to the 
443 Susanne Fall, Terezín, ráj mezi lágry, trans. Věra Koubová, Revolver Revue, Praha 2015, p. 76.
444 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 331.
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categories of the subject and consciousness or self-consciousness, 
whose identity with itself (coincidence) is the basis of thinking as 
knowledge. However, testimony, which clearly belongs to a different 
order than that of pure knowledge or cognition, shows that the sub-
ject is something split or decentred, because it is located in the gap 
between the living being and language, between the life function 
and life history (which is why the destruction of life history does not 
entail the liquidation of the subject’s humanity). This is experience 
that is brought to light by the testimony of survivors, both by virtue 
of what they testify and how they testify; the experience of incom-
mensurableness, of the relationship via irreducible difference, is that 
which “makes us think”, i.e. forces us to think differently. Blanchot 
formulated it in its most extreme manifestation in his reflections ac-
companying the testimony of Robert Antelme: we are beginning to 
understand that man is the indestructible that can be destroyed.445 
He experiences this at exactly the moment he approaches the lim-
its of suffering where he is nothing but that “other” that as pure 
“subject” he is not. It is therefore not unreasonable to say that man 
is capable of surviving man, because the latter is also a man whose 
humanity has been devastated (a reply to the implied question in the 
title of Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man), and even he belongs to the 
human species (confirmation of the title of Robert Antelme’s The 
Human Race). That which we designate “I” is the assisting witness 
to this de-subjectivisation: the man experiencing shame. 
The third chapter of Remnants of Auschwitz entitled Shame, or 
On the Subject, makes explicit reference to Levinas’s essay On Es-
cape (De l’évasion) from the mid-1930s,446 in which the author first 
sketched out the trajectory of his future work beyond the boundaries 
of ontology and the philosophy of knowledge in the position of pri-
ma philosophia. It is here, by means of a subtle analysis of the phe-
nomenon of shame, that he deconstructs the postulate of identity 
445 Ibid., pp. 191–192.
446 Emmanuel Levinas, De l’évasion, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1962 (1935).
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with itself in self-consciousness that, according to him, simply con-
ceals a deeper conflict in the subject. Because shame is not primarily 
a moral phenomenon, but rather stems from our inability to identify 
with what is in us and is alien to us (it approximates to the distinc-
tion between the life function and life history, or Binswanger’s dif-
ference between the dreaming and waking state), which, however, 
emerges in the borderline situation of the destruction of humanity. 
It is something that we would want to conceal but cannot, either 
from the other or from ourselves. We cannot escape ourselves, we 
are bound to ourself, we are permanently present to this difference 
(the non-coincidence in us, the irreducible crisis inside), in our com-
pleteness. It is in this sense we should understand the statement 
that the “I” is present to itself (présence du moi à soi-même), i.e. that 
the “I” is witness to its own de-subjectivisation at precisely the mo-
ment it becomes a subject (in Agamben’s subsequent formulation). 
Shame, as Levinas says, reveals being, which reveals itself and seeks 
an apology.447 Shame is a sign of this non-identity as it reveals itself, 
the impossibility of concealing the outside inside, the fact that the 
subject is affected by its own receptivity. 
Voice, speech, shame, traumatic experience and the witness there-
of, the semiotics of indexical signs (trace, ellipsis, secrecy), the rela-
tionship via irreducible difference, the non-identity of thought and 
being or consciousness and being, experience and language ... all 
of this is closely connected if philosophy responds to the event of 
the Holocaust by means of a root-and-branch transformation of its 
discourse. However, this transformation must be monitored not only 
wherever concepts change their meaning, wherever new concepts 
appear and old ones fade into the background, wherever accents and 
the like shift, but wherever it is possible to observe something like 
an internal resonance between various different places of this dis-
course (whether we give them their authors’ names or label them by 
447 Ibid., p. 114.
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specific problems or questions) that lends the transformed discourse 
its coherence. As Adorno wrote in Minima Moralia: “the soundness 
of a conception can be judged by whether it causes one quotation to 
summon another.”448 This applies not only to specific texts or works 
of a  particular author, but also to the discourse of philosophy as 
a whole. For this reason it would be difficult to find some minimal 
common denominator. It is more a case of strategic proximity, though 
this is not always clear at first sight. If, for example, in Derrida’s ne-
ologism différance we hear not only “difference” but also “deferral” 
in the sense of postponement, then the meaning of this invented 
concept is respect for resistance: if thinking does not attempt to 
identify something “as” something mediated via the already consti-
tuted horizon of expectation, this is not about becoming resigned to 
the failure of cognition, but rather an attempt to rescue that which 
always remains, since that which escapes, i.e. which resists exposure 
of this type, must be shown in this resistance, in the act of escape. 
In this way a mutual correspondence will be found between testi-
mony and Derrida’s untranslatable “concept” restance non présente, 
the echo of which is present in Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz. 
If we overlook the theological messianic connotations that the 
concept of the remainder or remains is surrounded by in the case of 
this author, the original interpreter of the texts of Walter Benjamin, 
in the phrase il resto we find firstly the present absence of the non-
identical (of the outside inside), and secondly (above all, one might 
add), another concept of temporality concealed within, a different 
dimension of time beyond chronology and teleology. In this sense 
il resto further develops the impulse provided by Benjamin’s reflec-
tions on the Jetzt-Zeit, the here-and-now. 
Il resto, remnant, restance – under no circumstances is this part of 
the whole449; the remainder or remains must be understood as an 
448 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 87
449 See, for instance, Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction. Stanford 
UP, Stanford 2009, p. 298 et. seq.
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excess. It indicates a divergence from the whole and as such refers to 
the impossibility of the identification of whole and remainder, their 
mutual cover (Deckung) as a means of cognising the unique (of an 
event), i.e. it refers to the remainder of non-identity in every act of 
identification. In this sense, and to a extent that does not exclude ei-
ther shifts or polemical dialogue between them, both Derrida’s and 
Agamben’s thinking links up to Adorno’s negative dialectics. How-
ever, at the same time Agamben’s il resto and Derrida’s restance refer 
to another temporality. In Agamben’s case a comparison offers itself 
with the “operational time” of the linguist Gustave Guillaume:450 
the time that human thinking requires in order to construct for it-
self a certain image of time must be set aside from linear time. The 
idea thus created then refers back to chronological time. However, 
operational time is heterogeneous in respect of this time (all the 
more so in that, in order to create an image of time, we must be 
able to “contract” it in our thinking.451 This comparison illuminates 
Agamben’s conception of messianic time especially: “the time that 
time takes to come to an end” 452 (il tempo che il tempo ci mette per 
finire), the time that remains between time and its end. 
However, perhaps all of this is prefigured, albeit in simpler form, 
both in Kracauer’s approach to waiting (Warten) as hesitant open-
ness that does not look for when and whether time will end, because 
it is necessary that life focus on the last thing before the last in the 
“antechamber” (Vorraum) of the end, and in Adorno’s requirement 
of a  relationship with the unconditional, the condition of which, 
however, is that it does not pose a question regarding the possibility 
(or impossibility) of its attainment – or redemption. 
Again, Derrida’s différance is not as remote as it might seem.  
450 Gustave Guillaume, Foundations for a  Science of Language. John Benjamin’s, Amsterdamn 
1984, p. 123.
451 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains, trans. Patricia Dailey, Stanford University Press, 




An integral aspect of the transformation of philosophical discourse 
is a transformation in the hierarchy of philosophical genres. The es-
say, fragment, dialogue, philosophical miniature or sketch initiated 
by apparently marginal or random observations once more comes 
into its own. Texts that say something by speaking of something 
else, texts whose content is presented by the very method of its pre-
sentation. This state of affairs was described by Adorno in Aesthetic 
Theory: art needs philosophy, since philosophy says what art cannot 
say, although it is art alone which is able to say it: by not saying it.453
And so the example of “internal architecture” from Benja-
min’s One-Way Street is actually not even an example: 
 
The tractatus is an Arabic form. Its exterior is undifferentiated and unobtru-
sive, like the façades of Arabian buildings, whose articulation begins only in 
the courtyard. So, too, the articulated structure of the tractatus is invisible 
from the outside, revealing itself only from within. If it is formed by chapters, 
they have not verbal headings but numbers. The surface of its deliberations 
is not enlivened with pictures, but covered with unbroken, proliferating ara-
besques. In the ornamental density of this presentation, the distinction be-
tween thematic and excursive expositions is abolished.454
 
453 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, GS 7, p. 13. 
454 Walter Benjamin, “One-Way Street”, in Selected Writings 1, p. 402.
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The question reads as follows: how do we show that which resists 
being shown, that which remains as il resto, remnant, as restance 
non-présente? How do we not lose that to which testimony refers? 
And in any case, what is testimony? These questions bring to life 
thinking that is not driven by method but declares itself as strategy. 
The very word strategy is already an explanation of sorts of this 
turn. Strategy, an approach that is not secured in advance, whose 
calculations are neither certain nor evident. In Adornian terms, 
the approach is justified by its outcome. Strategy implies a gam-
ble, whence the importance of the essay (“attempt” or “trial”) as 
a  philosophical genre and Michel Montaigne as its predecessor, 
for instance in Derrida’s Force of Law. Adorno provides a more de-
tailed explanation in The Essay as Form, in which the word “meth-
od” becomes a paleonym.
 
With regard to scientific procedure and its philosophic grounding as meth-
od, the essay, in accordance with its idea, draws the fullest consequences 
from the critique of the system. Even the empiricist doctrines that grant 
priority to open, unanticipated experience over firm, conceptual ordering re-
main systematic to the extent that they investigate what they hold to be the 
more or less constant preconditions of knowledge and develop them in as 
continuous a context as possible. Since the time of Bacon, who was himself 
an essayist, empiricism – no less than rationalism – has been “method”. 
Doubt about the unconditional priority of method was raised, in the actual 
process of thought, almost exclusively by the essay. It does justice to the 
consciousness of non-identity, without needing to say so, radically unradical 
in refraining from any reduction to a principle. (...) It proceeds, so to speak, 
methodically unmethodically. (...) It is not so much that the essay ignores 
indisputable certainty, as that it abrogates the ideal. The essay becomes 
true in its progress, which drives it beyond itself, and not in a hoarding ob-
session with fundamentals. Its concepts receive their light from a terminus 
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ad quem hidden to the essay itself, and not from an obvious terminus a quo. 
In this the very method of the essay expresses the utopian intention.455
 
Strategy is a relationship to the incalculable, i.e. a relationship via 
irreducible difference, a relationship to that which is on the point 
of arrival. If we attempt to calculate this, it is precisely because we 
confront the unpredictable, we do not know:  
 
If a strategy were guaranteed in and of itself, if its calculation were sure, 
there would be no strategy at all. Strategy always implies a wager – that is, 
a certain way of giving ourselves over to not-knowing, to the incalculable. 
We calculate because there is something incalculable. We calculate where 
we do not know, where we can make no determination.456 
 
The substitution of the method by strategy, which on the one hand 
is anticipated by Benjamin and his constellations and dialectical im-
age, and on the other by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his book Truth 
and Method (1960), can almost be followed step by step during the 
latter half of the twentieth century. In addition, in the background 
of Derrida’s différance is Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, 
in which the operation of language is compared to a game of chess: 
every move changes the entire system and so its scope cannot be 
precisely forecast. The response to this comparison is Derrida’s early 
essay Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sci-
ences (1966),457 in which the internal movement of the decentred 
structure is called the “play of structure”,458 clearly in polemic with 
the classical concept in which transformations of the structure are 
limited or regulated by its “centre” (or the principle or origin, as it 
455 Theodor W. Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1981, pp. 16, 21.
456 Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, Polity 
Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 13.




would be possible to say in other contexts). The game, as Benjamin 
knew (since he often had gambling in mind) requires more “pres-
ence of mind” than method, because only (the) presence of mind – 
open to that which is on the point of arrival – is capable of quickly 
clarifying the situation. 
 
He who asks fortune-tellers unwittingly forfeits an inner intimation of com-
ing events that is a thousand times more exact than anything they may say. 
He is impelled by inertia, rather than by curiosity, and nothing is more unlike 
the submissive apathy with which he hears his fate revealed than the alert 
dexterity with which the man of courage lays hand on the future. For pres-
ence of mind is an extract of the future, and precise awareness of the present 
moment is more decisive than foreknowledge of the most distant events.459
 
In other words, the paradigm of the game leads to the substitution 
of method by strategy. For Derrida this is one of the ways of intro-
ducing the movement of differánce: 
 
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, 
of freeplay. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a  truth or 
an origin which is free from freeplay and from the order of the sign, and 
lives an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no longer 
turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and 
humanism, the name man being the name of that being who, throughout 
the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology – in other words, through the 
history of all of his history – has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring 
foundation, the origin and the end of the game.460
459 Benjamin,“One-Way Street”, pp.  402–403. Cf.: “Presence of mind as a  political category 
comes magnificently to life in these words of Turgot: ‘Before we have learned to deal with things in 
a given position, they have already changed several times. Thus, we always perceive events too late, 
and politics always needs to foresee, so to speak, the present.’” Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Proj-
ect, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London 
1999, pp. 477–478.
460 Derrida, “La structure, signe et jeu...”, p. 427.
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Strategic thinking is called for, because the game is neither tele-
ological movement nor the development of that which is wrapped 
in origin (Husserl’s history is still both to a certain extent): neither 
is it movement without internal meaning. The turn toward strategy is 
a turn to an approach of hesitant openness that allows for the un-
predictable and so is always in a relationship with that which is on 
the point of arrival and is capable of understanding appropriately 
both the event and its time. Within this context the inspiration of 
messianic time is unsurprising, though this traditional idea is de-
constructed in various different ways by all the authors mentioned 
(beginning with Benjamin, moving onto Kracauer and Adorno and 
ending with Levinas, Derrida, Agamben et al.) 
Precisely because strategy calculates with the incalculable, it is able 
to relate to the event, i.e. to that which occurs earlier than is possi-
ble, and for this reason this relationship is a relationship via irreduc-
ible difference. Though asymmetrical, it is a relationship. However, 
thinking is only in this relationship to the event when it corresponds 
to it. 
The Holocaust, this “event unimaginable for human beings” 
(S. Lewenthal), in its capacity as event is a challenge to thinking, 
since it problematises it. It is unimaginable, it defies understanding, 
it is that which subverts the rationality of even attempting to under-
stand. For this reason, however, the response to the fact of the Holo-
caust is the transformation of philosophical discourse. This response 
does not attempt to assimilate, identify or explain the event of the 
Holocaust, but seeks to present its testimony regarding the Holo-
caust. This is not easy: in modern (traditional, classical or modern) 
philosophy, testimony is a minority genre. Testimony does not sub-
mit direct proof. Its evidence is controvertible, which puts it on the 
lowest level of epistemological relevance. All the more so because 
it is singular and without guarantee (as Paul Celan says:”Niemand 
zeugt für den Zeugen”, “No one bears witness for the witness”), 
and that which it testifies to it only actualises through the mediation 
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of indication. It is not therefore on the side of the necessary but the 
probable, it belongs to rhetoric not to philosophy. If philosophy is 
to bear witness regarding the Holocaust, its response must consist 
of a  transformation of the philosophical discourse (or as Deleuze 
would say, the “image of thought”), by means of which testimony be-
comes one of the central concepts or methods of showing. However, 
this presupposes, on a completely general level, that philosophy will 
turn its attention to the resistance that events place in the way of 
our (identifying, assimilating) understanding, and cease to regard 
this resistance as that which is to be broken. Respect for the event-
character of the event assumes respect for the other, the unique, the 
inappropriable. Respect for the escape of that which resists its own 
showing. The philosophical response does not explain the event but 
embodies it as testimony. 
This understanding of the event is formulated radically by 
Derrida. The event is that which we do not see coming because it 
is outside all horizons that anticipate and allow for cognition. It is 
outside the world inasmuch as the world is understood in the Hus-
serlian way as the horizon of all horizons. If it is that which the 
framework of its understanding has within itself, then we can say 
that upon the arrival of the event our world is cited within another 
context. The known is strange, the event is not inscribed within the 
continuous flow of time, but refers to a time that is somehow adven-
turist, reveals the event-meaning of time. 
The event relates to everything because it relates to meaning. The 
event’s intervention is radical inasmuch as it unsettles the horizon 
of all horizons by virtue of the consciousness of meaning that is 
irreducible to the horizon (that which makes sense is a deviation, 
a change of direction). It was this that Husserl had before his eyes, 
without being conscious of it, when he created the phenomenologi-
cal base of evident cognition in the act of identification as the con-
formity of like with like that pushes the incompatible to the side, 
as well as when he came across the problem of “hyletic data” when 
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analysing perception and the internal consciousness of time. He left 
to one side the fact that the carrier of meaning could in fact be the 
incompatible, i.e. the event.461 For this reason the world must be 
defined differently, namely as that which can be reconfigured by an 
event in response to an event.462 The world does not determine pos-
sibilities. Instead, this function is performed by events, namely crises 
of the world.  
Whence another way of thinking about time. The event as exter-
nal in relation to the current hermeneutic horizon of all horizons 
transcends presence. More precisely, the event is always present only 
as the past in the light of its future, and it can only ever be turned 
into a theme after the event, as it were. However, this does not only 
involve what is known as a traumatic relationship with the past, i.e. 
Freud’s Nachträglichkeit or “afterwardsness”, since at this juncture 
Benjamin’s concept of time as expressed in the Theses on the Phi-
losophy of History once again enters the equation: the past can only 
be seen in an instant of danger. This could be rephrased as follows: 
in a  world after the Holocaust hitherto concealed traces come to 
light, traces of an unrealised project of another modernity that we 
call postmodernism.  
 





Our world is cited as though within another context. The exte-
rior is indistinguishable from the interior, the known is suddenly 
strange, the appearance of the world, i.e. that which it shows me 
when I look for what is possible, has changed. The elsewhere is here. 
The event is the irruption of reality into the world. The sensation 
novel personalises this non-identifiability  – the mysterious villain 
could be anyone, the relationship between cause and effect is inter-
preted as a hypnotic influence.463 Its defining feature qua genre is 
the improbability that lurks in the shadows of the quotidian. This 
was why the surrealists were so fascinated by Fantômas, who electri-
fied the nerves of his readership. 
If Literature is confronted with the event, if it attempts to find 
a response to it, it tries in its own special way – determined by the 
meaning of the word “fiction” – to create a context that could be 
the referential framework of the event. It seeks meaning in crisis. 
However, above all it is able to register accurately this uncertainty in 
advance. Kafka’s strange worshipper suffers seasickness on dry land 
due to the fact that he has forgotten the real names of things and 
now in his haste casts random names over them. He observes that 
from time to time tall buildings collapse for no apparent reason.464 
Elsewhere a giant mole is caught sight of 465 and the elderly bach-
elor Blumfeld is followed in his room by two bouncing balls that 
follow him wherever he goes.466 And this is not to speak of Odradek. 
Eduard Raban, separated from the outside world, which he observes, 
463 A motif that survives, beginning with The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari via the novel Grey Face by Sax 
Rohmer (1924), the Czech translation of which, published in 1933, features a swastika on its cover, 
and Fritz Lang’sfilmDr. Mabuse, der Spieler(1922) toThe Manchurian Candidateby Richard Condon 
(1959). Starting in 1939, Hermann Broch worked on Theory of Mass Hysteria.
464 Franz Kafka, “Conversation with a Worshiper” (Early Stories).
465 Franz Kafka, “A Country Doctor”.
466 Franz Kafka, “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor“.
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departs. His journey has a destination, but he sets off in no clear di-
rection without its being possible to say that he is lost.467 
In trivial novels the relationship to Literature is silently sus-
pended. But not, however, to real history. The sheer variety of such 
novels is unthinkable without history. The detective story envisages 
the institutionalisation of the police force (The Metropolitan Po-
lice Act, 1828). The Western reflects the uncertain, shifting fron-
tier that, though indefinable, thus forms the identity of America.468 
The gangster movie appears simultaneously with the enforcement 
of prohibition (1919) and depicted the city as an asphalt jungle.469 
Spy novels and conspiracy thrillers are a transposition of paranoia 
onto the political map of the world, and enjoy a renaissance during 
the Cold War before this was replaced by the threat of terrorism. 
If the conventionalised schema of literature assumes a movement 
from the outbreak of a crisis that destabilises the existing balance 
(murder, conflict on still lawless borderlands, the rational business 
enterprise of gangsters who have become public enemy no. 1, a trai-
tor operating within the system, etc.) to the return of the original 
stability, we cannot overlook the fact that the resolution of the crisis 
postpones the problem to which it has unwittingly pointed, even 
though it appears to have ironed out the crisis (in this respect it 
is possibly close to myth as described by Levi-Strauss). When the 
perpetrator is revealed the scales fall from our eyes and the mystery 
is stripped from a person who is capable of murder. The restoration 
of order by means of the arrival of the law enables us to forget the 
difference between law and justice, and the liquidation of organised 
467 Franz Kafka, “Wedding Preparations in the Country”.
468 See Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History of 1893. 
The book begins by citing an official document from 1890: “Up to and including 1880 the country 
had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated 
bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line.” Penguin Books – Great Ideas, 
p. 1.
469 W. R. Burnet, The Asphalt Jungle, Knopf, New York, 1949 and The Asphalt Jungle directed by 
John Huston (MGM, 1950).
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crime glosses over the fact that a desire for success ends inevitably 
in failure. 
 
At bottom, the gangster is doomed because he is under the obligation to 
succeed, not because the means he employs are unlawful. In the deeper lay-
ers of the modern consciousness, all means are unlawful, every attempt to 
succeed is an act of aggression, leaving one alone and guilty and defence-
less among enemies: one is punished for success. This is our intolerable 
dilemma: that failure is a kind of death and success is evil and dangerous, 
is – ultimately – impossible. The effect of the gangster film is to embody 
this dilemma in the person of the gangster and resolve it by his death. The 
dilemma is resolved because it is his death, not ours. We are safe; for the 
moment, we can acquiesce in our failure, we can choose to fail.470
 
In short, lowbrow literature is covertly and unconsciously elliptical, 
unlike serious or highbrow literature. 
If we wanted to corroborate and illustrate this difference, a single 
example would suffice. The event brackets the world, the context 
appears to be lost, and Europe as cultural formation can seem as 
though it has suddenly found itself in Africa. This is literally how 
things are in one of the African novels by Edgar Wallace Sandi, 
the Kingmaker, 1922. In this book, one Mr. Sanders resorts to ma-
chine gun to civilise ruthlessly the natives, whose status as such is 
evinced by their names: M’sufu, K’salugu M’popo, Kofalaba, etc. 
and the fact that they have a  single word for the concepts “law” 
and “power”, while the idea of justice is conveyed with a word that 
means “revenge”. 
 
From each of the twelve districts of Rimi-Rimi you shall send me the best 
makers of huts and weavers of straw and thatchers of roof, and you shall 
470 Robert Warshow, “Gangster as Tragic Hero”, in: Robert Warshow, The Immediate Experience. 
Movies, Comics, Theatre and Other Aspects of Popular Culture, enlarged edition, Harvard UP, 
Harvard 2001, p. 103.
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each contribute the straw and the wood I desire, for I am going to build 
a great Palace house in this space and here I and the king I make shall site 
down and give laws so that all may live comfortably.”
“Lord,” said one of the deputation in dismay, “We heard you were not stay-
ing with us and our hearts were glad.”
“I am staying with you,” said Sanders, without a smile, “and if your hearts 
are not glad, your backs will be sore.”471
 
However, this is how Europe is represented in Heart of Darkness by 
Joseph Conrad (published serially in 1899). The continent is present 
in the figure of Kurtz, a product of Europe and the embodiment of 
its underbelly472. However, it is here, in a strange inversion, that Eu-
rope, supposedly the basis of universal meaning, becomes the other 
and strange. The way that Conrad presents the “event” is antitheti-
cal to Wallace: the outside was a world absorbed by reality. Further-
more, he is aware of the ellipticity of speech, which is unavoidable 
where reference must be made to “the heart of darkness”: 
 
The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which 
lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical (if his pro-
pensity to spin yarns be excepted), and to him the meaning of an episode 
was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought 
it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these 
misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of 
moonshine.473
 
Kurtz’s report for the International Society for the Suppression of 
Savage Customs is  
471 Edgar Wallace, Sandi, the King-maker, Project Gutenberg Australia, 2009, unpaginated.
472 “All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz; and by and by I learned that, most appropriately, 
the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs had entrusted him with the making 
of a report,for its future guidance.” Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. with Introduction and 
Notes by Owen Knowles, Penguin Classics 2007, p. 61. 
473 Ibid., p. 10.
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very simple, and at the end of that moving appeal to every altruistic senti-
ment it blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a flash of lightning in 





Only one thing remained reachable, close and secure amid all losses: lan-
guage. Yes, language: In spite of everything, it remained secure against 
loss. But it had to go through its own lack of answers, through terrifying 
silence, through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech. It went 
through. It gave me no words for what was happening, but went through it. 
Went through and could resurface, “enriched” by it all.475
 
The poems of Paul Celan are not only testimony but bear witness 
to testimony itself. This is true (not only) of Niemand zeugt für den 
Zeugen, i.e. the observation that there is nobody who could testify to 
the truth of what the witness says. Testimony is not a document. It is 
in fact incompatible with the imperative of security and demonstra-
bility, since, as Derrida says, that which it is talking about “is linked 
to a singularity and to the experience of an idiomatic mark (...) It is 
elliptical.”476 And yet it has its own particular way of showing, and 
that is through indication. 
 
We can “read” this poem, we can desire to read, cite, and re-cite it, while 
giving upon interpreting it, or at least on going over the limit beyond which 
interpretation encounters, at the same time, its possibility and its impossi-
bility. What we have here is a compulsion to cite and re-cite, to repeat what 
we understand without completely understanding it, feeling at work in the 
economy of the ellipsis a power more powerful than that of meaning and 
perhaps even than that of truth, of the mask which would manifest itself as 
mask. The reciting compulsion, the “by heart” desire, stems from this limit 
to intelligibility or transparency of meaning.477
475 Paul Celan, Speech on the Occasion of Receiving the Literature Prize of the Free Hanseatic 
City of Bremen, in Paul Celan, Collected Prose, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop, Psychology Press, 2003, 
p. 34.
476 Jacques Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoinage, L’Herne, Paris 2005, p. 15.
477 Ibid., p. 16.
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The poems of Paul Celan bear witness to testimony by virtue of their 
idiomaticity. This does not reside simply in German and its possibili-
ties, nor simply in the fact that the language of “willing execution-
ers” is obliged to become the bearer of the voice of their victims, but 
in what is another name for strategy: in their poetics. 
 
A poem can “bear witness” to a poetics. It can promise it, it can be a re-
sponse to it, as to a testamentary promise. Indeed it must, it cannot not, do 
so. But not with the idea of applying a previously existing art of writing, or 
of referring to one as to a charter written somewhere else, or of obeying its 
laws like a transcendent authority, but rather by itself promising, in the act 
of its event, the foundation of a poetics. It would be a matter, then, of the 
poem “constituting its own poetics,” as Krieger puts it, a poetics that must 
also, through its generality, become, invent, institute, offer for reading, in 
an exemplary way, signing it, at the same time sealing and unsealing it, the 
possibility of this poem.478
 
Since bearing witness is not synonymous with providing proof, it 
must appeal to faith. A unique experience is involved and thus no 
proxy may stand in for the witness. “Deep down, the witness knew 
then, as he does now, that his testimony would not be received. After 
all it deals with an event that sprang from the darket zone of man. 
Only those who experienced Auschwitz know what it was. Others 
will never know.”479 But is it not then necessary to take another 
step and to ask the question whether everything I tell the other is 
not bearing witness? If I  tell you what I am thinking, I want you 
to believe me. And do I not always seek recourse in my speech to 
some strategy, some poetics? If testimony is irreducible to concepts, 
because it refers to a specific time and place, the I must work on 
the concept in order that it become expression (Adorno). Poetics is 
478 Ibid., p. 8.
479 Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. Marion Wiesel, Hill and Wang, New York 2006, Preface to the new 
translation by Elie Wiesel, unpaginated. 
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an essential context that allows for an understanding of meaning. 
However, testimony does not accept meaning from elsewhere, but 
carries it within itself. It is a poetics specific to this and only this 
method of speech, this poem, this discourse. It is the inherent frame-
work of every “inspection” (if we may take the liberty of using Hus-
serl’s term) of that to which speech refers, and simultaneously delays 
its complete presence. Ellipsis cannot be avoided, it may only be de-
nied. The constative is contaminated by the performative: testimony 
belongs to the “dimension of performative interpretation, that is, of 
an interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets”480. In 
this way “inspection” becomes a matter of responsibility – to ghosts. 
This can be expressed in a  way that pays its respects both to 
Levinas’s motivations and Derrida’s philosophy: the witness is the 
hostage of ghosts by which he is persecuted and to which he provides 
shelter thanks to his testimony: 
 
The witness is not reducible to the relationship that leads from an index to 
the indicated. That would make it a disclosure and a thematization. It is the 
bottomless passivity of responsibility, and thus, sincerity. It is the meaning 
of language, before language scatters into words, into themes equal to the 
words and dissimulating in the said the openness of the saying...481
 
The witness testifies to something that escapes him as soon as he 
submits his testimony. Hence trauma became the key to understand-
ing the phenomenon of testimony and whence the poetics of ellipti-
cal discourse. In the poems of Paul Celan the ellipsis designates that 
which is crucial. The witness is guardian, heir, keeper of the legacy 
of that which was and disappeared.482 
Phenomenology begins with the methodical exclusion of every-
thing we know from elsewhere, all assumptions and, above all, the 
480 Derrida, Spectres, p. 89. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 51.
481 Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’etre, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1978, p. 192.
482 Cf. Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoinage, p. 28.
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“general thesis of the world”. It begins with epoché and reduction, 
with a procedure that Husserl calls Einklammerung or bracketing. 
However, that which is bracketed does not disappear completely. 
It is present, in brackets, but its operation is cancelled, suspend-
ed. Heidegger continues with this retaining elimination when he 
refers to the original or inaugural understanding of being, which 
was forgotten in the history of ontology (a kind of Urstiftung and 
Rückfrage, original foundation and retrospective questioning), 
with a strange graphic gesture: Seyn or “Beyng”. This usage (again 
with its meaning slightly shifted) is taken over by Derrida, who 
generalises it as a method of designating undecidability or cross-
contamination (“Le dehors est le dedans” 483) as the presence of ab-
sence or as a  sign of paleonymy (an old word used in a different 
way) or trace. Showing sous rature, under erasure. However, this 
graphic intervention then evokes the elliptical or a-thetic text (see 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle), the phenomenon of the gift 
or secrecy that is betrayed without being divulged. Or the presence 
of the voice in speech and the presence of the event borne witness 
to in testimony. A showing of that which escapes the phenomenon, 
restance non-présente. 
It is necessary to retain the word (accept the legacy), in order that 
it be possible to show that which remains, il resto; to bequeath the 
outside to meaning and thus to be inside in relation to the outside. 
A method of return to the start, to the original establishment that 
becomes clear now, within a new context created by the response to 
the event. 
When Derrida writes the essay “Ellipsis” in the margin of a book 
of poems by Edmond Jabès,484 he summarises all of this and thus 
reaffirms at a distance Husserl’s Rückfrage: 
 
483 Derrida, De la grammatologie, p. 65 et seq.
484 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 295 et seq.
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And Yukel said:
The circle is acknowledged. Break the curve. The route doubles the route. 
The book consecrates the book.
The return to the book here announces the form of the eternal return. The 
return of the same does not alter itself – but does so absolutely – except by 
amounting to the same. Pure repetition, were it to change neither thing nor 
sign, carries with it an unlimited power of perversion and subversion. This 
repetition is writing because what disappears in it is the self-identity of the 
origin, the self-presence of so-called living speech. That is the centre.485
 
Erasure is paradigm, a necessary ellipticity and thinking that is only 
there where it happens, because it is looking for a way of thinking 
differently and thus exposes itself to its own erasure, by means of 
which it actualises itself again and again in order to be true to that 
which is on the point of arrival. Or to express the same idea more 
simply: the irruption of reality into the world. 
It might seem as though this speech on showing that which does not 
show itself but which is not entirely absent is simply another in a se-
quence of sophisticated speculations begot by postmodernism. How-
ever, it has a distinguished predecessor in modernism. For instance, 
take the well known poem by Charles Baudelaire “A une passante”: 
 
The deafening road around me roared. 
Tall, slim, in deep mourning, making majestic grief, 
A woman passed, lifting and swinging 
With a pompous gesture the ornamental hem of her garment. 
 
Swift and noble, with statuesque limb. 
As for me, I drank, twitching like an old roué, 
From her eye, livid sky where the hurricane is born, 
The softness that fascinates and the pleasure that kills. 
485 Ibid., p. 296. 
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A gleam... then night: O fleeting beauty, 
Your glance has given me sudden rebirth,
Shall I see you again only in eternity?
Somewhere else, very far from here! Too late! Perhaps never!
For I do not know where you flee, nor you where I am going,
O you whom I would have loved, O you who knew it!486
 
This is a clinically accurate description of an encounter with some-
thing that shows itself without unveiling itself. It is this resistance to 
that which escapes in its disappearance that is a sui generis phenom-
enon. The unattainability of that which left a trace of itself in this 
encounter resides in the fact that that which could have happened 
never happened and never will happen, even though in the ephem-
eral moment of the encounter (éclat) it nevertheless somehow (un-
der erasure) shows itself. The limits of this “noema” from the order 
of secrecy, secretum, is expressed quite clearly: it will be fully present 
in eternity. 
In his essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire Walter Benjamin as-
sociates this poem with the idea of the flâneur, who wanders the city 
aimlessly, watching the passersby: 
 
In a widow’s veil, mysteriously and mutely borne along by the crowd, an un-
known woman comes into the poet’s field of vision. What this sonnet com-
municates is simply this: Far from experiencing the crowd as an opposed, 
antagonistic element, this very crowd brings to the city dweller the figure 
that fascinates. The delight of the urban poet is love – not at first sight, but 
at last sight. It is an eternal farewell which coincides in the poem with the 
moment of enchantment. (Es ist ein Abschied für ewig, der im Gedicht mit 
dem Augenblick der Berückung zusammenfällt).487
486 Trans. Geoffrey Wagner.
487 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, in: Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, 
trans. Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, New York 1968, p. 168.
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If we strip away from Baudelaire’s definition of the modern era the 
Christian connotations of “ephemerality” and cleave purely to this 
image of a brief encounter, we are in the midst of what is termed 
postmodern philosophy, a transformed discourse in which emphasis 
is placed on the asymmetrical relationship with the other (Levinas), 
the relationship with unrealised justice (Derrida), i.e. a relationship 
respecting difference, the movement of difference as the meaning 
of temporality. There is nothing that would be compatible with the 
certainty and evidence according to the rules of a cognitive, identify-
ing discourse, a relationship heterogeneous in respect of the logic of 
consciousness, intentionality and representation. This is associated 
with the fact that in a privileged way appearance is not showing in 
the sense of Husserlian phenomenology, but withdrawal (Entzug) in 
the sense that Dieter Mersch uses this word, where withdrawal or 
escape (Entziehen) he characterises (with the aid of “bracketing”) 
as an event: “(It) shows (itself) – (it) offers (itself) as a ‘gift’ of origi-
nal otherness”. Mersch goes on to remind us that “perception (...) 
is not cognition, differentiation, designation or representation, but 
above all answering.”488 
Thinking after the Holocaust discovers traces of another project 
of modernism in modernism itself. It discovers the very phenom-
enon of the trace, the trace as phenomenon. However, the trace is 
no longer a fleeting encounter with a promise of happiness, but the 
ash of the concentration camps: dein aschenes Haar Sulamith, “your 
ashen hair Sulamith.” 
 
488 Dieter Mersch, Ereignis und Aura. Untersuchungen zu einer Ästhetik des Performativen. Suhr-
kamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2002, pp. 50 and 46.
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The Holocaust is an unimaginable and unrepresentable event. Yes, if 
the philosophical discourse, part of which is a phenomenology con-
sisting of intuition, is not transformed in such a way that, in addition 
to intuition, it respects another method of showing, i.e. glimpsing.
In the summer of 1944, the Polish resistance smuggled a camera 
into Auschwitz intended for members of the Sonderkommando, i.e. 
those prisoners whose job was to service the crematorium, look af-
ter the operations of the gas chambers, and liquidate any trace of 
the Holocaust. They knew that as witnesses they stood no chance of 
surviving. When new members took the place of old, their first job 
was to bury the bodies of their shot predecessors. Those who knew 
what was taking place in the camp tried to preserve their testimony, 
and since escape was out of the question, they buried their jour-
nals, reports and other documents they had gathered in the ground. 
Shortly after the liberation of the camp the manuscripts of three of 
them (Haïm Herman, Zelman Gradowski and Leib Langfus) were 
discovered, and later of another two (Salmen Lewental in 1961 and 
1962 and Marcel Nadsari in October 1980.)489 As soon as they ob-
tained a camera, they availed themselves of the fact that the roof of 
one of the crematoria was being repaired and managed to take four 
photos of it. They shot the liquidation of corpses and the path of 
prisoners to the gas chamber from the alley between the buildings. 
As Didi-Huberman says, these photos are more rare than all possible 
artworks, because they were taken in a world that was attempting 
to make them impossible.490 However, in this case we must correct 
the claim of unimaginability, all the more so since calling this event 
489 An edition of these “Auschwitz Scrolls” was published in Revue d’histoire de la Shoah. Le monde 
juif in a special issue “Des voix sous les cendres. Manuscrits des Sonderkommando d’Auschwitz”, 
(no. 171, 2001) care of P. Mesnard and C. Saletti.
490 Georges Didi-Huberman, Images in Spite of All, trans. Shane B. Lillis, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 2012, p. 20.
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unrespresentable and inexplicable risks shifting it into the realm of 
mystical adoration. In addition, even a non-problematising under-
standing of the image needs correcting too.  
 
Photography, from this angle, shows a particular ability – illustrated by cer-
tain well-or lesser-known examples – to curb the fiercest will to obliterate. 
(...) A single look at this remnant of images, or erratic corpus of images in 
spite of all, is enough to sense that Auschwitz can no longer be spoken of in 
those absolute terms – generally well intentioned, apparently philosophical, 
but actually lazy – “unsayable” and “unimaginable”. The four photographs 
taken in August 1944 by the members of the Sonderkommando address 
the unimaginable with which the Shoah is so often credited today – and 
this is the second period of the unimaginable: tragically, the Shoah refutes 
it. Auschwitz has been called unthinkable. But Hannah Arendt has shown 
that it is precisely where thought falters that we ought to persist in our 
thought or, rather, give it a new turn. So, if we say that Auschwitz exceeds 
any existing juridical thought, any notion of fault or of justice, then political 
science and law must be rethought entirely. And if we believe that Aus-
chwitz exceeds all existing political thought, even anthropology, then we 
must rethink the very foundations of the human sciences as such.491
 
The book Images in Spite of All by Georges Didi-Huberman, which 
is devoted to these four photographs, inevitably broadens out into 
a  consideration of the relationship between image and imagina-
tion, image and text, image and archive. The starting point is the 
proposition that there is no one image, no image is complete, or as 
Godard might say: though there are two images here, there is al-
ready a third. The images change. If they encounter other images or 
texts, each can be the commencement of many such series in which 
they intensify. This encounter is the work of the imagination. If we 
want to know, we must imagine. Knowledge consists of assembly, 
491 Ibid., p. 23 and 25.
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i.e. an operation evoking resonance and difference. A  dimension 
of time other than chronology corresponds to assembly, a different 
dimension in which the contemporaneity of the non-contemporary 
predominates, i.e. Walter Benjamin’s Jetzt-Zeit, in which every mo-
ment may become filled if it encounters something past that expects 
it. The singularity of the unique is preserved in this time because 
the aim of the assembly is not the overlapping coverage of elements, 
eliminating the difference between the similar, but a constellation 
of conflicts. That which remains flashes in the resulting interstices, 
gaps or differences. This in spite of an impossibility that is unpro-
nounceable, unimaginable, unrepresentable. The relationship to the 
non-identical via irreducible difference. Showing despite its impos-
sibility. 
 
The very existence and the possibility of such testimony – its enunciation 
in spite of all – refute the grand idea, the closed notion, of an unsayable 
Auschwitz. It is to the very core of speech that testimony invites us, compel-
ling us to work there. It is harsh work, since what it concerns is a descrip-
tion of death at work, with the inarticulate cries and the silences that are 
implied.492
 
As tragic experience the unrepresentable requires its antithesis, i.e. 
an act in which we represent it in spite of all. This is why the Nazis 
wanted their crime to be unrepresentable. This is why the members 
of the Sonderkommando decided to take these four photographs of 
extermination. And this is why, though the words of the witnesses 
paralyse our ability to image what they depict, in spite of all we must 
attempt to understand better what their testimony is saying.  
 
In his essay Glimpses/Aperçues Didi-Huberman then suggests 
how to understand this method of appearing in interstices: the thing 
492 Ibid., p. 25.
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that appears before it disappears leaves something like the trace of 
a question, memory or desire. To glimpse means to look in passing. 
He reminds us of Baudelaire’s sonnet To a Passerby and concludes 
with a quote from a book by Anne-Lise Stern, who survived Aus-
chwitz and incorporated this experience into her psychoanalytical 
practice: 
 
The other memory: also on the way back from work, an uncovered truck 
crosses our path, filled with more or less naked men, already reduced to 
nothing. The eyes of one of those men met mine. We were still fresh, our 
convoy had not quite all been shaved. He still had a fine look in his eyes. 
The look of a man who knew that he was looking at a woman for the last 
time in his life. We stayed looking into each other’s eye for as long as pos-
sible, holding each other’s gaze. Then the truck disappeared into the birch 
wood, in the direction of crematorium.493
 
493 Anne-Lise Stern, Le Savoir-déporté. Camps, histoire, psychanalyse, Seuil, Paris 2004, p. 38, 
quoted in: Georges Didi-Huberman, “Glimpses. Between Appearance and Disappearance”, Zeitschrift 
für Medien- und Kulturforschung, 7/1/2016, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2016, p. 124.
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Auschwitz did not take place so that elegant philosophical treatises 
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